Myanmar has faced protracted internal violence since independence, with long-standing ethnic armed groups challenging central authority and a series of military coups. Following the 2021 military takeover, mass protests evolved into NIACs between the Tatmadaw (Myanmar armed forces) and a wide array of organized opposition forces, including National Unity Government (NUG)-aligned People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) and established ethnic armed groups (EAGs), alongside entrenched Rohingya displacement and repression. The reporting period was marked by international proceedings concerning crimes against the Rohingya, major territorial gains by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) composed of three EAGs under ‘Operation 1027’, fighting between Myanmar armed forces and other EAGs and China mediated ceasefire efforts. Despite episodic truces, hostilities persisted into 2025, confirming the continuation of multiple NIACs.
Classification(s) and Parties to the Conflict(s)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and Arakan Army (AA)
- Non-International Armed between Myanmar and Chin National Defence Force (CNDF)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)
Myanmar’s armed conflicts continued to generate widespread civilian harm, marked by airstrikes that were often indiscriminate or directly targeted civilians, including in disaster-affected areas, and by extensive use of anti-personnel mines, unguided bombs, and armed drones. Villages, displacement sites, schools, hospitals, and religious and cultural property were repeatedly struck, causing high civilian casualties, long-term disruption of essential services and large-scale displacement within Myanmar and across borders. Humanitarian needs escalated after major natural disasters, yet authorities systematically impeded aid to opposition-held areas and conducted further attacks that obstructed relief. Persons in the power of parties to the conflicts were subjected to killings, mutilation, torture, arbitrary detention, forced recruitment, and widespread sexual violence.
Historical Background
Origins and ethnic armed groups
Myanmar has experienced persistent internal violence since its independence in 1948, with conflicts largely rooted in ethnic diversity and colonial-era legacy. Ethnic armed groups (EAGs) emerged as autonomous actors – sometimes as coalitions – contesting central authority across border regions. Successive coups and constitutions failed to resolve these fault lines or prevent recurrent State confrontations with ethnic armed groups and between such groups.
Post-2021 coup dynamics
The February 2021 military takeover triggered mass protests that escalated into organized resistance. New anti-junta formations coalesced alongside long-standing EAGs. The National Unity Government (NUG) ‘declared war’ on the junta and created the People’s Defence Force (PDF) as an umbrella supported by various militias. By mid-2021, clashes were frequent and multi-regional, with the Tatmadaw – the Myanmar armed forces – employing heavy weaponry and airstrikes and resistance groups shifting to sustained ambushes and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Organization of parties
Opposition actors comprised PDFs recognized by the NUG, smaller People’s Defence Teams (PDTs), independent Local Defence Forces (LDFs), and established EAGs such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Arakan Army (AA). Despite varied agendas and uneven alignment with the NUG, these forces displayed command structures, operational coordination, and de facto territorial control in several areas.
Conflict classification under IHL
The combination of organized armed groups and protracted, geographically dispersed hostilities from March 2021 supports classification as multiple NIACs [hyperlink to glossary] between the Tatmadaw and diverse organized actors, some also fighting each other. These NIACs [hyperlink to glossary] have persisted in 2025 with fluctuating alliances and frontlines, and international responses – sanctions, statements, and limited diplomacy – have not altered underlying realities.
Rohingya crisis
In Rakhine, large-scale displacement of Rohingya and entrenched restrictions on movement intersect with parallel hostilities involving the Tatmadaw and the AA, with civilians caught between front lines and administrative controls.
Key Developments (2023–2025)
The reporting period saw several major developments:
- The Gambia v Myanmar case before the International Court of Justice: since the application of 11 November 2019 filled by The Gambia against Myanmar for violations of the Genocide Convention against its Rohingya minority, the Court ordered provisional measures on 23 January 2020 and, on 22 July 2022, allowed the case to proceed on the merits.
- Arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court: investigations into the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) started in November 2019. On 27 November 2024, the Prosecutor announced an arrest warrant for crimes against humanity related to the 2017 deportation and persecution of the Rohingya.
- Operation 1027: the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) that emerged in 2019 and which comprises Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arakan Army (AA) launched an offensive in late October 2023 that expanded through 2024, recording significant territorial gains by the 3BHA. The offensive was paused under a China-brokered truce in January 2024, but resumed in late June. The 3BHA seized vast amount of territory, including the headquarters of the Northeastern Regional Military Command in Lashio but handed Lashio over in April 2025 in pursuit of implementing a ceasefire deal between MNDAA and military junta brokered by China. The unprecedented level of co-ordination among Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups is a defining feature of Operation 1027 and considerably challenged the Myanmar military.
- Ceasefire negotiations and mediations by China: Beijing, which has extensive economic interests in Myanmar and supports the junta, mediated the January 2024 Haigeng ceasefire between the Tatmadaw (Myanmar armed forces) and the 3BHA and continued to press for local pauses and withdrawals, culminating in monitored arrangements around Lashio in April 2025.
- 2025 earthquake and subsequent ceasefires: following the 28 March 2025 earthquake, unilateral ceasefires were announced by the National Unity Government (NUG), some ethnic armed groups (EAGs), and the Myanmar military, though breaches and ongoing hostilities limited their effect on the humanitarian situation.
- The evolving violent situation between the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Arakan Army (AA). Sporadic border-area clashes since 2023, including intensified operations in early April 2025, remain below the threshold of a NIAC [hyperlink to glossary] and are akin to law enforcement activities.
- The nature and shifting alliances of the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs): post-2021, heterogeneous People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) have proliferated, ranging from local self-defence forces to urban guerrilla cells and mobile tactical units. Some PDFs are integrated into EAG command structures, while others have evolved into independent organized armed groups. Classification requires case-by-case assessment.
Non-International Armed Conflicts
Tatmadaw vs Arakan Army
Hostilities between the Tatmadaw and the AA are a NIAC meeting IHL’s organization and intensity criteria. Founded in 2009 and now centred in Rakhine, the AA operates through a political wing and a hierarchical military wing under Twan Mrat Naing, with nine regional commands, internal discipline, structured training, and a coherent public communications apparatus. Its forces, estimated in the tens of thousands, secure weapons and logistics via allied networks, employ both guerrilla and conventional tactics, and exercise consolidated control over substantial territory and key trade routes, including after capturing multiple bases along Rakhine’s borders. Hundreds of armed clashes have been recorded in recent years. The Tatmadaw has repeatedly used heavy weaponry and air and drone strikes, while the AA has seized heavy arms and maintained operational pressure on strategic locations such as Sittwe. Ceasefires concluded in 2020 and 2022 broke down, and large-scale fighting resumed through 2025, evidencing protracted armed violence and an ongoing NIAC.
Tatmadaw vs Chin National Defense Force
Following the 2021 coup, the Chin National Defence Force (CNDF), armed wing of the Chin National Organization, emerged within a fragmented Chin resistance alongside the Chin National Front and the Chin Brotherhood, and became a principal actor opposing the Tatmadaw. Hostilities have featured sustained airstrikes, significant casualties, and territorial shifts. In April 2025 resistance forces seized the last junta base in a Chin State town, consolidating control in Falam. Organizationally, the CNDF maintains a brigade-battalion structure with identifiable leadership, imposes pre-deployment training, and employs coordinated guerrilla tactics adapted to terrain. Alliances within the Chin Brotherhood, territorial control, and resulting logistical capacity further support its organization, while unified external communications via a spokesperson and official channels evidence the ability to speak with one voice. Taken together, these elements establish the requisite intensity and organization for a NIAC [hyperlink to the glossary] between the Tatmadaw and the CNDF to exist.
