The armed conflicts in Colombia originate from the 1960s, when Marxist guerrillas formed in response to unequal land distribution, later fuelled by the illicit drug economy and the emergence of right-wing paramilitaries. Despite the 2016 peace agreement with FARC-EP and the conclusion of temporary ceasefires with various armed groups under President Petro’s “Total Peace” policy, no long-term agreements have been concluded, and violence has intensified since mid-2024. A first group of armed conflicts (which satisfy the requirements for the application of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions) involve the Colombian National Army and multiple non-state armed groups, including the ELN, EGC, EMC and CDF; a second group of armed conflicts oppose these and other armed groups over territorial control and drug trafficking routes. Fragmentation of armed actors has multiplied factions, with ELN, EMC and SM experiencing splits during the reporting period. Internal displacement rose sharply, reaching 7.3 million people by the end of 2024.
Classification(s) and Parties to the Conflict(s)
- NIAC between Colombia and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
- NIAC between Colombia and Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia)
- NIAC between Colombia and Estado Mayor Central (EMC)
- NIAC between Colombia and Comandos de la Frontera (CDF)
- NIAC between ELN and EGC
- NIAC between ELN and Frente 33 of Estado Mayor de los Bloques y el Frente (EMBF)
- NIAC between EMC and Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez
- NIAC between EMC and EGC
- NIAC between EMC and ELN
- NIAC between EMC and Segunda Marquetalia (SM)
Other Actors
- Comuneros del Sur
- Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)
Civilians were repeatedly subjected to or affected by attacks during the reporting period. Anti-personnel mines improvised by multiple armed groups caused a sharp rise in casualties through 2024 and 2025, with many civilian victims and a growing proportion of children. Armed drones were widely used to drop explosives, conduct surveillance and enforce confinement, raising serious concerns under distinction, proportionality and precautions. Reports indicate growing recourse to human shields and confinement, preventing departures and access to basic necessities. Forced displacement remained the principal driver of humanitarian emergencies, disproportionately affecting Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities. Civilian infrastructure, particularly schools and hospitals, was frequently damaged and at times deliberately targeted. Violence against civilians persisted, with murders of human rights defenders, especially Indigenous and community leaders, environmental defenders and former FARC-EP fighters. Child recruitment increased in 2024, involving hundreds of children recruited mainly by FARC-EP dissidents and also by the ELN and EGC. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and hostage taking (known as secuestros) persisted, enforced disappearances rose, forced labour in resocialization camps was reported, and conflict-related sexual violence increased amid under-reporting.
Historical Background
The armed conflicts in Colombia find their roots in the 1960s, when campesino and student Marxist guerrillas reacted to unequal land distribution and to ownership policies favouring large landowners, agribusiness and mining companies. Following a decade of political violence known as ‘La Violencia’ (1948-1958), the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) were formed. Subsequent landowner mobilization in the 1980s fostered right-wing paramilitaries, notably the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Guerrilla groups relied on violence, abduction and extortion, while the illicit drug economy became a central driver that enriched multiple armed actors and intensified territorial competition. In the early 2000s, President Uribe’s firm security policy reduced criminality and coincided with the AUC’s disarmament, amid allegations against the government of human rights violations and ties to paramilitary groups. Under President Santos, peace negotiations culminated in a 2016 ceasefire with the FARC-EP, leading to demobilization, guaranteed political participation, UN verification, and the establishment of a transitional justice system. Despite the agreement, dissident factions emerged, large-scale protests unfolded, and conflict-related violence continued, especially since 2021. President Petro’s ‘Paz Total’ (‘Total Peace’) policy renewed talks and temporary ceasefires with different armed groups, but substantive agreements remain absent, and violence has risen since mid-2024.
Key Developments (2023–2025)
The reporting period saw several major developments:
- Escalating tension in Catatumbo: ELN’s longstanding control in this coca-growing region was recently challenged by the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y el Frente (EMBF)’s Frente 33, prompting in January 2025 a coordinated ELN offensive that caused significant civilian harm, widespread confinement and large-scale displacement. In response, Colombia and Venezuela announced a joint anti-narcotics military operation in the region.
- Operación Perseo: as part of the so-called ‘Misión Cauca’, the Colombian Army launched ‘Operación Perseo’ in October 2024 to retake El Plateado in southern Cauca, an Estado Mayor Central (EMC) stronghold in an area with a significant EMC and ELN presence, aiming to reassert state control and disrupt cocaine production and trafficking.
- Ceasefires and the total peace process: under the ‘Total Peace’ framework inaugurated by President Petro, temporary bilateral ceasefires with the ELN, EMC, EMBF (a splinter group of EMC), Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada (ACSN), Segunda Marquetalia (SM) and Comuneros del Sur (a splinter group of ELN) were negotiated, and, at various points, concluded, extended, suspended or expired. While these initiatives made progress with Comuneros del Sur and the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB, a splinter group of SM), no substantive agreement has been concluded with other groups, and violence has intensified.
- Fragmentation of armed actors: splits within ELN, EMC and SM multiplied factions, while other major groups remained comparatively intact.
- Assassination attempt, series of bombing and State response: following an attempted assassination of a presidential candidate in Bogotá on 10 June 2025, EMC carried out coordinated attacks across Cauca and Valle del Cauca, including in the city of Cali, using explosives, firearms and drones against police targets, causing police and civilian casualties. In response, security forces launched several operations against the EMC in the region.
