Nigeria

The following armed conflicts are taking place on the terrSeveral non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) are ongoing in the territory of Afghanistan.

A NIAC between the Taliban and the National Resistance Front (NRF)
A NIAC between the Taliban and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF)
A NIAC between the Taliban and Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-K)

Although Afghanistan is a party to Additional Protocol II of 1977, none of the NIACs taking place in Afghanistan reached the threshold of application of Article 1(1), because none of the armed groups exercised territorial control of a nature to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement the Protocol. Relevant provisions of Additional Protocol II of 1977 remain applicable to ‘all the persons who have been deprived of their liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to the armed conflict’ that opposed the Taliban and the security forces of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan before the takeover of Kabul, as well as ‘those deprived of their liberty or whose liberty is restricted after the conflict for the same reasons’.¹

Other non-state armed groups were also reportedly active on Afghan territory, committing sporadic acts of violence against the authorities. Publicly available information indicates that their violent acts did not cross the threshold of intensity of violence to qualify as armed conflicts.

In addition to this, a low-intensity international armed conflict persisted between Afghanistan and Pakistan throughout the reporting period.

Nigeria gained independence from British colonial rule on 1 October 1960. It exhibits a rich ethnographic diversity, with more than 250 distinct ethnic groups.² The northern region is predominantly Muslim in faith, whereas the southern region is predominantly Christian.³

The north-east of Nigeria has been subjected to ongoing conflict since the onset of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2009. The primary concentration of hostilities occurs within the so-named ‘BAY’ states (Borno, Adamawa and Yobe).⁴ Poverty may be a motivating factor for many young people joining the insurgency, but is not a sufficient explanation for the conflict.⁵ North-eastern Nigeria’s historical legacy, socio-economic neglect, and harsh environment have created conditions for the crisis to flourish.⁶ Since 2013, Nigerian armed forces have been supported in their fight against Boko Haram by the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a self-defence militia that notably neutralizes suicide-bombers and operates check-points, but which is also known for alleged human rights abuses.⁷ Notwithstanding the success of major military campaigns in 2015-2016, which served to undermine the group’s territorial control, Boko Haram’s tactics over time display a notable degree of adaptability.⁸ In early 2017, key donors set up the Oslo Consultative Group on Prevention and Stabilization in the Lake Chad Region, and the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the African Union adopted a regional strategy aimed at stabilising the conflict.⁹ Since 2020, a gradual but persistent decline has been seen in the overall security situation in the country, primarily due to an increase in the terrorist threat and the spread of organized gang activity.¹⁰

Since the beginning of the insurgency, Boko Haram has undergone a significant splintering process, leaving two main factions both of which are involved in conflicts with the Nigerian State in the north-east: Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’adati wal-Jihad (JAS or JASDJ), often referred to as ‘Boko Haram’, and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).¹¹ ISWAP’s most successful campaign directed against the Nigerian and allied militaries until 2025 occurred 2018 to 2020 and was principally confined to the north of Borno.¹² Since January 2025, however, ISWAP has intensified its insurgent activities, orchestrating to date at least twelve targeted attacks on military facilities and infrastructure across Borno State in the north-east of the country.¹³

In addition to the primary theatre of conflict, other areas of the country are in a state of heightened tension. Access to natural resources is a primary contributing factor to the drivers of conflict, evidenced by the persistently high levels of tension in the oil-rich region of the Niger Delta, the site of conflict among militias vying for a greater share in the region’s resources.¹⁴ Similarly, violence between pastoralists and farmers in central Nigeria over customary routes for grazing livestock have spread to other regions.¹⁵ This violence is a factor in the division between ethnic and religious groups as they are predominantly Fulani Muslim pastoralists and Christian farmers.¹⁶

There is a further contentious situation in the south-east of the country where separatist factions are engaged in an armed struggle for the establishment of an independent Biafra.¹⁷ Comparable actions in the late 1960s resulted in a civil war from 1967 until 1970.¹⁸

Moreover, experts have identified an escalating rate of gang crime (cattle theft, assaults, abductions) in the north-west as a critical threat to the general security situation.¹⁹ It is becoming increasingly evident to many that Islamist organizations are infiltrating gangs, blurring the distinction between crime and acts of terrorism.²⁰

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates 586,000 new internally displaced persons (IDPs) between 2023 and 2024 due to conflict in Nigeria, bringing the total number of conflict-related IDPs at the end of 2024 to 3.4 million.²¹

Challenges to Bola Tinubu’s win in the presidential election in February 2023

On 25 February 2023, Bola Tinubu, the candidate for Nigeria’s ruling party, the All Progressives Congress (APC), won the presidential election with 37 per cent of the votes.²²Alleging electoral fraud, opposition parties contested his victory in the Presidential Elections Petitions Tribunal, which dismissed their application on 6 September 2023.²³ Appealing the dismissal, the two main opposition presidential candidates, Atiku Abubakar of the People’s Democratic Party and Peter Obi of the Labour Party, approached the Supreme Court in October 2023.²⁴ On 26 October 2023, the Supreme Court dismissed the legal challenge, upholding the results of the February election.²⁵

Tense relations with Niger

In July 2023, a military coup d’état occurred in Niger in which various factions of the armed forces seized control of the state apparatus and annulled the constitution.²⁶ In a matter of days, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in an extraordinary session chaired by Nigerian president Bola Tinubu, unveiled a list of sanctions targeting Niger. These sanctions represent the most stringent measures the bloc has imposed on a member State.²⁷ President Bola Tinubu, newly elected, was said to be eager to prove a strong leader in a regional crisis.²⁸

In the aftermath of Nigeria’s involvement in the ECOWAS response to the coup, the military leaders of Niger withdrew their ambassador to Nigeria, Sidi Zakari.²⁹ The subsequent months were characterized by mounting diplomatic tension.³⁰ On 28 August 2024, however, a notable rapprochement occurred with the meeting of the defence chiefs of the two nations in Niamey, Niger’s capital.³¹ Finally, Niger and Nigeria reinstated official diplomatic dialogue on 16 April 2025, relaunching the cooperation mechanisms between the two neighbouring states.³²

In terms of the number of civilian casualties, the December incident constituted the deadliest airborne attack since January 2017 when an airstrike by the Nigerian Air Force resulted in the deaths of at least 234 civilians in Kala Balge, Borno state.⁵⁵ It is estimated that 6 per cent of all military airstrikes in 2023 were not directed at known and targeted armed groups and resulted in civilian casualties, and that they account for almost 10 per cent of the total estimated fatalities.⁵⁶ Similar events have taken place in the first half of 2025.⁵⁷ The aerial attacks causing civilian casualties signify a worrisome trend concerning the military’s inability to distinguish between military objectives and protected civilians/civilian objects, and a seemingly increasing indifference to inflicting civilian casualties.⁵⁸

Weakening of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

The MNJTF was set up in 1994 by Nigeria to combat cross-border violence around Lake Chad and to facilitate cross-border movement.⁵⁹ Initially limited to Nigeria’s army, it soon expanded to include troops from fellow Lake Chad Basin Commission countries, including Chad and Niger.⁶⁰ At a meeting in January 2015, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council agreed to support the efforts of the Lake Chad Basin Commission member states and Benin by authorizing the deployment of the MNTJF.⁶¹ As a result, the MNJTF was restructured and had its force increased to approximately 10,000 troops. New headquarters were set up in N’Djamena.⁶² The new force initiated operations on 30 July 2015, with Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria contributing troops and Benin deploying additional non-combat troops.⁶³

Notwithstanding the escalating activity of Boko Haram and its offshoots, over time the MNJTF made substantial progress in degrading the operational capabilities of both ISWAP and JAS (Boko Haram).⁶⁴ However, in the period under review, there was a deterioration in the sphere of international military cooperation throughout the Lake Chad Basin.⁶⁵ Chad issued a formal warning of its intention to withdraw from the alliance in 2024, due to an alleged member State’s failure to secure the borders which permitted Boko Haram and ISWAP insurgents to move throughout the region.⁶⁶ Following its 2023 coup, Niger withdrew from the MNJTF in March 2025, a move which has compromised intelligence sharing and disrupted collaborative military operations across the region’s porous borders.⁶⁷ The collapse of the joint military presence between Abuja and Niamey has created an operational vacuum along the Niger-Nigeria border, which has since been exploited by jihadist and criminal groups.⁶⁸

ISWAP launches largest offensive yet in January 2025

Since January 2025, ISWAP has heightened the scale and intensity of its insurgency, launching a series of coordinated attacks on military bases and infrastructure across Borno state, in the north-east of Nigeria.⁶⁹ These acts of violence encompassed, for example, an improvised explosive device (IED) concealed beneath a commercial vehicle in Biu, a town in Borno state, killing four individuals and injuring four others.⁷⁰ ISWAP instigated several further attacks in the following month, including an operation on a Nigerian army barrack in Yamtage, claiming to have killed three soldiers.⁷¹ The group continued its campaign throughout May, with the execution of one of its most complex attacks in recent history.⁷² On 12 May 2025, ISWAP militants launched an incursion into the town of Marte, capturing several soldiers and forcing others to retreat.⁷³ A coordinated attack on the nearby towns of Rann and Dikwa followed hours later.⁷⁴ The militants now have a strong presence in Marte, which has access to smuggling corridors around Lake Chad.⁷⁵

Arrest in Finland of Simon Ekpa, factional leader of the separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra

On 21 November 2024, Finnish police arrested five individuals, including Simon Ekpa, a factional leader of the separatist group known as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB).⁷⁶ The individuals were arrested on charges of financing terrorism and instigating lethal violence in Nigeria’s south-eastern region.⁷⁷

