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Non-international armed conflicts in Niger

Reporting period: July 2024 - June 2025

©Abdoul Rachid Maiga/ICRC. A little boy survived a suicide attack in which he lost a leg. Region of Daffa, Niger, December 2024.
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At a Glance

Since independence, Niger has combined close external ties, notably with France and other security partners, with recurrent coups and structural fragilities that fuel armed violence in Diffa, Tillabéri and other regions. From 2013, international counterterrorism deployments by France, the United States, and European missions shaped responses to Boko Haram, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). The July 2023 coup by the junta triggered constitutional suspension, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sanctions, and a progressive rupture with France, the European Union (EU), and later the United States. In this context, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso created the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), withdrew from regional mechanisms such as the G5 Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), established in 1994 by Nigeria to combat terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin. At the same time, security ties with Russia deepened, including through the arrival of Africa Corps personnel in Niamey. Restrictions on civic space and emerging pro-Bazoum groupings further reshaped the internal landscape. 

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THE ARMED CONFLICT(S)

Classification(s) and Parties to the Conflict(s)

  1. Non-international armed conflict between Niger and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) 
  2. Non-international armed conflict between Niger and JNIM
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CIVILIAN HARM

Civilians in Niger faced widespread harm in two NIACs, with ISSP and to a lesser extent JNIM responsible for coordinated killings, mass attacks on villages and mosques, burning and looting of homes and shops, and use of improvised anti-personnel mines that caused high civilian casualties and large-scale forced displacement. Clashes and airstrikes by Nigerien armed forces against ISSP also resulted in civilian deaths and damage to medical facilities, while ISSP attacks on health centres, schools, supply and humanitarian convoys and religious sites, combined with restrictions on humanitarian organizations imposed by Nigerien authorities, severely affected access to humanitarian assistance. Abductions, hostage-taking, enforced disappearances, pillage, sexual violence, and recruitment and use of children were largely attributed to ISSP and JNIM, while governmental forces were linked to arbitrary arrests and politically motivated detentions, together raising serious concerns of war crimes and in some instances crimes against humanity. 

Historical Background

Origins and political trajectory

Niger became independent in 1960 but maintained close political, economic and military links with France, notably around uranium extraction and Niger’s long-standing role in the global uranium supply chain. A severe drought in 1968 to 1974, compounded by governance failures, contributed to a coup in 1974 and a subsequent suspension of constitutional and parliamentary institutions. Multiparty democracy was introduced in 1993 after mass protests, yet recurrent coups followed in 1996, 1999 and 2010. After the 2010 transition, Mahamadou Issoufou was elected in April 2011, and the 2021 election of Mohamed Bazoum was regarded internationally as the first democratic and legitimate transfer of power since independence.

International military presence and counterterrorism support

From 2013, a number of multinational and European missions were stationed in Niger with training and operational support functions, including a German air transport hub in Niamey between 2016 and 2024. France launched Operation Barkhane in 2014, a long-term counterterrorism operation spanning five nations in the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, and later redeployed forces to Niger after the 2020 coup in Mali. The United States maintained military bases and conducted drone operations from 2013, while training Nigerien forces and supporting partner-led counterterrorism operations against Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the region.

Coup of July 2023 and regional security environment

Niger, long perceived as a stabilizing actor in the Sahel by the Western world, experienced a shift following the July 2023 coup, supported domestically and accompanied by a rupture with Western partners, particularly France, against a backdrop of earlier coups in Mali and Burkina Faso.

Security situation and conflict affected areas

Niger has faced armed conflict and internal disturbances in three regions: repeated Boko Haram attacks in Diffa since 2015 (East); gang activity in Dosso, Maradi, and Tahoua linked to networks from north-west Nigeria that remains below the armed conflict threshold (South); and escalating violence in Tillabéri since 2017 involving Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP).

