Non-international armed conflict in Benin

Historical Background

Regional context

Benin is a coastal State in West Africa’s Sahelian security environment, a region marked by recurrent non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) and violent extremist activity. Two dominant non-State actors, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal – Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), compete for territory and influence in the region, with indications that both are gaining ground against the authorities.

Cross-border dynamics

Benin borders States which have been badly affected by ongoing NIACs, notably Nigeria to the east and Burkina Faso and Niger to the north. The concentration of violence in borderlands increases the likelihood of spillover, and Benin’s position as a coastal corridor creates logistical opportunities for illicit flows of weapons and goods. The country has faced systematic infiltration by armed actors based in neighbouring States, alongside a reported rise in violent cross-border activity in northern Benin during the first half of 2025.

Security trajectory and armed actor expansion

After a long period of relative stability, extremist violence emerged from 2019 and became more recurrent, including attacks against security forces in the northern border area that facilitated armed actor movement across Atacora and Alibori. From 2021 onward, JNIM expanded and sought a consolidated foothold in northern Benin, with presence extending to areas around the Benin-Niger border and contributing to the closure of northern national parks. The period under review suggests a marked growth in JNIM operations and an increased interest by ISSP in northern Benin, with most reported attacks attributed to JNIM.

Key Developments (2023–2025)

During the reporting period, the situation saw several major developments:

1. Likely increase in ISSP activity: Available reports suggest that, from early 2024, ISSP has sought to expand into the Sahel’s littoral borderlands, including Benin, in line with Islamic State’s objective of consolidating a caliphate in Africa. Its reported, but unconfirmed, southern expansion appears intended to leverage Benin’s coastline to activate smuggling and trade routes and, potentially, facilitate the movement of weapons and munitions supplying operations in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria. During the reporting period, ISSP activity along Benin’s borders has been characterized as covert and under-reported. Accordingly, while the organization criterion is met, the related violence remains sporadic and, for the moment, does not reach the requisite intensity threshold.

2. Operation Mirador: Following a JNIM attack against a military post near the Burkina Faso border, Benin launched Operation Mirador to secure its northern frontier, reinforced through additional recruitment and deployment. In early January 2025, JNIM struck an Operation Mirador base, causing significant casualties and prompting government’s review of the underlying security approach.

3. Breakdown in military cooperation with Niger: A bilateral security arrangement with Niger collapsed after the unconstitutional change of government in Niger. Military cooperation ended amid allegations that Benin hosted troops deployed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to intervene against the junta in Niger. Relations remained fragile through 2025, with mutual accusations, border closure by Niger, and Benin’s denial of hosting a French base in Alibori.

4. Governance, external support and climate crises fueling conflict: A thwarted coup attempt against Benin’s president in 2024 led to indictments and lengthy prison sentences amid fair trial concerns. The United States offered training and concluded a bilateral support agreement in early 2025. Institutional reforms ahead of the 2026 elections include the creation of a Senate and extension of the presidential term. Climate-related pressure on agricultural land is identified as a potential driver of conflict.