The Nigeria-based faction of IBOP in early December 2024 issued a formal denunciation of the late-November 2024 declaration of Biafran independence by a faction based in Finland.⁷⁸ The IPOB insisted that the sole legitimate avenue for achieving independence would be through a UN-sponsored referendum.⁷⁹ Simon Ekpa was detained in Finland, where his trial on charges related to terrorism began in late May 2025.⁸⁰

Fall of Marte town to ISWAP in Borno state

In May 2025, ISWAP overran Nigeria’s 50^th Task Force Battalion in Marte.⁸¹ The assault began on the night of 12 May, prompting the military to retreat to Dikwa. This incident was one of a series of coordinated attacks on the towns of Marte, Dikwa, and Rann in eastern Borno carried out on 12 and 13 May 2025.⁸² These incursions enabled the group to establish a de facto authority over the Marte district, a pivotal locale due to its proximity to clandestine trafficking routes leading to the Lake Chad region, where ISWAP is headquartered.⁸³ In general, military targets are increasingly attacked by ISWAP, so that weapons can be seized, reliance on smuggling reduced, and territorial control consolidated, allowing civilians to be extorted and resources to be secured for operations and expansion.⁸⁴

Non-International Armed Conflict between Nigeria (supported by MNJTF) and Boko Haram (JAS)

Background

The NIAC between Nigeria and Boko Haram has been ongoing since July 2009.¹ In January 2015, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was created to support Nigeria in this conflict.² The MNJTF is composed of members of the armed forces of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger (Niger withdrew in March 2025) as well as non-combat troops from Benin. Considering that the MNJTF joined a pre-existing NIAC on the invitation of the Nigerian government, and in line with the support-based approach to classification of armed conflict, it can be concluded that Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (up until March 2025) are (or were) party to this NIAC, by opposition to Benin, which deploys only non-combat troops.³ During 2016, Boko Haram splintered into two factions – Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’adati wal-Jihad (JAS/JASDJ), which Western media continues to call Boko Haram,⁴ and Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP). For consistency this report refers to JAS/JASDJ as Boko Haram. Boko Haram has consistently exercised territorial control over parts of the Lake Chad Region.⁵ This includes approximately 40 per cent of the Lake Chad islands in Borno state.⁶

Intensity

The Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF) and Boko Haram clashed frequently during the reporting period. This includes military engagements during August 2023,⁷ May 2024,⁸ August 2024,⁹ October 2024,¹⁰ February 2025,¹¹ March 2025,¹² May 2025,¹³ and June 2025.¹⁴ The frequency and nature of these attacks escalated from the last quarter of 2024 until the end of the reporting period.

Reported clashes illustrate that violence remained sustained throughout the period under review. Some of the most notable engagements between NAF and Boko Haram are highlighted here. The Nigerian Air Force as of late 2024 increasingly employed airstrikes against Boko Haram.¹⁵ Airstrikes often result in high casualty rates amongst fighters. For example, the aerial attacks launched on 24 November 2023 in Borno state reportedly killed around 100 Boko Haram fighters,K. Nwezeh,¹⁶ and aerial strikes on 16 August 2024 claimed at least forty fighters, including five Boko Haram commanders.¹⁷ The African Union at a Joint Steering Committee held on 6 and 7 August 2024 applauded the efforts of the MNJTF to supress Boko Haram and other non-state actors in the Lake Chad region.¹⁸

The ground offensive on 30 May 2025 saw the Nigerian Armed Forces ward off an attack by Boko Haram fighters against its Bita military base in Gwoza, resulting in the reported death of sixty fighters.¹⁹ Apart from casualties amongst fighters and soldiers, the damage caused to infrastructure is a further indicator of violence. In areas where NAF and Boko Haram clash, villages are often burned and livestock killed as a part of ‘clearing operations’ by the NAF.²⁰

The weapons Boko Haram deploys include assault rifles and heavy machine guns.²¹ Boko Haram also often employs IEDs.²² Reports suggest that Boko Haram has acquired drone technology, which the group uses to drop locally-made grenades.²³

Internal displacement figures in Nigeria have remained high in the last two years. During 2023, approximately 291,000 persons were internally displaced. In 2024 that number was estimated at 295,000. The areas in which there have been clashes between the NAF and Boko Haram, including Borno, contributed to approximately 57,000 people being displaced.²⁴ In June 2025, UNHCR reported that Nigeria had the highest percentage of displaced persons in the region.²⁵

At the 1254^th meeting of its Peace and Security Council on 12 January 2025, the African Union expressed concern regarding the continuing activities of Boko Haram and reaffirmed that the regional collective security response needs to be well-coordinated, multipronged, and sustained. The African Union renewed the MNJTF mandate for an additional 12 months from 1 February 2025.²⁶ In his remarks on 9 June 2025 at a UN Security Council briefing on the Central African Region, the Deputy Political Counsellor of the United States voiced concern about the continuing level of violence generated by Boko Haram and encouraged African states and the MNJTF to remain engaged in this conflict.²⁷ The European Union has pledged €20 million to support the fight against Boko Haram for 2025.²⁸ The concerns raised by the international community highlight the reality that this NIAC continues to display an intense level of violence.

Organization

The leader of Boko Haram, at the time of reporting, was Imam Ibrahim Bakura Doro (aka Bakura Buduma).²⁹ His deputy Imam is Abu Issa. Other key leadership positions include the Chief of Police (Hisbah), held by Kannay; Chief Cleric, a position held by Mallam Mamman; and Chief Judge, a position held by Mallam Abdurahmane.³⁰ Ibrahim Bakura Doro often acts as the group’s spokesperson in an unofficial capacity via social media.³¹ Boko Haram has a military and a civilian wing. There is uncertainty around exactly how many fighters belong to Boko Haram, but a common estimate is several thousand.³²

As its leader, Imam Bakura Doro serves as the overall commander of the military wing and has direct command over the territory held by Boko Haram on the islands of Lake Chad. Commander Aliyu Ngulde, in turn, commands a Boko Haram-controlled enclave, Gwoza Hills, located along the Nigeria-Cameroon border. A smaller territory held by Boko Haram is commanded by Commander Alhai Kale.³³ The hills in the vicinity of the Shiroro reservoir in Kaduna state are commanded by Commander Sadiku. Owing to its deployment of regional commanders and large militia style units with, on average, 100 to 200 fighters,³⁴ Boko Haram has the capability to respect and implement IHL.

The leadership style of the military commanders is described as akin to patronage as the fighters are permitted a modicum of independence under regional command.³⁵ Boko Haram has a de facto Shura Council to offer religious guidance when required.³⁶

Boko Haram’s ideology informs its actions in that it considers as a legitimate target Muslims or Christians who do not support them or are perceived to support the government.³⁷ Boko Haram employs extreme violence, plunder, and sectarianism in its tactics and sanctions suicide attacks against civilians it views as ‘infidels’ or ‘apostates’.³⁸ Suicide bombing is a further tactic of Boko Haram; because the traditional burqa conceals the presence of a bomb and Islamic custom forbids men searching women, the female fighters wear the suicide vests.³⁹

Imam Bakura Doro has experience in procuring and distributing weapons and ammunition, strengthening the logistical capacity of Boko Haram.⁴⁰ Commander Shekau has expanded Boko Haram’s operational capabilities by accelerating the training in building and using IEDs, including vehicle-borne IEDs, as well as suicide vests.⁴¹ Boko Haram fighters carry their weapons at all times and, when needed, additional weaponry may be requested or exchanged within its structures.⁴²

Boko Haram often plunders or kidnaps for ransom in order to obtain resources.⁴³ The kidnapping of foreigners and wealthy Nigerian nationals has been lucrative.⁴⁴ To fund its activities, it also taxes fishermen and herders in areas under its control.⁴⁵ Boko Haram often engages in cattle theft and has ventured into selling scrap iron.⁴⁶ Local religious sympathizers donate to Boko Haram, but it is not reliant on external funding streams as generally its operations are low cost and are not dependent on the purchase of sophisticated weaponry.⁴⁷ Each regional leader controls a treasury and the administrative capacity of the group is limited.⁴⁸

A high unemployment rate enables the recruitment of fighters.⁴⁹ It has been claimed that, at times, Boko Haram conscripts members forcibly or by offering financial incentives.⁵⁰ Historically, training has been in camps located on Nigerian territory under control of Boko Haram, including Borno,⁵¹ as well as in Cameroon,⁵² and Somalia.⁵³

Boko Haram exercises stable control over several territories including three disjointed enclaves in the Lake Chad Basin. Specifically, it is reported Boko Haram has control over around 40 per cent of the islands in Lake Chad in Borno state.⁵⁴ Also, Boko Haram has taken territory previously held by ISWAP, thereby consolidating its stronghold in Lake Chad.⁵⁵ Territorial control is a requirement of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II and in practice provides confirmation of a form of responsible command exercised by the Boko Haram leadership.⁵⁶ Responsible command is a further requirement under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Moreover, control of territory places Boko Haram in a position to implement Additional Protocol II, as is demanded by the provision.⁵⁷ Actual implementation is not required.⁵⁸ Lastly, from the intensity assessment above, clearly the territory controlled by Boko Haram facilitates the planning of military operations and fulfilling the final requirement in Article 1(1) of the Protocol, which requires Boko Haram to be sufficiently organized to launch sustained and concerted attacks.⁵⁹

The organizational structure of Boko Haram is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under the Protocol. Hence, the NIAC between the NAF and Boko Haram constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

