Historical Background
Origins and context
Togo is a Sahelian coastal State on West Africa’s Atlantic coast with a population of roughly 8.5 million. Since independence in 1960, its political history has included military coups and long-standing executive rule supported by the armed forces.
Regional setting
Togo borders Burkina Faso and Benin, both affected by ongoing non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) in which Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal – Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) compete for territorial influence. The W-Arly-Pendjari (WAP) complex, a protected national park, spread across several neighbouring States and bordering Togo, has allegedly been used as an operational base and a corridor for illicit activity by armed groups.
JNIM activity
JNIM, the Sahel branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), has expanded operations into Togo. Initial incursions in November 2021 in the north prompted the deployment of Togolese security forces, and were followed by coordinated attacks against military outposts causing fatalities, injuries, and property destruction. Subsequent years saw a sustained pattern of attacks with increasing civilian and military harm and operations extending beyond the immediate border zone. This trend is considered as strategic expansion rather than mere spill-over from neighbouring conflicts.
ISSP involvement allegations
Togo has suggested that ISSP contributed to some attacks, but without publicly substantiated evidence, leaving uncertain whether ISSP conducts hostilities in Togo beyond occasional spill-over from the conflict in Burkina Faso.
Key Developments (2023–2025)
During the reporting period, the situation saw several major developments:
- The formation of and security efforts by the Confederation of Sahel States: During the period under review, Togo received training from the Confederation of Sahel States, an alliance formed by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger after their departure from ECOWAS and anchored in the Liptako Gourma Charter. The Confederation also pursued external security partnerships, including engagement with the Russian Federation. Togo repeatedly signalled interest in closer alignment and took part in joint exercises organized by the Confederation, yet remained within ECOWAS by the end of the reporting period.
- Constitutional reform from a presidential to a parliamentary system of government and public reaction: Successive constitutional amendments shifted Togo from a presidential to a parliamentary system and facilitated the continuation of President Faure Gnassingbé’s tenure. The reforms, perceived domestically as enabling indefinite rule, triggered violent protests that were met with excessive use of force, a significant number of arrests, and military deployments in some areas.
- Extension of state of emergency and information controls: The National Assembly prolonged the security emergency in the northern Savanes region to try and sustain expanded action against armed groups. In parallel, the authorities intensified information controls on the northern security situation, including limiting reporting on attacks and losses, the temporary suspension of international broadcasters, and recourse to social media blackouts.
Non-International Armed Conflict
Togo vs JNIM
During the period under review, Togo faced both spillover from neighbouring NIACs and an increased tempo of JNIM attacks on its territory, which evolved beyond border-limited incidents and reflected a broader strategic expansion. Although the confrontation is under-reported due to limited official communication and an information lockdown, recurring military operations against Togolese forces were reported, including ambushes on convoys and assaults on bases and patrols. In 2025, the confrontation escalated, combining drone use with cross-border ground incursions. Taken together, these elements indicate that the violence was not sporadic or isolated. The reported rise in casualties, sustained troop deployments in the north, and growing internal displacement further support the conclusion that the intensity threshold required for a NIAC was met. JNIM’s organization is evidenced by a tiered command structure, identifiable senior leadership and deputies, regionally distributed subgroups operating with some flexibility, internal disciplinary mechanisms through a consultative council, training capacity, and a logistics network enabling access to weapons and resources across the central Sahel and littoral States. On this basis, the situation between Togo and JNIM during the reporting period is classified as a NIAC.
Parties to the Conflict
State Party
- Togo
Non-State Parties
- Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)