Structural drivers and humanitarian impact

Conflict dynamics reflect broader Sahelian drivers including economic fragility, weak infrastructure, and poor living conditions, corruption, inadequate security, and climate pressures. Displacement rose sharply, with significant internal displacement recorded in 2023 and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) by end 2024, alongside a deteriorating humanitarian situation.

Key Developments (2023–2025)

The reporting period saw several major developments:

  1. Coup d’état in July 2023: On 26 July 2023, the Presidential Guard detained President Mohamed Bazoum in Niamey and placed him under house arrest. The coup leaders suspended the constitution, dissolved State institutions and closed borders, citing worsening security and governance conditions. President Bazoum’s planned senior military reshuffle, including the head of the presidential guard, was a key-trigger. The Army Chief of Staff sided with the junta to avert internal clashes. On 28 July 2023, Abdourahmane Tchiani proclaimed himself the leader of the ruling junta, the so-called National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP), with Salifou Modi as second-in-command. Pro-junta demonstrations followed, alongside arrests of political figures by the junta. A transitional cabinet was appointed and a transition of up to three years announced.

 

  1. Strained relations with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): ECOWAS imposed a series of sanctions on Niger on 30 July 2023, issued a one-week ultimatum and prepared for possible intervention before shifting to negotiation and mediation. Relations within ECOWAS alternated between upholding sanctions and facilitating partial de-escalation, with tensions culminating in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso confirming their withdrawal from ECOWAS, which became effective on 29 January 2025, while talks on practical arrangements continued.

 

  1. Tense relationship with Benin over crude oil exports: In September 2023, Niger ended its military cooperation agreement with Benin, deepening tensions. Although Niger later began exporting crude oil through a newly built pipeline to Benin, the route became a recurrent point of friction, with periodic blockages and repeated attacks on the pipeline, including one by the Patriotic Liberation Front (PLF), an armed group aligned with the ousted authorities, and another by the Lakurawa armed group. Mediation efforts helped contain the threat, but normalization remained gradual against a backdrop of renewed reciprocal accusations.

 

  1. Creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and regional consequences: In response to ECOWAS pressure, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso established the Alliance of Sahel States in September 2023, launched joint military exercises, and created a unified counterterrorism force. In parallel, Burkina Faso and Niger followed Mali in leaving the G5 Sahel anti-jihadist in early December 2023, leading to its dissolution. In late March 2025, Niger also withdrew from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), originally established in 1994 by Nigeria to combat terrorism in the Lake Chad basin.

 

  1. Rupture with France and shifting alliances: The junta leveraged anti-French sentiment, expelled the French ambassador, ended military cooperation and completed troop withdrawals by December 2023, followed by embassy closure. Niger terminated European Union (EU) missions, revoked migration legislation and deepened security ties with Russia, cancelling United States (US) military accords leading to US troop withdrawal by September 2024. Since April 2024, Russian military personnel reportedly linked to Africa Corps have been arriving in Niamey, providing training and equipment.

 

  1. Civic space, opposition measures, and dialogue: Authorities restricted media and civil society, targeted activists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including ending International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) operations in the country. Citizenship revocations and arrests affected Bazoum associates, followed by selective releases in April 2025. A February 2025 national dialogue recommended a renewable five-year transition, dissolution of parties and new institutions, leading to President Tchiani’s inauguration under a Charter of Refoundation and the creation of a consultative council.

 

  1. Creation of Free Armed Forces (FAL) and Coordination of Free Forces of Niger (CFLN): In late September 2024, former Minister of State Rhissa Ag Boula created FAL, a political and military movement seeking to overthrow the military authorities. This followed his announcement on 25 September 2024 dissolving the Council of Resistance for the Republic, originally focused on restoring democracy through peaceful means, after its interim president had excluded him over disagreements about pursuing armed action. On 5 October 2024, the FAL and three other pro-Bazoum armed groups formed the CFLN to align their efforts, though no military operations had been reported at the time of writing.
  1. Mutinies and armed violence in Diffa: In 2025, reports indicated episodes of discontent among rank-and-file soldiers, driven by poor living conditions, equipment and pay issues, as well as grievances about inadequate support and leadership. In parallel, Diffa saw sporadic incidents involving Boko Haram (JAS) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) between 2023 and 2025, including brief clashes, ambushes, and attacks on security positions. Overall, these events were presented as intermittent and largely incidental rather than sustained confrontations, and therefore as falling short of intensity required under IHL to reach the NIAC threshold.

Non-International Armed Conflicts

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Niger vs JNIM

Non-International Armed Conflict between Niger and Jama’a Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM)

JNIM, created in 2017 through the merger of several al Qaeda aligned armed groups, expanded into south-western Niger by 2017 to 2018 and later publicly framed Niger as an official theatre of operations. Throughout the reporting period, engagements between FAN and JNIM were frequent and sustained, with an escalation from mid-2024 onwards to near monthly incidents. Available reporting depicts repeated ambushes, assaults on military positions, and coordinated attacks, contributing to displacement and reflecting armed violence that meets the intensity threshold for a NIAC. JNIM’s arsenal and tactics include small arms and heavier weapons, as well as drones, IEDs, rockets and mortars, used in planned operations conducted at a high operational tempo. The group is described as having a structured hierarchy with central, regional and local command levels, consultative and disciplinary bodies, training arrangements, and a communications apparatus. It also maintains cross-border logistical networks and diversified revenue streams to sustain operations. Reports further indicate consolidated territorial control in several rural and protected areas in south-western Niger, enabling governance functions and facilitating the planning and execution of sustained and concerted military operations. On this basis, the conflict is assessed as an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

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Niger vs ISSP

Non-international armed conflict between Niger and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP)

ISSP, previously known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), began operating in the Sahel in 2016 and evolved into an independently operating ISSP in 2022, with a stated objective of consolidating territorial control. Throughout the period under review, fighting between the Nigerien Armed Forces (FAN) and ISSP was frequent and sustained, with clashes reported regularly from 2023 through the first half of 2025 and an apparent escalation towards the end of the period. While casualty reporting is inconsistent, available accounts indicate significant losses on both sides, recurrent ambushes and complex attacks, and material destruction, reflecting protracted armed violence meeting the intensity threshold. ISSP’s means and methods include improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), mortars, small arms, and coordinated multi-front operations supported by high mobility. Niger relied on aerial strikes and sought external training support to enhance its counter operations. ISSP is described as having a consolidated chain of command, internal disciplinary and judicial structures, defined operational zones, logistics hubs, supply corridors, and a media apparatus, enabling planned and coordinated military operations. Reports further indicate ISSP exercises territorial and governance control in areas along the Mali-Niger border, including social regulation through courts and enforcement. On this basis, the conflict is assessed as a NIAC meeting Additional Protocol II criteria.

Key Parties to the Conflict(s)

State Parties

  • Niger
  • France [until December 2023]

Non-State Parties

  • Jama’at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)
  • Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)

Other Main Actors

Other Non-State Actors Involved:

  • Boko Haram (JAS)
  • Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)
  • Patriotic Liberation Front (PLF)
  • Lakurawa

Regional Organizations and Alliances

  • Joint Force of the Group of Five of the Sahel (G5 Sahel: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad) [Niger withdrew in December 2023; G5 was then dissolved]
  • Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria; Benin contributes troops in non-combat roles) [Niger withdrew in March 2025]
  • Alliance of Sahel States (AES: Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso)

Foreign Involvement

  • Africa Corps/Russia
  • Joint Special Operations Task Force Gazelle as part of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) [until December 2023
  • UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) [German contingent at Niamey airbase, until August 2024]
  • United States of America [until September 2024]

ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

In Niger, attacks against civilians were widely attributed to the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), and included coordinated killings of civilians, attacks combining shootings with the burning of homes, and mass casualty assaults on worshippers in mosques. Clashes between the Nigerien Armed Forces and the ISSP also caused civilian deaths, including during fighting and through airstrikes that hit armed group columns but killed civilians. Medical protection was undermined, including during an ISSP attack on a health centre. Improvised anti-personnel mines used by armed groups continued to harm civilians. Violence and destruction by ISSP and JNIM contributed to large-scale forced displacement.