1
‘Boko Haram, including JAS, ISWAP and Ansaru’, European Union Agency for Asylum, October 2021; M. Nwankpa, ‘Boko Haram 2.0? The Evolution of a Jihadist Group Since 2015’, Hudson, 7 July 2025; M. P. de Montclos, ‘Boko Haram and politics: From insurgency to terrorism’, Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria, 2014.
2
‘MNJTF Mandate’, Multinational Joint Task Force.
3
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 16; ‘MNJTF Mandate’, Multinational Joint Task Force.
4
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
5
‘MNJTF Force Commander’s Text Speech: International Press Conference for Progress of Operation Lake Sanity II by Major General Ibrahim Sallau Ali’, Multinational Joint Task Force, 4 June 2024.
6
O. S. Okonkwo, ‘Nigeria’s Terror War: Why Misunderstanding Boko Haram (JAS) vs. ISWAP Could Cost Us Everything’, Medium, 23 April 2025; V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
7
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group, November 2023 ‘Scores of Boko Haram/ISWAP fighters killed in renewed clashes’, Zagazola, 18 November 2023; and U. Abubakar, ‘Scores feared killed in Boko Haram, ISWAP clash’, Punch, 18 November 2023.
8
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group.
9
L. Aleke, ‘Nigerian Military Air Strikes Kill Top Terrorist Commanders, Over 35 Others in Borno’, Arise News, 22 August 2024.
10
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; and T. David, ‘Nigeria: NAF Airstrikes Hit Terrorists’ Meeting Point, Kill Scores in Borno’, All Africa, 29 October 2024.
11
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; and N. Ismail, ‘Nigerian troops crush Boko Haram fighters, arrest notorious terror collaborator’, Daily Post, 19 February 2025.
12
‘Troops Eliminate Boko Haram Commander Abba Alai, Crush Terrorists in Gwoza and Garin Fallujah’, Zagazola, 3 March 2025; I. Ojo, ‘Troops kill B’Haram chief bomb maker, eight others in Sambisa’, Punch, 6 March 2025; ‘Air Component of OPHK Strikes JAS Enclave in Mandara Mountain, kill several Boko Haram’, Zagazola, 17 March 2025.
13
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group.
14
‘NAF Airstrikes Hit Another Boko Haram Enclave in Chiraliya, Several Terrorists Neutralised’, Zagazola, 6 June 2025; and ‘Troops, CJTF Intercept Boko Haram Logistics Movement, Neutralise Terrorist in Yobe’, Zagazola, 18 June 2025.
15
L. Aleke, ‘Nigerian Military Air Strikes Kill Top Terrorist Commanders, Over 35 Others in Borno’, Arise News, 22 August 2024; T. David, ‘Nigeria: NAF Airstrikes Hit Terrorists’ Meeting Point, Kill Scores in Borno’, All Africa, 29 October 2024; ‘Air Component of OPHK Strikes JAS Enclave in Mandara Mountain, kill several Boko Haram’, Zagazola, 17 March 2025; ‘NAF Airstrikes Hit Another Boko Haram Enclave in Chiraliya, Several Terrorists Neutralised’, Zagazola, 6 June 2025; ‘Nigerian military says 60 extremist killed in raids’, The Jordan Times, 31 May 2025; K. Nwezeh, ‘Air Strikes Kill Over 100 Terrorists in Borno State’, Arise News, 26 November 2023; I. Isamotu et al, ‘Nigeria: Air Strikes Killed 5 Boko Haram Commanders in Borno – NAF’, All Africa, 22 August 2024.
16
‘Air Strikes Kill Over 100 Terrorists in Borno State’, Arise News, 26 November 2023.
17
L. Aleke, ‘Nigerian Military Air Strikes Kill Top Terrorist Commanders, Over 35 Others in Borno’, Arise News, 22 August 2024; I. Isamotu et al, ‘Nigeria: Air Strikes Killed 5 Boko Haram Commanders in Borno – NAF’, All Africa, 22 August 2024.
18
‘Boko Haram and other terrorist groups activities in Lake Chad Basin region suppressed in a joint forces operation’, AU News, 8 August 2024.
19
K. Adeniyi, ‘Nigerian army kills 60 Boko Haram terrorists after repelling attack on military base’, AA, 30 May 2025.
20
Zagazola, Post on X, 8 May 2023; ‘‘They just shoot and burn’: Civilians targeted in Nigeria’s war on Boko Haram’, The New Humanitarian, 3 July 2023; The New Humanitarian, ‘“People living in our village have nothing to do with Boko Haram”’, YouTube, 30 June 2023; The New Humanitarian, ‘“We hid in the bush as they burnt”’ , YouTube, 30 June 2023.
21
‘Troops Eliminate Boko Haram Commander Abba Alai, Crush Terrorists in Gwoza and Garin Fallujah’, Zagazola, 3 March 2025.
22
I. Ojo, ‘Troops kill B’Haram chief bomb maker, eight others in Sambisa’, Punch, 6 March 2025; ‘Communiqué of the 1254th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held on 13 January 2025 on the Consideration Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram Terrorist Group and Renewal of its Mandate’, African Union, 3 February 2025, para 6.
23
‘Boko Haram Militants Attack Two Nigerian Army Bases with Grenade-strapped Drones’, Defense Mirror, 26 December 2024; N. Roll et al, ‘Nigeria, Sahel Militants Embrace DIY Drone’, eNCA, 27 March 2025; and ‘Nigerian Army Confirms Boko Haram’s Use Of Armed Drones In Borno, Similar To Israeli, Ukrainian Types’, Sahara Reporters, 14 May 2025.
24
‘Nigeria’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025.
25
‘Regional Trends: Forced Displacement in West and Central Africa in 2025’, UNHCR, 11 June 2025.
26
‘Communiqué of the 1254th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held on 13 January 2025 on the Consideration Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram Terrorist Group and Renewal of its Mandate’, African Union, 3 February 2025, para 15.
27
‘Central African Region – Security Council, 9931^st meeting’, United Nations Audiovisual Library, 9 June 2025.
28
O. Oshoko, ‘European Union Pledges 300 Million Euros to Support Fight Against Terrorism, Violent Extremism in North East, North West in 2025’, Security King, 7 April 2025.
29
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024; ‘Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On’, International Crisis Group, 30 May 2023.
30
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
31
‘Boko Haram – Video Reaffirming Loyalty to Abu Umaima and Rejecting ISWAP, translation by Sufyan Musah’, Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring Global Jihad in Nigeria, 12 May 2022.
32
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
33
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
34
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
35
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
36
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
37
‘Boko Haram, including JAS and ISIS-WA’, European Union Agency for Asylum, February 2019.
38
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024; ‘Boko Haram’, Counter Terrorism Guide.
39
‘Boko Haram’, Counter Terrorism Guide; ‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project.
40
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
41
‘Boko Haram’, Counter Terrorism Guide.
42
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
43
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
44
‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project.
45
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
46
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025.
47
‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project.
48
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
49
D. Mbachu, ‘Nigeria’s revamp of economic indicators sparks debate’, African Business, 13 February 2025.
50
‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project.
51
‘Cameroon, Nigeria Face ‘Advanced Weaponry’ from Terrorists’, African Defense Forum, 13 May 2025.
52
‘Cameroon army says dismantles Boko Haram training camp’, Reuters, 22 December 2014; ‘Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram’, International Crisis Group, 16 November 2016; M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Former Boko Haram Fighters Wait for Rehabilitation Facility’, Voice of America, 17 December 2017.
53
‘Nigerian Boko Haram fighters trained in Somalia: president’, Reuters, 15 February 2016; S. Busari, ‘Boko Haram sought terror training in Somalia, security chief says’, CNN, 25 February 2016; ‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project.
54
O. S. Okonkwo, ‘Nigeria’s Terror War: Why Misunderstanding Boko Haram (JAS) vs. ISWAP Could Cost Us Everything’, Medium, 23 April 2025; ‘Clashes between two factions of Boko Haram, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), have escalated in the Lake Chad region, resulting in significant casualties on both sides’, International Organisation for Peace Building and Social Justice, 24 February 2025; ‘Multiple Casualties as Escalating Rivalry Between Boko Haram, ISWAP Spreads to North West, North Central’, Zagazola, 23 February 2025; V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
55
‘Clashes between two factions of Boko Haram, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), have escalated in the Lake Chad region, resulting in significant casualties on both sides’, International Organisation for Peace Building and Social Justice, 24 February 2025; ‘Multiple Casualties as Escalating Rivalry Between Boko Haram, ISWAP Spreads to North West, North Central’, Zagazola, 23 February 2025.
56
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.
57
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.
58
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.38.
59
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021; A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40.

Non-international armed conflict between Nigeria (supported by the MNJTF) and ISWAP

Background

ISWAP is a splinter group from Boko Haram.The NIAC between ISWAP and Nigeria first began during 2016.¹ Considering that the MNJTF joined a pre-existing NIAC on the invitation of the Nigerian government, and in line with the support-based approach to classifying armed conflict, it can be concluded that Cameroon, Chad and Niger (up until March 2025) were party to this NIAC, whereas Benin has only deployed non-combat troops.²

Intensity

During the reporting period, the NAF and ISWAP frequently engaged in conflict; specifically, clashes were recorded in July 2023,³ September,⁴ October,⁵ February 2024,⁶ April,⁷ June,⁸ July,⁹ and September 2024,¹⁰ and in January 2025,¹¹ March,¹² and May 2025.¹³

Notable is a counterattack by ISWAP against the NAF in April 2024 when it successfully reclaimed control over the territories of Tumbun Allura and Falkima-Hakariya.¹⁴ The International Crisis Group indicates ISWAP is actively working to consolidate its influence in parts of central and western Borno state, as well as in neighboring Yobe state, where the threat from rival groups, particularly Boko Haram, is perceived to be lower.¹⁵ A raid on an ISWAP enclave around Goniri village, Damboa area resulted in the death of six fighters on 9 May 2024.¹⁶ As of June 2024, the NAF has reported significant military operations against Jihadist groups in the North-East region.¹⁷

In ways similar to the offensive against Boko Haram, the Nigerian Air Force has, on several occasions, conducted airstrikes against ISWAP.¹⁸ An example which led to the dislodgment of ISWAP from territory under their control is the airstrike on the southern Islands of Lake Chad on 15 July 2023.¹⁹ The ‘clearance campaign’ by government forces targeting ISWAP and Boko Haram militants around Lake Chad and the Sambisa Forest has yielded some success.²⁰ Notably, between 2 and 6 June 2024, Nigerian troops raided four ISWAP camps located in Bama, Marte, and Ngala, reportedly resulting in the death of over 100 insurgents.²¹ On 15 June 2024, multiple camps belonging to the group and located within the southern shore of Lake Chad were raided, leading to the rescue of thirty-four women and children. During this period, there was also an increase in attacks against civilians carried out by Nigerian soldiers for the purposes of regaining control of lost territory.²²

On 29 June 2024, MNJTF conducted a series of land, air, and naval operations around Lake Chad targeting ISWAP, which killed at least seventy militants.²³ ISWAP, in turn, has claimed successful attacks against the NAF in Garin Kukawa in Borno state, although the claims are denied by the NAF.²⁴

Despite the success of attacks launched by the NAF and MNJTF during 2024, ISWAP made a military comeback during 2025. ISWAP significantly increased coordinated attacks against NAF military bases during the first half of 2025, peaking in May.²⁵ This period has been described as demonstrating ISWAP’s most successful military campaign against the NAF and its support forces since 2018.²⁶ Establishing stable military control over territory has enabled ISWAP to launch coordinated attacks.²⁷ The evidence is that it was exercising stable control over territory by the end of the reporting period, including a large part of north-eastern Borno state.²⁸ However, the NAF achieved a notable success in its ongoing counterterrorism effort in the north-east by repelling an attack on an army position in Bita, Borno state, on 26 May 2025. Sixty ISWAP fighters were reportedly killed in the battle.²⁹

In so far as the attacks indicate planning, they meet the requirement under Article (1)1 of Additional Protocol II that attacks are concerted in nature.³⁰

The MNJTF often relies on deploying aerial attacks against ISWAP.³¹ As of April 2025,³² ISWAP, too, increasingly relied on using drone technology against the NAF and the MNJTF.³³

ISWAP’s advanced weaponry includes not only armed drones,³⁴ but also assault rifles, anti-aircraft weapons, 60mm mortars,³⁵ ArmaLite AR-10 Super SASS, Russian Orsis T-5000 sniper rifles,³⁶ quadcopter drones for battlefield reconnaissance support, vehicle-mounted weapons,³⁷ and ‘drop’ bombs.³⁸

The severity and frequency of attacks, including those in Borno state, significantly increased the need for internal displacement camps as thousands of civilians fled their homes in Marte, Dikwa, Rann and surrounding villages.³⁹

It is clear that the fighting between Nigeria (and support forces) and ISWAP continues to meet the notion of intensity demanded by IHL during the period under review.

Organization

ISWAP is an affiliate of Islamic State.⁴⁰ Boko Haram pledged allegiance to Islamic State in March 2015 and, at times, used the moniker ‘ISWAP’.⁴¹ Islamic State accepted the pledge in March 2015.⁴² After Boko Haram splintered into two factions during 2016, one faction retained the name ISWAP.⁴³ ISWAP, along with the Mali-based Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), reports to the Al-Furqan office, an office of Islamic State ‘Central’.⁴⁴

The overall structure of ISWAP displays coherency; it follows a bureaucratic approach in the governance of territory under its control and has a standing armed force.⁴⁵ Although an Islamic State affiliate, ISWAP must meet independently the organizational criteria under IHL to constitute a party to a NIAC. Islamic State, itself, promotes autonomous regional leadership.⁴⁶

ISWAP demonstrates a collective approach to leadership and has a functioning advisory council (Shura Council). The Shura Council is composed of senior leaders and clerics who are consulted about key decisions. The leadership structure contributes to a smooth leadership transition and the resolution of internal tensions.⁴⁷ The ISWAP Shura Council is composed of a chief of army staff (jaysh), Ibrahim Yusuf aka Abu Abdullahi, a chief judge (alkali), Mamman Khalifa A.K.A. Muhammad Ali Chief Administrator (idari), a chief of internal security (amniyya), Abu Ismail A.K.A. Dalilu, Auditor, Mallam Ismail, and a chief of police (hisbah), Modu Yerwama.⁴⁸

The head count of the military wing of ISWAP is estimated to range between 5,000⁴⁹ and 10,400 fighters. A ‘quid’ is a rank equivalent to ‘major’ and a person in this position has charge of approximately 400 fighters.⁵⁰ A quid has four munzirs, a position equivalent to ‘captain’, under direct command and each munzir commands about 100 fighters. Four naqibs, a position equivalent to ‘lieutenant’, report to each munzir. Each naqib commands twenty to thirty fighters.⁵¹ At an operational level, ISWAP units are constituted from smaller, standing professional units, which have been described as being well-controlled and well-trained.⁵² The breakdown into units and the exercise of control make it possible for unit commanders to impose an internal disciplinary system.

ISWAP adheres to an extreme Salafi interpretation of Islam.⁵³ ISWAP possesses an internal security service, called amniyya, and exercises control over its fighters during combat and in interacting with communities.⁵⁴ Amniyya gathers information in respect of the fighters and reports back at the highest level to an overall amir ul amniyya.⁵⁵ The measure of control ensures that fighters can be disciplined if they do not follow instructions on the battlefield or adhere to ISWAP’s religious code.⁵⁶

ISWAP is hands-on in controlling its fighters. The fighters are registered and the size of a fighting unit is regulated.⁵⁷ ISWAP keeps weaponry and munitions in a central arsenal and, if not deployed to an active operation, it forbids fighters from retaining weapons.⁵⁸ ISWAP relies on internal checks and balances to achieve a stronger state-building project and military campaign.⁵⁹

Clearly, ISWAP has a sophisticated command structure capable of responsible command – an organizational criterion required by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. ISWAP is able to implement the provisions of Additional Protocol II.⁶⁰

The military tactics deployed by ISWAP have significantly evolved over time. During 2025, the group demonstrated a capacity to employ territory under its control to launch near-simultaneous attacks on geographically remote military objectives.⁶¹ Territory controlled by ISWAP includes a large part of north-eastern Borno state.⁶² ISWAP frequently attacks at night, which suggests the possession of night-vision equipment, and has access to developed drone technology.⁶³ It is clear ISWAP has an attack strategy, or its attacks are planned, as required by Article (1) of Additional Protocol II.⁶⁴ The change in the nature of attacks has been attributed to support by Islamic State in sending instructors to train ISWAP fighters in the Lake Chad area as of 2024.⁶⁵ Military tactics include ‘overstretching’ NAF units in northern Borno and northern Yobe to consolidate territorial control in those areas.⁶⁶ Despite not consolidating control over northern Borno, ISWAP exercises sufficient stable territorial control over a part of this area,⁶⁷ which facilitates the launching of sustained and concerted attacks.

As a part of ISWAP’s military tactics, the group actively attempts to improve relations with civilians living in territory under its control.⁶⁸ These territories include central and southern Borno where the goal is to develop governance, which includes taxation and building prisons, courts and hospitals.⁶⁹ Specifically, ISWAP courts Muslims in north-eastern Nigeria through an outreach campaign which claims Muslim civilians will be protected in ISWAP-controlled areas on the condition they pay tax.⁷⁰

On 20 December 2024, ISWAP released a video aimed at recruiting and training fighters, who often are under 18 years of age.⁷¹ ISWAP relies on social media platforms, including WhatsApp and Telegram, to recruit fighters.⁷² It has a system akin to reservists; rijal (male reservists) live as civilians but can be called up to fill the ranks of fighters if losses are suffered in battle.⁷³

ISWAP has a sophisticated logistical system and benefits from advice and aid provided by Islamic State.⁷⁴ It raises funding through criminal activity such as kidnapping for ransom, arms and drug trafficking, fuel smuggling and the taxation of fishermen and cattle farmers.⁷⁵ It is estimated that ISWAP generates approximately US$5 million per month.⁷⁶ Its commanders and administrators are paid fixed salaries, but fighters are compensated from the spoils of war (ghanima). In the camps, the fighters are fed and they can ask for financial assistance.⁷⁷

Its logistical system is strengthened by internal controls which aim to achieve the centralisation of weaponry, to increase reliance on computers and ledgers to monitor food, equipment and food stocks, and to ensure salaries are paid to remunerated officials.⁷⁸ ISWAP assures unity of communication through a media team which has a primary function of showcasing it as a successful jihadist group. The media team has public relations and liaison functions, acting for ISWAP in its contact with other extremist groups outside Islamic State as well as with Islamic State ‘Central’. ISWAP uses a range of communication technologies, including Wi-Fi, clip-on microphones, walkie-talkies, data compression and archiving software, high-speed printers and laptops. It is the data compression and archiving software that enables ISWAP to communicate with Islamic State.⁷⁹ The communications system and media team would give ISWAP the capacity to disseminate and promote IHL, including the provisions of Additional Protocol II. The communication system combined with a sophisticated command structure and stable territorial control further guarantee at every level of ISWAP a flow of information that allows coordinated and sustained military operations.

ISWAP’s command structure has allowed it to organize sustained and concerted military operations, which secure territorial dominance and facilitate further territorial gains. In turn, the control of territory is an environment under which military discipline can be imposed on fighters and commanders can plan and execute military operations, as well as order a retreat. Additionally, control of territory means it is a realistic expectation that ISWAP apply Additional Protocol II.⁸⁰ At the time of reporting, ISWAP met the organizational criterion in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II.

1
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
2
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 16.
3
‘Nigerian airstrikes taking major toll on ISWAP’, defenceWeb, 26 July 2023.
4
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group.
5
‘Nigeria: NAF Airstrikes Neutralise Several Terrorists in Lake Chad’, All Africa, 3 October 2023.
6
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group.
7
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; I. G. Shuaibu, ‘Nigerian Airforce airstrikes kill terrorists kingpins, 30 others’, AA, 16 April 2024; Leadership News, ‘NAF Airstrikes Kill Terrorist Leaders, 30 Fighters in Borno’, Facebook, 16 April 2024, May,‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group.
8
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group.
9
‘Army kill 11 ISWAP terrorists in Sambisa forest’, Punch, 6 July 2024.
10
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; ‘Army kill 11 ISWAP terrorists in Sambisa forest’, Punch, 6 July 2024.
11
K. Adeniyi, ‘At least 35 Nigerian soldiers killed in last 3 weeks while fighting insurgency’, AA, 27 January 2025.
12
A. Dahiru, ‘ISWAP Claims Attacks on Nigerian Military and CJTF in North East Nigeria’, HumAngle, 10 March 2025.
13
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025; ‘BREAKING: ISWAP Terrorists Take Over Marte Council Area In Borno After Dislodging Nigerian Army, Capturing Soldiers’, Sahara Reporters, 13 May 2025; ‘Troops neutralised 60 terrorists in Borno – Army’, Vanguard, 30 May 2025; T. Akinmoyeje, ‘7 Attacks, 18 Soldiers Dead: Fresh Buni Gari Raid Mocks FG’s Repeated Claims of Defeating Insurgents’, Foundation for Investigative Journalism, 4 May 2025.
14
‘Battling Boko Haram Factions May Hinder Islamic State Group’s Plans’, Eurasia Review, 29 May 2024; ‘Battling Boko Haram Factions May Hinder Islamic State Group’s Plans’, African Defense Forum, 28 May 2024; ‘Boko Haram factional violence worries Islamic State’, defenceWeb, 8 May 2024.
15
‘Battling Boko Haram Factions May Hinder Islamic State Group’s Plans’, Eurasia Review, 29 May 2024; and A. Orolua, ‘No Nigerian territory in North East under the control of terrorists, says Theatre Commander’, The Daily Times Nigeria, 26 April 2024.
16
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group.
17
A. Orolua, ‘No Nigerian territory in North East under the control of terrorists, says Theatre Commander’, The Daily Times Nigeria, 26 April 2024.
18
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; I. G. Shuaibu, ‘Nigerian Airforce airstrikes kill terrorists kingpins, 30 others’, AA, 16 April 2024; Leadership News, ‘NAF Airstrikes Kill Terrorist Leaders, 30 Fighters in Borno’, Facebook, 16 April 2024.
19
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group.
20
M. Nwankpa, ‘Boko Haram 2.0? The Evolution of a Jihadist Group Since 2015’, Hudson, 7 July 2025; K. Adeniyi, ‘Nigerian army kills 60 Boko Haram terrorists after repelling attack on military base’, AA, 30 May 2025; M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025; G. Emeka, ‘More rescued victims of insurgency handed over to Borno state government’, Voice of America, 20 November 2024.
21
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group.
22
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group.
23
‘Regional Force Says 70 Jihadists Killed in Lake Chad’, The Defense Post, 2 July 2024; M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Chad, Cameroon say Boko Haram in villages after strikes kill 70 terrorists’, Voice of America, 2 July 2024.
24
‘ISWAP Releases Video Claiming Responsibility for Kukawa Attack Amid Military Gains’, Zagazola, 28 November 2024.
25
M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025.
26
M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025.
27
A. Salkida, ‘ISWAP Overruns Key Borno Sites in Coordinated Assault’, HumAngle, 14 May 2025.
28
O. S. Okonkwo, ‘Nigeria’s Terror War: Why Misunderstanding Boko Haram (JAS) vs. ISWAP Could Cost Us Everything’, Medium, 23 April 2025; ‘Resurgence of Boko Haram in Nigeria’, Compass by Rau’s IAS, 31 May 2025; and M. Abubakar and C. Ewokor, ‘Nigerian governor warns of Boko Haram comeback’, BBC, 9 April 2025.
29
‘Troops neutralised 60 terrorists in Borno – Army’, Vanguard, 30 May 2025.
30
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40.
31
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; ‘Nigeria: NAF Airstrikes Neutralise Several Terrorists in Lake Chad’, All Africa, 3 October 2023.
32
A. Usman, ‘Nigeria’s weak digital sovereignty is aiding terrorism and fuelling insecurity’, London School of Economics, 23 May 2025.
33
N. Roll et al, ‘Nigeria, Sahel Militants Embrace DIY Drone’, eNCA, 27 March 2025; A. Jamio, ‘Nigeria: ISWAP extremists launching attack drones’, DW, 16 April 2025; and ‘ISWAP Adds Armed Drones to Its Arsenal in Northeast Nigeria’, African Defense Forum, 13 May 2025.
34
A. Jamio, ‘Nigeria: ISWAP extremists launching attack drones’, DW, 16 April 2025.
35
‘Insurgents scatter as Nigeria rules the air’, defenceWeb, 8 January 2024.
36
T. Adebayo, ‘Lake Chad Basin insurgents raise the stakes with weaponised drones’, Institute for Security Studies, 17 March 2025.
37
‘ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, April 2025.
38
T. Adebayo, ‘Lake Chad Basin insurgents raise the stakes with weaponised drones’, Institute for Security Studies, 17 March 2025; F. Nasrullah, ‘So ISWAP Released A 15 Mins Long Video Pt I’, The Relevant Information, 24 May 2025.
39
A. Salkida, ‘ISWAP Overruns Key Borno Sites in Coordinated Assault’, HumAngle, 14 May 2025; U. A. Zanna, ‘Borno’s Resettled Families Are Quietly Fleeing Again’, HumAngle, 8 May 2025; and ‘Nigeria – Floods and conflict combine to trigger displacement in Borno state’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 13 May 2025.
40
M. Samuel, ‘Boko Haram factional violence worries Islamic State’, Institute for Security Studies, 25 April 2024.
41
‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024; and ‘Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)’, United Nations Security Council.
42
‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024; ‘Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)’, United Nations Security Council.
43
‘Boko Haram, including JAS and ISIS-WA’, European Union Agency for Asylum, February 2019; ‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024.
44
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024; L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘The Islamic State’s Global Long Game and Resurgence in Syria Poses an Evolved Threat to the West’, Institute for the Study of War, 9 January 2025.
45
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024; ‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
46
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024; L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘The Islamic State’s Global Long Game and Resurgence in Syria Poses an Evolved Threat to the West’, Institute for the Study of War, 9 January 2025.
47
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
48
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
49
‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024; ‘ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, April 2025; M. Cengiz, ‘Column: Terrorist Threat Assessment: Boko Haram and ISWAP in Nigeria’, Homeland Security Today, 4 June 2024.
50
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
51
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024; ‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
52
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
53
‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024.
54
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024; and V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
55
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
56
‘Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On’, International Crisis Group, 30 May 2023.
57
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
58
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
59
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
60
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.38.
61
M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025.
62
O. S. Okonkwo, ‘Nigeria’s Terror War: Why Misunderstanding Boko Haram (JAS) vs. ISWAP Could Cost Us Everything’, Medium, 23 April 2025; ‘Resurgence of Boko Haram in Nigeria’, Compass by Rau’s IAS, 31 May 2025; M. Abubakar and C. Ewokor, ‘Nigerian governor warns of Boko Haram comeback’, BBC, 9 April 2025.
63
M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025.
64
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40.
65
M. Samuel, ‘From the Levant to Lake Chad: ISIS fighters fuel ISWAP resurgence’, Good Governance Africa, 30 May 2025.
66
F. Nasrullah, ‘So ISWAP Released A 15 Mins Long Video Pt I’, The Relevant Information, 24 May 2025.
67
F. Nasrullah, ‘So ISWAP Released A 15 Mins Long Video Pt I’, The Relevant Information, 24 May 2025; O. S. Okonkwo, ‘Nigeria’s Terror War: Why Misunderstanding Boko Haram (JAS) vs. ISWAP Could Cost Us Everything’, Medium, 23 April 2025; ‘Resurgence of Boko Haram in Nigeria’, Compass by Rau’s IAS, 31 May 2025; M. Abubakar and C. Ewokor, ‘Nigerian governor warns of Boko Haram comeback’, BBC, 9 April 2025.
68
M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025.
69
‘After Shekau: Confronting Jihadists in Nigeria’s North East’, International Crisis Group, 29 March 2022; and ‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
70
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024; ‘Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On’, International Crisis Group, 30 May 2023; ‘After Shekau: Confronting Jihadists in Nigeria’s North East’, International Crisis Group, 29 March 2022; ‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
71
‘Islamic State In West Africa (ISWAP) Releases Video Showing ‘Cubs’ Executing Captives, Vowing To Carry The Caliphate’s Banner Generation After Generation’, Memri, 20 December 2024.
72
A. Dahiru, ‘Media Jihad: Social Media Use Shows Islamic State’s Increasing Interest In Africa’, HumAngle, 14 September 2022.
73
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
74
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
75
‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024.
76
S. M. Zuffa, ‘Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)’, Grey Dynamics, 22 February 2023; M. Samuel, ‘Boko Haram’s deadly business: an economy of violence in the Lake Chad Basin’, Institute for Security Studies, 5 October 2022.
77
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024; ‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
78
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024.
79
M. Samuel, ‘ISWAP’s use of tech could prolong Lake Chad Basin violence’, Institute for Security Studies, 13 April 2023.
80
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.

