Since independence in 1960, Burkina Faso has experienced recurrent coups, authoritarian or military rule and institutional weakening, with gold resources fuelling conflict. Jihadist violence expanded from 2015, interacting with regional insecurity and leading to unprecedented levels of civilian harm between 2023 and 2025, as Jama’at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP), on the one hand, and State forces with the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), on the other hand, contested territory and were implicated in serious abuses. Successive coups in 2022 brought a military junta that suspended the constitution, extended the transition to 2029 and intensified repression, media controls and forced conscription. Armed groups, notably JNIM, now control large portions of the territory, more than two million people are internally displaced, and food insecurity is acute. Internationally, relations with France deteriorated while cooperation with Russia, including deployment of Africa Corps and creation of the Alliance of Sahel States with Mali and Niger, reshaped security partnerships and regional alignments.
Classifications and Parties to the Conflicts
- Non-international armed conflict between Burkina Faso (supported by Africa Corps and, in certain instances, by VDP units) and Jama’at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)
- Non-international armed conflict between Burkina Faso (supported by Africa Corps) and Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP)
Hostilities between Burkina Faso’s armed forces and VDP on one side and JNIM and ISSP on the other severely affected civilians, with deliberate and indiscriminate attacks, ethnically targeted massacres, widespread reprisals, and terror tactics, particularly against Fulani and other communities seen as disloyal. Medical personnel and facilities, humanitarian workers and civilian infrastructure, including homes, shops, schools and health centres, were repeatedly attacked, while extensive use of improvised explosive devices (IED), sieges and movement restrictions impeded relief and contributed to acute food insecurity. Millions were forcibly displaced amid killings, abductions, sexual violence and child recruitment. State forces were also implicated in arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearance, forced requisition to the military, pillage and grave mistreatment of the dead, alongside intimidation and disappearance of journalists and activists, amounting to serious violations of IHL and possible war crimes.
Historical Background
Origins
Since independence in 1960, Burkina Faso has experienced repeated coups, constitutional suspensions, and prolonged authoritarian or military rule. These cycles of instability are linked to colonial-era exploitation and post-independence governance failures that weakened institutions. The presence of gold deposits has further fuelled conflict by providing revenue streams for militant groups.
Political instability and security deterioration
A long succession of coups culminated in the 2014 popular uprising that ousted Blaise Compaoré after he attempted to amend the constitution to extend his rule. The subsequent transition was quickly overshadowed by escalating jihadist violence from 2015, facilitated by Burkina Faso’s location near Mali, Niger, and the West African coast. A 2016 attack in Ouagadougou marked a deepening security crisis, and mass protests against insecurity erupted in 2021.
Recent coups and transitional governance
In January 2022, President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré was overthrown by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba, who was himself removed in September 2022 by Captain Ibrahim Traoré amid persistent insurgent violence and disputes over ties with French counterterrorism forces. Traoré’s junta suspended the constitution, dissolved the legislature, prioritized security over elections, and later extended military rule to July 2029, alongside intensified repression and media restrictions.
Humanitarian and territorial impacts
By 2025, over two million people were internally displaced, and tens of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from Mali, were present. Armed groups controlled roughly 40 per cent of the territory, humanitarian access was restricted, and conflict-driven inflation and declining agricultural production worsened food insecurity, with millions facing severe shortages.
Key Developments (2023–2025)
The reporting period saw several major developments:
- Increasing levels of civilian harm due to conflict and insecurity: From mid-2023, civilians were caught between jihadist violence and counterinsurgency operations, including attacks on persons suspected of collaborating with the State and allegations of abuses by government forces and the VDP (‘Volontaires pour la défense de la Patrie’) against Fulani communities. Several massacres and large-scale attacks, including attempts to seize towns, as well as lethal drone strikes were recorded. In 2024, violence reached an unprecedented level since the beginning of insurgency in 2015, with coordinated nationwide attacks by insurgents and further allegations of large-scale massacres by State forces and auxiliaries. In early 2025, sustained attacks continued across multiple regions, with renewed allegations of massacres and further civilian killings, followed by a relative lull in June.
- Human rights and humanitarian developments: From the second half of 2023, the authorities tightened control over civic space through media suspensions, harassment, and forced conscription, alongside a major dengue epidemic. In 2024 and 2025, repression deepened through arbitrary arrests, intimidation, broadcaster bans, and measures further constraining expression and association, amid sustained pressure on unions and civil society.
- Governance and political developments: Across 2023 to mid-2025, upon allegations of repeated attempted coups, the authorities consolidated power through purges, reshuffles, coup-related arrests, fiscal reforms, and cabinet dissolution and replacement, while pursuing mining nationalisation and facing investor withdrawal.
- Developments in international relations: From late 2023, relations with France deteriorated amid diplomatic expulsions and arrests, while ties with Russia deepened. In 2024 and 2025, Burkina Faso confirmed withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), expanded cooperation with Russia, and faced heightened regional tensions, including disputes involving Côte d’Ivoire and Algeria, alongside new mining arrangements with a Russian firm and high-level external visits.
- Creation of the ‘Alliance of Sahel States’ (AES) between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger: Between 2023 and 2025, the three States created the AES, advanced integration projects, exited regional security frameworks (G5 Sahel), held joint exercises and summits, introduced a common biometric passport, established a unified force, and conducted a joint operation in the tri-border area.
- A rebranded support force: the Russian Federation’s Africa Corps: Africa Corps deployed to Burkina Faso from early 2024 for security and training. Since its rebranding in late 2023, Africa Corps has qualified as Russian State agents.
- Increasingly frequent and diverse VDP activity: The VDP, created by a 2020 law as auxiliaries to the armed forces, operate sometimes under State command and sometimes more autonomously. Given their diverse roles, VDP members may be considered as forming part of militia belonging to Burkina Faso when offensively engaged. At other times, when acting in personal self-defence or to defend their communities from unlawful attacks, they remain civilians who cannot be attacked.
Non-International Armed Conflicts
Burkina Faso vs JNIM
Since 2017, JNIM has operated in Burkina Faso as a merged of four established groups – Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Sahara Emirate, Al-Murabitun, Ansar Dine, and Katiba Macina – incorporating Ansarul Islam as its Burkinabe wing. Its growing influence has been reflected in a marked increase in lethality. Hostilities between JNIM and Burkina Faso’s armed forces, including alongside VDP auxiliaries, were frequent throughout the reporting period and characterized by recurrent large-scale offensives, attacks on military positions, and significant civilian harm, with violence described as making Burkina Faso a focal point of extremist attacks in the Sahel. JNIM’s operational profile includes planned and sustained attacks, the use of military-grade weapons, opportunistic capture of arms from State forces, increasing reliance on improvised explosive devices, and reported adaptation of quadcopter drones to deliver explosives, alongside extensive displacement. Territorial control remains contested, yet external reporting indicates large areas fall outside effective military control, enabling JNIM to plan persistent operations and meeting the territorial control element associated with Additional Protocol II. Organizationally, JNIM displays a structured hierarchy with central, regional and local commanders, consultative and disciplinary bodies, cross-regional reinforcement, training capacity, logistical networks, and resource mobilisation through taxation, looting and illicit economies. These combined features satisfy the intensity and organization criteria and fulfil Additional Protocol II thresholds, supporting the existence of an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC between Burkina Faso and JNIM.
Burkina Faso vs ISSP
ISSP operates predominantly in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, particularly in the Liptako-Gourma border region. Formerly known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, it emerged in 2015 following a split within Al-Mourabitoun and an allegiance pledge to Islamic State. ISSP was linked to ISWAP between 2019 and 2022, and has been treated as an autonomous province since 2022, with its first attacks in Burkina Faso reported in 2016. During the reporting period, ISSP was less active in Burkina Faso than in Mali and Niger and largely confined to the northern Sahel Province, with its presence constrained by the dominance of JNIM, Burkinabe forces, and VDP auxiliaries. Nevertheless, attributed incidents remained lethal, including attacks on civilians and military convoys, while further operations occurred near the Burkinabe border. ISSP employs IEDs, including vehicle-borne devices, mortars, small arms, and ambush tactics, and its activities possibly contribute to displacement. Although engagements with the Burkinabe Armed Forces were infrequent, they remained deadly, and the intensity threshold under IHL continued to be met. Organizationally, ISSP displays a consolidated chain of command, a central council with specialized offices, a regional and zonal structure, disciplinary mechanisms, logistical hubs and supply corridors, and the capacity to plan and coordinate operations. These features satisfy the requirements for a NIAC, while its limited territorial reach in Burkina Faso does not meet the threshold for an Additional Protocol II-type conflict.