During the reporting period, parties to the armed conflicts in Niger deliberately targeted civilians, conduct which may amount to war crimes. Where violence against civilians is widespread or systematic and committed with knowledge of the attack, it may also constitute crimes against humanity. Testimonies attributed most attacks to ISSP, with Tillabéri particularly affected. Coordinated assaults in Kokorou and Libiri in December 2024 caused dozens of civilian deaths, including children, without reported involvement of Nigerien armed forces, indicating direct targeting of civilians. In 2025, further killings were reported in villages, including attacks combining shootings with the burning of homes. ISSP also attacked civilians gathered in mosques in Manda and in Téra department, causing mass casualties. Reported civilian harm attributed to the Nigerien Armed Forces remained limited.

Potentially Indiscriminate Attacks

In Niger, beyond direct attacks on civilians, clashes between the Nigerien Armed Forces and ISSP frequently resulted in civilian deaths and injuries, raising concerns about disproportionate effects. In December 2024, an ISSP assault around a market in Téra where Nigerien forces were present reportedly caused heavy military losses and significant civilian casualties. The government denied the attack had occurred and suspended BBC radio over its reporting. State conduct also raised concerns where airstrikes against columns of non-State armed groups after an attack on a position in Tyawa killed several civilians. Local accounts describe frustration that protection arrived only after looting, arson, and killings had already occurred.

ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE

In Niger, recurrent attacks on civilian infrastructure were attributed primarily to the ISSP, including the burning and firing upon homes, shops and villages, reportedly to deter perceived collaboration with Nigerien forces. Schools were repeatedly attacked, generating threats against teachers and students and widespread closures. Medical facilities in Tillabéri were frequently attacked, most often through ISSP arson or gunfire, while one incident involved a Nigerien drone strike on a health facility. Along the Niger-Burkina Faso border, ISSP attacks on supply convoys caused civilian deaths and disrupted the delivery of goods and assistance. Humanitarian organizations were also compelled by Nigerien authorities to cease operations based on allegations that they supported non-State armed groups. An attack on a mosque during Ramadan caused large-scale civilian casualties, and raised concerns under the principle of distinction and special protection of religious property.

Attacks on Homes, Shops and Villages

In western Niger, ISSP operations to establish control over rural areas were marked by recurrent attacks on civilian objects, including the firing on and burning of homes and shops. The attack on a mosque in the Fambita quarter of Kokorou in March 2025 was accompanied by the burning of nearby houses. Similar patterns were reported across other villages during the period, particularly in Tillabéri, with witness and victim accounts describing the destruction of homes as a warning against collaboration with Nigerien governmental forces.

VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY

Violations against persons in the hands of the enemy were linked to both ISSP and governmental forces. ISSP abductions led to deaths, including of foreign nationals and workers, with some victims tortured or otherwise ill-treated. Governmental forces were reported to have engaged in recurring arbitrary arrests and detention of civilians, including political figures and civil society actors. Enforced disappearance concerns were raised where ISSP abductions involved concealment of fate and whereabouts. Additional patterns attributed to ISSP included pillage and destruction of civilian property and conflict-related sexual violence affecting women and girls, while children faced recruitment, killing or maiming, abduction, and loss of access to education.

Deprivation of liberty attributed to ISSP were reported to have resulted, in some instances, in the killing of abducted persons, including foreign nationals and workers seized in conflict-affected areas and during incidents linked to attacks against the Nigerien Armed Forces. While some abductees were released, other cases were described as ending in death or leaving the victims’ fate unknown. Where an abduction is followed by death, the conduct was characterized as likely constituting murder, in addition to other possible violations linked to captivity.