3. Non-International Armed Conflict between ISWAP and Boko Haram

Background

In 2016, following separation from Boko Haram, a NIAC commenced between ISWAP and Boko Haram.¹ These armed groups compete for territorial control mostly within Borno state.²

Intensity

During the reporting period, clashes between Boko Haram and ISWAP continued, including incidents recorded in August 2023,³ November 2023,⁴ December 2023,⁵ April 2024,⁶

The second half of 2023 was marked by retaliatory attacks between Boko Haram and ISWAP in attempts to dominate territory in and around Marte Town, Borno state. A significant engagement in this period occurred between 18 and 19 August 2023 when Boko Haram and ISWAP clashed and approximately 100 fighters were reportedly killed.⁷ At Tumbum Ali Island in Marte during November 2023 ISWAP counter-attacked, destroying at least ten boats and reportedly killing between sixty and seventy fighters.⁸ These clashes have led to a rise in the number of IDPs fleeing the region and has resulted in overcrowding in IDP camps.⁹

In October 2023, Boko Haram launched a major offensive against ISWAP,¹⁰ which forced ISWAP fighters to evacuate many of their island territories in the Lake Chad area.¹¹ Those familiar with the clashes say that Boko Haram occupied as much as 40 per cent of the islands previously controlled by ISWAP, but ISWAP has managed to keep control over the mainland in these areas.¹² In retaliation, from 15 to 17 December 2023, ISWAP engaged Boko Haram in a gun fight and regained some territory in Marte. This counterattack reportedly resulted in the death of forty fighters.¹³ Between 2 April and 13 May 2025, ISWAP launched a series of coordinated attacks on Marte, gaining de facto control over the district.¹⁴

A significant engagement took place during the first half of 2024 between 18 and 24 April. ISWAP used twenty vessels to transport approximately 130 soldiers to reach the Boko Haram stronghold in Doron Kirta Wulgo, Ngala, and Marte. In preparation, Boko Haram had moved fighters to defensive positions.¹⁵ Boko Haram commander Khaid Allayo Gana died in the clash¹⁶ and approximately 100 fighters were killed.¹⁷The nature of these attacks illustrates the ability of both sides to engage in sophisticated military operations against each other.

A further significant clash took place at the beginning of August 2024. Boko Haram and ISWAP fought over territorial claims in the north-eastern Lake Chad region in Borno state. ISWAP reportedly suffered severe losses with ninety fighters killed, while Boko Haram lost ten fighters.¹⁸

ISWAP fighters are equipped with AK 47 rifles, anti-aircraft guns, 60mm mortars,¹⁹ as well as drone technology and drop bombs.²⁰ They have the capability to convert commercial drones into ‘flying bombs’, which has enlarged their capacity to inflict damage.21 African Defense Forum, 13 May 2025. Boko Haram fighters, too, use assault rifles and heavy machine guns.²² Boko Haram frequently uses IEDs.²³ Reports suggest that, as in the case of ISWAP, Boko Haram has acquired drone technology and drops locally-made grenades.²⁴

Boko Haram and ISWAP are equally matched in the type of weaponry they use, and both sides suffer significant casualties when they engage. It is reported that ISWAP and Boko Haram have lost more fighters fighting each other than in engagements with the NAF or MNJTF.²⁵ Clearly, the high intensity of the fighting between ISWAP and Boko Haram throughout the reporting period equates to protracted armed violence.

Organization

Under the rules of IHL, Boko Haram and ISWAP are sufficiently organized and display sophisticated command structures.²⁶

Throughout the reporting period Boko Haram and ISWAP were engaged in a NIAC.

1
‘Boko Haram, including JAS and ISIS-WA’, European Union Agency for Asylum, February 2019; and ‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
2
O. Ayandele and C. C. Aniekwe, ‘A Decade After Chibok: Assessing Nigeria’s Regional Response to Boko Haram’, ACLED, 16 April 2024; F. Iyorah, ‘Rivalry among Boko Haram factions compounds violence in northern Nigeria’, Al Jazeera, 8 September 2023; ‘Over 100 ISWAP, Boko Haram killed as terrorists intensify fight of supremacy’, Zagazola, 12 August 2024.
3
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; ‘Over 100 terrorists dead as Boko Haram, ISWAP clash in Lake’, Zagazola, 19 August 2023.
4
U. Abubakar, ‘Scores feared killed in Boko Haram, ISWAP clash’, Punch, 18 November 2023; ‘Scores of Boko Haram/ISWAP fighters killed in renewed clashes’, Zagazola, 18 November 2023.
5
‘Scores of terrorists killed as ISWAP/Boko Haram clash in NE’, Zagazola, 17 December 2023.
6
‘Escalated ISWAP/Boko Haram Clashes Claim Over 100 Fighters’, Zagazola, 24 April 2024, September 2024,‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group and February 2025 ‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group.
7
‘Over 100 terrorists dead as Boko Haram, ISWAP clash in Lake’, Zagazola, 19 August 2023; M. Adebukola, ‘Over 100 Terrorists Killed As ISWAP, Boko Haram Clash In Borno’, New Telegraph, 19 August 2023.
8
‘Scores of Boko Haram/ISWAP fighters killed in renewed clashes’, Zagazola, 18 November 2023; U. Abubakar, ‘Scores feared killed in Boko Haram, ISWAP clash’, Punch, 18 November 2023.
9
U. Abubakar, ‘Scores feared killed in Boko Haram, ISWAP clash’, Punch, 18 November 2023.
10
M. Samuel, ‘Analysis: Boko Haram factions fight each other, leave Islamic State worried’, Premium Times, 25 April 2024.
11
M. Samuel, ‘Analysis: Boko Haram factions fight each other, leave Islamic State worried’, Premium Times, 25 April 2024.
12
M. Samuel, ‘Analysis: Boko Haram factions fight each other, leave Islamic State worried’, Premium Times, 25 April 2024.
13
‘Scores of terrorists killed as ISWAP/Boko Haram clash in NE’, Zagazola, 17 December 2023.
14
‘Inside Islamic State of West Africa’s Seizure of a Strategic Nigerian Stronghold’, Truth Nigeria, 16 May 2025; M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025; T. Adebayo, ‘Lake Chad Basin’s military bases in ISWAP’s crosshairs’, Institute for Security Studies, 14 July 2025.
15
‘Escalated ISWAP/Boko Haram Clashes Claim Over 100 Fighters’, Zagazola, 24 April 2024.
16
‘Escalated ISWAP/Boko Haram Clashes Claim Over 100 Fighters’, Zagazola, 24 April 2024; ‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group.
17
‘Escalated ISWAP/Boko Haram Clashes Claim Over 100 Fighters’, Zagazola, 24 April 2024.
18
‘Over 100 ISWAP, Boko Haram killed as terrorists intensify fight of supremacy’, Zagazola, 12 August 2024.
19
‘Insurgents scatter as Nigeria rules the air’, defenceWeb, 8 January 2024.
20
F. Nasrullah, ‘So ISWAP Released A 15 Mins Long Video Pt I’, The Relevant Information, 24 May 2025.
21
‘ISWAP Adds Armed Drones to Its Arsenal in Northeast Nigeria’, African Defense Forum, 13 May 2025.
22
‘Troops Eliminate Boko Haram Commander Abba Alai, Crush Terrorists in Gwoza and Garin Fallujah’, Zagazola, 3 March 2025.
23
I. Ojo, ‘Troops kill B’Haram chief bomb maker, eight others in Sambisa’, Punch, 6 March 2025; ‘Communiqué of the 1254th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held on 13 January 2025 on the Consideration Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram Terrorist Group and Renewal of its Mandate’, African Union, 3 February 2025, para 6.
24
‘Boko Haram Militants Attack Two Nigerian Army Bases with Grenade-strapped Drones’, Defense Mirror, 26 December 2024; N. Roll et al, ‘Nigeria, Sahel Militants Embrace DIY Drone’, eNCA, 27 March 2025; ‘Nigerian Army Confirms Boko Haram’s Use Of Armed Drones In Borno, Similar To Israeli, Ukrainian Types’, Sahara Reporters, 14 May 2025.
25
‘Escalated ISWAP/Boko Haram Clashes Claim Over 100 Fighters’, Zagazola, 24 April 2024.
26
For Boko Haram (above) and ISWAP (above).