Tatmadaw vs Kachin Independence Army
The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), as the armed wing of the Kachin Independence Organisation, resumed hostilities with the Tatmadaw in 2011 after a 1994 ceasefire collapsed following rejection of incorporation of ethnic armed groups into border guard forces. The confrontation has since generated significant displacement and a persistent humanitarian crisis. The intensity criterion is met as from 2021 onward clashes have been regular, with escalation in 2025 after a temporary unilateral ceasefire, including sustained operations in key areas such as Bhamo and Hpakant. The Tatmadaw’s reliance on air and drone strikes and the KIA’s consolidation of territorial control in Kachin State, alongside regional concern and large-scale displacement, evidence protracted armed violence. The organization criterion is also fulfilled since the KIA has a hierarchical command with brigades and battalions, headquarters in Laiza, integrated local People’s Defence Forces, and coherent leadership and messaging. It conducts guerrilla and increasingly conventional operations, maintains alliances, secures arms through manufacture, capture and procurement, and finances activities through resource revenues and taxation. Consequently, a NIAC between Myanmar and KIA exists during the reporting period.
Tatmadaw vs the Karen Liberation Army
The KNLA, the military wing of the Karen National Union (KNU), has opposed the State armed forces for decades. The KNLA satisfied the organization criterion as it sits within a sophisticated KNU defence architecture, fielding seven brigades with a clear chain of command, central staff branches, and integrated arrangements with People’s Defence Forces. It issues official communications, maintains disciplinary mechanisms capable of enforcing norms, and has received training on protection standards, evidencing capacity to comply with and implement IHL. The intensity criterion is likewise met as the KNLA exercises stable territorial control in Karen areas, conducts coordinated guerrilla and offensive operations with allied forces, and has recently seized multiple regime positions along key corridors, reflecting protracted, organized armed violence. These features, together with the Tatmadaw’s sustained counter-operations, confirm that hostilities between the Tatmadaw and the KNLA amount to a NIAC under IHL.
Myanmar vs the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
Hostilities between the Tatmadaw and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA, Kokang Army) satisfy the IHL thresholds for a NIAC. Fighting is recurrent across several fronts, marked by coordinated offensives, prolonged exchanges involving heavy weaponry, and disruptions of governmental control, which together reflect protracted violence fulfilling intensity threshold. The MNDAA exhibits a discernible command hierarchy and integrated operational structures able to plan complex actions on multiple axes, sustain logistics and communications, enforce discipline, and hold or contest territory, thereby meeting the organization criterion for a non-State armed group. In light of both the sustained level of armed violence and the structured character of the MNDAA, the situation qualifies as an ongoing NIAC between the Tatmadaw and the MNDAA for the purposes of IHL.
Myanmar vs the Ta'ang National Liberation Army
The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) founded in January 2009, has engaged the Tatmadaw (Myanmar armed forces) in hostilities since at least 2011. After the 2021 coup, it consolidated control over large areas of northern Shan while playing a significant role in Operation 1027 alongside allied forces. The Tatmadaw regularly conducts airstrikes, including drones, causing casualties and destruction, while the TNLA maintains control over several territories. Renewed offensives despite diplomatic efforts, including a China-brokered truce in early 2025, offensives evidence protracted armed violence satisfying intensity criterion. Within the PSLF, the TNLA operates under a hierarchical command headed by a chairman and senior commanders, fields brigades and numerous battalions, provides training, and has policing and judicial structures that enable discipline and the implementation of IHL. The combination of sustained, coordinated hostilities, identifiable leadership and units, and effective territorial control corresponds to protracted armed violence between organized parties and is therefore constitutive of a NIAC between the Tatmadaw and the TNLA.