- Increased displacement: at the end of 2024, internal displacement rose sharply, with 7.3 million internally displaced people reported, driven by conflicts and drug related violence.
Non-International Armed Conflicts
Colombia vs the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
Colombia vs the Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC)
Colombia vs the Estado Mayor Central (EMC)
Colombia vs the Comandos de la Frontera (CDF)
The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) vs the Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC)
The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) vs the Frente 33 of the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y el Frente (EMBF)
The Estado Mayor Central (EMC) vs the Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez
The Estado Mayor Central (EMC) vs the Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC)
The Estado Mayor Central (EMC) vs the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
The Estado Mayor Central (EMC) vs the Segunda Marquetalia (SM)
Key Parties to the Conflict
State Parties
- Colombia
Non-state parties
- Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
- Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC))
- Estado Mayor de los Bloques y el Frente (EMBF)
- Comandos de la Frontera (CDF)
- Estado Mayor Central (EMC)
- Segunda Marquetalia (SM)
- Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez (Frente 57)
Other Main Actors
Non-State Actors
- Comuneros del Sur
- Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
Civilians were repeatedly subjected to or affected by attacks during the reporting period. Anti-personnel mines improvised by multiple groups caused a sharp rise in casualties through 2024 and 2025. Armed drones were widely used to drop explosives, conduct surveillance and enforce confinement, raising serious concerns under distinction, proportionality and precautions. Reports also describe growing recourse to human shields and confinement, preventing departures and access to basic necessities and exposing civilians, including children, to harm and recruitment. Forced displacement remained the principal driver of humanitarian emergencies, and humanitarian access was repeatedly curtailed or denied by armed groups.
Use of anti-personnel mines
Colombia remains among the countries with the highest toll from anti-personnel mines, which are improvised by multiple armed groups. The toll rose sharply in 2024 and continued into 2025, with many civilian victims and a growing proportion of children casualties. These data indicate that considerable use has been indiscriminate. Mines severely restrict freedom of civilian movement and access to essential services, and their effects endure long after hostilities, displacing or confining communities and undermining food security. Explosive ordnance affected numerous departments in Colombia, with the Pacific region most impacted, and spread to new areas for the first time in years. As territorial control remains a key objective, mine use is expected to persist, including by groups newly employing mines to secure strategic corridors.
Use of armed drones
During the reporting period, armed groups widely used drones to drop explosive munitions, for surveillance and reconnaissance, and to enforce civilian confinement. The increased use of armed drones by armed groups raises serious concerns under IHL, notably in relation to the principle of distinction, including the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, as well as proportionality and precautions in attack. Deliberate targeting of civilians, as well imprecise delivery of munitions through commercially available drones, are particularly problematic. Reported drone attacks grew from 2024 to 2025, injuring not only members of the armed forces but also civilians, including children. Cauca was most affected, with frequent operations by the EMC, and incidents were also recorded in Arauca, Antioquia, Nariño, Norte de Santander and Putumayo.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
Civilian infrastructure in Colombia has frequently been damaged and, at times, deliberately targeted. Incidents affecting civilian objects – particularly schools and hospitals – raise serious concerns about compliance with IHL by armed groups and, to a lesser extent, the Colombian armed forces. These concerns relate to the principles of distinction, including the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, and proportionality in attack; the underlying duty to take precautions to avoid and, in any event, minimize damage to civilian objects; and the duty to ensure the special protection of medical facilities.
Schools and education were particularly affected by the violence, with some severely damaged during hostilities. An increased number of attacks on schools in 2024, and numerous incidents of threats and attacks on teachers, damage to infrastructure, and emplacement of IEDs were reported in 2024. The most affected areas were in Cauca and, to a lesser extent, in Antioquia, Arauca, Norte de Santander and Putumayo.
VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY
In 2024 and 2025, violence against civilians persisted. Murders of human rights defenders, especially Indigenous and community leaders, environmental defenders and former FARC-EP fighters were documented, predominantly committed by armed groups and regularly targeting Indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples. Child recruitment increased in 2024, including of children under 15, with hundreds recruited mainly by FARC-EP dissidents and also by the ELN, the EGC and Colombian forces. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and hostage taking persisted, affecting civilians including children, and arbitrary detentions by security forces were reported. Enforced disappearances rose, forced labour in resocialization camps was reported, and conflict related sexual violence increased amid under-reporting. Persons with disabilities were marginalised while mines and IEDs caused traumatic amputations requiring lifelong care.
- Murder
- Unlawful Recruitment
- Arbitrary Detention
- Enforced Disappearances
- Forced Labour
- Sexual Violence
- Persons with Disabilities
Murder of Civilians and Former Fighters
In 2024, dozens of massacres were verified, predominantly committed by armed groups. The main victims were human rights defenders, especially Indigenous and community leaders, and former FARC-EP fighters. Indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples were regularly targeted. The killing of human rights defenders and of Indigenous and community leaders undermines community structures and erodes civilian resistance, facilitating the consolidation of territorial and social control by armed groups. Violence continued into 2025 across multiple departments. While most incidents were attributed to armed groups and some criminal organizations, State forces were also implicated. Environmental defenders were murdered in connection with deforestation, illegal mining, logging and wildlife trafficking that profit armed groups, with the EMC particularly active in remote Amazon departments. These killings constitute murder and prima facie war crimes, and the victims were in the power of a party as they lived in areas under its control.