State Parties

Nigeria
Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) troop-contributing countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger (announced withdrawal March 2025) and Nigeria)

Non-State parties

Boko Haram (JAS)
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)

Foreign Involvement

Benin (deployment of non-combat troops within MNJTF)

1
Article 2(2) Additional Protocol II of 1977.
2
‘Conflict in many parts of the country’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2 February 2024; A. Gandonu, ‘Nigeria’s 250 Ethnic Groups: Realities and Assumptions’, Perspectives on Ethnicity, 1978; ‘The People’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Nigeria, undated.
3
‘Conflict in many parts of the country’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2 February 2024; ‘The People’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Federal Republic of Nigeria.
4
‘The Need for Protection of Civilians in North East Nigeria: Protection Analysis Update’, Global Protection Cluster, April 2024; and S. Brechenmacher, ‘Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3 May 2019.
5
M. T. Dansabo and U. I. Dabai, ‘The Impact of Poverty on Northern Nigeria’s Development: A Comprehensive Analysis’, International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, 30 August 2024; and F. N. Kamta et al, ‘The Root Causes of the Crisis in Northeast Nigeria: Historical, Socioeconomic and Environmental Dimensions’, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, May 2020.
6
F. N. Kamta et al, ‘The Root Causes of the Crisis in Northeast Nigeria: Historical, Socioeconomic and Environmental Dimensions’, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, May 2020.
7
AOAV, ‘Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)’, 2 March 2016; K. Madueke and I. A. Buba, ‘Civilian Joint Task Force’, African Cities Research Consortium/Urban Reform Database, 3 May 2024.
8
S. Brechenmacher, ‘Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3 May 2019; and O. Ayandele and C. C. Aniekwe, ‘A Decade After Chibok: Assessing Nigeria’s Regional Response to Boko Haram’, ACLED, 16 April 2024.
9
S. Brechenmacher, ‘Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3 May 2019; and ‘Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery & Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region’, Lake Chad Basin Commission and African Union Commission, August 2018.
10
‘Conflict in many parts of the country’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2 February 2024; and ‘Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism’, Institute for Economics & Peace, November 2020.
11
‘Boko Haram, including JAS and ISIS-WA’, European Union Agency for Asylum, February 2019; ‘Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On’, International Crisis Group, 30 May 2023; ‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024; M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025.
12
M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025.
13
M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025; ‘The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast’, The Soufan Center, 21 May 2025; and M. Samuel, ‘From the Levant to Lake Chad: ISIS fighters fuel ISWAP resurgence’, Good Governance Africa, 30 May 2025.
14
‘Conflict in many parts of the country’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2 February 2024; O. Mateos, ‘Understanding Niger Delta’s violence from a World-Ecology perspective’, Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional, 2021; B. Martos, ‘Niger Delta: oil impact conflict’, Universidad de Navarra: Global Affairs, 17 April 2018; and J. Campbell, ‘Significant Rise of Insecurity in the Niger Delta Through 2019’, Council on Foreign Relations, 26 February 2020.
15
‘Conflict in many parts of the country’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2 February 2024; ‘The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast’, The Soufan Center, 21 May 2025; U. Efobi et al, ‘Climate change and the farmer-Pastoralist’s violent conflict: Experimental evidence from Nigeria’, Ecological Economics, February 2025; S. S. Nana, ‘How to stop Nigeria’s worsening farmer-pastoralist violence’, The New Humanitarian, 5 May 2025; and L. Brottem, ‘The Growing Complexity of Farmer-Herder Conflict in West and Central Africa’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 12 July 2021.
16
‘Conflict in many parts of the country’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2 February 2024; ‘The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast’, The Soufan Center, 21 May 2025; and S. S. Nana, ‘How to stop Nigeria’s worsening farmer-pastoralist violence’, The New Humanitarian, 5 May 2025.
17
‘Conflict in many parts of the country’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2 February 2024; S. F. C. Daly, ‘Unfinished Business: Biafran Activism in Nigeria Today’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 7 April 2021; and C. Nwonwu, ‘Biafra quest fuels Nigeria conflict: Too scared to marry and bury bodies’, BBC News, 9 January 2023.
18
‘Conflict in many parts of the country’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2 February 2024; and A. T. Nwaubani, ‘Remembering Nigeria’s Biafra war that many prefer to forget’, BBC, 15 January 2020.
19
‘Conflict in many parts of the country’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2 February 2024; K. Adebajo and H. Ibrahim, ‘Violent Criminal Gangs Displace and Disrupt North West Nigeria’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 21 October 2024; and O. Ojewale, ‘Northwest Nigeria Has a Banditry Problem. What’s Driving It?’, Global Observatory, 22 May 2024.
20
‘Conflict in many parts of the country’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2 February 2024.
21
‘Nigeria’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025.
22
N. Orjinmo, ‘Bola Tinubu wins Nigeria’s presidential election against Atiku Abubakar and Peter Obi’, BBC, 1 March 2023; ‘Bola Tinubu wins Nigeria’s presidential election’, Economist Intelligence, 9 March 2023; and C. Asadu, ‘Nigeria’s Bola Tinubu declared winner of presidential vote’, AP News, 1 March 2023.
23
‘Nigeria election tribunal upholds President Bola Tinubu’s victory’, Al Jazeera, 6 September 2023; C. Eboh, ‘Nigerian election tribunal upholds Tinubu’s presidential win’, Reuters, 7 September 2023; and T. Obiezu, ‘Opposition Parties Reject Nigeria’s Presidential Election Court Verdict’, Voice of America, 7 September 2023.
24
T. Obiezu, ‘Opposition Parties Reject Nigeria’s Presidential Election Court Verdict’, Voice of America, 7 September 2023; ‘Nigeria Opposition Petitions Supreme Court to Overturn President Tinubu’s Win’, Voice of America, 23 October 2023; and ‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group.
25
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; ‘Nigeria’s Supreme Court affirms Tinubu’s presidential victory’, Al Jazeera, 26 October 2023; and ‘Nigeria: Supreme Court upholds Tinubu’s election victory’, Deutsche Welle, 26 October 2023.
26
‘The coup in Niger’, Institute for Security Studies, August 2023; and G. Yabi, ‘The Niger Coup’s Outsized Global Impact’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 31 August 2023.
27
N. Obais, ‘ECOWAS, Nigeria and the Niger Coup Sanctions: Time to Recalibrate’, International Crisis Group, 5 December 2023; ‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; and J. Are, ‘Niger junta withdraws ambassadors from Nigeria, US, France’, The Cable, 4 August 2023.
28
N. Obais, ‘ECOWAS, Nigeria and the Niger Coup Sanctions: Time to Recalibrate’, International Crisis Group, 5 December 2023.
29
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; J. Are, ‘Niger junta withdraws ambassadors from Nigeria, US, France’, The Cable, 4 August 2023; and ‘Niger Republic To Withdraw Ambassadors To Nigeria, 3 Others As Deposed Leader Calls On U.S. For Help’, 24 Daily, 4 August 2023.
30
G. Ikeh, ‘Niger, Nigeria resume official dialogue on improving relations’, APA News, 18 April 2025; and ‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group.
31
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; ‘Nigeria’s Defence Chief Musa Visits Niger Junta Leaders To Discuss Security Collaboration’, Arise News, 28 August 2024; and E. Addeh, ‘Nigeria’s Defence Chief Visits Niger Republic to Discuss Security Collaboration’, This Day Live, 29 August 2024.
32
G. Ikeh, ‘Niger, Nigeria resume official dialogue on improving relations’, APA News, 18 April 2025.
33
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; ‘Nigeria Inflation Rate’, Trading Economics; ‘CPI and Inflation Report December 2023: Executive Summary’, National Bureau of Statistics: Nigeria.
34
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; ‘Nigerian unions protest increasing cost of living’, Industri-all Global Union, 28 February 2024; ‘Nigerian workers start two-day nationwide protest’, Africa News, 13 August 2024; and ‘Communique at the end of a National Executive Council (NEC) Meeting of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) held on Tuesday, the 27th Day of February 2024’, Nigeria Labour Congress, 27 February 2024.
35
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; A. Abiodun, ‘Customs suspends sale of seized food items over stampede’, The Nation, 26 February 2024; K. Okojie, ‘Nigeria Customs halts food distribution after fatal stampede’, Business Day, 27 February 2024; and N. Princewill, ‘Nigeria customs confirms deaths in stampede for discounted rice’, CNN, 27 February 2024.
36
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; B. Ezeamalu, ‘Nigeria: Citizens resort to looting, warnings of ‘looming anarchy’’, The Africa Report, 6 March 2024; N. Shotayo, ‘FCT residents loot foodstuffs at NEMA warehouse as economic hardship worsens’, Pulse, 3 March 2024; A. Muritala, ‘Deadly gatherings: The alarming recurrence of fatal stampedes in Nigeria’, International Centre for Investigative Reporting, 17 January 2025; and M. Abubakar, ‘Nigeria crush at charity cash hand-out event kills seven in Bauchi’, BBC, 25 March 2024.
37
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; and ‘Nigeria Situation Report, 5 April 2024’, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 5 April 2024.
38
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat and H. Nsaibia, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: August 2024’, ACLED, 6 September 2024; and N. Adika, ‘GeoPoll Report: Nigeria Nationwide Protests’, GeoPoll, 13 August 2024.
39
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; N. Adika, ‘GeoPoll Report: Nigeria Nationwide Protests’, GeoPoll, 13 August 2024; ‘Chronicling the #EndBadGovernance Protest as Nigerians Cry for Change’, This Day Live, 6 August 2024; and H. A. Najimdeen, ‘The Rise of Youth Protests in Sub-Saharan Africa: Patterns and Implications’, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 7 August 2024.