Key Parties to the Conflict(s)
State Parties
- Burkina Faso
Non-State Parties
- Jama’at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)
- Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)
Other Main Actors
Other Non-State Actors Involved:
- Several independent self-defence groups
- Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDPs)
Regional Organizations and Alliances:
- Joint Force of the Group of Five of the Sahel (G5 Sahel: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad) [Burkina Faso withdrew in December 2023; G5 was then dissolved]
- Alliance of Sahel States (AES: Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso)
Foreign Involvement:
- Africa Corps (Russia)
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
Hostilities between Burkina Faso’s armed forces and the Volunteers for Defence of the Homeland (VDPs) on the one hand, and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP) on the other, were marked by persistent attacks on civilians, including deliberate targeting, indiscriminate violence, and reprisals, with Fulani communities repeatedly singled out and armed groups also attacking communities viewed as aligned with the State. Medical personnel were attacked and killed by both State and non-State actors, amid wider intimidation of humanitarian workers. Use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remained a major driver of civilian harm and impeded humanitarian access. Armed groups also restricted humanitarian relief through sieges and isolation tactics that contributed to acute food insecurity. Displacement reached very high levels, with civilians fleeing violence, coercion, and deprivation.
- Attacks against Civilians
- Attacks against Medical Personnel
- Weapons
- Sieges and Starvation
- Forced Displacement
- Humanitarian Relief
Burkina Faso saw persistent attacks on civilians in hostilities opposing State forces to JNIM and the ISSP. Civilian deaths have risen over recent years, with the greatest harm occurring in the NIAC between Burkina Faso and JNIM, and many incidents involved deliberate targeting of civilians by parties to both armed conflicts. Burkina Faso’s armed forces and associated VDP fighters conducted counterterrorism operations that are said to have been marked by indiscriminate violence and widespread reprisals against communities suspected of collaborating with non-State armed groups, with Fulani repeatedly singled out. JNIM likewise attacked communities it perceived as aligned with government forces. Large-scale killings carried out as reprisals and seemingly intended to terrorize civilians amount to acts of violence whose primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population, which are serious violations of IHL and possible war crimes.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
Attacks on civilian infrastructure in Burkina Faso were reported as recurrent, with homes and shops frequently shot at and burned down in efforts to extend territorial control. Violence also severely affected education, as schools were repeatedly attacked, which contributed to widespread closures. Medical units were similarly impacted, with health facilities and activities regularly attacked across several regions, particularly in the Est and Sahel, most often involving JNIM targeting health infrastructure and contributing to the suspension of humanitarian medical operations and reduced access to healthcare.
Attacks on Homes and Shops
Under customary IHL, attacks may only be directed against military objectives and must not be directed against civilian objects. In efforts to extend its control across the country, JNIM in particular has devastated civilian infrastructure, frequently firing on or burning down homes and shops.
VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY
In Burkina Faso, killings and massacres of civilians by JNIM, the ISSP, and governmental forces operating alongside the VDP were reported as pervasive, including reprisals and targeting of communities deemed disloyal. Governmental forces were also linked to arbitrary detention, torture or other ill-treatment, enforced disappearances, and deaths in custody, alongside forced recruitment through enforced requisition to the military. Pillage and unlawful destruction of civilian property were documented as recurrent and attributed to JNIM and the VDP. Sexual violence and abductions affected women and girls, while children faced killing, sexual violence, abduction, and ongoing recruitment. Mistreatment of the dead and repression of journalists and activists was also alleged.
- Murder
- Torture
- Arbitrary Detention
- Enforced Disappearances
- Looting and pillage
- Forced Recruitment
- Sexual Violence
- Protection of Children
- Treatment of the Dead
- Protection of Journalists
Murder of Civilians
In Burkina Faso, killings and massacres of civilians have been pervasive, feeding a cycle of retaliatory violence between JNIM, the ISSP, and State actors. In particular, State security forces operating alongside VDP members were implicated in massacres of ethnic Fulani in and around Solenzo, with a recurring pattern of entering Fulani villages after fighting, accusing inhabitants of complicity, rounding up men and summarily executing them. JNIM also carried out deliberate killings of civilians perceived as linked to the government or its security forces, including a church attack in Sanaba where men were restrained and their throats cut, with other targeted shootings framed as revenge for alleged denunciations. Video footage further shows JNIM using lists of names, largely ethnic Tamboura in Djibo, to identify civilians it deemed disloyal. Verified footage from Solenzo also depicts VDP violence against men and women and threats to execute a wounded woman in front of her child. Moreover, JNIM often instructed civilians not to cultivate tall-growing crops such as millet or corn, which it said hinder operations, and those who did not comply feared they would be murdered.
Death in Detention
The reporting period raised concerns about deaths in detention in Burkina Faso, against a backdrop of unlawful deprivation of liberty and inhuman or degrading treatment attributed to governmental forces. Civilians were reportedly arrested on accusations of affiliation with armed groups. Civil society actors, journalists, and magistrates were also subjected to arbitrary arrest and coercive measures, with the fate of many detainees remaining unknown at the time of writing. IHL requires humane treatment and access to medical care for detainees, and the unlawful killing of a person in custody is likely to constitute a war crime.