Democratic Republic of the Congo

During the reporting period, multiple armed conflicts – both of an international and non-international character – were ongoing in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

International armed conflicts

There was an international armed conflict (IAC) between the DRC and Rwanda, which occurred in three forms:

An active conflict between the DRC and the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).
A proxy conflict between the DRC and Rwanda through its effective control of the March 23 Movement (M23).¹
Military occupation of the DRC by Rwanda, including through M23 acting as a proxy armed group for Rwanda.

The DRC is a State Party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 1977, which apply, along with customary international humanitarian law (IHL), to the IAC. The law of occupation is set out in Geneva Convention IV of 1949, Additional Protocol I of 1977, and customary IHL, including the customary rules on military occupation dating back to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

Non-international armed conflicts

At least two non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) took place to which the DRC was a party:

DRC v the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
DRC v the Cooperative for the Development of the Congo (CODECO)

At least three other NIACs were ongoing in the DRC:

Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) v M23
CODECO v the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF)
CODECO v Zaïre.

All five NIACs are governed by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and customary IHL. The DRC is a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977. The NIAC between the DRC and the ADF continues to meet the additional requirements of Article 1(1) of the Protocol, meaning that this treaty is directly applicable to that conflict. Additional Protocol II does not apply to NIACs between organized armed groups.²

An armed group acting as a proxy under the effective control of a foreign State extinguishes an existing NIAC. Therefore, the fighting between the DRC and the M23 does not qualify as a NIAC.

Between 1885 and 1908, the territory of present-day DRC belonged to Leopold II, King of the Belgians, and then between 1908 and 1960 it was a Belgian colony.³ This was an exploitative period in which millions of lives were sacrificed to the scourges of slavery and forced labour, as well as disease and famine. ⁴ Upon gaining independence from Belgium, the people of the DRC were subject to dictatorial rule under Mobutu Sese Seko (1965–97).⁵ He named the country Zaire and ruled over it with an iron fist for thirty-two years.⁶

In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in neighbouring Rwanda, which saw one million ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus killed by Hutu extremists, close to two million refugees, among them the perpetrators of the genocide (mostly Hutu), fled to eastern Congo, exacerbating an already severe crisis in the region.⁷ Hutu extremists among the Rwandan refugees in the DRC organized a militia, which led to increased tensions as, in response, Tutsis formed counter-militias.⁸

The conflict that subsequently broke out, the so-called First Congo War (1996–97), involved several African States, most prominently Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda, who each had security concerns about Mobutu’s assistance to rebel groups operating across the continent.⁹ This alliance of States was spearheaded by Rwanda, which had just transitioned to a Tutsi-led government under President Paul Kagame. Rwandan troops and Tutsi militias invaded Zaire, claiming Hutu groups in eastern DRC were a security threat and that the regime was harbouring Hutu extremists. ¹⁰ The Rwandan coalition’s invasion was executed in coordination with Laurent Kabila, the opposition leader in Zaire at the time.¹¹ Following the removal of Mobutu in 1997, Laurent Kabila was installed as president of what he renamed as the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹²

President Kabila ultimately antagonized even his allies. The east of the country was particularly afflicted by violence between competing rebel factions who profited from the exploitation of natural resources.¹³ In 1998, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi formed a military alliance and attacked the DRC. Their objective was to combat rebel groups and prevent further regional insecurity, marking the beginning of the Second Congo War (1998–2003). ¹⁴ President Kabila sought the support of other African States – Angola, Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe – offering them mining concessions in the DRC in return for military assistance.¹⁵ In July 1999, the seven States engaged in the conflict signed the Lusaka Peace Accord, which, despite being ratified, was not fully implemented.¹⁶ The accord resulted in the deployment to the DRC of 5,000 United Nations (UN) peacekeepers (the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC).¹⁷

During a tumultuous period, Laurent Kabila was assassinated in an attempted coup d’état in 2001 that was orchestrated by his closest associates and personal security detail.¹⁸ Laurent Kabila’s son, Joseph Kabila, took power in 2001, and was inaugurated in 2006.¹⁹ Under Joseph Kabila, the Second Congo War formally concluded when, in December 2002, the Rwandan and Ugandan governments signed the Pretoria Accord that provided for the establishment of a provisional government, the cessation of hostilities, and the incorporation of militia into a new, unified national army.²⁰ The accord was ratified in April 2003.²¹

Despite considerable variance in estimates, the death toll in the war and the related humanitarian disaster is believed to have exceeded three million by 2004, making it the deadliest conflict since World War II.²² Notwithstanding the agreement, civil unrest and violent conflict continued in eastern DRC, the economy was in a state of near collapse, and infrastructure had been decimated.²³

The formation in the early 2000s of the March 23 Movement (M23), comprising predominantly ethnic Tutsis, and the subsequent launch of a major offensive between 2012 and 2013, resulted in the exceptional decision by the UN Security Council to establish an offensive brigade under the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 2013. Its objective was to support the Congolese army in putting down the rebellions in the east.²⁴

Following fraudulent elections in 2011 and multiple postponements of the 2015 and 2016 elections due to President Joseph Kabila’s refusal to concede power despite his term being at an end, Félix Tshisekedi was declared the winner of the December 2018 presidential elections and inaugurated in January 2019. This marked the first peaceful transfer of power in the history of the DRC.²⁵ Recent years under the presidency of Felix Tshisekedi – controversially re-elected in 2023 – have been characterized by a globalization of the conflict, particularly through the involvement of the United States and China, both seeking access to the DRC’s abundant natural resources. There has also been deployment of regional military forces – the Southern African Development Community’s Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) between 2023 and 2025, and previously the East African Community Regional Force in the DRC (EACRF) between 2022 and 2023.²⁶

The resurgence of M23 in 2022 is a further significant factor in explaining the armed conflicts in eastern DRC. The group controls large portions of North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, and the Congolese government has repeatedly accused the Rwandan government of providing financial and other forms of support to it.²⁷ Conversely, Kigali accused Kinshasa of providing support to Hutu extremist militias, including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).²⁸ Rwanda and Uganda, in conjunction with their militias, have a clear interest in the Congolese mining sector.²⁹

Another concerning development, particularly in regard to civilian protection, is the increasing threat posed by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).³⁰ Since its formal affiliation with Islamic State (IS) in 2019, it has undergone a rapid evolution into one of IS’s most active wilayats, greatly increasing the group’s personal and financial capabilities.³¹ According to ACLED, in 2023 alone, the group was responsible for over 1,000 civilian deaths.³² These events have resulted in the initiation of a collaborative military operation between the DRC and Uganda named ‘Operation Shujaa’ in an effort to counter the ADF’s advance.³³

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), at the end of 2024 more than six million people were internally displaced within the DRC due to conflict and other armed violence.³⁴

International reactions to Rwandan participation in the eastern DRC conflict

The international community repeatedly expressed concern over the escalating violence in the ongoing conflict in the DRC and condemned the support reportedly provided by Rwanda to M23 during the reporting period. For instance, on 28 July 2023, the European Union (EU) imposed sanctions on nine individuals responsible for serious violations of human rights and for instigating armed conflict in the eastern DRC, including a Rwandan military officer.³⁵ As the RDF continued operations in conjunction with M23 in early 2024, France, the United States, and a number of other States called on Rwanda to end its military activities in the DRC and to cease supporting M23.³⁶

A leaked UN report in June 2024 indicated a significant military presence by Rwanda in North Kivu, and on 8 July 2024, the UN Security Council met to consider the situation in eastern DRC in light of heightened tensions between the DRC and Rwanda.³⁷ In a similar progression, the Security Council chose to extend the operational scope of the 14,000-strong MONUSCO peacekeeping mission on 20 December 2024 for a period of one year.³⁸ This decision was accompanied by a condemnation of ‘foreign support’ for M23, amid ongoing deliberations about whether to publicly identify Rwanda as the source of this assistance.³⁹

In the first half of 2025, the UN Security Council issued a condemnation of M23’s military advances on 26 January and on 21 February, demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities.⁴⁰ The call was reiterated by regional and international actors, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU), the EU, the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes, the United States, and others.⁴¹ Several nations have restricted the scope of their bilateral cooperation with Rwanda, suspending aid payments or imposing sanctions.⁴² Additionally, on 17 March 2025, the EU imposed sanctions on nine individuals and one entity, including three senior RDF members.⁴³

Anti-MONUSCO protests and discussions about the mission’s withdrawal

MONUSCO was established in 2010, superseding the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC), which was established by Security Council Resolution 1279 to oversee the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, signed in July 1999 between the DRC and five regional States (Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe).⁴⁴ Nevertheless, since its formation, MONUSCO’s progress has been impeded by political factors and popular dissatisfaction.⁴⁵

On 30 August 2023, government forces prevented a demonstration organized by a religious group against MONUSCO in the eastern Congolese city of Goma.⁴⁶ A minimum of forty-three people were killed, fifty-six were injured, and more than 150 were detained during the protest. ⁴⁷ In the aftermath of these events, President Tshisekedi advocated the initiation of withdrawal of MONUSCO in December 2023, contrary to the previously set timeframe of 2024.⁴⁸

However, in light of the growing insecurity connected to the resurgence of M23 and its large-scale offensives in North Kivu and Ituri since 2024, the UN and the government of the DRC indicated in mid-July 2024 that MONUSCO would slow the pace of its withdrawal.⁴⁹ On 20 December 2024, the Security Council extended the mandate of the 14,000-strong peacekeeping mission for a period of one year.⁵⁰ As of June 2025, MONUSCO remained in the DRC.⁵¹

Lifting the ‘state of siege’ in Ituri and North Kivu provinces

In May 2021, a ‘state of siege’, i.e. a regime akin to martial law, was declared by the Congolese government in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri, conferring extensive authority on the military.⁵² According to Amnesty International, this has been used repeatedly as a means of suppressing opposition, resulting in deaths or arbitrary arrests of many activists. ⁵³

In August 2023, President Tshisekedi hosted a roundtable conference during which the participants called for the immediate lifting of the ‘state of siege’, citing the lack of results in fight against armed groups in North Kivu and Ituri.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, on 18 September 2023, Tshisekedi replaced the military governor of North Kivu with a different army general, de facto extending it, before finally announcing an end to the emergency regime on 12 October 2023, in the midst of mounting popular discontent.⁵⁵

Contested presidential elections in December 2023

Presidential elections were held in the DRC on 20 December 2023.⁵⁶ The Electoral Commission extended voting for a day following widespread reports of malfunctions at voting stations, including missing equipment and voter registers.⁵⁷ The same day, four opposition candidates called for a rerun, while the party of former President Kabila issued a statement threatening the possibility of acts of destabilisation.⁵⁸ The EU had previously revoked its election observation mission, citing concerns about technical aspects and security.⁵⁹

Several people were wounded in the capital on 27 December 2023 when opposition protestors threw stones at security forces, who fired tear gas at Fayulu’s campaign headquarters.⁶⁰ The Electoral Commission announced on 31 December 2023 that Tshisekedi had been re-elected, securing over 73% of the vote, a decision later confirmed by the Constitutional Court on 9 January 2024.⁶¹ However, opposition candidates Moïse Katumbi and Fayulu openly challenged the legitimacy of the election process and categorically rejected the official results.⁶²

Following his inauguration on 20 January 2024, Tshisekedi announced a new government on 29 May 2024, appointing individuals loyal to him and those who had been instrumental in his electoral campaign in prominent positions.⁶³ The new government took office on 11 June 2024, following protracted delays, with the National Assembly formally approving a government under the auspices of Prime Minister Suminwa.⁶⁴

Establishment of the Alliance Fleuve Congo with M23

On 15 December 2023, Corneille Nangaa, former head of the Congolese Electoral Commission, presented a new political-military alliance with M23 and other groups in Nairobi – the so-called ‘Alliance Fleuve Congo’ (AFC).⁶⁵ Kinshasa summoned the Kenyan ambassador to the DRC the following day and recalled its own ambassador to Kenya.⁶⁶ In January 2024, Adam Chalwe, the erstwhile leader of ex-president Joseph Kabila’s party, officially joined the AFC.⁶⁷

Following an AFC meeting in Rutshuru on 28 March 2024, at which several individuals associated with the political movement of the former President Kabila were present alongside Corneille Nangaa, the ruling party chief, Augustin Kabuya, accused Kabila of providing support to M23 insurgents and claimed that the former president had fled the country.⁶⁸ On 24 July 2024, the military court in Kinshasa initiated legal proceedings against Corneille Nangaa and 24 others, citing an accusation of “high treason”.⁶⁹ On 8 August, the court handed down a death sentence in absentia to Corneille Nangaa, alongside 25 others, including M23 leader, Bertrand Bisimwa.⁷⁰ In response, the EU reaffirmed its stance against capital punishment and Nangaa rejected the verdict.⁷¹

The ‘Nairobi process’ and the end of the EACRF military intervention in the DRC

The East African Community (EAC)-driven Nairobi Process is a regional peace initiative that aims to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the eastern DRC.⁷² The process was initiated by the East African Heads of States during the inaugural conference held on 8 April 2022, after the DRC had joined the EAC on 29 March 2022.⁷³ At a second conference of heads of State on 21 April 2022, participants agreed on a two-pronged strategy of political intervention and military/security enforcement.⁷⁴

Forming agreement between EAC members in April 2022, the EACRF deployed its first and only military intervention – in the DRC in November 2022 – with the aim of mitigating the escalating conflict in the country’s eastern regions.⁷⁵ The culmination of a series of factors, including delays, a deficiency in external funding, and a divergence in perceptions of the mission’s objective, ultimately resulted in the premature expulsion of the EACRF from the country sixteen months later, in December 2023.⁷⁶

Failure of the ‘Luanda peace process’

Established as part of the 2022 Luanda Roadmap and as a supplementary initiative to the Nairobi Process aimed at resolving tension, specifically between Rwanda and the DRC, the Luanda peace process came to a halt by October 2023 due to intensified fighting between M23 and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC).⁷⁷ The process was reinitiated in March 2024 under the auspices of Angolan President João Lourenço as mediator and, on 30 July of the same year, a lasting ceasefire was agreed to by the two nations.⁷⁸ Several unsuccessful attempts at diplomatic negotiations between the Rwandan and DRC foreign ministers subsequently sought to address the root causes of the recurring conflict.⁷⁹

Nevertheless, a meeting pursuant to the July 2024 ceasefire held between the Rwandan and Congolese heads of the intelligence services in Rubavu, Rwanda, on 29 and 30 August 2024, proved constructive.⁸⁰ The parties concluded the ‘Rubavu Agreement’, which centred on three key points: the neutralisation of the FDLR, withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the DRC, and the potential involvement of Rwanda’s forces in the military operation against the FDLR.⁸¹ Meanwhile, on 29 August 2024, the DRC announced it had initiated proceedings against Rwanda at the East African Court of Justice, alleging violations of its sovereignty and crimes against civilians.⁸²

With the Luanda peace process stalling amid reciprocal accusations, a much-anticipated meeting between Tshisekedi and Kagame at a peace summit in Angola on 15 December 2024 was cancelled at short notice, bringing diplomatic momentum to an abrupt standstill. This followed Kagame’s insistence that the Congolese government engage in direct negotiations with M23 rebels.⁸³ The Angolan-mediated peace negotiations collapsed on 24 March 2025 and President Lourenço formally relinquished his role as mediator to prioritize his duties as president of the African Union.⁸⁴ The same day, the EAC and SADC jointly appointed an extended panel of five facilitators to spearhead peace efforts under the merged Nairobi and Luanda Processes.⁸⁵

SAMIDRC deployment and withdrawal

On 17 November 2023, Congolese President Tshisekedi signed an agreement for a Southern African regional force to be deployed in eastern parts of the DRC to support the government in restoring peace and security; on 15 December 2023, the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) was deployed.⁸⁶ The mission comprised troops from Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania.⁸⁷

On 24 April 2024, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa declared an extension on the deployment of troops to the SAMIDRC, and on 5 May 2024 the SAMIDRC published plans to initiate a large-scale offensive in response to M23 rebellion.⁸⁸ The mission, however, was consistently short of money.⁸⁹ Notwithstanding the challenges, SAMIDRC’s mandate was renewed on 20 November 2024 for a period of one year.⁹⁰

After a surge in attacks on peacekeepers in eastern DRC in January 2025, however, which resulted in the death of fourteen South African soldiers, and the overall intensification of the conflict, SADC decided on 13 March 2025 to end its mission to the DRC ahead of November 2025.⁹¹ On 29 April 2025, SAMIDRC began withdrawing its troops from the DRC. ⁹²

Pledges to respect civilians by Nduma Defense of Renewed Congo/Guidon and Collective of Movements for Change/Self-Defense Force of Congolese People

At a regional conference organized by Geneva Call in February 2024, representatives from seven armed groups from different African countries committed to stepping up their efforts to combat food insecurity and sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflicts.⁹³ These included two groups from the DRC, namely the Nduma Defense of Renewed Congo/Guidon (NDRC/Guidon) and the Collective of Movements for Change/Self-Defense Force of Congolese People (CMC-FDP)⁹⁴. More specifically, in the presence of several Western diplomats, the envoys pledged that their forces would strive to put an end to sexual violence, food insecurity, and famine-like conditions, and would work to improve access to healthcare in the increasingly violent parts of eastern DRC where they operate.⁹⁵ It was reiterated that these are not formal agreements and that the armed groups are not legitimized by them.⁹⁶

Attempted coup d’état in May 2024

On 19 May 2024, the Congolese Army claimed to have prevented a coup d’état attempt led by Christian Malanga, a US resident and proponent of the New Zaire movement.⁹⁷ The incident occurred in Kinshasa’s Gombe district, where several dozen gunmen targeted locations of a symbolic nature, including the residences of high-ranking officials and an unoccupied State house.⁹⁸ The incident resulted in the death of Malanga, one accomplice, and two members of the police.⁹⁹ Subsequently, on 13 September 2024, a military court in Kinshasa handed down sentences of death to thirty-seven individuals for their involvement in the May coup attempt.¹⁰⁰

Renewed investigations into the DRC by the International Criminal Court

On 14 October 2024, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a statement announcing renewed investigations into crimes allegedly perpetrated in North Kivu since January 2022.¹⁰¹ Since the opening of an investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor in the DRC in 2004, the ICC has issued seven arrest warrants and investigations have been opened against six suspects.¹⁰² The prosecutor’s pronouncement comes in the wake of a second referral by the DRC in May 2023 for alleged crimes in North Kivu and the conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Office of the Prosecutor and the DRC in June 2023 seeking to enhance collaboration. ¹⁰³

Joseph Kabila’s return to DRC politics

In late 2024, former President Joseph Kabila returned to the political stage in the DRC, ending a six-year period of relative silence.¹⁰⁴ He has made numerous public appearances during which he criticized President Tshisekedi and refrained from condemning Rwanda for its support of M23.¹⁰⁵

In light of Kinshasa’s longstanding allegations that Kabila is orchestrating support for M23 rebels from behind the scenes, the Congolese Ministry of Justice, on 18 April 2025, initiated criminal proceedings against him on charges of high treason, and subsequently ordered seizure of his assets.¹⁰⁶ The following day, the Interior Ministry formally banned Kabila’s political party, citing its perceived ‘ambiguous stance’ on the M23 insurgency.¹⁰⁷ On 22 May, the Senate overturned Kabila’s lifetime immunity, paving the way for a military prosecution.¹⁰⁸

Following a two-year period of exile, Kabila arrived in the M23 stronghold of Goma on 26 May 2025.¹⁰⁹ Between 29 and 30 May, he consulted with religious and traditional leaders, a move that had the potential to upset delicate negotiations underway at the time between Kinshasa and M23.¹¹⁰ He made his first public appearance accompanied by leaders of the AFC on 30 May 2025.¹¹¹

M23’s capture of strategic towns

Following their most significant offensive to date, M23 rebels captured the towns of Katale and Masisi in North Kivu on 3 and 4 January 2025, and proceeded to take control of Sake on 23 January 2025 – the site of conflict since the resumption of hostilities between M23 and the government in 2022.¹¹² M23 headed for Goma, taking over the provincial capital of North Kivu on 27 January 2025.¹¹³ The fighting, largely in the form of gunfire and bombardment, killed many, predominantly civilians, and injured thousands.¹¹⁴ Reports indicate that at least thirteen peacekeepers from the UN and SADC were also killed.¹¹⁵

Despite a unilateral ceasefire by M23 on 4 February 2025, ¹¹⁶ their offensive advanced into South Kivu, where they captured significant mining towns in Kalehe territory between 18 and 20 January 2025 and took control of the key town of Minova on Lake Kivu on 20 January 2025.¹¹⁷ On 15 February 2025, M23 advanced into Bukavu, the second-largest city in eastern DRC and the provincial capital of South Kivu.¹¹⁸ The group pursued the retreating army and Burundian forces, and on 18 and 19 February 2025, captured the city of Kamanyola on the tri-border of Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda.¹¹⁹

The insurgents advanced to the north in North Kivu, taking territory in Lubero in late February 2025.¹²⁰ Also in North Kivu, M23 continued its advance into Walikale territory and captured the town on 19 March 2025, opening a route to the country’s third-largest city, Kisangani, in Orientale province.¹²¹ Following the capture of the town by M23 rebels, they declared their withdrawal from Walikale as a gesture of support for prevailing peace efforts, pulling out in early April 2025.¹²²

Shift in conflict dynamics

The ever-increasing expansion of the M23’s territorial footprint (see above) and their increased offensives launched alongside the RDF have led to a shift in the dynamics of the multiple ongoing NIACs in the DRC more generally. Several non-State armed groups that were previously fighting against the FARDC have reportedly sided with them in recent months to fight against their common enemy, the M23. The FARDC is, for example, suspected to have formed an alliance with the FDLR against M23 during most of the reporting period.¹²³ However, contradictory reports concerning the current relationship between FARDC and the FDLR exist.¹²⁴ During September 2024, the FARDC and FDLR briefly resumed fighting.¹²⁵ This is in line with a historical pattern; since the formation of the FARDC in 2003, the army has opportunistically joined forces with the FDLR when confronted by Rwandan-backed rebellions, but when not under threat, it has also conducted various offensives against the armed group.¹²⁶ It is unclear if the Washington Peace Agreement (see below) may cause the fighting between the FARDC and FDLR to reignite, as it encourages disarmament of the FDLR.¹²⁷ The FARDC has consequently called on the FDLR to comply with the Washington Peace Agreement.¹²⁸

A second rapprochement could be witnessed between the FARDC and the Mai-Mai Yakutumba during the reporting period. Despite the Mai-Mai Yakutumba waging a guerrilla campaign against the FARDC in Kivu since 2017, ¹²⁹ only a single clash between the actors was reported on 8 December 2023.¹³⁰ This lull in fighting can be attributed to various armed group leaders, including William Yakutumba, entering into a non-aggression pact with the DRC government in Baraka at the end of July 2024, and agreeing to back FARDC operations against the M23.¹³¹ It is important to note, however, that this shift in conflict dynamics could quickly be reversed in the future, and fighting between the FARDC and groups such as the FDLR and the Mai-Mai Yakutumba could resume instantly, as the reason for their temporary joining of forces is merely a common enemy. The underlying issues leading to the fighting between these groups in the first place has not yet been resolved.

Launch of the ‘Convention pour la révolution Populaire/Force pour la révolution populaire’ under Thomas Lubanga

From September 2024, efforts to set up a new armed grouping, the CRP/FRP, had been led by Thomas Lubanga in Kampala, with the Ugandan authorities providing at least passive endorsement.¹³² The first documented meetings were held in Kampala in January and February 2025 with Ituri armed group representatives, notably the Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI) and the Zaïre group.¹³³ Subsequently, an MoU was endorsed, establishing the foundational principles of this new political-military movement.¹³⁴ The convicted war criminal, Thomas Lubanga, who is based in Uganda, officially declared the creation of the CRP/FRP in late March 2025.¹³⁵ The movement is known generally as the CRP but with an armed wing, the FRP.¹³⁶

The group seeks to overthrow the government in Ituri province, posing an additional security threat to the conflict-stricken region.¹³⁷ The creation of the CRP/FRP saw the involvement of Zaire commanders Fidele Babala, Pharaon, and Logo Marine, with Logo Marine taking the role of deputy chief of staff.¹³⁸ Similar to AFC’s approach, CRP/FRP proclaimed it represents a coalition of all major armed groups in Ituri and published a leadership structure that assigned roles to the group’s representatives.¹³⁹ Nevertheless, a number of groups, including the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo (CODECO), denied affiliation with the CRP/FRP and certain leaders claimed their purported signatures were a forgery.¹⁴⁰ The authorities of Ituri province, in turn, asserted that the CRP is collaborating with M23 militia with the aim of taking control of the province.¹⁴¹

In 2012, Thomas Lubanga had been charged by the ICC with recruitment of child soldiers and sentenced to fourteen years’ imprisonment. ¹⁴² Following his release in 2020, he was appointed by President Tshisekedi to a task force with the aim of restoring peace in Ituri.¹⁴³ In 2022, however, he was detained by CODECO in Ituri for a period of two months, which he attributes to the actions of the government.¹⁴⁴

Creation of the ‘Coalition Nationale pour la Libération du Congo’/‘Force Nationale pour la Libération du Congo’ under Innocent Kaina

In April 2025, Colonel Innocent Kaina – a former senior figure in M23 and known by the alias India Queen – established a new politico-military movement to combat the DRC government.¹⁴⁵ The group is called the Coalition Nationale pour la Libération du Congo (CNLC), whose armed wing is the Forces Nationales pour la Libération du Congo (FNLC).¹⁴⁶ On 30 March 2025, a statement confirmed that Kaina is the Commander-in-Chief of the FNLC and that Major Kasereka André is the group’s spokesperson.¹⁴⁷ The group says it is based in Aveba in Ituri province.¹⁴⁸ The Kinshasa government’s alleged corruption, nepotism, harassment, illegal arrests of children, and ethnic divisions were cited by the group as reasons for their political response.¹⁴⁹ Kaina and his team emphasize that they want to fight for the rights of Congolese peoples, provide services, and promote good governance.¹⁵⁰

Increasing involvement of the UPDF

The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) is officially embroiled in the DRC conflict in its fight against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). ¹⁵¹ Since its launch in late 2021, the Ugandan-Congolese “Operation Shujaa” – translated from Swahili to mean “bravery” – has successfully pushed the ADF out of several key strongholds in the vicinity of the Ugandan border.¹⁵² In the aftermath of the 16 June 2023 attack on a school in Uganda, Ugandan and DRC forces further escalated their joint operations against ADF militants in the Mwalika Valley area of Beni territory in North Kivu.¹⁵³ By mid-July 2023, the military campaign has reportedly killed sixteen militants, including several high-ranking leaders. ¹⁵⁴

In July 2024, the UPDF and the FARDC agreed to extend Operation Shujaa to Lubero district.¹⁵⁵ In October 2024, the Congolese government announced a further extension to the joint Congolese and Ugandan anti-ADF mission.¹⁵⁶ On 4 February 2025, Uganda increased its military engagement in the eastern DRC, deploying over 1,000 additional troops under Operation Shujaa.¹⁵⁷ Further UPDF troops were deployed along the Lubero-Butembo axis, with others assigned to the Bunia and Mahagi and Djugu territories in Ituri.¹⁵⁸ In 2025 alone, at least 3,000 extra UPDF troops were deployed, increasing its total presence in the DRC to over 6,000.¹⁵⁹ The DRC had been informed officially of only 2,000 UPDF troops being deployed under Operation Shujaa.¹⁶⁰

This expansion of UPDF soldiers in early 2025 coincided with the victorious AFC/M23 and RDF attack on Goma.¹⁶¹ Reports suggest that the deployment of the UPDF was a strategic move to protect the northern front lines of North Kivu.¹⁶² However, Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, insisted that the UPDF’s presence was not related to fighting M23 rebels, but rather to countering the ADF and ensuring the construction of the Kasindi-Beni-Butembo road.¹⁶³ The DRC government confirmed that the new UPDF deployment in early 2025 had been undertaken without its prior approval and that unilateral initiatives were undertaken by UPDF outside the framework of joint operations with the FARDC.¹⁶⁴ The closeness of UPDF forces to AFC/M23 and RDF positions in the southern part of Lubero territory has caused concern about the impartiality of the UPDF’s presence, given that some UPDF elements had previously been found to support AFC/M23 operations.¹⁶⁵

Increasing involvement of Burundi

Between December 2024 and January 2025 operations by the AFC/M23 and the RDF in the Kalehe territory prompted the deployment of the Burundian army, Force de Défense Nationale du Burundi (FDNB), to prevent the AFC/M23 and the RDF from advancing southwards.¹⁶⁶ To stop Bukavu and Kavumu from falling into the hands of the AFC/M23 and the RDF, several hundred FDNB troops were sent north of Bukavu in Katana and Nyamukubi.¹⁶⁷ On 31 January 2025, a further 2,000 troops from Burundi were deployed to Kamanyola in the Ruzizi Plain, in proximity to the tri-border area shared by Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC.¹⁶⁸ In early February 2025, following the takeover of Bukavu and Kavumu by AFC/M23 and RDF, FDNB troops were repositioned.¹⁶⁹ In early April 2025, 7,000 to 9,000 Burundian troops were deployed in South Kivu, according to estimates by intelligence sources, especially in the Ruzizi Plain and in the Hauts Plateaux near Minembwe.¹⁷⁰

The continued deployment en masse of FDNB soldiers in support of the FARDC has fuelled tension between Rwanda and Burundi.¹⁷¹ Serious clashes between the FDNB, backed by the FARDC, and Wazalendo groups (see below), as well as the AFC/M23, supported by the RDF, have killed several hundred FDNB troops.¹⁷² In February 2025, Burundi’s President, Évariste Ndayishimiye, accused Rwanda of planning to invade his country, citing Rwanda’s support for the Burundian armed opposition group, Red Tabara.¹⁷³ Rwanda, for its part, has expressed a desire to see regime change in both Burundi and the DRC.¹⁷⁴ In mid-March 2025, Burundi and Rwanda reportedly concluded a non-aggression agreement and agreed to de-escalate the situation, both verbally and militarily.¹⁷⁵

Establishment of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Fact-Finding Mission

In light of the escalating hostilities and worsening mass violations of human rights and IHL in the provinces of North and South Kivu, including massacres, conflict-related sexual violence, and attacks on civilian populations, the Human Rights Council in February 2025 requested that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights urgently establish a fact-finding mission to report on events in the DRC since January 2022.¹⁷⁶ The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) requested that the fact-finding mission be mandated to investigate and establish the facts, circumstances, and root causes of all alleged violations of international human rights law and IHL, as well as potential international crimes.¹⁷⁷

Peace initiative under the auspices of Qatar and the USA in 2025

In an unexpected development on 18 March 2025, DRC President Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Kagame held a meeting in Qatar, during which they issued a call for an ‘immediate and unconditional ceasefire’.¹⁷⁸ In the aftermath of this ceasefire, the levels of violence associated with M23 insurrection did not decrease; however, the RDF and the FARDC were less involved in the conflict.¹⁷⁹

In the wake of the Qatar-led negotiations, at the start of April 2025, M23 pulled out of Walikale, a strategically important town in North Kivu they had captured in March 2025, calling the move a goodwill gesture ahead of the Doha talks.¹⁸⁰ This development coincided with a visit to the Great Lakes region by the US Senior Adviser for Africa, Massad Boulos, and with a period where M23 struggled to maintain control of areas it had captured.¹⁸¹ A joint statement on 23 April in Doha indicated the possibility of a truce, but no progress has been made since.¹⁸² In early May, a third round of talks produced no tangible result, and AFC/M23 representatives left Doha.¹⁸³

The US administration of President Trump aims to broker a peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda and attract billions of dollars in Western investment to the mineral-rich region.¹⁸⁴ On 25 April, the Congolese Foreign Minister, Thérèse Kayikwamba, and her Rwandan counterpart, Olivier Nduhungirehe, signed a ‘declaration of principles’ under the auspices of the United States.¹⁸⁵ The declaration committed the two nations to ‘immediate de-escalation’ of the conflict in the eastern DRC and to drafting a peace agreement by 2 May 2025.¹⁸⁶ Concurrently, Washington persisted with minerals-for-security negotiations with Kinshasa and Kigali.¹⁸⁷

On 27 June, the Congolese and Rwandan foreign ministers signed the peace agreement brokered by the United States and Qatar in Washington, DC.¹⁸⁸ The deal calls on the belligerents to cease hostilities and respect their neighbours’ territorial integrity.¹⁸⁹ It also demands they stop supporting non-State armed groups and set up joint monitoring and security mechanisms. Under the terms of the agreement, Rwandan soldiers must withdraw from eastern DRC within three months.¹⁹⁰

Following M23 rebels’ dismissal of the deal as a bilateral pact that did not involve them, and reflecting the separate NIAC between the DRC and M23, they too signed a ceasefire deal called the ‘Declaration of Principles’ in Qatar on 19 July 2025.¹⁹¹ The agreement, which is meant to serve as a framework for a permanent settlement, stipulates that both sides must refrain from attacks and ‘hate propaganda’, as well as ‘any attempt to seize by force new positions on the ground’.¹⁹² A definitive peace accord was supposed to be reached by 18 August 2025 in accordance with the terms of the US-facilitated accord between the DRC and Rwanda in June.¹⁹³

Ceasefire agreement signed in Ituri by six armed groups

On 28 June 2025, six local armed groups, namely CODECO, Zaïre/Auto-défense des communautés victimes de l’Ituri’ (ADCVI), Mouvement Populaire d’Autodéfense de l’Ituri, FRPI, Front Patriotique et Intégrationniste du Congo, and Chini Ya Tuna, all parties to the dialogue known as Aru II, signed a cessation of hostilities agreement in Aru, Ituri.¹⁹⁴ The consensus was achieved during a five-day exchange of ideas between armed groups, community representatives, and members of civil society, with the backing of MONUSCO.¹⁹⁵ Implementing this agreement, as others before it, is now essential.¹⁹⁶ The difficulty lies in the fact that, once disarmed, the militia are left with no means of subsistence and return to taking up arms.¹⁹⁷

During the reporting period, the armed forces of the DRC (FARDC), and its support forces MONUSCO and the FDNB (see above), and the opposing forces of Rwanda, along with a proxy, the M23, have been engaged in an IAC taking three different forms. First, a traditional IAC between the DRC and Rwanda; second, an IAC by proxy between the DRC and Rwanda with M23 as its proxy; and third, the occupation of DRC territory by Rwanda through M23. In line with the support-based approach to classifying armed conflicts, it can be concluded that MONUSCO and the FDNB are (or were) parties to the IAC between the DRC and Rwanda.¹⁹⁸

The government of the DRC has, additionally, increasingly relied on the use of private military and security companies (PMSCs), especially in its fight against Rwanda and the M23. These PMSCs include the Bulgarian company Agemira RDC,¹⁹⁹ the Romanian Asociatia RALF,²⁰⁰ the Congolese Congo Protection,²⁰¹ and US-based Erik Prince’s firm.²⁰²

International armed conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (and its support forces) and Rwanda

The pre-existing IAC between the DRC and Rwanda continued throughout the reporting period. In January and March 2022, DRC officials alleged that M23 was operating with the assistance of RDF special forces. On 28 March 2022, the spokesperson of the military governor of North Kivu stated that M23, supported by the RDF, had launched attacks on FARDC positions in Tshanzu and Runyoni between 27 and 28 February. The claim was refuted by the Government of Rwanda and an M23 spokesperson.¹ Although denied by the DRC and by Rwanda, UN experts assert that RDF soldiers were present and operating alongside M23 on the territory of the DRC as early as May 2022.² Reports indicate that the RDF fought alongside M23 more than a dozen times in 2022 and at the start of 2023, mainly in the areas of Rutshuru and Nyiragongo.³

It is well documented that the RDF fought alongside M23 against the FARDC on several occasions during the reporting period.⁴ On 23 January 2025, the RDF and M23 engaged in heavy fighting against the FARDC and its support forces in Sake, 25km west of Goma.⁵ The fighting escalated, sparking intensive artillery exchanges on 27 January, when M23 and the RDF entered Goma. By 29 January, M23 and the RDF were in control of the city.⁶ The RDF was also reported as being physically present in Petit Nord and South Kivu.⁷

An IAC occurs when one or more States resort to using armed force against another State, regardless of the motive or of the intensity of the violence.⁸ An IAC can be triggered by an attack that is directed at the territory of another State; it is not necessary that the attack is directed against the armed forces of that State. The RDF engaged in heavy fighting against the FARDC and support forces on the territory of the DRC; therefore, a traditional IAC is triggered.

IHL applies in the IAC between the DRC and Rwanda, despite the US-brokered ceasefire agreement of 27 June 2025.⁹ The declassification of an IAC depends on an objective judgment of a general end to military operations displaying a degree of stability and permanence.¹⁰ As such, an IAC can continue to exist even where a peace agreement exists.¹¹ Although it is uncertain whether the RDF continues to actively fight alongside the M23, ¹² hostilities continue, at least with M23.¹³

International armed conflict between the DRC and Rwanda through a proxy M23

Since its resurgence in November 2021, M23 has consistently fought the FARDC, particularly in the North Kivu region.¹⁴

If a State is deemed to exercise at least ‘overall control’ over an organized armed group fighting another State, the conflict is classified as an IAC. ¹⁵ Overall control is more than merely equipping and financing an organized armed group; it requires a State to assist in the coordination and general planning of the organized armed group’s military activities.¹⁶

There is evidence that M23 received direct instructions from the government of Rwanda and its intelligence services on several occasions.¹⁷ These Instructions involved ‘strategic level decision-making’ such as to seize, hold, or withdraw from territory. According to the UN Panel of Experts, this clearly demonstrates that M23 is hierarchically subordinate to the Government of Rwanda, which exercised overall operational coordination over the group.¹⁸

Despite the mounting evidence, Rwanda has, on several occasions, denied supporting M23.¹⁹ M23 also denies a relationship with Rwanda.²⁰

The UN Group of Experts on the DRC, however, in their July 2025 report, found that the RDF had ‘effective control’ and ‘de facto direction’ over M23 operations.²¹ Evidence strongly suggests that M23 is indeed under the effective control of Rwanda and is, therefore, its proxy.²²

Military occupation of the DRC by Rwanda, including through M23 acting as a proxy armed group for Rwanda

Rwanda is also engaged in belligerent occupation of certain areas within the DRC, both directly and through its proxy, M23.

According to the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), occupation by proxy is present when an third State exercises at the least overall control over an organized armed group which, in turn, is in effective control of territory of another State.²³ ‘Occupation by proxy’ involves determining whether the conditions of the test are met by agents under the control of a State or are acting on its behalf.²⁴

Under IHL, a situation of ‘direct’ occupation exists if the territory is ‘under the authority of the hostile army’, even in the absence of resistance. ²⁵ The hostile foreign force meets the requirement of exercising effective control over territory without the consent of the sovereign State.²⁶ The nature of effective control in the context of occupation involves three cumulative conditions:²⁷

The foreign State’s armed forces are physically present in the territory or parts of the territory of the territorial State without its consent.
The presence of the foreign forces prevents the effective local government in place at the time of invasion from substantially or completely exercising its powers.
The foreign forces are able to establish their own authority.

A proxy occupation thus necessitates that occupying forces are physically present in the territory of the DRC without its consent. During the reporting period, the RDF and M23 jointly captured strategic areas in the DRC in an attempt to consolidate territorial control.²⁸ According to the Report of the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission on the situation in North and South Kivu provinces, M23 exercised control over much of the Rutshuru and Nyiragongo territories, as well as large parts of Masisi by the end of 2024.²⁹ In January 2025, further strategic territorial gains were jointly made by M23 and Rwanda, which include the Masisi centre in North Kivu, Minova town in Kalehe territory, the Bulenga peninsula, and the strategically important capitals, Goma and Bukavu.³⁰ The UN Experts claimed in July 2025 that the territory controlled by M23 and the RDF increased by 100 per cent as compared to areas controlled by these forces in November 2024.³¹ The DRC repeatedly called on M23 to withdraw from its territory.³² Thus, the first requirement of occupation by proxy has been met.

The second requirement demands that the physical presence of occupying forces prevents the effective local government in place at the time of invasion from substantially or completely exercising its powers. M23, in the areas under its control, replaces the officials who exercise the governmental functions of the State, preventing the local government from substantially exercising its powers.³³ M23 operationalized a parallel administration in territories under its control, ³⁴ which, consequently, prevented the pre-invasion local authorities from substantially exercising their powers. The UN Panel of Experts maintain that M23 ‘engaged in a systematic effort to dismantle existing State authority and civil structures in the territories under its control, replacing them with its own parallel governance while targeting perceived dissenters, erasing institutional records and laying the groundwork for demographic and land-control changes’. Thus, the second requirement is satisfied.³⁵

The final requirement for occupation, including by proxy, is the ability of the occupying forces to establish their own authority. In several areas under its control, specifically in North and South Kivu, M23 has established authority, including the appointment of governors, deputy governors, territorial administrators, mayors, ‘mine delegates’, police officers, a Directorate General of Migration, a Directorate General of Customs and Excise, officials working in intelligence services, and so forth. ³⁶ M23 has imposed a tax collection system and replaced civil servants and customary chiefs who oppose M23 authority with sympathetic and supportive individuals.³⁷ These facts demonstrate that M23 is not merely able to but has indeed established a parallel authority in areas under its control. Thus, the final requirement for occupation by proxy is met.

The test is cumulative, and as all the requirements are satisfied, Rwanda is occupying parts of the DRC, including through its proxy, M23. The Report of the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission on the situation in North and South Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo agrees, asserting that there is a legal possibility that Rwanda occupies certain areas within the DRC, exercising territorial control in parts of the Kivu region both directly and through M23 acting as its proxy force.³⁸

1
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2022/479, 14 June 2022, para 71.
2
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2022/967, 16 December 2022, paras 49–51.
3
L. Serwat, ‘The resurgence and alliances of the March 23 Movement (M23)’, ACLED, 23 March 2024.
4
‘U.S.-DRC Relations: Disinformation v. Fact’, US Embassy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 16 February 2024; Matthew Miller, ‘Final Report by UN Group of Experts’, US Mission to the African Union, 19 June 2023; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, paras 40–45.
5
‘Report of the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission on the situation in North and South Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo’, UN Doc A/HRC/60/80, 5 September 2025, para 12.
6
‘Report of the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission on the situation in North and South Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo’, UN Doc A/HRC/60/80, 5 September 2025, paras 12–13.
7
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, paras 13–19.
8
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule”’, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para 70; ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee for the Red Cross, 2024, 9–10.
9
‘Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda’, US Department of State, 27 June 2025.
10
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11.
11
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11; ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Delalić et al’, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, para 184; ICTR, ‘The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, para 207; SCSL, ‘Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor’, Trail Chamber II,Judgment, 18 May 2012, paras 563 – 566.
12
‘Report of the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission on the situation in North and South Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo’, UN Doc A/HRC/60/80, 5 September 2025, para 16
13
W. Muia and B. P. Usher, ‘DR Congo rebels killed 140 civilians despite peace process, rights group says’, BBC, 21 August 2025; S. Dean and L. Madowo, ‘Two countries signed a peace deal in Washington. On the ground, little has changed’, CNN, 22 September 2025; ‘Report of the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission on the situation in North and South Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo’, UN Doc A/HRC/60/80, 5 September 2025, para 19. Accordingly, this IAC is ongoing.
14
L. Serwat, ‘The resurgence and alliances of the March 23 Movement (M23)’, ACLED, 23 March 2024; ‘DRC – North Kivu: M23 Crisis Analysis (11 June 2024)’, International Organization for Migration, 11 June 2024; J. Z. Walker, ‘The Resurgence of the M23: Regional Rivalries, Donor Policy, and a Stalled Peace Process’, New York University Center on International Cooperation, 4 December 2024.
15
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 12.
16
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić’, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, para 131; ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 12.
17
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, paras 8 and para 18.
18
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 18.
19
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2022/479, 14 June 2022, para 8; ‘Rwanda refutes allegations from UN Group of Experts on the DRC Midterm report’, Republic of Rwanda, 8 January 2021; Rwanda Government Communications, Post on X, 21 December 2022.
20
Bertrand Bisimwa, Post on X, 4 December 2022; BBC News, ‘M23 rebels leader denies assistance from Rwanda’, YouTube, 4 March 2025.
21
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 44.
22
‘Report of the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission on the situation in North and South Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo’, UN Doc A/HRC/60/80, 5 September 2025, para 20; ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 45; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 44.
23
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 12; N. Kalandarishvili-Mueller, ‘Occupation and Control in International Humanitarian Law’, Routledge, 2021, 57; T. Ferraro, ‘Determining the beginning and end of an occupation under international humanitarian law’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2012, 158.
24
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 12.
25
‘Article 42 of Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
26
T. Ferraro and L. Cameron, ‘Article 2: Application of the Convention’, International Committee for the Red Cross: Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, 2016, para 302; International Committee for the Red Cross, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict’, RULAC, October 2015.
27
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11 – 12; International Committee for the Red Cross, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict’, RULAC, October 2015, 11; T. Ferraro, ‘Determining the beginning and end of an occupation under international humanitarian law’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2012
28
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 13; ‘DRC: UN report raises spectre of war crimes and crimes against humanity in North and South Kivu’, OHCHR, 5 September 2025.
29
‘Report of the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission on the situation in North and South Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo’, UN Doc A/HRC/60/80, 5 September 2025, para 7.
30
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, paras 14 – 19.
31
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 19.
32
‘DR Congo army says M23 reinforcing in area it vowed to leave’, Eyewitness News, 27 March 2025; ‘DR Congo calls for withdrawal of M23 rebels, Rwandan forces from city of Goma’, AA, 6 February 2025.
33
‘Report of the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission on the situation in North and South Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo’, UN Doc A/HRC/60/80, 5 September 2025, para 15.
34
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 25
35
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 27.
36
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 26.
37
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 30.
38
‘Report of the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission on the situation in North and South Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo’, UN Doc A/HRC/60/80, 5 September 2025, para 22.

Non-international armed conflict between the Democratic Republic (and its support forces) of the Congo and the Allied Democratic Forces

Background

The ADF is one of the oldest militant groups in Africa.¹ It emerged in 1994 from the fusion of two factions: Islamic fundamentalists belonging to the Tablighi Jamaat sect, and the former National Army for the Liberation of Uganda.² The ADF’s initial operations were in Uganda’s Rwenzori region, but it retreated into the jungles of eastern DRC in 2002 under pressure from the UPDF.³ The ADF pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS), and by 2020 their current leader, Seka Baluku, had declared the group to be the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) in eastern DRC and Uganda.⁴ The group has a long-standing presence in the north of North Kivu province, particularly in Beni territory. Since 2021, there has been a notable escalation in its operations, leading the group to gradually extend its territory northwards towards Ituri province.⁵ As a reaction to the surge in attacks by the ADF, the FARDC and the UPDF joined forces in 2021 to launch Operation Shujaa, aimed at dismantling the ADF in Ituri and North Kivu.⁶ Furthermore, MONUSCO has been instrumental in providing logistical support and establishing a permanent combat deployment to counter the advances of the ADF.⁷ In line with the support-based approach to classifying armed conflicts, it can be concluded that the UPDF and MONUSCO are parties to this NIAC.⁸

Intensity

The final UN Expert report stated that the ADF conducted 120 attacks between July 2024 and February 2025, resulting in at least 300 civilian casualties.⁹ Attacks were frequently reported by Islamic State communication platforms between June and October 2024.¹⁰ Between January and June 2025, clashes became infrequent.¹¹ The majority of reported attacks were, however, directed specifically against civilians and were not clashes between the FARDC and ADF.¹²

Clashes between the FARDC and the ADF were reported in July 2023, ¹³ August 2023, ¹⁴ August 2024, ¹⁵ and June 2025.¹⁶ Joint operations by the FARDC supported by the UPDF caused 120 casualties in the ADF with eighty fighters captured.¹⁷

Weapons used by the ADF include improvised explosive devices (IEDs) because the ADF have an internal IED expert Anywari Al Iraq.¹⁸ The use of explosives decreased during the final year of the reporting period, owing to the successful disruption of supply networks for raw materials such as explosives and detonators. ¹⁹ This disruption has, however, increased the ADF’s usage of drones carrying IEDs.²⁰ The ADF has also adapted to the use of technology, employing satellite communications and computers to enhance aerial attack efficiency. ²¹

ADF attacks are sufficiently sustained and concerted as to enable the group, despite operating through highly mobile cells, to continue to exercise stable control over parts of territory in the DRC²² as demanded by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II of 1977.²³

The intensity of violence generated by the engagements between the FARDC (and its support forces) and the ADF satisfies the necessary requirements under IHL.

Organization

The ADF’s headquarters are called ‘Madina’. They had to be relocated further north to Mambasa territory in the Ituri province, owing to advances made by the FARDC and its support forces in July 2024.²⁴ The ADF’s military command structure is described by UN Experts as ‘streamlined’. Some subgroups do, however, operate with some degree of independence. Nevertheless, all subgroups report to Seka Baluku. Similarly, all major attacks require approval from Baluku, and post-attack reports and photographs must be submitted to him.²⁵ At the time of reporting, Seka Baluku ²⁶ was the commander of the ADF, and the second in command is Seka Umaru. ²⁷ Mzee Pierro is in charge of military operations and is the commander based in Madina, and Mzee Kayira, another senior commander also based in Madina, is in charge of ADF logistics and finance.²⁸ Other senior officials include Benjamin Kisikolania (in charge of intelligence), and Filipo Bogere (in charge of special operations). The judiciary/political affairs desk is vested in the overall commander, Baluku.²⁹ Baluku also leads a senior advisory council which unites the executive and judiciary organs of the ADF. Baluku also serves as the ‘supreme judge’.³⁰ This hierarchical organizational structure is akin to responsible command, as required by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II.

Discipline in ADF camps is enforced through imposing a radical interpretation of Sharia law.³¹ Training camps are also used to disseminate Islamic law.³² It is thus possible for the ADF to include IHL instruction as part of the teachings in training camps. Discipline and adherence to IHL could be enforced in the existing judiciary structures.³³ Territorial control, as depicted below, enables the ADF to implement IHL, including Additional Protocol II, as required by its Article 1(1).³⁴ Article 1(1) demands the ability to implement Additional Protocol II, not its actual implementation.³⁵

The military tactics of the ADF include operating in cells.³⁶ It is sufficiently organized to be highly mobile and often launch simultaneous attacks involving burning and looting.³⁷ It managed to evade direct confrontations when cells were weakened.³⁸ The ADF remains highly adaptable, and after suffering losses during 2024, it merged six camps into three larger ones to promote security.³⁹ By 1 November 2024, it was reported that due to heightened military pressure, the ADF divided its military wing into two distinct territories, one in Epulu Game Reserve, north of the Komanda-Lolwa-Mambasa road, and the other westward into Tshopo province. The organizational structure remains the same.⁴⁰

The ADF often employs night-time raids, uses crude weapons, and deliberately targets civilians.⁴¹ The ADF is sufficiently organized to launch sustained and concerted military operations. The disruption of financial flows led the ADF to expand into new illicit activities such as cocoa trade and kidnappings for ransom.⁴²

Territorial control is a requirement of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Despite being described as a highly mobile force, the ADF does exercise stable military control over parts of the DRC. More specifically, it exercises stable control over the area in which one of its camps (see above) is located. The Mwalika camp, located in the Mwalika Valley, about eighty kilometres from Beni in North Kivu Province, has consistently been a camp for the ADF since the early 2000s.⁴³ It is not the size of territory controlled that matters for classification but rather the quality of control.⁴⁴

The ADF retains significant influence over Ituri and North Kivu provinces.⁴⁵ Since April 2025, it is said that the ADF has moved away from sporadic acts of terror and is now establishing a comprehensive network of economic, ideological, and military control to secure its long-term presence in Ituri and North Kivu provinces.⁴⁶ In the affected areas, including the Mambasa region in Ituri and North Kivu’s Lubero territory, the ADF dominates local populations using financial extortion, religious coercion, resource exploitation, and agricultural control.⁴⁷

From the intensity assessment above, the territory controlled by the ADF facilitates the planning of military operations, fulfilling the final requirement in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, which requires the ADF to be sufficiently organized to launch sustained and concerted attacks.⁴⁸ The organizational structure of the ADF is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Hence, the NIAC between the DRC and ADF constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

1
P. Nantulya, ‘The Ever-Adaptive Allied Democratic Forces Insurgency’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 8 February 2019.
2
K. R. Kabagambe, ‘Unmasking the ADF: Inside the Rise of Current Uganda’s Most Dangerous Militant Threat’, Fam Reports, 4 June 2025; L. Serwat, ‘As M23 rebels take hold of eastern Congo, the Islamic State is capitalizing on the chaos’, ACLED, 18 June 2025; ‘Inside the ADF Rebellion: A Glimpse into the Life and Operations of a Secretive Jihadi Armed Group’, Congo Research Group, November 2018.
3
K. R. Kabagambe, ‘Unmasking the ADF: Inside the Rise of Current Uganda’s Most Dangerous Militant Threat’, Fam Reports, 4 June 2025; L. Serwat, ‘As M23 rebels take hold of eastern Congo, the Islamic State is capitalizing on the chaos’, ACLED, 18 June 2025.
4
L. Serwat, ‘As M23 rebels take hold of eastern Congo, the Islamic State is capitalizing on the chaos’, ACLED, 18 June 2025; E. Mutaizibwa, ‘Inside the Lhubiriha, Kichwamba ADF attacks’, Monitor, 25 June 2023.
5
L. Serwat, ‘As M23 rebels take hold of eastern Congo, the Islamic State is capitalizing on the chaos’, ACLED, 18 June 2025.
6
N. Mooloo, ‘Focusing on M23 allows ADF insurgents to expand in eastern DRC’ Institute for Security Studies, 22 September 2025.
7
‘United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/176, 20 March 2025, para 21.
8
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 16.
9
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/Rev.1, 6 February 2025, para 28.
10
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 26.
11
L. Serwat, ‘As M23 rebels take hold of eastern Congo, the Islamic State is capitalizing on the chaos’, ACLED, 18 June 2025.
12
M. Ellison and C. Nabiswa, ‘Analysis: ADF emerges as the deadliest armed group in east DR Congo’, 29 November 2024; ‘ADF Rebels Kill 15 in Eastern DRC Attacks’, Voice of America: Africa, 14 April 2024; K. Aine, ‘ADF Strikes Again in Eastern Congo, Civilians Bear the Brunt’, Chimp Reports, 17 January 2025.
13
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘ADF Rebels Kill 12 in Eastern DR Congo: Local Sources’, The Defense Post, 16 July 2023
14
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Noon briefing of 21 August 2023’, UN Secretary-General, 21 August 2023; ‘19 rescued in joint operation against ADF rebels’, Xinhua, 22 August 2023
15
‘Eastern DR Congo buffeted by fresh flareups with ADF, M23 rebels’, Xinhua, 2 August 2024; ‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group
16
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group.
17
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/Rev.1, 6 February 2025, para 30.
18
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, Annex 1.
19
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/Rev.1, 6 February 2025, para 126.
20
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/Rev.1, 6 February 2025, para 126.
21
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 18.
22
See below
23
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
24
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 15 and Annex 2.
25
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, paras 23 and 25 and Annex 7.
26
L. Serwat, ‘As M23 rebels take hold of eastern Congo, the Islamic State is capitalizing on the chaos’, ACLED, 18 June 2025; https://www.hoover.org/research/rumble-jungle-iscaps-rising-threat
27
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 24 and Annex 7.
28
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, Annex 7.
29
K. R. Kabagambe, ‘Unmasking the ADF: Inside the Rise of Current Uganda’s Most Dangerous Militant Threat’, Fam Reports, 4 June 2025.
30
J. Thompson, ‘Examining Extremism: Allied Democratic Forces’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 29 July 2021; J. Stearns, ‘Inside the ADF Rebellion: A Glimpse into the Life and Operations of a Secretive Jihadi Armed Group’, New York University: Congo Research Group, 14 November 2018; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2021/560, 10 June 2021, Annex 4.
31
J. Thompson, ‘Examining Extremism: Allied Democratic Forces’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 29 July 2021; J. Stearns, ‘Inside the ADF Rebellion: A Glimpse into the Life and Operations of a Secretive Jihadi Armed Group’, New York University: Congo Research Group, 14 November 2018.
32
J. Stearns, ‘Inside the ADF Rebellion: A Glimpse into the Life and Operations of a Secretive Jihadi Armed Group’, New York University: Congo Research Group, 14 November 2018; L. Serwat, ‘As M23 rebels take hold of eastern Congo, the Islamic State is capitalizing on the chaos’, ACLED, 18 June 2025.
33
J. Thompson, ‘Examining Extremism: Allied Democratic Forces’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 29 July 2021; J. Stearns, ‘Inside the ADF Rebellion: A Glimpse into the Life and Operations of a Secretive Jihadi Armed Group’, New York University: Congo Research Group, 14 November 2018; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2021/560, 10 June 2021, Annex 4.
34
‘Article 1 – Material Field of Application’, International Committee for the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
35
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.38.
36
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, 2 and Annex 2.
37
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 10.
38
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 9.
39
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 9 and Annex 2.
40
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, Annex 1. The ADF has also been active in Uganda. ‘ISIS – Democratic Republic of Congo (ISIS-DRC)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, February 2022.
41
K. R. Kabagambe, ‘Unmasking the ADF: Inside the Rise of Current Uganda’s Most Dangerous Militant Threat’, Fam Reports, 4 June 2025.
42
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, Annex 5.
43
N. Mooloo, ‘Focusing on M23 allows ADF insurgents to expand in eastern DRC’ Institute for Security Studies, 22 September 2025; ‘Congo’s army recovers largest Ugandan rebel stronghold’, AP News, 12 February 2018; M. Gyagenda, ‘Rwandan Army Uniforms, IDs Found in ADF Camps After Raid by DR Congo’, Soft Powers News,18 November 2019; ‘Muhindo Akili Mundos’, United Nations Security Council; S. Mugabi, ‘DRC Army: We’ve Killed 45 ADF Rebels’, Chimp Reports, 13 January 2020; ‘Njovu, the commander of ADF Camp in Mwalika charged over tourist’s death’, Kasese Guide Radio, 13 November 2023; ‘Women rescued from ADF rebels camp in DR Congo’, TRT Afrika, 19 July 2023.
44
Y. Dinstein, ‘Non-International Armed Conflict in International Law’, Cambridge University Press, 2021, 62; M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.
45
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 11.
46
‘Strategic Shift of ADF/ISCAP’, African Security Analysis, 18 April 2025.
47
‘Strategic Shift of ADF/ISCAP’, African Security Analysis, 18 April 2025.
48
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40; M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.

Non-International Armed Conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (and its support forces) and the Cooperative for the Developments of the Congo (CODECO)

Background

The FARDC and the ‘Coopérative pour le développement du Congo/Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du peuple congolais’ (CODECO/URDPC, hereafter CODECO) have sporadically clashed since 2018.¹ The NIAC between the DRC and CODECO started as early as 2021.² The group is fighting the FARDC in an attempt to take control of the entire Djugu region.³

CODECO has its roots in a militia established to represent the grievances of the Hema people regarding agricultural land use.⁴ These grievances have since become less important as the group targets civilians in the Ituri province in order to fight against the government and/or external control. Towards the end of 2024, M23 reached out to CODECO asking it to join a coalition against the FARDC.⁵

MONUSCO has played a pivotal role in providing support to the FARDC in their ongoing efforts to combat CODECO. This support has encompassed various crucial activities, including the destruction of illegal checkpoints, medical evacuation operations, undertaking patrols, and the establishment of temporary operational bases in affected areas.⁶ MONUSCO has also reportedly opened mortar fire against CODECO fighters and repelled CODECO attacks.⁷ In line with the support-based approach to classifying armed conflicts, it can be concluded that MONUSCO is a party to this NIAC.⁸

Intensity

Only one specific clash between the FARDC and CODECO was reported during this reporting period, which occurred on 6 April 2024. The group operates through a loosely structured hierarchy from towns in the Djugu and Mahagi districts in the Ituri province. ⁹ Towns from which they operate include Djuon, Fataki, Bule, Bunia, and Mahagi. These operations were confirmed by Colonel Chris Magezi, head of the Office of Defence Public Information for the UPDF.¹⁰ As the ICRC points out, NIACs often go through fluctuations of intensity, which include intensity temporarily dipping below protracted armed violence. This, however, does not lead to the declassification of the NIAC.¹¹ Therefore, temporal lulls in fighting between the FARDC and CODECO do not legally entail the end of this pre-existing NIAC. For a NIAC to end, one of two requirements must be satisfied. First, one of the parties to the NIAC ceases to exist, for example, the non-State actor is completely defeated or demobilized.¹² This is not the case as CODECO remained in existence during the reporting period.¹³ Or, second, there is a lasting cessation of fighting without any real risk of resumption.¹⁴ The clash between FARDC and CODECO in April 2024 and the targeting of civilians and internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps by CODECO¹⁵ indicates a very real risk of continued fighting between the FARDC and CODECO.

More significantly, despite the prolonged lull in fighting, CODECO continues to hold territory that, throughout the reporting period, remained outside the control of the FARDC. CODECO holds territory in the Ituri and North Kivu provinces, including large parts of northern Ituri close to the Ugandan border.¹⁶ Even in the absence of clashes, territorial control by a non-State actor indicates that the threshold of protracted armed violence may be met.¹⁷

The required level of intensity under IHL is met between the DRC and CODECO.

Organization

CODECO has a well-established command structure¹⁸ which includes regional and local commanders operating with autonomy over routine operations but receiving instructions on joint operations from its overall command.¹⁹ Overall command communicates operational instructions on potential operations during meetings or through social media platforms²⁰. As of June 2023, three CODECO factions were officially incorporated into the CODECO command structure. Representatives have seats at the CODECO headquarters and operate under the overall command of CODECO. These factions are the ‘Force de défense contre la balkanisation du Congo’ (FDBC, also known as ‘Force contre la balkanisation du Congo’), the ‘Armée de libération du Congo’ (ALC), CODECO/Bon Temple de Dieu (CODECO Bon Temple) and CODECO/Catholique.²¹

The overall Commander of CODECO, at the time of reporting, is General Bahati Charite,²² based at CODECO headquarters in Dyaro, Dhendo groupment in the Walendu Pitsi sector.²³ Other high-ranking officers include Kiza Charité, the armed group’s Chief of Staff, and his deputy, Désire Londroma.²⁴ Desire Nkuna Kiza, in turn, serves as the Secretary of Defence.²⁵

The command is structured into six brigades, each with its own brigade commander. The first brigade is based at the CODECO headquarters, under the command of Chief of Staff Kiza Charite. Maki Kasongo commands the second brigade, Alfred commands the third brigade, Rehema commands the fourth brigade, Logo Delo commands the fifth brigade, and the sixth brigade is commanded by Songe.²⁶ This streamlined hierarchical command structure, which previously consisted of only five brigades, ²⁷ is a result of an in-depth internal assessment of its command structure by CODECO commanders. During this assessment and restructuring exercise, particular attention was paid to increase their capacity to exercise ‘effective command and control’ and to achieve accountability of fighters who commit serious violations of IHL and international human rights law.²⁸ The Chief of Staff issues strategic directives to brigade commanders and subordinate local commanders.²⁹ Local commanders have autonomy over day-to-day operations but are required to submit operational updates to the Chief of Staff, who, in turn, provides guidance on coordinated large-scale operations involving mobilisation and synchronisation of military tactics.³⁰ The Chief of Staff also issues denials or assumes responsibility for attacks by his fighters.³¹ CODECO leadership has owned up to the difficulty experienced in limiting and preventing retaliatory attacks against civilians and denies giving such orders.³² Whilst punishment has been imposed for acts of theft or disobedience, there is no evidence of punishment in response to direct retaliatory attacks against civilians.³³ CODECO also trains its fighters prior to deployment.³⁴ What is clear from this command structure and the training offered to fighters is that CODECO is able to impose discipline and disseminate IHL.

CODECO generally plans large, coordinated attacks from strategic locations close to its targets after gathering sufficient intelligence.³⁵ The weapons of choice are mostly bladed weapons, such as machetes, as these weapons are less noisy than guns and delay alerting their enemy.³⁶ CODECO also uses guns, and fires to burn down enemy infrastructure as a military tactic.³⁷ The group often targets mining areas because mineral resources sustain its activities.³⁸

Apart from raising funds from illicit mining activities, CODECO also engages in kidnapping for ransom, taxation, and asking for contributions from members of the Lendu community.³⁹

CODECO actively recruits fighters either voluntarily or by force.⁴⁰ The majority of recruits come from the Lendu agricultural community.⁴¹ Communication is mostly handled by the official CODECO spokesperson Bassa Zurkpa Gershom⁴² through social media platforms.⁴³

CODECO is, therefore, sufficiently organized to meet the organizational criteria demanded by IHL.

The pre-existing NIAC between the DRC and CODECO continued throughout the reporting period.

1
‘Fighting in DRC’s Ituri Province Creates Massive Displacement’, African Defense Forum, 16 May 2023.
2
D. Uebersax, ‘M23 conflict caused nearly 3 out of every 4 displacements in the DRC this year’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 23 September 2024.
3
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/990, 30 December 2023, Annex 49.
4
‘CODECO Explained’, Everything Explained Today.
5
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 90; L. Karr and Y. Ford, ‘Uganda in the DRC’s M23 Conflict – Friend to All, Enemy to None’, America Enterprise Institute, 20 April 2025.
6
‘Dozen illegal CODECO checkpoints destroyed by MONUSCO in Djugu’, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo, 29 May 2024; ‘United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/176, 20 March 2025, paras 28–29; ‘Press Release: MONUSCO strengthens its civilian protection efforts in Ituri in response to escalating violence’, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 12 February 2025.
7
M. Hallam, ‘DR Congo: Militia kill dozens of villagers in Ituri province’, DW, 11 February 2025; L. Betyna, ‘Dozen illegal Codeco checkpoints destroyed by MONUSCO in Djugu’, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 29 May 2024.
8
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 16.
9
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 153; L. Karr and Y. Ford, ‘Uganda in the DRC’s M23 Conflict – Friend to All, Enemy to None’, America Enterprise Institute, 20 April 2025; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/431, 13 June 2023, para 104.
10
Chris Magezi, Post on X, 21 March 2025; Chris Magezi, Post on X, 26 July 2025.
11
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 18–19.
12
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 18 – 19.
13
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 126.
14
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 18–19.
15
‘DR Congo: Deadly Militia Raid on Ituri’s Displaced’, Human Rights Watch, 24 July 2023; ‘More Than 40 Killed in IDP Camp Attack in DR Congo’s Ituri’, International Center for Transitional Justice, 13 June 2023; ‘More than 45 killed in attack on DR Congo displacement camp: UN’, Al Jazeera, 12 June 2023
16
‘United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/403, 23 June 2025, Figure II.
17
ICC, ‘The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda’, Judgment, Trial Chamber VI, 8 July 2019, para 717; ICC, ‘The Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi’, Judgment and Sentence, Trial Chamber VIII, 27 September 2016, para 49.
18
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/990, 30 December 2023, Annex 49
19
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 126.
20
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/431, 13 June 2023, para 107
21
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/431, 13 June 2023, para 107.
22
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 154
23
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 127.
24
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, Annex 57.
25
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 154.
26
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 127.
27
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/990, 30 December 2023, Annex 49
28
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 152.
29
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 153.
30
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 154.
31
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 154.
32
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 155.
33
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, paras 127 and 156.
34
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/990, 30 December 2023, para 75; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 155.
35
M. Hallam, ‘DR Congo: Militia kill dozens of villagers in Ituri province’, DW, 11 February 2025.
36
‘PR: MONUSCO strengthens its civilian protection efforts in Ituri in response to escalating violence’, MONUSCO, 14 February 2025.
37
M. Hallam, ‘DR Congo: Militia kill dozens of villagers in Ituri province’, DW, 11 February 2025.
38
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/431, 13 June 2023, para 108; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 153; ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: M23 rebels strike in North Kivu and CODECO in Ituri’, Open Doors, 12 July 2024; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2022/967, 16 December 2022, para 93; ‘DR Congo: Deadly Militia Raid on Ituri’s Displaced’, Human Rights Watch, 24 July 2023; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, paras 127 – 128.
39
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/431, 13 June 2023, para 111; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, paras 160–161.
40
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 155.
41
M. Ellison and C. Nabiswa, ‘Analysis: ADF emerges as the deadliest armed group in east DR Congo’, BBC Monitoring, 29 November 2024.
42
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 154; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/990, 30 December 2023, Annex 49; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, Annex 57
43
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/990, 30 December 2023, Annex 49.

Non-International Armed Conflict between the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the March 23 Movement (M23)

Background

The FDLR are also fighting against M23. Despite receiving support from the FARDC, the FDLR’s military action against M23 appears to be occurring outside the control of the FARDC,¹ meaning that this is a separate NIAC between the two armed groups.² The first attacks by M23 and the RDF against FDLR strongholds were reported in 2022.³

FDLR has been a key ally to the DRC government in its fight against Rwandan-backed violence since at least 1998.⁴ The FDLR is of Rwandese origin and is composed mainly of ethnically Hutu members. The FDLR has been accused of being genocidaires owing to its involvement in the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi people.⁵ The FDLR remains sympathetic to the former Hutu regime in Rwanda.⁶

M23 declared that it is opposing those groups that discriminate and target the Rwandan Tutsi community, ⁷ and has specifically vowed to protect the Tutsi community against the FDLR. ⁸ It is, therefore, obvious why the fighting between the FDLR, who are a symbolic threat to the Tutsi, and the M23, who are a Tutsi dominated armed group, continues in the DRC.⁹

Intensity

FDLR fighters (often supported by FARDC, VDP/Wazalendo and FDNB) continued to clash with M23 and the RDF during the reporting period including in areas around Karengera, Rusayo, Kibati, and Kanyamahoro which are all traditional FDLR strongholds.¹⁰ The FDLR is often supported by Wazalendo groups and vice versa. The FDLR also adopted a strategy of embedding its combatants within Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie (VDP)/Wazalendo units and subsequently claiming that the FDLR had vanished.¹¹

Specific clashes reported include those which occurred in August 2023, ¹² January 2024,¹³ February 2024,¹⁴ March 2024,¹⁵ January 2025,¹⁶ February 2025,¹⁷ and April 2025.¹⁸ The FDLR and its allies, the VDP/Wazalendo, suffered heavy losses after intense fighting against M23 in Sake, Mubambiro, and Goma during the first half of 2025.¹⁹ Fighting in the Kivu region involving M23 resulted in the internal displacement of 1,100,000 people between January and June 2025.²⁰

The deadliest attacks in this conflict to date concerned the battle for the occupation of Goma.²¹ Heavy fighting, which occurred in January 2025 in Goma, between M23 and the FDLR (including support forces such as the Wazalendo) caused significant casualties in the FDLR.²² Goma is of significant value for M23 and FDLR as it is a provincial capital city which serves as a regional trade hub.²³ Violence started escalating between 23 and 25 January when M23 started cutting off key supply routes into Goma, Minova, and Saké.²⁴ M23 made their way into Goma on 26 January 2025.²⁵ By 27 January 2025, M23 took operational control of Goma.²⁶

The death toll from this fighting was reported as being approximately 900 to 2,900 people,²⁷ with at least 3,000 injured.²⁸ Many FDLR fighters were detained by M23 and handed over to the Rwandan government.²⁹

Intense fighting with M23 forced FDLR fighters to withdraw or relocate from the vicinity of Nyiragongo volcano and inside Virunga National Park. ³⁰ The military dominance of M23 over FDLR led to the FDLR losing territory to M23, forcing it to relocate its headquarters from Tongo to Shove, further south in Rutshuru territory.³¹

A major setback for the DRC was the withdrawal of SAMIDRC (the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) which was announced on 13 March 2025.³² This withdrawal was a direct consequence of political pressure in South Africa following this troop-contributing State suffering heavy losses³³ during the battle for the occupation of Goma.³⁴

Despite a brief strain in the FDLR and FARDC relationship stemming from the Luanda process between September 2024 and December 2024, ³⁵ the FDLR continues to receive significant military support and equipment from the FARDC.³⁶ Weapons provided by FARDC includes AK-47s,³⁷ however, other types of weapons provided are underreported. The government of the DRC suggests that Rwanda is inflating the nature of such support.³⁸

M23 has access to heavy weaponry and artillery ³⁹ including armed drone capabilities, ⁴⁰ unguided rockets, including 122mm grade rockets,⁴¹ and mortars and artillery.⁴² M23 also uses machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.⁴³ Military capabilities include signal interference (jamming and spoofing) equipment which interferes with aircraft systems⁴⁴ and anti-tank grenade launchers.⁴⁵ M23 also has access to the RDF’s high-tech short-range air defence system.⁴⁶ It is suggested that M23’s advanced arsenal is the result of RDF’s support.⁴⁷

High intensity fighting between the FDLR and M23 continued throughout the reporting period. The threshold of the notion of intensity, protracted armed violence, as demanded by IHL is satisfied.

Organization

FDLR

The FDLR consists of a political and military branch. These branches are closely intertwined and function as a single organization.⁴⁸

The FDLR’s political wing kept the moniker FDLR whilst its armed wing was named the Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FOCA).⁴⁹ ‘General’ Victor Byiringiro (alias Rumuri or Rumuli) serves as the interim president of the FDLR political wing.⁵⁰ His deputy, who also serves as the senior FDLR intelligence officer, is ‘Major General’ Cyprien Uzabakiriko (alias Ave Maria or Mugisha Kolomboka).⁵¹

The overall military commander of FDLR-FOCA (hereafter FDLR) at time of writing is Major General Omega Israel,alias Ntawunguka Pacifique. ⁵² There are some unconfirmed reports suggesting that M23 killed Ntawunguka in January 2025, ⁵³ although no successors were announced at time of reporting.⁵⁴

The military wing of FDLR is geographically divided; operational command strongholds are established in different territories. Command posts include the Rusayo stronghold in Nyiragongo territory under the command of Colonel Sirkoof (alias Gustave Kubwayo) and the Mubambiro and Sake stronghold based in Massisi territory under the command of Colonel Oreste Ndatuhoraho (alias Marinet).⁵⁵ Following clashes with M23, FDLR regrouped in three battalions, each of which are in charge of one of three strategic military routes (axes): (a) ‘Samariya’ is in charge of the Kishishe, Kalengera, Kibirizi and Mabenga axis; b ‘Jericho’ is in charge of the Rwindi-Nyanzale axis; and (c) ‘Médaillon’ is in charge of the Sake, Mubambiro and Karuba axis. ⁵⁶ The FDLR responds to operational realities, relocating positions when required.⁵⁷ Evidence of experience in military tactics includes the regrouping and resumed military operations by the FDLR after suffering heavy losses in Goma in January 2025.⁵⁸ As of April 2025, the FDLR, together with VDP/Wazalendo, engaged in front line military operations against M23 in Nyiragongo, Rutshuru, Lubero, and Masisi territories, and in South Kivu.⁵⁹

The FDLR has a specialised military unit called the Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur (CRAP).⁶⁰ Colonel Colonel Sirkoof (alias Gustave Kubwayo) has been acting as the CRAP commander since March 2024 and is supported by his deputy Ngabo Guillaume (alias Bagdad or Pierre Celestin Rurakabije).⁶¹ Other high-ranking officials include Defence commissioner, General Hakizimana Apollinaire (alias Amikwe Lepi, alias Poète),⁶² Brigadier-General Ezechiel Gakwerere,⁶³ and General Nyembo who is in charge of military intelligence.⁶⁴ The use of conventional ranks suggests that the FDLR’s structure may mimic that of a conventional professional standing armed force. It is suggested that the FDLR’s internal structure closely resemble that of the previous (genocidal) Rwandese army.⁶⁵ Key military decisions are made bi-annually by a steering committee which is composed of the fifteen highest-ranking commanders: the FDLR president, his two vice presidents, an executive secretary, and ten executive commissioners.⁶⁶

The FDLR can enforce discipline through its combatant’s justice system which employs magistrates to conduct trials. Consequences of disciplinary infractions include execution and forced labour.⁶⁷ FDLR also has training camps⁶⁸ which may enable this non-State armed groups to teach its fighters IHL.

The military strategy of the FDLR is shaped by battlefield realities. The FDLR changes location of geographic strongholds if so demanded and has strategically embedded VDP/Wazalendo militia in its ranks⁶⁹ as a response to a brief spat with the FARDC in September 2024.⁷⁰

Despite suffering significant losses in Goma in early 2025, the RDF’s official spokesperson estimated in June 2025 that the FDLR has between 7,000 and 10,000 fighters.⁷¹ The FDLR is continuously engaged in intensified recruitment drives as a response to losses suffered in fighting M23.⁷²

The FDLR sustains and funds this conflict through the exploitation of charcoal and wooden planks, imposing taxes at checkpoints, and conducting kidnappings for ransom.⁷³ Tree-felling proves lucrative to the FDLR, who has made up to US$1,118,000 per annum from this business venture.⁷⁴ The FDLR enjoys logistical support from the FARDC despite the arms embargo.⁷⁵ It is unclear whether the Washington Peace Agreement,⁷⁶ which calls for the disbandment of the FDLR, will halt weapons flowing from the FARDC to the FDLR.⁷⁷ FDLR has received weapons from ex-FAR, the ex-Rwandese Armed Forces under the former Hutu government,⁷⁸ from Rwanda in 1994, from President Mobuto of Zaire in 1996, and equipment from President Kabila of the DRC from around 1998 until 2001. Alternatively, the group has captured weapons from other enemy armed groups, including the Rwandan Patriotic Army and the National Congress for the Defence of the People.⁷⁹

The FDLR shares one voice. Lieutenant-colonel Sacramento Mahongue acts as the spokesperson of the armed wing, whilst Niyiturinda Placide (alias Cure Ngoma) is the group’s political spokesperson. The FDLR’s liaison officer is Fidele Sebagenzi.⁸⁰

It is clear that FDLR remains sufficiently organized under IHL.

M23

M23 is considered the most active non-State armed group in the DRC⁸¹ where it dominates territory in North Kivu and South Kivu. It is estimated that M23’s military wing is at least 3,000⁸² to 6,000⁸³ strong. Most M23 fighters are ethnic Tutsi.⁸⁴

M23 has a central command structure overseeing strategic decisions, diplomatic relations, and overall direction.⁸⁵ At the time of writing, the leader of the central command of M23 based in the DRC is Sultani Ammeanuel Makenga. ⁸⁶ The political wing and the armed wing reports to the central command structure. Governors in North and South Kivu also report to central command.⁸⁷ The political wing of M23 manages its external relations, propaganda, negotiations and political strategies.⁸⁸ At time of writing, Bertrand Bisimwa held the office of the head of the political wing of M23.⁸⁹

The armed wing of M23 is called Armée révolutionaire du Congo (ARC, Congolese Revolutionary Army).⁹⁰ The ARC/M23 is divided into groups which are operational in different zones. All groups are organized into units and fighters are awarded specific ranks.⁹¹ Ranks are akin to standing professional militaries.⁹² The ARC/M23 is not only tasked to carry out military operations but also exercises territorial control over parts of the DRC it successfully wrested from government control. The ARC/M23 is further responsible for the recruitment and training of fighters.⁹³

Key high-ranking officials in M23 at time of reporting include General Baudoin Ngaruye who is the third-highest ranking military commander in M23,⁹⁴ Brigadier General Bernard Maheshe Byamungu who is deputy commander of operations and intelligence,⁹⁵ Brigadier General Justin Gacheri Musanga, ⁹⁶ Colonel Léon Kanyamibwa who is in charge of military training in Tchanzu,⁹⁷ and Major Willy Ngoma who acts as the military spokesperson for M23.⁹⁸ Promotions are offered both based on performance and in recognition of bravery.⁹⁹\This hierarchical organizational structure is akin to responsible command as required by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II.

As the ranking structure of M23 is akin to a professional standing military and because it exercises stable control over territory¹⁰⁰ it offers different levels of training to fighters,¹⁰¹ and imposes discipline on its fighters, thus enabling it to implement IHL and specifically Additional Protocol II. Actual implementation of IHL is not required to satisfy this requirement Article 1(1) demands the ability to implement Additional Protocol II, not its actual implementation.¹⁰² M23 training, which lasts up to five months, includes rules of engagement¹⁰³ which could be aligned with IHL. During August 2025, M23 signed a deed of commitment to comply with IHL through Geneva Call.¹⁰⁴ Geneva Call is an NGO who aims to promote IHL norms among non-State armed groups.¹⁰⁵

Territorial control is a requirement of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. The M23 continued to exercise stable control over territory in the DRC throughout the reporting period.¹⁰⁶M23 also made significant territorial gains during the reporting period.¹⁰⁷

Colonel Jeff Kabayiza is in charge of M23’s logistics.¹⁰⁸ The logistical capacity of this group is enhanced by the consolidation of territories under its control in the DRC, which specifically includes North and South Kivu.¹⁰⁹ Access and control over natural resources such as minerals sustains M23’s military operations.¹¹⁰ Illegal logging,¹¹¹ taxation, and looting from farms also supports M23’s conflict sustaining efforts.¹¹² M23 recruits both by engaging in forced recruitment drives¹¹³ and by accepting FARDC defectors.¹¹⁴

Military tactics employed by M23 represent a hybrid of conventional military tactics and guerrilla tactics.¹¹⁵ Territorial control over strongholds allows M23 to be highly mobile and adaptable and orchestrate guerrilla tactics which include hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, and surprise raids. Examples of conventional military operations include the seizure and control of urban areas as was evidenced by the capture of Goma.¹¹⁶ The capture of Goma confirmed the continued ability of M23 to launch sustained and concerted military operations as required by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II.

M23 is also capable of launching psychological military operations against enemy forces. M23 is also known for its adaptability and resilience in the face of military setbacks; it is reportedly able to regroup and re-strategize to meet battlefield demands.¹¹⁷ M23 is also highly successful in launching military operations to expand its territorial footprint.¹¹⁸ Access to technology, such as reconnaissance drones and tactical intelligence, allows for strategic planning of military operations which promotes battlefield success.¹¹⁹ Apart from kinetic military operations, M23 has established a ‘digital army’ which employs disinformation campaigns as a tool for destabilization to gain military advantages. Lawrence Kanyuka, in his role as head of communication and spokesperson for M23, commands this portfolio.¹²⁰ It can be deduced from the intensity assessment above and from the military tactics employed by M23 that the territory controlled by M23 clearly facilitates the planning of military operations, fulfilling the final requirement in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, which requires M23 to be sufficiently organized to launch sustained and concerted attacks.¹²¹

It is clear that M23 is sufficiently organized as demanded under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II.

The pre-existing NIAC between the FDLR and M23 continued throughout the reporting period.

1
‘Fighting Fire with Fire in Eastern Congo: The Wazalendo Phenomenon and the Outsourcing of Warfare’, Ebuteli, 16 May 2025
2
D. Zane and W. Chibelushi, ‘What’s the fighting in DR Congo all about?’, BBC, 1 July 2025; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, Annex 23.
3
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 73; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/431, 13 June 2023, paras 86 – 90.
4
‘Fighting Fire with Fire in Eastern Congo: The Wazalendo Phenomenon and the Outsourcing of Warfare’, Ebuteli, 16 May 2025.
5
I. Wafula, ‘The evidence that shows Rwanda is backing rebels in DR Congo’, BBC, 29 January 2025.
6
L. Serwat, ‘In the Great Lakes region, lasting peace remains elusive between armed groups with international ties’, ACLED, 12 December 2024.
7
B. Coulibaly, ‘‘We are waging an existential war’: M23’s Bertrand Bisimwa on DRC conflict’, Al Jazeera, 1 January 2025; P. Huon, ‘After the fall of Goma and Bukavu, where is DR Congo’s M23 war headed?’, The New Humanitarian, 20 March 2025
8
‘Democratic Republic of Congo: What’s happening and why are M23 rebels fighting?’, Reuters, 14 February 2025.
9
J. Stearns, ‘From CNDP to M23: The evolution of an armed movement in eastern Congo’, Rift Valley, 2012.
10
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 71.
11
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 75.
12
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group
13
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 31
14
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 32
15
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 33
16
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 72
17
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 72
18
‘Clashes hit rebel-controlled Goma, largest city in east Congo’, Reuters, 12 April 2025.
19
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 65.
20
‘Democratic Republic of Congo: Humanitarian Situation Report No.1’, UNICEF, 28 August 2025.
21
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 78; S. Quillen, ‘DR Congo updates: Rwanda-backed M23 rebels tighten grip on Goma’, Al Jazeera, 29 January 2025; P. Huon, ‘After the fall of Goma and Bukavu, where is DR Congo’s M23 war headed?’, The New Humanitarian, 20 March 2025.
22
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 65; S. Quillen, ‘DR Congo updates: Rwanda-backed M23 rebels tighten grip on Goma’, Al Jazeera, 29 January 2025.
23
S. Quillen, ‘DR Congo updates: Rwanda-backed M23 rebels tighten grip on Goma’, Al Jazeera, 29 January 2025.
24
‘Tense calm, fears for the future in DRC’s Goma a week after M23 takeover’, Al Jazeera, 3 February 2025; ‘Escalation of Conflict in Eastern DRC Situation Report #1, January 29, 2025’, Reliefweb, 29 January 2025.
25
‘Tense calm, fears for the future in DRC’s Goma a week after M23 takeover’, Al Jazeera, 3 February 2025.
26
‘Escalation of Conflict in Eastern DRC Situation Report #1, January 29, 2025’, Reliefweb, 29 January 2025; ‘Tense calm, fears for the future in DRC’s Goma a week after M23 takeover’, Al Jazeera, 3 February 2025.
27
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 79; ‘As Goma ceasefire largely holds, Congo rushes to bury bodies from rebel offensive’, Reuters, 4 February 2025; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025
28
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 79.
29
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 73.
30
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025.
31
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 73.
32
‘SADC Continues Phased Withdrawal of SAMIDRC Forces From Goma and Sake, Eastern DRC’, Southern African Development Community, 12 June 2025; ‘New chapter as SANDF withdraws from DRC’, South African Government News Agency, 4 May 2025.
33
‘Statement by President Cyril Ramaphosa on the recent developments in the eastern DRC and deaths of South African soldiers’, Department of International Relations and Cooperation: Republic of South Africa, 29 January 2025; G. Martin, ‘Defence Minister and SANDF top management slammed for DRC deaths as M23 rebels threaten Goma’, DefenceWeb, 27 January 2025
34
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; P. Huon, ‘After the fall of Goma and Bukavu, where is DR Congo’s M23 war headed?’, The New Humanitarian, 20 March 2025.
35
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 67
36
‘Fighting Fire with Fire in Eastern Congo: The Wazalendo Phenomenon and the Outsourcing of Warfare’, Ebuteli, 16 May 2025; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; D. Gatimu, ‘DRC govt supplies heavy weapons to FDLR, allied militia as clashes intensify’, The Great Lakes Eye, 23 August 2025.
37
F. Misser, ‘River of arms’, Good Governance Africa, 31 March 2020
38
R. Gras, ‘What remains of the FDLR in eastern DRC?’, The Africa Report, 7 January 2025; D. Mercer and W. Ross, ‘DR Congo accuses Rwanda of faking genocide suspects video’, BBC, 2 March 2025; ‘Polémique autour de la remise de présumés FDLR au Rwanda’, DW, 4 March 2025.
39
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024
40
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, paras 51 and 52
41
‘DR Congo: Rwandan-backed armed group and Congolese army must stop using explosive weapons in densely populated areas’, Amnesty International, 19 January 2025
42
L. Serwat, ‘The resurgence and alliances of the March 23 Movement (M23)’, ACLED, 23 March 2025.
43
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024.
44
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, paras 46 and 47; I. Wafula, ‘The evidence that shows Rwanda is backing rebels in DR Congo’, BBC, 29 January 2025
45
L. Serwat and P. Bofin, ‘The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) operations abroad signal a shift in Rwanda’s regional standing’, ACLED, 27 September 2024; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024.
46
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, paras 49 and 50.
47
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024; A. McKenna, ‘March 23 Movement’, Britannica, 22 October 2025; L. Serwat and P. Bofin, ‘The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) operations abroad signal a shift in Rwanda’s regional standing’, ACLED, 27 September 2024; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024; I. Wafula, ‘The evidence that shows Rwanda is backing rebels in DR Congo’, BBC, 29 January 2025.
48
‘Waning Cohesion: The Rise and Fall of the FDLR-FOCA’, Small Arms Survey, 2015.
49
H. Romkema, ‘Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the DRC’, Wilson Center, 7 July 2011.
50
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 74; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, Annex 42.
51
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 74.
52
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 72; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 71.
53
‘FDLR commander Pacifique Ntawunguka ’Omega’ killed’, IGIHE, 26 January 2025; J. Karuhanga, ‘Rwanda: FDLR Military Leader Pacifique Omega Ntawunguka Killed. Who Was He?’, All Africa, 26 January 2025; J. Karuhanga, ‘FDLR military leader Pacifique ‘Omega’ Ntawunguka missing in action. Who is he?’, The New Times, 26 January 2025; E. Hakizimana, ‘Omega, the leader of the FDLR/FOCA, was killed’, The Inspirer, 26 January 2025; J. Le Bihan, ‘10 choses à savoir sur Pacifique « Omega » Ntawunguka, chef redouté des FDLR’, Jeune Afrique, 13 March 2025
54
J. Karuhanga, ‘FDLR military leader Pacifique ‘Omega’ Ntawunguka missing in action. Who is he?’, The New Times, 26 January 2025.
55
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 73.
56
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 77.
57
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, 2.
58
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, paras 65 – 67.
59
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 70.
60
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 75.
61
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 75; ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: EU lists nine individuals and one entity’, European Council, 26 July 2024.
62
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, Annex 51
63
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, Annex 51
64
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, Annex 51.
65
N. Florquin and C. Seymour, ‘Down, but Not Out: The FDLR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Research Note 56)’, Small Arms Survey, January 2016.
66
‘Waning Cohesion: The Rise and Fall of the FDLR-FOCA’, Small Arms Survey, 2015.
67
H. Romkema, ‘Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the DRC’, Wilson Center, 7 July 2011.
68
‘FDLR: Past, Present, and Policies’, Social Science Research Council, March 2014
69
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 75
70
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, 2.
71
‘RDF reveals FDLR has around 10,000 fighters’, IGIHE, 11 June 2025.
72
‘Fighting Fire with Fire in Eastern Congo: The Wazalendo Phenomenon and the Outsourcing of Warfare’, Ebuteli, 16 May 2025; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 64.
73
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 78.
74
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 133 and Annex 79.
75
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 72; J. Z. Walker, ‘The Resurgence of the M23: Regional Rivalries, Donor Policy, and a Stalled Peace Process’, New York University Center on International Cooperation, 4 December 2024; R. Gras, ‘What remains of the FDLR in eastern DRC?’, The Africa Report, 7 January 2025; L. M. Kagire, ‘Ex-FDLR leader: DR Congo’s support for Genocidal militia still the biggest threat to peace’, The New Times, 7 April 2025; D. Gatimu, ‘DRC govt supplies heavy weapons to FDLR, allied militia as clashes intensify’, The Great Lakes Eye, 23 August 2025.
76
‘Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda’, US Department of State, 27 June 2025
77
J. Bahati, ‘Addressing the FDLR Question: A Pragmatic Path Toward Lasting Peace Between Rwanda and the DRC’, Africa Faith & Justice Network, 17 October 2025.
78
‘Annex to the letter dated 19 December 2024 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2024/950, 20 December 2024, para 3
79
‘Waning Cohesion: The Rise and Fall of the FDLR-FOCA’, Small Arms Survey, 2015.
80
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, Annex 51.
81
L. Serwat, ‘March 23 Movement (M23)’, ACLED
82
L. Serwat, ‘In the Great Lakes region, lasting peace remains elusive between armed groups with international ties’, ACLED, 12 December 2024; J. Z. Walker, ‘The Resurgence of the M23: Regional Rivalries, Donor Policy, and a Stalled Peace Process’, New York University: Center on International Cooperation, 4 December 2024; I. Wafula, ‘The evidence that shows Rwanda is backing rebels in DR Congo’, BBC, 29 January 2025
83
P. Nantulya, ‘Risk of Regional Conflict Following Fall of Goma and M23 Offensive in the DRC’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 29 January 2025
84
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024.
85
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024.
86
J. Stearns, ‘M23’s operational commander’, Rift Valley, 3 December 2012; L. Serwat, ‘The resurgence and alliances of the March 23 Movement (M23)’, ACLED, 23 March 2025; I. Wafula, ‘The evidence that shows Rwanda is backing rebels in DR Congo’, BBC, 29 January 2025; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024.
87
‘Bahati Erasto’, Open Sanctions; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024.
88
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024.
89
B. Coulibaly, ‘‘We are waging an existential war’: M23’s Bertrand Bisimwa on DRC conflict’, Al Jazeera, 1 January 2025; ‘EU sanctions Rwandan generals on eve of crucial diplomatic week’, The Africa Report, 18 March 2025.
90
J. Stearns, ‘From CNDP to M23: The evolution of an armed movement in eastern Congo’, Rift Valley, 2012.
91
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024.
92
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024.
93
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024.
94
‘Baudoin Ngaruye’, Open Sanctions; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 36
95
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 105; ‘Bernard Byamungu Mheshe’, Open Sanctions; ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: EU lists nine individuals and one entity’, European Council, 26 July 2024; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 36
96
‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: EU lists nine individuals and one entity’, European Council, 26 July 2024; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 36 and Annex 24
97
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 39
98
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, Annex 23; ‘Willy Ngoma’, Open Sanctions.
99
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 35 and Annex 24.
100
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, paras 25 – 29
101
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024
102
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.38.
103
I. Wafula, ‘The evidence that shows Rwanda is backing rebels in DR Congo’, BBC, 29 January 2025
104
K. Jefford, ‘‘A scandal’: Geneva Call boss Alain Délétroz slams states sidelining humanitarian law’, Geneva Solutions, 10 September 2025.
105
‘About Us’, Geneva Call.
106
D. Zane and W. Chibelushi, ‘What’s the fighting in DR Congo all about?’, BBC, 1 July 2025; L. Serwat, ‘As M23 rebels take hold of eastern Congo, the Islamic State is capitalizing on the chaos’, ACLED, 18 June 2025; ‘The (new) M23 offensive on Goma: Why this long-lasting conflict is not only about minerals and what are its implications? – Q&A’, IPIS, 6 February 2025.
107
See above under heading M23’s capture of strategic towns.
108
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 36.
109
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, paras 44 – 47.
110
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024.
111
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, paras 127 – 130
112
A. McKenna, ‘March 23 Movement’, Britannica, 22 October 2025; L. Serwat, ‘The resurgence and alliances of the March 23 Movement (M23)’, ACLED, 23 March 2025; I. Wafula, ‘The evidence that shows Rwanda is backing rebels in DR Congo’, BBC, 29 January 2025; M. Toulemonde, ‘DRC‑Rwanda: Rubaya coltan mine at the heart of M23 financing’, The Africa Report, 6 February 2025.
113
A. McKenna, ‘March 23 Movement’, Britannica, 22 October 2025.
114
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024; ‘The DRC conflict enters a dangerous new phase’, DefenceWeb, 6 March 2025.
115
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024.
116
C. Murithi and E. Egbejule, ‘Who are the M23 rebels and why is there fighting in eastern DRC?’, The Guardian, 14 February 2025; J. Kabumba, ‘Islamic State-linked rebels kill at least 10 people in eastern Congo’, AP News, 15 January 2025; ‘‘Declaration of war’: M23 rebels claim seizing key DR Congo city of Goma’, Al Jazeera, 27 January 2025 ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: What’s happening and why are M23 rebels fighting?’, Reuters, 14 February 2025; ‘DR Congo’s M23 rebels enter centre of strategic city Bukavu’, Al Jazeera, 16 February 2025.
117
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024.
118
L. Serwat, ‘The resurgence and alliances of the March 23 Movement (M23)’, ACLED, 23 March 2025; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024.
119
‘M23 In Focus: Unraveling The Rebellion in the DRC’, Intelligensis, 23 February 2024.
120
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 28.
121
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40; M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.

Non-International Armed Conflict between the Cooperative for the Developments of the Congo (CODECO) and the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF)

Background

The UDPF deployed soldiers in the DRC in Mahagi town, located near the Ugandan-DRC border, during the first week of March 2025.¹ The UPDF spokesman, Felix Kulayigye, stated that soldiers were deployed in response to alleged massacres of civilians in this border region.² Approximately 1,000 UPDF troops were unilaterally deployed by Uganda to the Bunia, Mahagi, and Djugu territories of the DRC in February and March 2025, in addition to the UPDF troops already in the DRC in support of ‘Operation Shujaa’.³ The Congolese government made it clear that this additional UPDF deployment was carried out without prior approval from the Congolese government. ⁴ This additional deployment increased the total number of UPDF personnel in the DRC since 2024 to over 6,000, whereas the DRC government had only officially been notified of 2,000 UPDF personnel.⁵

Intensity

The first half of 2025 was marked by clashes between the UPDF and CODECO following the deployment of over 1,000 UPDF soldiers to the Bunia, Mahagi, and Djugu territories.⁶

Specific clashes were reported in February,⁷ March,⁸ and May 2025. ⁹

A particularly violent clash occurred in March 2025.¹⁰ The UPDF claimed to have killed 242 CODECO fighters in an offensive after CODECO had attacked a UPDF military post in Fataki locality in Ituri province. Other sources claim that seventy fighters and twelve soldiers were killed.¹¹ After these attacks, CODECO met with UPDF leadership in Entebbe, Uganda, to offer their apology for engaging the UPDF.¹² UN Experts assert that CODECO and UPDF were, in fact, engaged in weeks of intense fighting, including frequent aerial bombardments, which resulted in heavy casualties on the side of CODECO, losses suffered by the UPDF, and the destruction of civilian homes.¹³ Exact figures were not made available.

The conflicts ongoing in North and South Kivu, as well as in Ituri, had, by June 2025, led to approximately 4 million IDPs.¹⁴

The clashes between CODECO and the UPDF satisfy the notion of intensity under IHL.

Organization

CODECO is sufficiently organized under IHL.¹⁵

A new NIAC between CODECO and the UPDF, therefore, emerged during the reporting period.

1
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 134.
2
‘Ugandan army deploys to town in northeast DR Congo amid fears of wider conflict’, RFI, 2 March 2025.
3
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, paras 58 – 59.
4
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 59.
5
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 58.
6
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, paras 134 – 140.
7
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 126
8
‘Uganda military says it killed 242 Codeco rebels in east DRC in a week’, Times Lives, 24 March 2025
9
Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group.
10
L. Karr and Y. Ford, ‘Uganda in the DRC’s M23 Conflict – Friend to All, Enemy to None’, America Enterprise Institute, 20 April 2025.
11
‘UPDF Kills 242 CODECO Militias In Two-Day Battle At Fataki, Eastern DRC’, Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force, 21 March 2025; ‘Uganda military says it killed 242 Codeco rebels in east DRC in a week’, Times Lives, 24 March 2025.
12
‘CODECO Rebel Leaders Meet Gen Kainerugaba, Apologize For Attacks On UPDF’, Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force, 22 April 2025.
13
Chris Magezi, X, 21 March 2025; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 138.
14
‘Democratic Republic of Congo: Humanitarian Situation Report No.1’, UNICEF, 28 August 2025.
15
See above.

Non-International Armed Conflict between the Cooperative for the Developments of the Congo (CODECO) and Zaïre

Background

CODECO is a non-State actor, predominantly made up of Lendu fighters, that operates mostly in eastern Ituri.¹ CODECO originated as an agricultural development cooperative in the late 1970s but morphed into an armed group in 1999.² CODECO structured itself into a union of Lendu militias fighting over land disputes against the Hema communities.³ Zaïre is the moniker used to refer to the ADCVI or ‘Front populaire d’autodéfense en Ituri’.⁴ Zaïre claims to represent the interests of the Hema community.⁵ CODECO, representing the Lendu,⁶ and Zaïre, representing the Hema, are thus in direct ideological opposition.⁷

Clashes between CODECO and Zaïre resumed in 2017, when CODECO started attacking Hema civilians.⁸ They continued to escalate throughout 2018,⁹ eventually morphing into a NIAC during 2022,¹⁰ and remaining active throughout this reporting period.¹¹

Intensity

CODECO and Zaïre continued fighting in this pre-existing NIAC throughout the reporting period.¹² Violence between these enemies has escalated since September 2024 in Djugu territory.¹³ Clashes between CODECO and Zaïre spiked again in April 2025.¹⁴ Clashes that were specifically reported include those which transpired during February 2024,¹⁵ March 2024, ¹⁶ July 2024,¹⁷ and February 2025.¹⁸ CODECO made territorial strides by ousting Zaïre fighters from Mongbwalu and large parts of Bayali Kilo.¹⁹ Consequently, Hema civilians who are often targeted by CODECO would have fled these areas, contributing to the IDP count.²⁰

The types of weapons CODECO used in these attacks included bladed weapons and guns.²¹ Zaire’s arsenal includes AK-type assault rifles, Russian machine guns (Pulemyot Kalashnikova Modernizirovannyy or PKMs), Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPG-7’s), handguns, and grenades.²²

The violence generated from fighting between CODECO and Zaïre fulfils the intensity criteria demanded by IHL.

Organization

CODECO

CODECO is sufficiently organized under IHL.²³

Zaïre

Despite referring to itself as a ‘self-defence group’²⁴ Zaïre is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL. By 2022, Zaïre was considered an organized armed group by UN Experts.²⁵ Little information is publicly available regarding the command structure of Zaïre. ²⁶

What is known is that this non-State actor has a military wing²⁷ as well as a youth wing.²⁸ Fighters are also uniformed.²⁹ Known high-ranking leaders of Zaïre include Logo Marine Mugenyi,³⁰ a close ally of Thomas Lubanga and the Deputy Chief of Staff of Lubanga’s CRP/FRP,³¹ who commands training programmes in Tchanzu;³² Commander Baraka Amos Maki, based in Mabanga town, Djugu territory;³³ Commander Babala Fidele Castro Ngabu, based in Lodjo mining area up until June 2024;³⁴ Commander Chura, the leader of the Hema Youth based in Bule;³⁵ Commander Mandro Saliko, responsible for the Bua, Bahema, Banywagi chiefdom near Tchomia;³⁶ and spokesperson Vicky Ngona.³⁷

What is revealed about the Zaïre command structure is that it is hierarchical, and regional commanders command factions based in geographically dispersed operational areas. Four active geographically separated factions are Zaïre-K, Zaïre-Malayika, Zaïre-Mazembe, and Zaïre-Djamaique.³⁸ Operational areas include Nyaka and Mbidjo in the western Djugu district,³⁹ Madombo,⁴⁰ and Pluto in Lodjo, where this non-State actor has its headquarters.⁴¹

A commander in charge of training and the existence of training programmes,⁴² which at times are carried out together with the M23,⁴³ gives Zaïre the ability to impose discipline and to train fighters in IHL. Discipline is imposed through punishment, which includes fines, incarceration, or whippings.⁴⁴

Since 2022, this non-State armed group no longer primarily engages in self-defence tactics but rather employs planned attacks against CODECO. ⁴⁵ The Zaïre military leadership holds meetings in which they discuss military strategy.⁴⁶ Zaïre mostly launches large-scale attacks against CODECO factions in the Mongbwalu mining site areas.⁴⁷ It has, on occasion, engaged in guerrilla tactics such as ambushes and retaliatory attacks.⁴⁸

Zaïre provides logistical support to new fighters who undergo training in Tchanzu and are then deployed in Ituri.⁴⁹ Zaïre leadership made a tactical decision to join an alliance with the M23, the National Coalition for the Liberation of Congo (CNLC), and the CRP⁵⁰ during 2024, in order to develop a comprehensive strategy including logistics intended to benefit all members of the alliance with respect to identifying key areas of operations, operational bases, weaponry transit routes, and the facilitation of safe troop movements across Lake Albert from Uganda in preparation of possible large scale assaults.⁵¹ Zaïre intensified recruitment and training drives during May and June 2024.⁵² Purchases and transfers of weapons and ammunition increased in June and July 2024. ⁵³ The UN Experts suggest that fighters established a network of arms trafficking from Uganda.⁵⁴ Acquired military equipment includes militarized pick-up trucks, boats, and commercial drones, giving Zaïre increasing capacity to operate on Lake Albert.⁵⁵ Funding for military equipment and weapons comes from illicit gold mining activities, taxation labelled as ‘security taxation’ imposed on artisanal miners, and checkpoint fees.⁵⁶

Communities also contribute, either voluntarily or through enforced contributions, to sustain Zaïre’s activities.⁵⁷

Despite Zaïre holding a disarmament ceremony in Mabanga on 15 February 2025, most weapons were already non-functional and very few functional weapons were handed over. In addition, approximately 2,500 to 3,000 fighters returned to rejoin their cells in their operational areas after this ceremony. UN Experts consider this ceremony as staged; evidence shows that Zaïre continued to stockpile arms, train fighters, and fight during the first half of 2025.⁵⁸

Zaïre, therefore, meets the organizational requirements demanded by IHL.

The NIAC between CODECO and Zaïre continued throughout the reporting period.

1
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024; S. Lawal, ‘A guide to the decades-long conflict in DR Congo’, Al Jazeera, 21 February 2024.
2
D. Uebersax, ‘M23 conflict caused nearly 3 out of every 4 displacements in the DRC this year’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 23 September 2024; ‘DR Congo: Deadly Militia Raid on Ituri’s Displaced’, Human Rights Watch, 24 July 2023.
3
‘AFRICA/DR CONGO – Ituri Province: two churches closed after desecration by rebels’, Agenzia Fides, 25 September 2024.
4
L. Karr and Y. Ford, ‘Uganda in the DRC’s M23 Conflict – Friend to All, Enemy to None’, America Enterprise Institute, 20 April 2025.
5
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/990, 30 December 2023, para 74.
6
‘DR Congo: Deadly Militia Raid on Ituri’s Displaced’, Human Rights Watch, 24 July 2023
7
L. Karr and Y. Ford, ‘Uganda in the DRC’s M23 Conflict – Friend to All, Enemy to None’, America Enterprise Institute, 20 April 2025.
8
C. Sengenya, ‘Why Ituri’s war-displaced fear a UN peacekeeper pullout’, The New Humanitarian, 23 December 2024.
9
‘DR Congo: Deadly Militia Raid on Ituri’s Displaced’, Human Rights Watch, 24 July 2023
10
‘RDC-Ituri: Le groupe Zaïre/FPAC se transforme de plus en plus en un groupe armé organisé, avec un réseau de trafic d’armes en provenance d’Ouganda’, Actualite, 3 January 2023; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2022/967, 16 December 2022, paras 86, 87 and 89
11
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, paras 126 and 129.
12
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 126; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 82; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/990, 30 December 2023, Annex 50; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/431, 13 June 2023, paras 104, 110 and 113.
13
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 143.
14
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 129.
15
‘CODECO rebel attack kills 15 people in eastern DR Congo’, Al Jazeera, 19 February 2024
16
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group
17
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group
18
‘United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/176, 20 March 2025, para 25.
19
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 128.
20
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025.
21
‘PR: MONUSCO strengthens its civilian protection efforts in Ituri in response to escalating violence’, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo, 14 February 2025.
22
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 129.
23
See above.
24
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 149
25
‘RDC-Ituri: Le groupe Zaïre/FPAC se transforme de plus en plus en un groupe armé organisé, avec un réseau de trafic d’armes en provenance d’Ouganda’, Actualite, 3 January 2023; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2022/967, 16 December 2022, para 87.
26
‘Djugu, l’autre conflit sanglant de l’est de la RDC’, Congo Research Group, 27 January 2023; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2022/479, 14 June 2022, para 101.
27
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2022/967, 16 December 2022, paras 87 – 88; ‘RDC-Ituri: Le groupe Zaïre/FPAC se transforme de plus en plus en un groupe armé organisé, avec un réseau de trafic d’armes en provenance d’Ouganda’, Actualite, 3 January 2023
28
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/990, 30 December 2023, para 81.
29
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 150.
30
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 95
31
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 130
32
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 95
33
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 101; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, Annex 60
34
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, Annex 50
35
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/990, 30 December 2023, para 81
36
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 84
37
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/990, 30 December 2023, Annex 50.
38
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/431, 13 June 2023, para 117.
39
L. Karr and Y. Ford, ‘Uganda in the DRC’s M23 Conflict – Friend to All, Enemy to None’, America Enterprise Institute, 20 April 2025; ‘RDC-Ituri: Le groupe Zaïre/FPAC se transforme de plus en plus en un groupe armé organisé, avec un réseau de trafic d’armes en provenance d’Ouganda’, Actualite, 3 January 2023
40
‘Ituri (DRC): the Congolese army and MONUSCO launch a joint offensive against armed groups’, SOS Médias Burundi, 11 July 2024
41
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, Annex 96.
42
‘RDC-Ituri: Le groupe Zaïre/FPAC se transforme de plus en plus en un groupe armé organisé, avec un réseau de trafic d’armes en provenance d’Ouganda’, Actualite, 3 January 2023; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, paras 83 – 87
43
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 152
44
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2022/479, 14 June 2022, para 106.
45
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2022/967, 16 December 2022, para 89.
46
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 150.
47
‘RDC-Ituri: Le groupe Zaïre/FPAC se transforme de plus en plus en un groupe armé organisé, avec un réseau de trafic d’armes en provenance d’Ouganda’, Actualite, 3 January 2023.
48
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/431, 13 June 2023, Annex 67.
49
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 85.
50
L. Karr and Y. Ford, ‘Uganda in the DRC’s M23 Conflict – Friend to All, Enemy to None’, America Enterprise Institute, 20 April 2025
51
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 88.
52
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 81.
53
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 81.
54
‘RDC-Ituri: Le groupe Zaïre/FPAC se transforme de plus en plus en un groupe armé organisé, avec un réseau de trafic d’armes en provenance d’Ouganda’, Actualite, 3 January 2023; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2022/967, 16 December 2022, para 88.
55
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, para 81.
56
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 169; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, paras 98 – 103; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, paras 158 – 159.
57
‘RDC-Ituri: Le groupe Zaïre/FPAC se transforme de plus en plus en un groupe armé organisé, avec un réseau de trafic d’armes en provenance d’Ouganda’, Actualite, 3 January 2023; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2022/967, 16 December 2022, para 91.
58
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 129.

Diverse self-defence militia and VDP activity

The complex conflict landscape in the DRC has led to an increase in frequent and diverse self-defence militia activity. Such self-defence militias are non-State actors that traditionally assemble for the purpose of ethnic or communal self-defence. In the DRC, militias at times fight alongside the FARDC against common enemies who threaten the security of their villages.²⁰³ Bellal and Maslen observe that although the term ‘militia’ is not defined under IHL, it can be understood to mean a ‘military or paramilitary unit or group, which is not composed of professional soldiers but of regular citizens who are trained for their military duty in cases of emergency to support regular troops’ and that such groups do not usually form part of the State’s armed forces despite playing a supplementary role.²⁰⁴ Notable examples of militias playing a supplementary role in the DRC include the Wazalendo coalition of self-defence groups supporting the FARDC and its supporting forces against M23²⁰⁵ and the Raia Mutomboki, which has historically opposed the FDLR.²⁰⁶

The Wazalendo are a loose umbrella of self-defence militia, who are fighting alongside the FARDC against M23 in the North and South Kivu regions.²⁰⁷ Many self-defence groups in the South Kivu region have adopted the Wazalendo moniker in order to both legitimize their existence and criminal practices, and benefit from future government negotiations.²⁰⁸ In September 2023, the Congolese government formally created the Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie (VDP), which consists of selected members of Wazalendo armed groups from northern Kivu, and labelled it as its official proxy force.²⁰⁹

Notwithstanding the existence of the VDP, several other self-defence militias on the ground continue to use the term ‘Wazalendo’, and both terms are often used interchangeably.²¹⁰ This makes it very difficult to determine which Wazalendo self-defence militia forms part of the VDP proxy force recognised by the government.²¹¹ Militias using the Wazalendo moniker are so diverse in their motivations and compositions that fights between different Wazalendo groups often occur.²¹² Despite some evidence of VDP leadership and the appointment of a spokesperson, Jules Mulumba,²¹³ and some factions communicating on behalf of the Wazalendo militia more broadly,²¹⁴ official efforts to prevent internal strife within the Wazalendo factions have not been successful.²¹⁵

The nature of control exercised by the FARDC over those Wazalendo militias that qualify as VDPs is unclear and unstable.²¹⁶ Reports indicate that VDP fighters have, on occasion, attacked FARDC soldiers.²¹⁷ Imposing discipline and assigning responsibility is complicated by joint operations and cohabitation among various Wazalendo groups.²¹⁸

Wazalendo groups are further described as ‘undisciplined’.²¹⁹ The lack of discipline and structured command is illustrated by many Wazalendo factions focusing on recruiting new fighters for the purpose of expanding their own areas of influence, acting as de facto authorities, and starting illicit ventures.²²⁰ The FARDC attempted to integrate the VDPs into the armed forces, but this merely resulted in competition between the various factions.²²¹ After suffering losses in Goma, the VDPs were plagued by defections, distrust of the Congolese government, and internal rivalry.²²² Some VDPs even opportunistically aligned with the M23.²²³

The Wazalendo militias lack the degree of organization demanded under IHL to be considered as a party to a conflict. As a consequence such militias are disqualified from becoming bound by IHL through the support-based approach. These self-defence militias, however, lose protection as civilians while directly participating in hostilities.

Another prominent self-defence militia in the DRC, Raia Mutomboki, has its origins in communal self-defence groups that mobilized in southern Shabunda territory during 2005 and 2006 against the FDLR.²²⁴ This group now operates primarily in the northern territories of South Kivu.²²⁵ Multiple Raia Mutomboki factions exist²²⁶ although all of these factions share a common belief system based on their use of magical potions and fetishes (dawa).²²⁷

However, they generally lack a common command structure, as well as a unity of voice, and fighting between groups is common.²²⁸ This self-defence militia has been described as ‘lacking cohesion’.²²⁹ As a militia group, it is ‘not one of unliterary movement but a series of different armed groups, bound only by a name and a broad ideology of self-defence’ explicitly lacking any resemblance of a coherent chain of command.²³⁰ The rapid nature of splintering within existing factions hinders the establishment of internal institutions and hierarchies.²³¹ The Raia Mutomboki factions have differing relationships with the FARDC. Some Raia Mutomboki self-defence factions fight alongside the FARDC against M23²³² while others oppose the FARDC because of abuses committed by the FARDC against civilians.²³³

The Raia Mutomboki lacks the necessary degree of organization needed to become a party to a conflict, and members are to be considered civilians directly participating in hostilities when fighting alongside the FARDC.

Clearly, this list of self-defence groups is not exhaustive. As of mid-2025, more than 120 militias and armed groups were actively operating in the provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Tanganyika.²³⁴ In instances where these groups engage in self-defence or defence of their communities against unlawful acts, their members remain civilians unless and for the duration of their direct participation in hostilities.²³⁵

State Parties

DRC
Rwanda
Uganda
Burundi
MONUSCO (Bangladesh, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, South Africa, Tanzania, Uruguay) [mandate extended until 20 December 2025]
East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) (Burundi, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda) [premature expulsion in December 2023]
SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) (Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania) [SAMIDRC withdrew in April/May 2025]

Non-state parties

M23
ADF
CODECO
FDLR
Zaïre

Others

Congo Protection
Mai-Mai groups
Wazalendo/VDP

1
As noted below, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), which was established on 15 December 2023, has operated in an alliance with M23 since then. This entry employs the term ‘M23’ to refer to the AFC/M23 alliance.
2
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.44.
3
‘Colonial rule, dictatorship, civil war’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 19 July 2023; J. Kerstan, ‘Demokratische Republik Kongo’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 24 February 2025; N. Payanzo and R. Lemarchand, ‘History of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Britannica, 12 September 2025; S. P. Tunamsifu, ‘The Colonial Legacy and Transitional Justice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Africa Journal of Conflict Resolution, 12 December 2022.
4
‘Colonial rule, dictatorship, civil war’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 19 July 2023; N. Payanzo and R. Lemarchand, ‘History of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Britannica, 12 September 2025; S. P. Tunamsifu, ‘The Colonial Legacy and Transitional Justice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Africa Journal of Conflict Resolution, 12 December 2022.
5
‘Colonial rule, dictatorship, civil war’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 19 July 2023; J. Kerstan, ‘Demokratische Republik Kongo’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 24 February 2025; N. Payanzo and R. Lemarchand, ‘History of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Britannica, 12 September 2025; S. P. Tunamsifu, ‘The Colonial Legacy and Transitional Justice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Africa Journal of Conflict Resolution, 12 December 2022.
6
‘Colonial rule, dictatorship, civil war’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 19 July 2023; J. Kerstan, ‘Demokratische Republik Kongo’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 24 February 2025; N. Payanzo and R. Lemarchand, ‘History of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Britannica, 12 September 2025; S. P. Tunamsifu, ‘The Colonial Legacy and Transitional Justice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Africa Journal of Conflict Resolution, 12 December 2022.
7
J. Kerstan, ‘Demokratische Republik Kongo’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 24 February 2025; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; M. Zapata, ‘A brief history of Congo’s wars’, Christian Science Monitor, 29 November 2011; N. Payanzo and D. D. Cordell, ‘Mobotu’s Regime’, Britannica, 12 September 2025.
8
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; N. Payanzo and D. D. Cordell, ‘Mobotu’s Regime’, Britannica, 12 September 2025; ‘Assessment for Hutus in the Dem. Rep. of the Congo’, University of Maryland: Minorities at Risk, 31 December 2006.
9
‘Colonial rule, dictatorship, civil war’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 19 July 2023; J. Kerstan, ‘Demokratische Republik Kongo’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 24 February 2025; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; M. Zapata, ‘A brief history of Congo’s wars’, Christian Science Monitor, 29 November 2011; N. Payanzo and D. D. Cordell, ‘Mobotu’s Regime’, Britannica, 12 September 2025.
10
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; ‘Assessment for Hutus in the Dem. Rep. of the Congo’, University of Maryland: Minorities at Risk, 31 December 2006; H. W. French, ‘Kagame’s Hidden War in the Congo’, Global Foreign Policy, September 2009.
11
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; M. Zapata, ‘A brief history of Congo’s wars’, Christian Science Monitor, 29 November 2011; N. Payanzo and D. D. Cordell, ‘Mobotu’s Regime’, Britannica, 12 September 2025; C. McGreal, ‘The roots of war in eastern Congo’, The Guardian, 16 May 2008.
12
‘Colonial rule, dictatorship, civil war’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 19 July 2023; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; M. Zapata, ‘A brief history of Congo’s wars’, Christian Science Monitor, 29 November 2011.
13
J. Kerstan, ‘Demokratische Republik Kongo’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 24 February 2025.
14
J. Kerstan, ‘Demokratische Republik Kongo’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 24 February 2025; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; N. Payanzo and D. D. Cordell, ‘The Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Britannica, 12 September 2025.
15
J. Kerstan, ‘Demokratische Republik Kongo’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 24 February 2025; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; N. Payanzo and D. D. Cordell, ‘The Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Britannica, 12 September 2025.
16
M. Zapata, ‘A brief history of Congo’s wars’, Christian Science Monitor, 29 November 2011; N. Payanzo and D. D. Cordell, ‘The Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Britannica, 12 September 2025.
17
M. Zapata, ‘A brief history of Congo’s wars’, Christian Science Monitor, 29 November 2011.
18
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; N. Payanzo and D. D. Cordell, ‘The Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Britannica, 12 September 2025.
19
‘Colonial rule, dictatorship, civil war’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 19 July 2023; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; N. Payanzo and D. D. Cordell, ‘The Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Britannica, 12 September 2025; ‘Inauguration of DRC’s first democratically elected president in 40 years’, Reliefweb, 6 December 2006.
20
‘Colonial rule, dictatorship, civil war’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 19 July 2023; M. Zapata, ‘A brief history of Congo’s wars’, Christian Science Monitor, 29 November 2011; N. Payanzo and D. D. Cordell, ‘The Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Britannica, 12 September 2025.
21
‘Colonial rule, dictatorship, civil war’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 19 July 2023; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; N. Payanzo and D. D. Cordell, ‘The Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Britannica, 12 September 2025; ‘Secretary-General Hails Pretoria Agreement as Political Milestone for Peace in Congolese Conflict’, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 8 August 2002.
22
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; M. Zapata, ‘A brief history of Congo’s wars’, Christian Science Monitor, 29 November 2011; ‘Second Congo War 1998-2003’, EBSCO, 2021; ‘Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An ongoing crisis’, International Rescue Committee, 1 May 2007; ‘Democratic Republic Of The Congo’, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
23
‘Colonial rule, dictatorship, civil war’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 19 July 2023; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; N. Payanzo and D. D. Cordell, ‘The Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Britannica, 12 September 2025.
24
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; N. Payanzo and D. D. Cordell, ‘The Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Britannica, 12 September 2025; ‘Mandate’, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo; ‘The Resurgence of The M23: Regional Rivalries, Donor Policy, and a Stalled Peace Process’, Ebuteli, 6 August 2024.
25
‘Colonial rule, dictatorship, civil war’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 19 July 2023; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; N. Payanzo and D. D. Cordell, ‘The Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Britannica, 12 September 2025; M. Bearek, ‘Félix Tshisekedi’s improbable inauguration leaves Congo in a confused daze’, The Washington Post, 24 January 2019.
26
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; P. Asanzi, ‘The revived Luanda Process – inching towards peace in east DRC?’, Institute for Security Studies, 21 October 2024; I. Byegarazo and R. Mwansa, ‘Prioritizing Human Security for Peace Processes: The Nairobi/Luanda Process and EAC-SADC Regional Encounter on the Eastern Congo Conflict’, Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network, 28 February 2025; D. Chigunwe, ‘DRC/Rwanda Luanda peace process unpacked’, The Herald, 5 February 2025; ‘Deployment of the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Southern African Development Community, 4 January 2024; ‘SAMIDRC withdrawal from DR Congo underway’, DefenceWeb, 29 April 2025.
27
N. Payanzo and D. D. Cordell, ‘The Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Britannica, 12 September 2025; ‘The Resurgence of The M23: Regional Rivalries, Donor Policy, and a Stalled Peace Process’, Ebuteli, 6 August 2024.
28
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; J. Butty, ‘Rwanda, DRC Squabble Over Support For Rebel Groups’, Voice of America: Africa, 10 November 2023.
29
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; ‘DRC says Rwandan mineral smuggling costs it almost $1bn a year financial’, Financial Times, 23 March 2023.
30
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Council for Foreign Relations, 9 June 2025; ‘The Escalating Web of Conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’, The Soufan Center, 28 January 2025; ‘DRC: ADF exploiting M23 crisis’, Dragonfly Intelligence, 17 March 2025.
31
‘The Escalating Web of Conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’, The Soufan Center, 28 January 2025; ‘IntelBrief: South Africa Has Emerged as a Financial Hub for ISIS in Africa’, The Soufan Center, 21 March 2023.
32
‘The Escalating Web of Conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’, The Soufan Center, 28 January 2025; L. Serwat, ‘Conflict Watchlist 2024: Democratic Republic of Congo: Re-elected President Tshisekedi Faces Regional Crisis in the East’, ACLED, 17 January 2024; ‘IntelBrief: Uganda School Attack Shows Jihadists’ Continued Reach’, The Soufan Center, 23 June 2023.
33
‘The Escalating Web of Conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’, The Soufan Center, 28 January 2025; ‘Uganda’s DRC mission under scrutiny amid claims of double dealing’, RFI, 6 December 2024; C. Weiss and R. O’Farrell, ‘Media Matters: How Operation Shujaa Degraded the Islamic State’s Congolese Propaganda Output’, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point; ‘Uganda’s Operation Shujaa in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Fighting the ADF or Securing Economic Interests?’, New York University: Center on International Cooperation, 14 June 2024; L. Karr et al, ‘Africa File, April 3, 2025: Russia-Sahel Summit; Sahelian Juntas Target Chinese Mining; M23 Loses Walikale but Uganda Leaves Vacuum’, Critical Threats, 3 April 2025.
34
‘Congo, Democratic Republic of’, Internal Displacement Monitoring, 14 May 2025.
35
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: EU lists nine individuals responsible for human rights violations and abuses and for sustaining armed conflict, instability and insecurity’, European Council, 28 July 2023.
36
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat and J. G. Birru, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: February 2024’, ACLED, 7 March 2024; ‘France calls on Rwanda to stop supporting M23 rebels in eastern DRC’, The East African, 20 February 2024; ‘France calls on Rwanda to cease support for rebels in eastern Congo’, Reuters, 20 February 2024; ‘Macron urges Rwanda to end support for DRC rebels, withdraw troops’, Le Monde, 30 April 2024; ‘U.S.-DRC Relations: Disinformation v. Fact’, US Embassy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 16 February 2024; R. Muhumuza, ‘Rwanda rejects US calls for withdrawal of missiles and troops from eastern Congo’, AP News, 19 February 2024; ‘The United Kingdom is deeply concerned by the worsening conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo: UK statement at the UN Security Council’, Gov.UK, 24 April 2024; C. Pierret, ‘Félix Tshisekedi, president of the DRC: ‘Rwanda is not the only one responsible for the Congo’s misfortunes’’, Le Monde, 2 April 2024.
37
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; L. Fleming and D. Bikorimana, ‘Two armies accused of backing DR Congo’s feared rebels’, BBC, 9 July 2024; FRANCE 24 English, ‘Leaked UN report cites ‘substantial evidence’ of Rwanda supporting M23 rebels’, YouTube, 23 December 2022.
38
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Security Council Renews Mandate of Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2765 (2024)’, United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 20 December 2024.
39
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Security Council Renews Mandate of Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2765 (2024)’, UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 20 December 2024.
40
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo’, UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 26 January 2025; USNC, ‘Resolution 2773 (2025)’, 21 February 2025.
41
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Statement of the International Contact Group (ICG) on the situation in eastern DRC’, Germany: Federal Foreign Office, 27 January 2025; ‘Peace And Security Council 1256th Emergency Ministerial meeting held on the Recent Developments in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’, African Union, 28 January 2025; ‘European Parliament resolution of 13 February 2025 on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo’, European Parliament, 13 February 2025; T. Bruce, ‘Sanctioning Drivers of Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, US Department of State, 20 February 2025; ‘Treasury Sanctions Rwandan Minister and Senior Militant for Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, US Department of the Treasury, 20 February 2025; ‘Africa 54: EAC, SADC call for ceasefire in DRC, and more’, Voice of America: Africa, 10 February 2025.
42
‘Treasury Sanctions Rwandan Minister and Senior Militant for Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, US Department of the Treasury, 20 February 2025; ‘Germany suspends new development funding to Rwanda’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 4 March 2025; ‘Statement by Ministers Joly, Hussen and Ng on Rwanda’s involvement in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo conflict’, Government of Canada, 3 March 2025; ‘UK Statement on response to the situation in Eastern DRC’, Gov.UK, 25 February 2025.
43
‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: EU lists further nine individuals and one entity’, European Council, 17 March 2025.
44
‘About’, MONUSCO.
45
D. Tull, ‘Die MONUSCO und das Dilemma der Stabilisierung’, Vereinte Nationen, 24 October 2016; S. Jänsch, ‘‘It is clear that Congolese people are against MONUSCO’’, IPS Journal, 20 January 2023; P. Nantulya, ‘Understanding the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Push for MONUSCO’s Departure’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 20 May 2024.
46
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Justice for August 30th Goma Massacre’, Amnesty International; ‘MONUSCO is concerned by the heavy loss of lives after an unauthorised demonstration in Goma’, MONUSCO, 31 August 2023.
47
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Justice for August 30th Goma Massacre’, Amnesty International; ‘MONUSCO is concerned by the heavy loss of lives after an unauthorised demonstration in Goma’, MONUSCO, 31 August 2023; ‘At least 7 killed in anti-UN protests in Congo’s Goma’, Reuters, 31 August 2023.
48
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘DR Congo President sets early withdrawal of UN peacekeepers, country will take reins of its destiny’, United Nations News, 20 September 2023; ‘DR Congo President Tshisekedi seeks withdrawal of UN peacekeepers this year’, Al Jazeera, 21 September 2023.
49
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Military Group’s Expansion in Democratic Republic of Congo ‘Carries Very Real Risk of Provoking Wider Regional Conflict’, Mission Head Tells Security Council’, United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 8 July 2024; ‘Congo UN peacekeepers pausing pullout, no timeline for next phase’, Reuters, 9 July 2024.
50
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Security Council Renews Mandate of Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2765 (2024)’, UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 20 December 2024.
51
‘June 2025 Monthly Forecast: Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Security Council Report, 1 June 2025.
52
‘Q&A: Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict in North Kivu Province’, Human Rights Watch, 26 September 2024; ‘DRC: Impact of the state of siege in the provinces’, Africa News, 13 August 2024.
53
‘DRC: One year on, ‘State of Siege’ used as a tool to crush dissent’, Amnesty International, 10 May 2022.
54
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group.
55
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; M. Ferdinand, ‘DR Congo: Tshisekedi Announces End To State Of Siege In Eastern Kivu’, Pan African Visions, 14 October 2023.
56
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: 2023 General Elections’, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 15 December 2023.
57
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; C. Châtelot, ‘DRC elections: Voting extended to a second day after chaotic start’, Le Monde, 21 December 2023; E. Makumeno, ‘DR Congo elections: Vote enters second day after ‘chaos’’, BBC, 21 December 2023; ‘Congo: Election extended after logistical chaos’, DW, 21 December 2023.
58
‘DRC refuses opposition demands for election re-run despite irregularities’, RFI, 29 December 2023; K. Ahmed, ‘Presidential candidates call for rerun of Democratic Republic of the Congo polls’, The Guardian, 20 December 2023.
59
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; R. Gras, ‘DRC: Why EU is abandoning its election observation mission’, The Africa Report, 5 December 2023; ‘EU Cancels DR Congo Election Observer Mission’, Barron’s, 29 November 2023.
60
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘DR Congo’s government to ban protests against election ‘irregularities’’, France 24, 26 December 2023; ‘At least 13 wounded as DRC police break up banned election protest’, RFI, 27 December 2023; B. Malenga and E. Makumeno, ‘DR Congo elections: Fayulu’s supporters clash with police in Kinshasa’, BBC, 27 December 2023.
61
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘DR Congo’s President Tshisekedi wins second term with 73% of the vote’, France 24, 31 December 2023; E. Makumeno and J. Winter, ‘DR Congo election: President Felix Tshisekedi declared landslide winner’, BBC, 31 December 2023; ‘DR Congo Constitutional Court Confirms Tshisekedi Won Election’, International Center for Transitional Justice, 22 January 2024.
62
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group.
63
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘His Excellency President Tshisekedi inaugurated for the second term as President of the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Southern African Development Community, 20 January 2024; ‘DR Congo President Tshisekedi sworn in for second term’, Le Monde, 20 January 2024; ‘DRC president forms new government’, Voice of America: Africa, 29 May 2024; ‘DR Congo names new government after months of delay’, Reuters, 29 May 2024.
64
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘DRC’s new PM and parliament sworn in after months of delay’, RFI, 11 June 2024; ‘Tshisekedi’s new government prompts coalition disquiet’, Africa Intelligence, 11 June 2024.
65
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; V. Duhem, ‘DRC elections: Corneille Nangaa joins forces with M23 to create a new political alliance’, The Africa Report, 18 December 2023; ‘DR Congo opposition figure announces alliance with rebels’, The East African, 15 December 2023; ‘Exiled DRC opposition figure announces alliance with M23 rebels’, TRT Global, 16 December 2023.
66
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; A. A. Kasongo, ‘Congo recalls envoys to Kenya and Tanzania over alliance launch in Nairobi’, Reuters, 16 December 2023; M. Maina, ‘Surprise Exit: DRC Ambassador Ends Tenure Early After Diplomatic Recall’, Kenyan Foreign Policy, 20 July 2024.
67
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; S. B. Tshiamala and R. Gras, ‘DRC: Who orchestrated Joseph Kabila’s ‘comeback’ from exile?’, The Africa Report, 9 June 2025; ‘Assessing Social Media Perceptions of the SADC Military Deployment in the DRC’, Insecurity Insight, March 2024.
68
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; P. Ilunga, ‘Shoe on the other foot: Kabila also drawn into eastern DRC insecurity’, The East African, 13 April 2024; ‘Former DRC president Joseph Kabila accused of backing rebels’, The Citizen, 13 April 2024.
69
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; B. Malenga, ‘Former Congo election body head Yobeluo skips military trial’, AA, 24 July 2024.
70
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘DR Congo military court sentences 26 armed group members to death’, Al Jazeera, 9 August 2024; P. Ilunga, ‘DRC military court sentences Nangaa, M23 leaders to hang’, The East African, 8 August 2024.
71
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘EU opposes death sentence for M23 rebel leaders’, The Independent, 10 August 2024.
72
I. Byegarazo and R. Mwansa, ‘Prioritizing Human Security for Peace Processes: The Nairobi/Luanda Process and EAC-SADC Regional Encounter on the Eastern Congo Conflict’, Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network, 28 February 2025; ‘Overview of the EAC-led Nairobi Process’, East African Community; M. P. Dizolele and N. Elbe, ‘Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 February 2025.
73
I. Byegarazo and R. Mwansa, ‘Prioritizing Human Security for Peace Processes: The Nairobi/Luanda Process and EAC-SADC Regional Encounter on the Eastern Congo Conflict’, Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network, 28 February 2025; ‘Overview of the EAC-led Nairobi Process’, East African Community; M. P. Dizolele and N. Elbe, ‘Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 February 2025.
74
I. Byegarazo and R. Mwansa, ‘Prioritizing Human Security for Peace Processes: The Nairobi/Luanda Process and EAC-SADC Regional Encounter on the Eastern Congo Conflict’, Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network, 28 February 2025; ‘Overview of the EAC-led Nairobi Process’, East African Community; M. P. Dizolele and N. Elbe, ‘Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 February 2025.
75
F. Bauma et al, ‘The East African Community Regional Force in the DR Congo: A Regional Retrospective’, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, November 2024; ‘East African Community Regional Force (EACRF)’, East Africa Community.
76
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; F. Bauma et al, ‘The East African Community Regional Force in the DR Congo: A Regional Retrospective’, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, November 2024; J. Russo, ‘East Africa’s troops are leaving the DRC: what went wrong and what comes next’, The Conversation, 11 December 2023.
77
P. Asanzi, ‘The revived Luanda Process – inching towards peace in east DRC?’, Institute for Security Studies, 21 October 2024; I. Byegarazo and R. Mwansa, ‘Prioritizing Human Security for Peace Processes: The Nairobi/Luanda Process and EAC-SADC Regional Encounter on the Eastern Congo Conflict’, Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network, 28 February 2025; D. Chigunwe, ‘DRC/Rwanda Luanda peace process unpacked’, The Herald, 5 February 2025.
78
P. Asanzi, ‘The revived Luanda Process – inching towards peace in east DRC?’, Institute for Security Studies, 21 October 2024; D. Chigunwe, ‘DRC/Rwanda Luanda peace process unpacked’, The Herald, 5 February 2025; ‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Angolan President proposes direct dialogue between Rwanda and DRC’, Angola Press Agency, 16 February 2024.
79
P. Asanzi, ‘The revived Luanda Process – inching towards peace in east DRC?’, Institute for Security Studies, 21 October 2024; D. Chigunwe, ‘DRC/Rwanda Luanda peace process unpacked’, The Herald, 5 February 2025; ‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat and J. G. Birru, ‘Africa Overview: January 2025’, ACLED, 14 January 2025.
80
P. Asanzi, ‘The revived Luanda Process – inching towards peace in east DRC?’, Institute for Security Studies, 21 October 2024; D. Chigunwe, ‘DRC/Rwanda Luanda peace process unpacked’, The Herald, 5 February 2025; ‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; J. Tilouine, ‘War in the east: Congolese and Rwandan intelligence services close to finalising agreement’, Africa Intelligence, 3 September 2024; L. Serwat and J. G. Birru, ‘Africa Overview: August 2024’, ACLED, 6 September 2024; O. Ngutjinazo et al, ‘Congo-Rwanda cease-fire: A lasting peace effort?’, DW, 1 August 2024.
81
P. Asanzi, ‘The revived Luanda Process – inching towards peace in east DRC?’, Institute for Security Studies, 21 October 2024; D. Chigunwe, ‘DRC/Rwanda Luanda peace process unpacked’, The Herald, 5 February 2025; J. Tilouine, ‘War in the east: Congolese and Rwandan intelligence services close to finalising agreement’, Africa Intelligence, 3 September 2024.
82
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘DRC launches case against Rwanda to the African Court of Human and People’s Rights’, Africa News, 5 December 2024; ‘Court Hears Applications Arising From Case Filed by DRC Against Rwanda Over Alleged Conflicts in North Kivu Region’, East African Court of Justice, 27 September 2024.
83
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat and J. G. Birru, ‘Africa Overview: January 2025’, ACLED, 14 January 2025; ‘DR Congo, Rwanda peace talks in Angola cancelled after hitting ‘deadlock’’, RFI, 15 December 2024; ‘Congo and Rwanda say Angola peace talks canceled’, DW, 15 December 2024; ‘Rwanda, DR Congo peace talks hit snag as mediator Angola calls off meeting’, Al Jazeera, 15 December 2024; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025.
84
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; R. Gras, ‘Snubbed by Kagame, surprised by Qatar: Why Angola’s Lourenço gave up on DRC peace deal’, The Africa Report, 25 March 2025; ‘Angola ends mediation role in the DRC-Rwanda conflict amid failed talk’, Africa News, 24 March 2025.
85
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘Congo-Kinshasa: Five Former African Countries’ Heads of State Appointed to Facilitate DRC Peace Process’, All Africa, 25 March 2025; ‘9887^th Meeting’, UN Doc S/PV.9887, 27 March 2025.
86
‘Deployment of the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Southern African Development Community, 4 January 2024; E. Rose, ‘DR Congo Signs Agreement for SADC Troop Deployment’, All Africa; P. Ilunga, ‘DRC signs deal for SADC troops deployment’, The East African, 18 November 2023; E. Mutebi, ‘Will SADC bring peace to DRC?’, The Great Lakes Eye, 12 December 2023.
87
‘Deployment of the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Southern African Development Community, 4 January 2024; ‘SANDF deployment as part of MONUSCO; SAMIDRC withdrawal; SANDF Employment extension; Outstanding departmental responses; with Deputy Ministers’, Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 9 May 2025.
88
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘South Africa: Ramaphosa Approves $95m Military Extension in Mozambique, DR Congo’, All Africa, 25 April 2024; ‘South Africa extends troop deployment in Mozambique and Congo’, Reuters, 24 April 2024.
89
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; G. Martin, ‘SANDF denies SAMIDRC mission was a failure as withdrawal begins’, defenceWeb, 4 May 2025; ‘Another Regional Intervention Falls Short in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Reliefweb, 21 March 2025.
90
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘SAMIDRC extended to December 2025’, defenceWeb, 22 November 2024; ‘December 2024 Monthly Forecast: Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Security Council Report, 1 December 2024.
91
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Southern African bloc decides to end military mission in DRC’, RFI, 16 March 2025; ‘Media Statement: Committee Welcomes Decision to Terminate SADC Mission in DRC, Calls for Continued Diplomatic Interventions’, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 13 March 2025; ‘Statement by President Cyril Ramaphosa on the recent developments in the eastern DRC and deaths of South African soldiers, 29 January 2025’, Republic of South Africa: Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 29 January 2025.
92
‘SAMIDRC withdrawal from DR Congo underway’, defenceWeb, 29 April 2025; ‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group.
93
‘Seven armed groups reinforce their commitment to prevent food insecurity and sexual and gender-based violence in East Africa’, Geneva Call, 5 February 2024.
94
‘Seven armed groups reinforce their commitment to prevent food insecurity and sexual and gender-based violence in East Africa’, Geneva Call, 5 February 2024
95
J. Keaton, ‘As conflict worsens in eastern Congo, 2 armed groups pledge to respect civilians’, The Hill, 30 March 2024.
96
J. Keaton, ‘As conflict worsens in eastern Congo, 2 armed groups pledge to respect civilians’, The Hill, 30 March 2024.
97
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; S. Lewis, ‘Who was behind the DRC’s attempted coup, and were Americans involved?’, Al Jazeera, 20 May 2024; L. Serwat, ‘Africa Overview: May 2024’, ACLED,10 June 2024; ‘A live-streamed attempted coup in Congo shakes the region’, The Economist, 23 2024.
98
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; S. Lewis, ‘Who was behind the DRC’s attempted coup, and were Americans involved?’, Al Jazeera, 20 May 2024; L. Serwat, ‘Africa Overview: May 2024’, ACLED, 10 June 2024; ‘A live-streamed attempted coup in Congo shakes the region’, The Economist, 23 May 2024.
99
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat, ‘Africa Overview: May 2024’, ACLED,10 June 2024; ‘A live-streamed attempted coup in Congo shakes the region’, The Economist, 23 2024.
100
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; S. Rolley and J. Doneti, ‘Three US citizens sentenced to death in Congo over role in failed coup’, Reuters, 14 September 2024; ‘DR Congo military court sentences 37 to death in coup trial’, Al Jazeera, 13 September 2024.
101
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC on the Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and renewed investigations’, ICC, 14 October 2024; ‘DRC: The renewal of ICC investigations in North-Kivu raises new hopes for victims’, International Federation for Human Rights, 23 October 2024.
102
‘DRC: The renewal of ICC investigations in North-Kivu raises new hopes for victims’, International Federation for Human Rights, 23 October 2024; ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo’, ICC.
103
‘DRC: The renewal of ICC investigations in North-Kivu raises new hopes for victims’, International Federation for Human Rights, 23 October 2024; ‘The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Karim A.A. Khan KC, concludes his first visit to the DRC with the signing of a new Memorandum of Understanding, renewing cooperation towards justice in the DRC’, ICC, 6 June 2023; ‘Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Karim A.A. Khan KC, on the referral by the DRC regarding the situation in its territory’, ICC, 15 June 2023.
104
S. B. Tshiamala and R. Gras, ‘DRC: Who orchestrated Joseph Kabila’s ‘comeback’ from exile?’, The Africa Report, 9 June 2025.
105
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; S. B. Tshiamala and R. Gras, ‘DRC: Who orchestrated Joseph Kabila’s ‘comeback’ from exile?’, The Africa Report, 9 June 2025.
106
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; J. Afrique, ‘DRC: Facing treason charges, Kabila slams Tshisekedi as ‘drunk on power’’, The Africa Report, 26 May 2025; W. Nyamasege, ‘DRC accuses former President Joseph Kabila of treason, orders asset seizure’, Igihe, 20 April 2025.
107
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; W. Nyamasege, ‘DRC accuses former President Joseph Kabila of treason, orders asset seizure’, Igihe, 20 April 2025; Y. Kombi, ‘Congo suspends former president Kabila’s political party’, Reuters, 20 April 2025.
108
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; E. Makumeno and L. Fleming, ‘DR Congo ex-leader lashes out after immunity lifted for treason charges’, BBC, 24 May 2025; M. J. Kavanagh, ‘Congo Lifts Ex-President Kabila’s Immunity From Prosecution’, Bloomberg, 23 May 2025.
109
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Goma : Joseph Kabila has just arrived in Goma – AFC authorities confirm’, SOS Médias Burundi, 26 May 2025; C. Macaulay, ‘Ex-DR Congo president returns from self-imposed exile, party says’, BBC, 26 May 2025; M. Élysée, ‘Former president Joseph Kabila returns to the DRC, ending political exile’, Africa News, 26 May 2025.
110
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Congo ex-president Kabila makes first public appearance in rebel-held Goma’, Reuters, 30 May 2025.
111
S. B. Tshiamala and R. Gras, ‘DRC: Who orchestrated Joseph Kabila’s ‘comeback’ from exile?’, The Africa Report, 9 June 2025; ‘Congo ex-president Kabila makes first public appearance in rebel-held Goma’, Reuters, 30 May 2025; ‘Former DRC President Joseph Kabila Reemerges in Rebel-Held Goma Amidst Political Turmoil’, The Voice of Africa, 30 May 2025.
112
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat and J. G. Birru, ‘Africa Overview: February 2025’, ACLED, 10 February 2025; J. Winter and W. Ross, ‘Rwanda-backed rebels seize key town in DR Congo’, BBC, 5 January 2025; ‘M23 claims capture of Katale in Masisi’, Igihe, 4 January 2025.
113
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat and J. G. Birru, ‘Africa Overview: February 2025’, ACLED, 10 February 2025; C. Mureithi, ‘Rwandan-backed rebels M23 claim capture of eastern DRC city Goma’, The Guardian, 27 January 2025; L. Serwat, ‘Q&A: What is happening in and around Goma?’, ACLED, 29 January 2025; M. Bassim, ‘The Fall of Goma: Implications of M23’s Capture’, Catalyst, 7 March 2025.
114
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat, ‘Q&A: What is happening in and around Goma?’, ACLED, 29 January 2025; ‘DR Congo: Peacekeepers killed in heavy fighting with M23’, DW, 26 January 2025.
115
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat, ‘Q&A: What is happening in and around Goma?’, ACLED, 29 January 2025.
116
W. Ross and H. Khalil, ‘Rebels declare ceasefire in DR Congo for ‘humanitarian reasons’’, BBC, 3 February 2025; D. Vaid, ‘DR Congo: Rebel alliance announces unilateral ceasefire’, DW, 4 February 2025; C. Mureithi, ‘Rwandan-backed rebel group M23 declares unilateral ceasefire in DRC’, The Guardian, 4 February 2025
117
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat and J. G. Birru, ‘Africa Overview: February 2025’, ACLED, 10 February 2025; L. Serwat, ‘DRC: The Rwanda-backed M23 capture Kavumu, just 30 km from South Kivu’s capital, Bukavu – Expert Comment’, ACLED, 14 February 2025; B. Rukanga, ‘Rwanda-backed rebels capture key eastern DR Congo town’, BBC, 21 January 2025; ‘M23 captures Minova’, Igihe, 21 January 2025.
118
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; J. Le Bihan and R. Gras, ‘East Congo: After taking Bukavu, where next for M23? Uvira’, The Africa Report, 21 February 2025; P. Huon, ‘After the fall of Goma and Bukavu, where is DR Congo’s M23 war headed?’, The New Humanitarian, 20 March 2025; C. Mureithi, ‘Rwanda-backed M23 rebels capture eastern DRC’s second-largest city’, The Guardian, 17 February 2025; E. Makumeno, ‘Second DR Congo city falls to Rwanda-backed rebels’, BBC, 16 February 2025; L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025.
119
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘War in Eastern Congo: the city of Kamanyola has been recaptured by the rebels, which brings them to control the border with three countries’, SOS Médias Burundi, 20 February 2025; W. McMakin, ‘Residents say Rwanda-backed rebels are advancing on a third city in eastern Congo’, AP News, 18 February 2025.
120
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; C. B. Etahoben, ‘After Goma, Rwanda-Backed Rebels Regrouping to Capture Other Towns in DR Congo’, HumAngle, 3 February 2025; Y. Ford and L. Karr, ‘Congo War Security Review’, Critical Threats, 21 February 2025.
121
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘M23 rebels capture key town of Walikale in eastern DR Congo’, Al Jazeera, 20 March 2025; C. Mureithi, ‘M23 rebels capture strategic mining hub of Walikale in eastern DRC’, The Guardian, 20 March 2025.
122
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘M23 rebels backtrack on vow to withdraw from DR Congo’s Walikale’, France 24, 24 March 2025; ‘DRC M23 rebels to withdraw from Walikale in peace gesture’, Al Jazeera, 22 March 2025; T. Sakr, ‘M23 Rebels to Withdraw from Walikale in Support of Ceasefire’, Daily News Egypt, 23 March 2025.
123
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124
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 70; ‘Statement on Situation in Eastern DRC’, Republic of Rwanda: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 26 January 2025; L. Brooke-Holland, ‘Conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’, United Kingdom Parliament: House of Commons Library, Research Briefing, 20 February 2025, 17; S. Lawal, ‘A guide to the decades-long conflict in DR Congo’, Al Jazeera, 21 February 2024; M. Blanshe, ‘Rwanda & DRC accuse each other of using rebel groups to their advantage’, The Africa Report, 10 June 2022; S. Rolley, ‘Army disarray hobbles Congo’s fight with Rwanda-backed rebels, officers say’, Reuters, 4 July 2024; ‘Congo Army Vows to Punish Any Soldiers With Links To Hutu Extremists’, Voice of America: Africa, 22 November 2023; ‘DRC: Army promises to arrest “any soldier” in connection with the FDLR’, Africa News, 13 August 2024.
125
‘Photo of the week: eventful week between allies in North Kivu’, SOS Médias Burundi, 30 September 2024; O. Liffran and J. Tilouine, ‘Kinshasa’s secret operation to neutralise FDLR chief Omega’, Africa Intelligence, 26 September 2024.
126
J. Z. Walker, ‘The Resurgence of the M23: Regional Rivalries, Donor Policy, and a Stalled Peace Process’, New York University: Center on International Cooperation, 4 December 2024.
127
‘Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda’, US Department of State, 27 June 2025.
128
J. Tasamba, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo military orders Rwandan rebels to surrender’, AA, 12 October 2025.
129
J. B. Munyakazi, ‘Examining the Role of Youth in the Maï-Maï Yakutumba Insurgency’, Kujenga Amani, 1 February 2018
130
‘Minembwe: Plusieurs villages attaqués par la coalition Mai Mai Biloze Bishambuke, yakutumba et les rebelles burundais Red Tabara, l’armée donne un bilan provisoire’, Kivu Times, 8 December 2023.
131
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, paras 108 – 109 and Annex 54; R. Amani, ‘RDC: Le général rebelle Yakutumba, un vrai cauchemar pour L’AFC-M23 dans le Sud-Kivu’, Express Media, 7 July 2025.
132
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024.
133
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘RDC: ce que l’on sait du mouvement politico-militaire de Thomas Lubanga’, RFI, 12 March 2025.
134
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘RDC: ce que l’on sait du mouvement politico-militaire de Thomas Lubanga’, RFI, 12 March 2025.
135
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘War Criminal Thomas Lubanga Forms New Rebel Group in DR Congo’, All Africa; ‘DRC: Convicted warlord Lubanga announces new rebel movement in Ituri province’, Africa News, 1 April 2025; ‘War criminal Lubanga launches new rebel group, threatens fresh chaos in eastern Congo’, RFI, 1 April 2025.
136
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘RDC: ce que l’on sait du mouvement politico-militaire de Thomas Lubanga’, RFI, 12 March 2025.
137
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘DRC: Convicted warlord Lubanga announces new rebel movement in Ituri province’, Africa News, 1 April 2025; ‘War criminal Lubanga launches new rebel group, threatens fresh chaos in eastern Congo’, RFI, 1 April 2025; ‘Thomas Lubanga and the Convention for the Popular Revolution (CPR): Revival of Militancy and Regional Destabilization in the Great Lakes Region’, Robert Lansing Institute, 10 April 2025.
138
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025.
139
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025.
140
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025.
141
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘War criminal Lubanga launches new rebel group, threatens fresh chaos in eastern Congo’, RFI, 1 April 2025; S. Rolley, ‘Convicted war criminal Lubanga announces new rebel group in east Congo’, Reuters, 31 March 2025.
142
‘DRC: Convicted warlord Lubanga announces new rebel movement in Ituri province’, Africa News, 1 April 2025; ‘War criminal Lubanga launches new rebel group, threatens fresh chaos in eastern Congo’, RFI, 1 April 2025; ‘Lubanga Case’, ICC.
143
‘War criminal Lubanga launches new rebel group, threatens fresh chaos in eastern Congo’, RFI, 1 April 2025; ‘Convicted Congolese war criminal Thomas Lubanga forms new rebel group in Ituri’, The East African, 31 March 2025; J. Nsiku, ‘Thomas Lubanga: From ICC Convict to Rebel Leader – A Threat Reborn in Ituri’, Great Lake Crisis, 14 March 2025.
144
‘War criminal Lubanga launches new rebel group, threatens fresh chaos in eastern Congo’, RFI, 1 April 2025; S. Rolley, ‘Convicted war criminal Lubanga announces new rebel group in east Congo’, Reuters, 31 March 2025; ‘RDC: retenu en otage depuis deux mois, l’ancien chef de guerre Thomas Lubanga a retrouvé la liberté’, Jeune Afrique, 13 April 2022; T. Sakr, ‘War Criminal Lubanga Forms New Rebel Group, Threatens Eastern Congo Stability’, Daily News Egypt, 1 April 2025.
145
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘DRC: Colonel KAINA, ex-FARDC, creates a new rebellion in Ituri’, Kivu Morning Post, 2 April 2025; ‘Col. Kaina wahoze muri M23 yasubiye mu ishyamba’, Umuryango, 1 April 2025; ‘Colonel Innocent Kaina wahoze muri M23 yashinze Umutwe yise FNLC’, Ahupa Visual Radio, 1 April 2025.
146
‘DRC: Colonel KAINA, ex-FARDC, creates a new rebellion in Ituri’, Kivu Morning Post, 2 April 2025; ‘Col. Kaina wahoze muri M23 yasubiye mu ishyamba’, Umuryango, 1 April 2025; ‘Colonel Innocent Kaina wahoze muri M23 yashinze Umutwe yise FNLC’, Ahupa Visual Radio, 1 April 2025.
147
‘DRC: Colonel KAINA, ex-FARDC, creates a new rebellion in Ituri’, Kivu Morning Post, 2 April 2025; ‘Col. Kaina wahoze muri M23 yasubiye mu ishyamba’, Umuryango, 1 April 2025; ‘Colonel Innocent Kaina wahoze muri M23 yashinze Umutwe yise FNLC’, Ahupa Visual Radio, 1 April 2025.
148
‘DRC: Colonel KAINA, ex-FARDC, creates a new rebellion in Ituri’, Kivu Morning Post, 2 April 2025; ‘Col. Kaina wahoze muri M23 yasubiye mu ishyamba’, Umuryango, 1 April 2025; ‘Colonel Innocent Kaina wahoze muri M23 yashinze Umutwe yise FNLC’, Ahupa Visual Radio, 1 April 2025.
149
‘DRC: Colonel KAINA, ex-FARDC, creates a new rebellion in Ituri’, Kivu Morning Post, 2 April 2025; ‘Col. Kaina wahoze muri M23 yasubiye mu ishyamba’, Umuryango, 1 April 2025; ‘Colonel Innocent Kaina wahoze muri M23 yashinze Umutwe yise FNLC’, Ahupa Visual Radio, 1 April 2025.
150
‘DRC: Colonel KAINA, ex-FARDC, creates a new rebellion in Ituri’, Kivu Morning Post, 2 April 2025; ‘Col. Kaina wahoze muri M23 yasubiye mu ishyamba’, Umuryango, 1 April 2025; ‘Colonel Innocent Kaina wahoze muri M23 yashinze Umutwe yise FNLC’, Ahupa Visual Radio, 1 April 2025.
151
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025.
152
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153
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; A. Lime and A. Okumu, ‘Uganda school attack: “Gospel songs interrupted by screaming”’, BBC, 18 June 2023; ‘Ugandan School Attack’, UK Parliament, 20 June 2023; ‘Play materials and dignity kits making a difference for education in emergency contexts in Uganda’, UNICEF, 10 October 2023.
154
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group.
155
L. Karr et al, ‘Africa File, April 3, 2025: Russia-Sahel Summit; Sahelian Juntas Target Chinese Mining; M23 Loses Walikale but Uganda Leaves Vacuum’, Critical Threats, 3 April 2025; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024.
156
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; A. Oyinloye, ‘DRC: Félix Tshisekedi announces continued military cooperation with Uganda in fight against ADF’, Africa News, 14 October 2024; ‘Congo, Uganda: Congolese Leader Announces Extension of Joint Operations Against ADF Rebels’, Rane, 14 October 2024.
157
L. Serwat, ‘As M23 rebels take hold of eastern Congo, the Islamic State is capitalizing on the chaos’, ACLED, 18 June 2025; ‘Uganda deploys additional troops to DRC’, Economist Intelligence, 11 February 2025; D. Lewis and S. Rolley, ‘Uganda sends 1,000 more soldiers to east Congo near M23 conflict, sources say’, Reuters, 4 February 2025; ‘Uganda Deploys Additional Troops to Eastern Congo Amid Escalating Conflict’, Insider, 4 February 2025; P. Kenyette, ‘Ugandan troops enter DRC to combat militias’, Military Africa, 25 February 2025; ‘Uganda Deploys 1,000 More Soldiers to Eastern Congo Amid M23 Conflict’, Hicgi News Agency, 4 February 2025.
158
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025.
159
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘UN Security Council Pins Uganda for Deploying 4000 Extra Troops in DRC Without Consent’, Kamwokya Times, 24 July 2025.
160
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘UN Security Council Pins Uganda for Deploying 4000 Extra Troops in DRC Without Consent’, Kamwokya Times, 24 July 2025.
161
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘Tense calm, fears for the future in DRC’s Goma a week after M23 takeover’, Al Jazeera, 3 February 2025; D. Pankhurst, ‘DRC rebels take eastern city of Goma – why it matters and what could happen next’, The Conversation, 4 February 2025.
162
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025.
163
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; A. Kayinamura, ‘Museveni says UPDF not in Congo to fight M23’, The New Times, 22 September 2025.
164
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘UN Security Council Pins Uganda for Deploying 4000 Extra Troops in DRC Without Consent’, Kamwokya Times, 24 July 2025.
165
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025.
166
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘Burundi warns Rwanda as eastern DR Congo conflict advances’, RFI, 12 February 2025.
167
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; S. Kasujja, ‘Tension rises between DRC, Burundi armies as M23 captures more territory’, The Great Lakes Eye, 26 January 2025.
168
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘Burundi troops deploy in eastern DRC’s Uvira as M23 rebels close in’, TRT Global, 25 February 2025; ‘Burundi troops withdraw in eastern Congo as M23 rebels expand reach, sources say’, Reuters, 18 February 2025.
169
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘Burundi troops withdraw in eastern Congo as M23 rebels expand reach, sources say’, Reuters, 18 February 2025.
170
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘South Kivu: Burundian troops in large numbers in Fizi to slow down Twirwaneho and contain the M23’, SOS Médias Burundi, 23 May 2025; ‘Eastern DRC: Burundi fuels chaos with soldiers and civilians recruited into the Wazalendo’,SOS Médias Burundi, 25 May 2025.
171
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘Congolese escaping M23 conflict face new hardships in Burundi’, The New Humanitarian, 12 May 2025.
172
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; S. Kasujja, ‘Why DRC continues to be a death trap for Burundian soldiers’, The Great Lakes Eye, 26 April 2025; ‘Uvira: 17 Burundian soldiers killed in clashes in Rugezi’, SOS Médias Burundi, 16 April 2025; ‘Burundi Troops Killed In Fighting With M23 In DR Congo: Military’, Barron’s, 13 March 2025.
173
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; N. Maseko and N. Booty, ‘Rwanda planning to attack Burundi, president tells BBC’, BBC, 25 March 2025; A. Naughtie, ‘Burundi president claims Rwanda plans to incite war in his country’, Euro News, 25 March 2025.
174
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025; ‘Rwanda says Burundi president’s claim it will attack ‘unfortunate’’, TRT Global, 25 March 2025; M. Ozkan, ‘Rwanda calls Burundi president’s claim that Kigali plans to attack his country ‘unfortunate’’, AA, 26 March 2025.
175
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025.
176
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177
‘Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 7 February 2025: S-37/1: Situation of human rights in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo’, 12 February 2025; ‘Human Rights Council Establishes Fact-Finding Mission on Human Rights Abuses and Violations in the Provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Also Establishes Independent Commission of Inquiry to Continue Work of the Fact-Finding Mission’, OHCHR, 7 February 2025.
178
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: April 2025’, ACLED, 4 April 2025; L. Serwat, ‘DRC: A ceasefire agreement has been reached between the DRC and Rwanda – Expert Comment’, ACLED, 19 March 2025; ‘Joint Statement on Efforts to Support Peace in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo’, US Department of State, 30 April 2025; ‘Security Council urged to support eastern DR Congo peace initiatives’, UN News, 16 April 2025.
179
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: April 2025’, ACLED, 4 April 2025.
180
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘M23 rebels backtrack on vow to withdraw from DR Congo’s Walikale’, France 24, 24 March 2025; ‘DRC M23 rebels to withdraw from Walikale in peace gesture’, Al Jazeera, 22 March 2025; T. Sakr, ‘M23 Rebels to Withdraw from Walikale in Support of Ceasefire’, Daily News Egypt, 23 March 2025.
181
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Digital Press Briefing: Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos and Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Corina Sanders’, US Department of State, 17 April 2025; H. Kimuyu, ‘Trump’s in-law tours Kenya, Great Lakes with eyes on Congo minerals’, The East African, 2 April 2025.
182
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; S. Rolley and A.A. Kasongo, ‘Congo, M23 commit to work towards peace after Doha talks’, Reuters, 24 April 2025; ‘Qatar offers proposal in stalled peace talks between DRC and M23’, RFI, 6 June 2025.
183
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘Qatar offers proposal in stalled peace talks between DRC and M23’, RFI, 6 June 2025; A. Mills and S. Rolley, ‘Congo and M23 rebels resume peace talks in Doha, sources say’, Reuters, 6 May 2025.
184
‘Qatar offers proposal in stalled peace talks between DRC and M23’, RFI, 6 June 2025; R. Maclean, ‘Trump Says the US Is Close to Brokering a Congo-Rwanda Peace Deal’, New York Times, 21 May 2025.
185
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group.
186
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘DR Congo, Rwanda agree to draft peace deal by May 2’, Al Jazeera, 26 April 2025; ‘Rwanda and DR Congo set May 2 deadline for peace deal’, France 24, 25 April 2025; ‘Rwanda, DR Congo set goal for peace deal draft amid lingering suspicion on both sides’, Le Monde, 26 April 2025; W. Ross and J. Lukiv, ‘DR Congo and Rwanda vow to agree peace plan within days’, BBC, 26 April 2025.
187
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188
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; P. Nije, ‘DR Congo-Rwanda peace deal met with scepticism in rebel-held city’, BBC, 28 June 2025; ‘The DR Congo-Rwanda Deal: Now Comes the Hard Part’, International Crisis Group, 4 July 2025; S. Sanderson, ‘DRC-Rwanda peace deal: What you need to know’, DW, 27 June 2025.
189
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; P. Nije, ‘DR Congo-Rwanda peace deal met with scepticism in rebel-held city’, BBC, 28 June 2025; ‘The DR Congo-Rwanda Deal: Now Comes the Hard Part’, International Crisis Group, 4 July 2025; S. Sanderson, ‘DRC-Rwanda peace deal: What you need to know’, DW, 27 June 2025.
190
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; P. Nije, ‘DR Congo-Rwanda peace deal met with scepticism in rebel-held city’, BBC, 28 June 2025; ‘The DR Congo-Rwanda Deal: Now Comes the Hard Part’, International Crisis Group, 4 July 2025; S. Sanderson, ‘DRC-Rwanda peace deal: What you need to know’, DW, 27 June 2025.
191
‘Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Crisis Group; ‘DR Congo, M23 rebels sign deal in Qatar to end fighting in eastern Congo’, Al Jazeera, 19 July 2025; ‘Doha agreement brings DR Congo government and M23 rebels a step closer to peace’, UN News, 20 July 2025; D. N. Kupemba and N. Booty, ‘Hope for peace as DR Congo and M23 rebels sign deal in Qatar’, BBC, 19 July 2025.
192
D. N. Kupemba and N. Booty, ‘Hope for peace as DR Congo and M23 rebels sign deal in Qatar’, BBC, 19 July 2025; ‘DR Congo and Rwanda-backed M23 rebels sign ceasefire agreement in Qatar’, France 24, 19 July 2025.
193
D. N. Kupemba and N. Booty, ‘Hope for peace as DR Congo and M23 rebels sign deal in Qatar’, BBC, 19 July 2025; ‘DR Congo and M23 rebels say they will sign peace deal mid-August’, RFI, 22 July 2025; S. Mwanamilongo, ‘Experts sceptical about DR Congo peace deal’, DW, 20 July 2025.
194
‘PR: MONUSCO welcomes the signing of the cessation of hostilities agreement in Ituri and calls on non-signatory armed groups to join the peace dynamic’, UN Peacekeeping, 1 July 2025; ‘RDC: six groupes armés signent un accord de paix en Ituri’, RFI, 29 June 2025; J. T. Okala, ‘In Aru, Local Armed Groups Commit to Ending Hostilities in Ituri’, MONUSCO, 1 July 2025.
195
‘RDC: six groupes armés signent un accord de paix en Ituri’, RFI, 29 June 2025; J. T. Okala, ‘In Aru, Local Armed Groups Commit to Ending Hostilities in Ituri’, MONUSCO, 1 July 2025.
196
‘RDC: six groupes armés signent un accord de paix en Ituri’, RFI, 29 June 2025; JT. Okala, ‘In Aru, Local Armed Groups Commit to Ending Hostilities in Ituri’, MONUSCO, 1 July 2025.
197
‘RDC: six groupes armés signent un accord de paix en Ituri’, RFI, 29 June 2025; J. T. Okala, ‘In Aru, Local Armed Groups Commit to Ending Hostilities in Ituri’, MONUSCO, 1 July 2025.
198
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 16.
199
R. Gras, ‘French and Romanian instructors, Chinese drones… Tshisekedi outsources the fight against M23’, The Africa Report, 22 May 2024
200
I. Walufa, ‘DR Congo’s failed gamble on Romanian mercenaries’, BBC, 31 January 2025
201
I. Walufa, ‘DR Congo’s failed gamble on Romanian mercenaries’, BBC, 31 January 2025
202
‘Erik Prince’s Involvement in the DRC’, African Security Analysis, 20 May 2025.
203
P. Huon, ‘‘Ticking time bomb’: DR Congo turns to abusive militias to fight M23 rebels’, The New Humanitarian, 13 August 2024; J. Verweijen and M. Thill, ‘DRC has created a reserve force to fight M23 – why this may backfire’, The Conversation, 27 January 2025; C. P. Davey, ‘DRC: rising Twirwaneho rebel group highlights the unending volatility of the country’s east’, The Conversation, 28 August 2023.
204
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 17.10.
205
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 63
206
J. Stearns et al, ‘Raia Mutomboki: The flawed peace process in the DRC and the birth of an armed franchise’, Rift Valley, 2013.
207
‘Fighting Fire with Fire in Eastern Congo: The Wazalendo Phenomenon and the Outsourcing of Warfare’, Ebuteli, 16 May 2025; P. Huon, ‘‘Ticking time bomb’: DR Congo turns to abusive militias to fight M23 rebels’, The New Humanitarian, 13 August 2024; J. Verweijen and M. Thill, ‘DRC has created a reserve force to fight M23 – why this may backfire’, The Conversation, 27 January 2025.
208
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, 2 and paras 31, 122.
209
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 60.
210
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 60.
211
‘Fighting Fire with Fire in Eastern Congo: The Wazalendo Phenomenon and the Outsourcing of Warfare’, Ebuteli, 16 May 2025.
212
‘Fighting Fire with Fire in Eastern Congo: The Wazalendo Phenomenon and the Outsourcing of Warfare’, Ebuteli, 16 May 2025.
213
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 61
214
‘Fighting Fire with Fire in Eastern Congo: The Wazalendo Phenomenon and the Outsourcing of Warfare’, Ebuteli, 16 May 2025
215
‘Fighting Fire with Fire in Eastern Congo: The Wazalendo Phenomenon and the Outsourcing of Warfare’, Ebuteli, 16 May 2025.
216
‘Fighting Fire with Fire in Eastern Congo: The Wazalendo Phenomenon and the Outsourcing of Warfare’, Ebuteli, 16 May 2025.
217
‘DR Congo: Army-Backed Militias Abuse Civilians in South Kivu’, Human Rights Watch, 23 May 2025.
218
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 110.
219
‘RDC: qui sont les «wazalendo», ces volontaires qui combattent le M23 aux côtés de l’armée congolaise?’, CNews, 8 February 2025; ‘DR Congo: Army-Backed Militias Abuse Civilians in South Kivu’, Human Rights Watch, 23 May 2025.
220
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/990, 30 December 2023, para 86.
221
J. Verweijen and M. Thill, ‘DRC has created a reserve force to fight M23 – why this may backfire’, The Conversation, 27 January 2025; ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, paras 66 – 68; ‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2023/990, 30 December 2023, paras 36 – 38.
222
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, paras 68 – 69.
223
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2025/446, 3 July 2025, para 69.
224
‘Armed group biographies’, Suluhu.
225
‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc S/2024/432, 4 June 2024, para 175.
226
‘Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc A/2024/969, 27 December 2024, paras 105 and 133 and Annex 53
227
J. Stearns et al, ‘Raia Mutomboki: The flawed peace process in the DRC and the birth of an armed franchise’, Rift Valley, 2013.
228
‘Armed group biographies’, Suluhu; J. Stearns et al, ‘Raia Mutomboki: The flawed peace process in the DRC and the birth of an armed franchise’, Rift Valley, 2013.
229
J. Stearns et al, ‘Raia Mutomboki: The flawed peace process in the DRC and the birth of an armed franchise’, Rift Valley, 2013.
230
J. Stearns et al, ‘Raia Mutomboki: The flawed peace process in the DRC and the birth of an armed franchise’, Rift Valley, 2013, 39.
231
J. K. Stearns, ‘The War That Doesn’t Say It’s Name: The Unending Conflict in the Congo’, Princeton University Press, 2021.
232
‘Clashes Erupt in South Kivu as FARDC Battles M23 Rebels for Control of Shabunda’, Rwanda Dispatch, 7 October 2025
233
‘Armed group biographies’, Suluhu; Ethuin, ‘A closer look at the Raia Mutomboki’, Suluhu, 11 August 2013.
234
‘Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 15 July 2025.
235
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Democratic Republic of the Congo

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between July 2023 and June 2025)

International Armed Conflicts

International armed conflict between the DRC and Rwanda through a proxy M23

Military occupation of the DRC by Rwanda, including through M23 acting as a proxy armed group for Rwanda

Non International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Below the threshold situations

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-state parties

Others