Parties to the Conflict(s) and Other Main Actor(s)
State Party
- Myanmar
Non-State Parties
- Arakan Army (AA)
- Chin National Defence Force (CNDF)
- Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
- Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)
- Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)
- Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)
Other Resistance Movements
- Several Ethnic Armed Organisations
- Various People’s Defence Forces
Foreign involvement
- China
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
There have been continued serious violations of IHL. Myanmar’s air attacks were often directed at civilians or were indiscriminate, and continued strikes in earthquake-affected areas caused many casualties. The military have emplaced anti-personnel mines in and around villages, and frequently used unguided gravity bombs in populated areas, resulting in extensive civilian harm. Reports also indicate the Arakan Army used armed drones against Rohingya civilians fleeing toward Bangladesh. Displacement reached about five million, propelled by unlawful attacks and abuses. Despite acute needs after major disasters, authorities impeded aid to areas outside their control and airstrikes further obstructed relief.
Airstrikes by the Myanmar have frequently been indiscriminate or have targeted civilians deliberately. An internally displaced person (IDP) camp in Shan State was struck with two 500-pound bombs and then strafed, and later hit again, despite there being no discernible military objective in the vicinity. A crowded market in Mandalay Region was bombed with two 500-pound munitions after the jet circled, producing the deadliest incident there since the area shifted to the control of an armed group. Despite the 28 March 2025 earthquake, air attacks continued in Chin, Mandalay, and Sagaing, killing and injuring many. Even where fighters or checkpoints were nearby, the extent of damage suggests that the choice of large bombs resulted in many civilian casualties, raising significant concerns about compliance with the principle of proportionality in attack.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
Tatmadaw air operations in opposition-held areas caused severe civilian harm and widespread destruction. Schools were repeatedly struck during the reporting period, while broader patterns show hundreds of education sites attacked since 2021 with long term disruption. Medical facilities were also targeted. Religious and cultural sites suffered extensive damage, with hundreds of buildings destroyed and recent strikes killing civilians at monasteries and churches.
Attacks against Villages and Shelters
Recent Tatmadaw air operations in opposition-held areas generated severe civilian harm and widespread destruction. In January 2025, bombing of Kyauk Ni Maw village in Rakhine state killed numerous civilians and destroyed hundreds of structures. Although the military claimed having observed fire flashes from buildings, the Arakan Army claimed that the attack did not strike their positions. Even assuming the presence of Arakan Army fighters within the village, the effects indicate a disproportionate attack. In May 2025, combat aircraft struck a monastery sheltering displaced people in Bhamo, Kachin, where Kachin Independence Army (KIA) elements were reportedly present. The circumstances suggest disproportionate civilian harm and a failure to take all feasible precautions to minimize incidental damage to civilians and civilian objects.
VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY
Serious violations against persons in the power of parties to the conflict were pervasive. Civilians, including public officials and local politicians, were murdered by the Tatmadaw and organized armed groups through summary executions, mass killings, and acts of mutilation. A sustained pattern of terror tactics by the Tatmadaw was reported, with beheadings, dismemberment, and village-wide arson, often coupled with murder, pillage, and forced conscription. Torture by State forces and non-State armed groups occurred in detention and during attacks, sometimes preceding execution, with electroshock and severe abuses of Rohingya detainees. Children faced high levels of killing, maiming and recruitment. Arbitrary detention expanded after the coup, forced recruitment persisted, and conflict-related sexual violence remained widespread and severe.
- Murder
- Torture
- Acts of terrorism
- Protection of Children
- Arbitrary Detention
- Forced Recruitment
- Sexual Violence
Murders of civilians were widespread and perpetrated by both state forces and organized armed groups. Military raids in Magway featured summary executions at close range including older persons and killings preceded by torture, with bodies concealed and evidence of electroshock abuse. In Rakhine, as the Arakan Army expanded territorial control, accounts indicate mass killings of Rohingya civilians and mutilation, together with lethal ill treatment in custody. Armed groups also pursued targeted assassinations of protected public officials and local politicians, a pattern ongoing since 2021, with at least 136 killings, sometimes linked to accusations of facilitating forced porterage or conscription.