40
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat and H. Nsaibia, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: August 2024’, ACLED, 6 September 2024; and ‘Nigeria: Police used excessive force to violently quash #Endbadgovernance protests’, Amnesty International, 28 November 2024.
41
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat and H. Nsaibia, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: August 2024’, ACLED, 6 September 2024; T. Obiezu, ‘Amnesty International says Nigerian police killed 24 in crackdown on August protests’, Voice of America, 28 November 2024; and ‘Bloody August: Nigerian Government’s Violent: Crackdown on #EndBadGovernance Protests’, Amnesty International, November 2024.
42
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; C. Ewokor and M. Abubakar, ‘Nigerian president demands end to deadly protests’, BBC, 4 August 2024; B. Ezeamalu, ‘Tinubu calls for protest to end; organisers say it will continue’, The Africa Report, 5 August 2024.
43
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; ‘UNHCR scrambles aid as devastating floods sweep Nigeria’, UNHCR, 17 September 2024.
44
‘UNHCR scrambles aid as devastating floods sweep Nigeria’, UNHCR, 17 September 2024; ‘Nigeria: Floods’, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 18 September 2024; and ‘Crocodiles and snakes ‘washed into communities’ as flood hits Nigerian zoo’, The Guardian, 10 September 2024.
45
‘UNHCR scrambles aid as devastating floods sweep Nigeria’, UNHCR, 17 September 2024; ‘Nigeria: Floods’, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 18 September 2024.
46
‘UNHCR scrambles aid as devastating floods sweep Nigeria’, UNHCR, 17 September 2024; ‘Nigeria: Floods’, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 18 September 2024.
47
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; ‘UNHCR scrambles aid as devastating floods sweep Nigeria’, UNHCR, 17 September 2024; ‘Nigeria: Hundreds of thousands in need of aid as flooding wipes out homes – WFP’, UN News, 13 September 2024.
48
F. Hulton, ‘Weather tracker: Nigeria hit by deadly flooding described as “worst in 60 years”’, The Guardian, 2 June 2025; ‘Death toll in Nigeria floods rises to 151’, Reuters, 2 June 2025; N. Princewill, ‘At least 150 killed as deadly floods hit Nigerian town’, CNN, 31 May 2025; ‘Deadly flooding in Nigeria displaces thousands’, UN News, 2 June 2025; A. Olaoluwa and C. Macaulay, ‘More than 700 believed dead in devastating Nigeria floods’, BBC, 2 June 2025.
49
F. Hulton, ‘Weather tracker: Nigeria hit by deadly flooding described as ‘worst in 60 years’’, The Guardian, 2 June 2025; and ‘Deadly flooding in Nigeria displaces thousands’, UN News, 2 June 2025.
50
F. Hulton, ‘Weather tracker: Nigeria hit by deadly flooding described as ‘worst in 60 years’’, The Guardian, 2 June 2025; and ‘Deadly flooding in Nigeria displaces thousands’, UN News, 2 June 2025.
51
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat et al, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: December 2023’, ACLED, 12 January 2024; R. Assheton, ‘Nigerian army drone strike accident kills at least 85 civilians’, The Guardian, 5 December 2023; ‘Nigerian army drone strike error kills civilians’, France 24, 5 December 2023; and ‘Nigeria: Army drone strike error kills 85 civilians at Muslim festival’, Africa News, 6 December 2023.
52
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat et al, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: December 2023’, ACLED, 12 January 2024; R. Assheton, ‘Nigerian army drone strike accident kills at least 85 civilians’, The Guardian, 5 December 2023; ‘Nigerian army drone strike error kills civilians’, France 24, 5 December 2023; ‘Nigeria: Army drone strike error kills 85 civilians at Muslim festival’, Africa News, 6 December 2023.
53
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; ‘Nigeria’s Tinubu expresses grief, ‘indignation’ after army drone accident kills 85 civilians’, France 24, 5 December 2023.
54
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; and ‘World News in Brief: Nigeria airstrikes condemned, supporting Venezuelan migrants and refugees, weapons in Myanmar’, UN News, 6 December 2023.
55
L. Serwat et al, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: December 2023’, ACLED, 12 January 2024.
56
L. Serwat et al, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: December 2023’, ACLED, 12 January 2024.
57
‘Military air strike kills at least 20 people in northwest Nigeria’, Al Jazeera, 2 June 2025; B. Rukanga and N. Ogbonna, ‘Nigeria military kills 16 civilians in air strike ‘mistake’’, BBC, 13 January 2025; A. Kingimi and C. Eboh, ‘At least 20 killed in airstrike on militia group, Nigeria air force says’, Reuters, 2 June 2025; and ‘Nigeria: Civilians ‘mistakenly’ killed in military airstrike’, DW, 13 January 2025.
58
L. Serwat et al, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: December 2023’, ACLED, 12 January 2024.
59
O. Ayandele and C. C. Aniekwe, ‘A Decade After Chibok: Assessing Nigeria’s Regional Response to Boko Haram’, ACLED, 16 April 2024; and ‘About the Force’, Multinational Joint Task Force.
60
‘About the Force’, Multinational Joint Task Force.
61
O. Ayandele and C. C. Aniekwe, ‘A Decade After Chibok: Assessing Nigeria’s Regional Response to Boko Haram’, ACLED, 16 April 2024; ‘About the Force’, Multinational Joint Task Force.
62
‘About the Force’, Multinational Joint Task Force.
63
‘The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast’, The Soufan Center, 21 May 2025; and ‘About the Force’, Multinational Joint Task Force.
64
O. Ayandele and C. C. Aniekwe, ‘A Decade After Chibok: Assessing Nigeria’s Regional Response to Boko Haram’, ACLED, 16 April 2024; R. Hoinathy and R. S. Tayo, ‘Decades of security cooperation under threat in Lake Chad Basin’, Institute for Security Studies, 27 January 2025.
65
‘The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast’, The Soufan Center, 21 May 2025.
66
‘The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast’, The Soufan Center, 21 May 2025; R. Hoinathy and R. S. Tayo, ‘Decades of security cooperation under threat in Lake Chad Basin’, Institute for Security Studies, 27 January 2025; M. E. Kindeza, ‘Chad president threatens to withdraw from regional force after Boko Haram attack kills over 40 Chad troops’, Voice of America, 2 November 2024; L. Serwat and H. Nsaibia, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: November 2024’, ACLED, 9 December 2024.
67
‘The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast’, The Soufan Center, 21 May 2025; R. Hoinathy and R. S. Tayo, ‘Decades of security cooperation under threat in Lake Chad Basin’, Institute for Security Studies, 27 January 2025.
68
‘The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast’, The Soufan Center, 21 May 2025.
69
‘The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast’, The Soufan Center, 21 May 2025.
70
F. Aina, ‘Why Islamic State is expanding its operations in north-eastern Nigeria’, The Conversation, 28 May 2025; R. Jimoh, ‘‘Four dead, four injured’ as IED explodes in Borno’, The Cable, 21 March 2025; ‘Four Killed, four Injured as IED Explodes in Borno’, Zagazola, 21 March 2025.
71
F. Aina, ‘Why Islamic State is expanding its operations in north-eastern Nigeria’, The Conversation, 28 May 2025; A. Jamiu, ‘Nigeria: ISWAP extremists launching attack drones’, DW, 16 April 2025.
72
F. Aina, ‘Why Islamic State is expanding its operations in north-eastern Nigeria’, The Conversation, 28 May 2025; ‘Insight’, BBC Monitoring, 14 May 2025.
73
‘The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast’, The Soufan Center, 21 May 2025; F. Aina, ‘Why Islamic State is expanding its operations in north-eastern Nigeria’, The Conversation, 28 May 2025; ‘Insight’, BBC Monitoring, 14 May 2025.
74
‘The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast’, The Soufan Center, 21 May 2025; F. Aina, ‘Why Islamic State is expanding its operations in north-eastern Nigeria’, The Conversation, 28 May 2025; and A. Salkida, ‘ISWAP Overruns Key Borno Sites in Coordinated Assault’, HumAngle, 14 May 2025.
75
‘The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast’, The Soufan Center, 21 May 2025; F. Aina, ‘Why Islamic State is expanding its operations in north-eastern Nigeria’, The Conversation, 28 May 2025; A. Kingimi, ‘At least 20,000 flee insurgency-hit town in Nigeria, governor says’, Reuters, 19 May 2025.
76
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; ‘Finnish police arrest 5 suspects over separatist violence in Nigeria’, Voice of America, 21 November 2024; and ‘Finland Arrests Nigerian Separatist In Online Terror Probe’, Barron’s, 21 November 2024.
77
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group.
78
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; M. Balogun, ‘No, Finland’s president Alexander Stubb has not pledged to support Biafra’s independence from Nigeria’, Africa Check, 29 November 2024; M. Rubin, ‘Biafra Declares Independence: A Renewed Quest for Freedom’, American Enterprises Institute, 1 December 2024.
79
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; ‘IPOB Denounces Simon Ekpa, Declares True Biafra Will Come Through UN Referendum’, The Traffic, 16 December 2024; M. Rubin, ‘Biafra Declares Independence: A Renewed Quest for Freedom’, American Enterprises Institute, 1 December 2024.
80
‘Africa: Nigeria’, International Crisis Group; C. Ugwu, ‘Simon Ekpa denies terrorism charges as Finnish court begins trial’, Premium Times, 30 May 2025; ‘Finland court give date for hearing of Simon Ekpa case’, BBC News, 22 May 2025; A. Oluwafemi, ‘Simon Ekpa’s trial begins in Finland as prosecutor seeks six-year jail term’, The Cable, 30 May 2025.
81
T. Adebayo, ‘Lake Chad Basin’s military bases in ISWAP’s crosshairs’, Institute for Security Studies, 14 July 2025.
82
M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025.
83
M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025.
84
T. Adebayo, ‘Lake Chad Basin’s military bases in ISWAP’s crosshairs’, Institute for Security Studies, 14 July 2025; ‘Inside Islamic State of West Africa’s Seizure of a Strategic Nigerian Stronghold’, Truth Nigeria, 16 May 2025.

Nigeria

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between 2023 and 2025)

Challenges to Bola Tinubu’s win in the presidential election in February 2023

Tense relations with Niger

Massive inflation followed by a cost-of-living crisis and protests

Repeated devastating flooding

Nigerian army drone strikes mistakenly kill civilians

Weakening of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

ISWAP launches largest offensive yet in January 2025

Arrest in Finland of Simon Ekpa, factional leader of the separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra

Fall of Marte town to ISWAP in Borno state

Non-International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-State parties

Foreign Involvement