Classification
Historical Background
Origins and context
Since 1982, the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) has pursued Casamance’s independence in West Africa’s oldest armed conflict. The conflict reflects Casamance’s distinct geography, resources, ethnic diversity, perceived marginalization and separatist claims.
Deterioration of the situation
The MFDC created its armed wing, Atika, in the mid-1980s, and armed operations escalated from 1990. Guerrilla warfare peaked in the 1990s, with Senegal combining military, political and diplomatic responses. Despite several ceasefires, sporadic and sometimes severe violence continued, causing significant displacement.
First wave of splintering within the MFDC
Early ceasefires increased internal divisions between ‘Front Nord’ and ‘Front Sud’, and later created further splits within ‘Front Sud’ between moderate factions and hardliners led by Sadio.
Regional spill-over and subsequent improvement of the security situation after Abdoulaye Wade’s election
The conflict spread into Guinea-Bissau during the late 1990s, where MFDC elements became involved in internal fighting following General Mané’s coup against the Guinean president. Abdoulaye Wade’s election in Senegal led to renewed peace efforts and a 2004 agreement, improving security without achieving lasting peace.
Second wave of splintering of the MFDC
Following the death of MFDC leader Abbé Diamacoune Senghor, the organisation split into multiple factions, each with its own leadership: Diakaye’s, Badiate’s, and Sadio’s factions.
Macky Sall’s election and amelioration of the situation in Casamance
Newly elected Senegalese president Macky Sall pursued development policies and engaged in mediation and negotiations. A 2023 agreement with Diakaye’s faction led to disarmament among former fighters.
Humanitarian impact of the conflict
The conflict remained relatively low in intensity but caused thousands of deaths, large-scale displacement and refugee flows, landmine contamination, and abuses by both the Senegalese army and the MFDC.
Key Developments (2023–2026)
The reporting period saw several major developments:
- Protests in Dakar and Ziguinchor following Ousmane Sonko’s arrest: In June 2023, protests erupted in Dakar and Ziguinchor following the arrest of Ousmane Sonko, opposition leader and Mayor of Ziguinchor, after his conviction for corruption of youth. Demonstrations continued over subsequent months and were violently repressed by Senegalese security forces, causing multiple deaths and injuries.
- Presidential elections in March 2024: Despite former President Macky Sall’s attempts to limit opposition and postpone the presidential election, which led to widespread protests violently suppressed, the poll was held peacefully on 24 March 2024. Bassirou Diomaye Faye, an opposition candidate released from prison shortly before the vote, won the election and became Senegal’s youngest president. He appointed Ousmane Sonko as prime minister.
- Peace agreement signed between Senegal and the MFDC Badiate’s faction: In February 2025, Senegal signed a peace agreement with Cesar Atoute Badiate’s MFDC faction, following earlier commitments on disarmament. The agreement included presidential pardon, amnesty, reintegration and local investment measures, but Salif Sadio’s powerful faction remained outside the agreement.
- Implementation of the Diomaye Plan for Casamance: The new government introduced a development plan for Casamance focused on local governance structures, economic revitalization, demining and support for small and medium-sized enterprises.
- Departure of French troops from Senegal: President Faye requested the withdrawal of French troops, invoking sovereignty. France handed over its last military sites in July 2025, ending its permanent military presence while maintaining possible training, intelligence and targeted military support.
Non-International Armed Conflict
Senegal vs MDFC
The NIAC between Senegal and the MFDC continued despite peace agreements with the Diakaye’s faction in 2023 and the Badiate’s faction in 2025. Salif Sadio’s faction remained outside these agreements and continued to oppose the Senegalese government. The intensity threshold was previously met through armed confrontations, ambushes, mines and improvised explosive devices, casualties, kidnapping, looting, military operations and displacement. However, reported violence remained limited between 2023 and 2025, followed by a temporary surge in early 2026 and no further reported clashes after March 2026.
The broader decrease in violence, effective implementation of peace agreements and stabilization efforts indicate that the intensity threshold was no longer met by May 2026 at the latest. The organization requirement remained satisfied, as the MFDC retained political and military wings, a provisional committee, factional leadership, financing through illicit activities, access to arms and operational tactics. Accordingly, by May 2026 at the latest, the NIAC between Senegal and the MFDC has ended
Parties to the Conflict
State Parties
- Senegal
Non-State Parties
- Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC)