Pakistan

During the reporting period, three non-international armed conflicts (NIAC) were ongoing: a NIAC between Pakistan and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP); another between Pakistan and the main factions of the Baloch insurgency (constituted in a coalition under Baloch Raaji Aajohi Sangar, BRAS); and a NIAC between Pakistan and Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K), which has now ended for lack of intensity. The situations of armed violence between Pakistan and other insurgents, including al-Qaeda and its affiliates fall below the threshold of armed conflict.

Pakistan has also been a party to two international armed conflicts (IACs) with its neighbours: One (ongoing) with Afghanistan and another, short-lived IAC with India in 2025.

Pakistan is a State Party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. All parties to the NIACs taking place in Pakistan are bound by Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, as well as by customary international humanitarian law applicable to NIACs. Pakistan is not a State Party to either of the Additional Protocols of 1977 although it has signed both treaties.

Since its independence and partition from India in 1947, Pakistan has experienced political turmoil linked to its cultural and religious diversity. While Executive power has oscillated between civilian and military rule, provincial leaders have remained influential, resulting in shifting alliances and changing governments.¹ The rise of separatist and Islamist movements has further exacerbated political instability; at this time, the TTP is the most prominent of these movements.²

Fighting between Pakistan and the TTP started in 2002, when Pakistan began conducting military operations against foreign fighters in its tribal areas alongside United States (US) drone strikes against al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and other insurgents. In response, the TTP formed out of veterans of armed conflicts in Afghanistan and members of local tribal groups.³ In 2004, Pakistan launched military offensives in the tribal areas near its border with Afghanistan against Taliban and fighters believed to be affiliated to al-Qaeda. The United States simultaneously targeted suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban members in the same area through its covert Predator drone campaign. Further offensives were launched in subsequent years.⁴

In parallel, armed groups have been fighting the government in search of independence of the province of Baluchistan.⁵ Attacks by other Islamist militants, including the Khorasan branch of Islamic State (IS-K),⁶ and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (a sectarian group linked to Islamic State),⁷ also took place. Armed clashes and attacks have occurred in various regions of Pakistan, including its tribal areas, and in cities such as Islamabad and Lahore.⁸

Baluchistan’s separatist aspirations

The Baloch people who inhabit Baluchistan, a region spanning parts of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan that has been described as ‘a resource-rich but underdeveloped province’,⁹ have long felt marginalized by the central government, fuelling separatist movements and armed insurgencies over the course of several decades.¹⁰ The origins of the conflict lie in the partition of India and Pakistan, specifically the accession of Kalat state to Pakistan in March 1948,¹¹ which prompted a revolt led by Agha Abdul Karim, the brother of the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmed Yar Kahn. The revolt, which developed into a major insurrection, coincided with the first phase of the Baloch conflict.¹² In parallel, Baluchistan has been progressively integrated into Pakistan’s state system through laws enacted between 1948 and 1955.¹³ Several phases of armed unrest have since occurred – in the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s – consolidating the Baloch people’s claims for self-determination, and sustaining the insurgency.¹⁴

After a period of relative calm in the 1990s, the latest, and still ongoing, phase of the conflict began in the early 2000s.¹⁵ This phase, rooted in growing tensions between Baloch nationalist parties and the Pakistani State over social and economic inequality, which intensified demands for greater autonomy, has resulted in two decades of violence involving killings, suicide bombings, enforced disappearances and internal displacement.¹⁶

Following violent suppression of a protest in Quetta, Baluchistan’s capital city, by the police in 1990s, Hyrbyair (or Harbyar) Marri, a Baloch nationalist, founded the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) in 1996 in Bolan area, and Aslam Baloch, also known as Aslam Achu, became first commander of BLA.¹⁷ In 1998, the nationalist government of Baluchistan was removed from power by the Pakistani government, prompting Hyrbyair Marri to go into exile in the United Kingdom in 2000.¹⁸ After the arrest of his father and an ideologue of the nationalist movement, Nawab Baksh Marri, in connection with the murder of Justice Nawaz Marri, confrontations between the Baloch, and the Pakistani State erupted, leading to an armed insurgency by the BLA.¹⁹

Targeting initially government installations as well as railway, communication and transmission lines in the province, the BLA also carried out rocket attacks, laid landmines, and initiated other attacks using explosive devices against the Frontier Corp (FC), a Pakistani government paramilitary group.²⁰ In 2003, a new faction of the Baloch insurgency named the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) emerged with the support of the BLA, seeking to expand the insurgency into middle-class areas, such as Makran and Rakhshan divisions.²¹

From 2000 to 2005, the BLA and the BLF fought with Pakistani security forces. Baloch insurgents fired rockets during President Musharraf’s meeting in Kohlu district on 14 December 2005. In parallel, the Baloch insurgency targeted international investors, notably from China, as for example in the killing by the BLF of three Chinese engineers in Gwadar on 3 May 2004.²² Clashes between Nawab Bugti and his tribe with the security forces led to his assassination during a military operation in 2006.²³ His death marked a turning point in the Baloch insurgency, strengthening the BLA and the BLF and contributing to the creation of the Baloch Republican Army (BRA).²⁴ The security situation deteriorated when the BLA leader, Balach Marri (the son of Nawab Baksh Marri) was killed in Afghanistan in November 2007 in circumstances that remain unclear. This had the effect of mobilizing youth in favour of the Baloch insurgency.²⁵

In September 2008, the BLA, BRA, and BLF unilaterally declared a ceasefire, the first and only one in the history of the conflict, while Pakistani security forces reduced their operations in the province but did not stop all military operations. Nevertheless, between 2008 and 2018, insurgency’s operation remained limited, with few exceptions, including the first BLA’s suicide bombing against a Baloch politician in Quetta in December 2011.²⁶

Fragmentation, unification and regional dimension of the Baloch insurgency

At the same time, the Baloch insurgency faced internal divisions (see below), with its first major split occurring in 2012 when the United Baloch Army (UBA) broke away from the BLA amid allegations of financial fraud. Internal disputes with the Baloch insurgency generated tensions and clashes over resources and equipment, and further fragmentation.²⁷ In 2018, Alsam Baloch, considered as the father of the modern guerilla warfare of the BLA and an influential figure within different factions of the insurgency, was expelled by the BLA over organizational disciplinary issues and founded the splinter BLA-Jeeyand faction (BLA-J), before being mysteriously killed in Kandahar city (Afghanistan) in December 2018.²⁸ As a result, two factions emerged from the BLA – the BLA-A and the BLA-J – and violence intensified as the BLA-J again mounted suicide attacks.²⁹ Following defections from the BLA-A to the BLA-J, the BLA-A ended major attacks, instead relying on ambushes and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and targeted killings. The BLA-J gained prominence through major attacks.³⁰ Likewise, in 2018, BRA field commander Gulzar Imam broke away, formed its own faction, BRA-Beegbar, then allied with a former UBA commander expelled for disciplinary grounds, Sarfaraz Nabgulzai, and established together the Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA) in January 2022, which joined the Baloch Raaji Aajohi Sangar (BRAS) umbrella (see below).³¹

Along with these internal divisions, several Baloch factions coalesced under the umbrella of BRAS (see further below), an alliance that was formally established on 10 November 2018.³² Initially formed by the BLF and the BLA-J, the coalition was joined by the Baloch Republican Guards (BRG) in April 2018, the BRA-Beegbar in May 2019, and the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA), a non-Baloch group, in July 2020.³³

Although every Baloch faction seeks the independence of Baluchistan, some factions limit their aspirations to Pakistan, while others expand them to neighbouring countries forming part the ‘Greater Baluchistan’, namely Afghanistan and Iran (see below).³⁴ In Iran, Baloch militants, who have faced discrimination and economic disparities on a sectarian basis, have historically clashed with the Iranian authorities. Fearing that the conflict would spill across its border, Iran provided logistical support to Pakistan in the 1970s. Over time, however, Pakistan and Iran have also accused each other of providing safe haven to the Baloch insurgency, especially since it has taken root in Iran under Jaishul Adl since 2021.³⁵

Finally, even though the majority of Baloch militants have not followed a jihadi ideology, the TTP (see below) have on several occasions endorsed their struggle against the Pakistani State.³⁶

Targeting of Chinese nationals and interests by the Baloch insurgency

The perceived exploitation of resources in Baluchistan by the Pakistan government and, subsequently, by China, including through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) launched in 2015, resulted in exacerbating grievances over resource control and marginalization, as well as Chinese nationals and projects being increasingly targeted by the Baloch insurgents since the early 2000s.³⁷ This includes the November 2018 attack against the Chinese consulate,³⁸ and numerous suicide bombings and attacks targeting Chinese nationals, infrastructure linked to the CPEC, and escorting Pakistani security forces from 2020 to 2024.³⁹ In response, Pakistani security forces were extensively deployed to secure CPEC projects, further militarizing the region, and drastic counterinsurgency measures were adopted. Rather than weakening the Baloch insurgency, these measures generated local resentment further fuelling sympathy for the insurgency.⁴⁰ China became also increasingly involved in internal security in Pakistan, reinforcing Pakistan’s dependency on China (see below).

Anti-election operations by Baloch armed groups

Another feature of the operations of the Baloch insurgency is the targeting of the election process. Assimilating electoral process to a tool of oppression, Baloch armed groups have often targeted poll stations, election candidates and election staff in the province since 2013. BRAS has acted as the main coordinator of attacks by its factions since its formation in 2017.⁴¹

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emergence

The TTP, also known as the Pakistani Taliban due to its link to Afghanistan, was founded by tribal militants in Pakistan who fought in Afghanistan in support of the Taliban before the 9/11 attacks.⁴² The TTP emerged in the context of the expansion of Pakistani military operations launched in 2002 under US pressure in the then Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) against al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters. These were perceived by local Pashtun tribes as assaults on their autonomy. Since then, the TTP has been the target of major Pakistani military operations, as well as US drone strikes. At the same time, it has benefited from the protection of the Afghan Taliban and from the porous border with Afghanistan.⁴³

The TTP was formally established in July 2007 in the aftermath of the Pakistani military’s ‘Red Mosque Operation’, which targeted mosques and seminaries in Islamabad closely linked to militant groups. The TTP sought to unify Sunni Islamist non-State armed groups based primarily in the north-western border region, the former FATA, in opposition to Pakistan’s policy shift and its support to the US conflicts against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Even though the TTP has pledged allegiance to the Afghan Taliban and drawn its name from them, it has not formed part of the latter.⁴⁴ Aiming initially at removing the Pakistani government from former FATA and resisting Western forces in Afghanistan, while implementing Sharia law in areas under its control, the TTP, following a change in leadership, grew closer to al-Qaeda. Attacks were conducted mostly in former FATA, but were also mounted in cities across Pakistan.⁴⁵ Capitalizing on the failure of Pakistani operations in the 2000s and on local grievances – including socio-economic concerns, Pakistani governance and security failures, corruption, and excessive use of force by Pakistan Army – the TTP expanded across FATA, establishing de facto institutions that compensated for governmental deficiencies and increasing its territorial control.⁴⁶ However, the killing of its founder, Baitullah Mehsud, in a US drone strike conducted as part of a joint Pakistan-US intelligence operation in 2009 led to the first splintering of the TTP and a decline of its organizational capacity. His successor, Hakimullah Mehsud, was also killed in a US drone strike in November 2013. As there was not predesignated successor, Mullah Fazlullah, a commander who had orchestrated several terror attacks, was elected as the new leader of the TTP, even though he lacked ties to the Mehsud and Waziri tribes.⁴⁷

Al-Qaeda and its affiliates’ fluctuating presence and significance in Pakistan

al-Qaeda is an Islamist group, mainly comprising Sunni Muslim Pashtuns, that was initially based in Pakistan (1988–91), then in Sudan (1991–96), in Afghanistan (1996–2002), and again in Pakistan (since 2002), when its leadership moved in Pakistani tribal areas after the US invasion of Afghanistan.⁴⁸

In the 2000s, al-Qaeda used Pakistani territory to house its operatives and leaders in tribal areas, notably FATA, from where they continued to operate, plan attacks against worldwide targets and funnel money.⁴⁹ In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan offered extensive support to US targeting of al-Qaeda and other foreign militants present on its soil and, in early 2002, it began conducting operations in tribal areas (see above).⁵⁰ In early 2003, after suffering substantial losses among its operatives in Pakistan and facing constraints caused by its limited communication with the outside world, al-Qaeda retreated to FATA and refocused on its local networks, benefiting from the support and protection of local clerics as well as the Mehsud and Wazir tribes. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda continued to plan attacks against Western targets, relying increasingly on homegrown jihadists in the West, towards whom it directed its propaganda and recruitment efforts.⁵¹ Shortly after, in late 2004 and early 2005, al-Qaeda also rebuilt its training capacity in the area and resumed training foreign fighters, although not without difficulties due to the limited access to the tribal areas.⁵²

al-Qaeda has also mounted attacks against Pakistani targets since 2001, initially focusing on military and intelligence officials and then broadening them in the late 2000s, as observed by Lahore attack on Ahmadi mosques (28 May 2010) and the Data Darbar Sufi shrine (1 July 2010), with thousands of Shia being the victims of targeted killings between 2008 and 2010.⁵³ At the same time, al-Qaeda moved its centre of gravity from tribal regions to more urban areas of Punjab and Sind provinces.⁵⁴ In addition, al-Qaeda reinforced its collaboration with Pakistani Islamist armed groups, including the TTP, and conducted attacks in close coordination with them.⁵⁵

Weakened by the emergence of the Islamic State and its Khorasan Branch (IS-K), alongside repeated Pakistani military operations and US drone strikes (see below), al-Qaeda nonetheless succeed in maintaining a presence in Pakistan in the late 2010s, notably through the creation of Jamaat un Ansar al-Sharia Pakistan, which pledged its allegiance to al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS).⁵⁶ Compared with AQIS, which was created in 2014, ⁵⁷ Ansar al-Shariah has been more active, ⁵⁸ conducting several terror attacks, mostly in Karachi, shortly after its creation in June 2017.⁵⁹

The rise and decline of Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K)

In June 2014, the Islamic State announced the establishment of its caliphate. Three months later, TTP commander Hafiz Saeed Khan pledged allegiance to Islamic State, laying the groundwork for the creation of its Khorasan Branch (IS-K), which was officially announced in January 2015. Many of the fighters from the region, however, had already pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi before then.⁶⁰

Over the following years, hundreds of TTP members and a substantial number of senior commanders defected to IS-K, including the overall TTP spokesman as well as several district-level commanders and officials. In parallel, several senior Afghan Taliban figures joined or aligned with IS-K.⁶¹ Besides TTP members fleeing Pakistani military operations,⁶² analysts have linked the major attraction exerted by IS-K on the TTP, including among its leadership, to three factors. First, before the emergence of IS-K, the TTP was the most ideologically radical group in the area. Second, dissatisfaction with Fazlullah’s appointment and subsequent fragmentation within the TTP (see below) drew some of its members towards IS-K. Third, IS-K’s leadership included former senior TTP commanders and focused on fighting the Pakistani State.⁶³

But the TTP was not fully absorbed into IS-K. The reasons for this included the Afghan Taliban’s use of its strong historical ties with the TTP leadership to discourage defections to IS-K and to ensure that the TTP continued publicly to support them; the fact that Islamic State required new members to unconditionally pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi; and the failure of IS-K to transform anti-Pakistani State narratives into action and its violent fight against the Afghan Taliban. Consequently, although numerous TTP members, including at leadership level, defected and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, the TTP did not join it as a group but, as result, was seriously weakened.⁶⁴

Since 2015, however, numerous State-led operations across Afghanistan and Pakistan inflicted substantial losses on IS-K and led to a drastic decrease in the group’s attacks in Pakistan. In 2019, IS-K claimed 22 attacks in Pakistan but only 13, with a total of 77 victims (death and injuries), the following year.⁶⁵ Although IS-K was still considered in 2021 capable of launching occasional large-scale and devastating attacks, its position had severely deteriorated and it had become only a weaker alternative for jihadis in the region.⁶⁶ Moreover, despite ideological similarities, IS-K started targeting the Afghan Taliban in mid-2021, killing several senior officials and attacking foreign interests within and beyond Afghanistan. As a result, the Afghan Taliban came to view IS-K as a main threat and launched offensives against it, albeit without being able to dismantle it.⁶⁷

Operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ and the decline of the TTP

Efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the TTP fell apart in June 2014 following a TTP attack by ten gunmen against Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, which killed dozens.⁶⁸ In response, Pakistan launched an unprecedented ‘counter-terrorism’ operation, Zarb-e-Azb (‘Sharp Strike’), against various Islamist non-State armed groups based in North Waziristan district of FATA.⁶⁹ In turn, the TTP carried out several attacks, including the deadliest terrorist attack ever recorded in Pakistan, against the Army Public School in Peshawar, killing nearly 150, mostly young students. ⁷⁰ This prompted Pakistan to adopt a National Action Plan to combat terrorism and extremism across the nation and, by June 2016, the Pakistan military claimed to have removed all militants from FATA.⁷¹ Over the course of the two-year operations, around 500 soldiers and 3,500 insurgents were reportedly killed. With support from the United States, mainly in the form of drone strikes, Pakistan significantly weakened the TTP between 2014 and 2018, killing its top leadership, and driving most of its fighters into Afghanistan, where they regrouped.⁷² The TTP was also fragilized by internal fragmentation following the death of its leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, in 2013 and the election of Mullah Fazlullah, who was not from Mehsud tribe, as well as by public revulsion at its brutal violence against civilians. This led several factions to splinter from the TTP and prompted defections to IS-K.⁷³ As a result, attacks and clashes decreased overall in 2015, but they continued to occur regularly, at times causing significant casualties.⁷⁴ Such attacks included a March 2016 suicide bombing targeting families celebrating Easter in Lahore, killing nearly 70 people and injuring more than 300 others, as well as another suicide bombing at hospital where lawyers had gathered, killing more than 70 and injuring 100 others.⁷⁵

The revival of the TTP

Under the leadership of Noor Wali Mehsud, who succeeded Fazlullah after he was killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan in June 2018, the TTP rebuilt their strength, improved internal discipline and cohesion, reintegrated splinter jihadi factions, and made the violence more discriminate.⁷⁶

In particular, in September 2018, the TTP issued a manual entitled ‘Operation Manual for Mujahideen of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’, aimed both at consolidating Noor Wali Mehsud’s position and at setting new targeting guidelines intended to focus attacks on military and State institutions while avoiding the targeting of civilians and thereby improving the group’s public image.⁷⁷ The new targeting guidelines issued in 2018 have curtailed the TTP’s violence against civilians. Accordingly, although cross-border attacks increased significantly between 2020 and 2022,⁷⁸ civilian casualties declined, accounted for a smaller share of overall casualties, and fewer attacks targeted civilians.⁷⁹ The shift by the TTP resulted in most attacks being directed against the Pakistani military, which consequently accounted for the mainstay of casualties between 2021 and 2022.⁸⁰

In addition, the TTP sought to reduce internal division by introducing new stipulations that placed the emir in charge of both military and theological matters and established internal reconciliation mechanisms at local, regional and national levels.⁸¹ In 2022, the TTP took the process a step further by initiating a centralization process of its leadership structure, transforming its organizational model from an umbrella structure to a centralized one similar to that of the Afghan Taliban (see below).⁸²

The TTP also facilitated the integration of former defectors and other militant groups. First, by appointing Noor Wali Mehsud, a leader from the influential Mehsud tribe, the TTP reinforced its influence in the border region with Afghanistan and persuade Mehsud tribesmen to return to its fold.⁸³ Second, and more importantly, in early July 2020, the TTP undertook in Afghanistan to merge with influential commanders and rival groups, a process moderated by al-Qaeda. As a result, eight jihadi groups – including three TTP splinters (Hakimullah Mehsud faction, Jama’at ul-Ahrar and Hizb ul-Ahrar), two important Pakistan al-Qaeda affiliates, a faction of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and two prominent militant groups from North Waziristan – (re)joined the TTP. This trend has accelerated since the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan (see below), which marked the end of the active jihadi insurgency in Afghanistan. Between the second half of 2021 and the first four months of 2023, 21 groups opposed to the Pakistani State joined the TTP, including four Baloch militant groups. This development further strengthened the TTP by increasing its manpower, bringing in experienced fighters, reinforcing its foothold in strategic areas (see below), and reducing the risk of future internal conflicts.⁸⁴

Another trend observed in 2020 was the geographical expansion of TTP’s attacks beyond their strongholds along the border of Afghanistan.⁸⁵

As a result, not only attacks increased exponentially but the TTP accounted also for between 2,500 and 6,000 members within its ranks by 2020, despite continued pressure by Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁸⁶ This trend continued to be observed in early 2021, which prompted some observers to declare that ‘the TTP may once again establish itself as a major threat in Pakistan’.⁸⁷ More broadly, between 2020 and 2022, TTP-claimed attacks more than tripled, with a monthly average increasing from 14 to 45.⁸⁸ This re-emergence prompted analysts to refer to the TTP as ‘one of the biggest national security threats to the [Pakistani] State’.⁸⁹

A consolidation and expansion that the TTP have sought to reinforce through repeated attempts to co-opt the struggles carried out by the Baluchistan secessionist movement (see above) and Pashtun rights movements (see below) in order to bolster its support within Pakistan.⁹⁰

The Taliban return to power in Afghanistan and its influence on the TTP, al-Qaeda, and IS-K

TTP

The situation of the TTP has always been impacted by the position of the Taliban in Afghanistan and, despite Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban’s resistance for decades, the Afghan Taliban has provided safe haven for TTP’s militants and leadership.⁹¹ The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan translated into a strengthening and emboldening of the TTP and, therefore, into an increase in the frequency and sophistication of its attacks in Pakistan, even though the Taliban officially instructed TTP fighters to not participate in operations outside Afghanistan.⁹² In addition to the acceleration of mergers due to the Taliban takeover described above, the Afghan Taliban also freed hundreds of extremists, not only members of al-Qaeda, but also members and senior commanders from the TTP.⁹³

While the Afghan Taliban have offered to mediate between Pakistan and the TTP, they have always refused to crack down on the TTP despite Pakistan’s repeated demands that it do so.⁹⁴ After failed negotiations, TTP attacks escalated in the second half of 2022.⁹⁵ Pakistan conducted airstrikes against the TTP in Afghanistan.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, pressed by the Afghan Taliban, the TTP announced a unilateral ceasefire in May 2022 and negotiations resumed under the auspices of the Afghan Taliban in June.⁹⁷ However, negotiations ended and the TTP resumed attacks after the killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri by a US drone strike in Kabul on 31 July 2022 (see below). On 28 November 2022, the TTP officially announced the end of the ceasefire following the killing of two of its senior commanders in Afghanistan. Since then, TTP attacks against Pakistan have gradually increased as the TTP has consolidated in Afghanistan.⁹⁸ Afghan Taliban fighters have not only supplied the TTP with training, equipment, and weapons – including advanced military-grade weaponry after the withdrawal of Western troops from Afghanistan – they also took part in some of its cross-border operations, alongside AQIS and al-Qaeda fighters. Some Taliban fighters also joined the TTP and the number of Afghan nationals increased in the TTP ranks.⁹⁹

Al-Qaeda and its affiliates

With the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, al-Qaeda regained one of its traditional strongholds, once again benefiting from safe haven and political support in Afghanistan. Although several Western countries feared an al-Qaeda ‘comeback’, namely that al-Qaeda would be able to rebuild its network and capabilities to the point where it could once again perpetrate terror attacks around the world,¹⁰⁰ the outcome appears to be more nuanced. Despite the 2020 United States-Taliban Doha agreement, under which the Afghan Taliban committed to preventing international jihadist groups, including al-Qaeda, from using Afghan territory to act against the United States and its allies, they have maintained ties with al-Qaeda’s senior leadership.¹⁰¹ In particular, al-Qaeda new training camps were reportedly identified by the US Army in June 2022, and Al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s leader until he was killed in 2022,¹⁰² reportedly benefited from the protection of Taliban’s Minister of Interior, Sirajuddin Haqqani.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, al-Qaeda’s presence and activity in and from Afghanistan have remained limited compared to the late 1990s.¹⁰⁴ More broadly, the Afghan Taliban appear to oscillate between seeking foreign funding and thereby accommodating international community’s concerns (Kabul faction) and adhering to a harder ideological line against the Western world (Kandahar faction), including by not limiting Jihadist groups inside Afghanistan.¹⁰⁵ In a 2020 letter, AQIS leader Osama Mehmood stated that al-Qaeda had agreed to not use Afghan territory to target the United States and its allies.¹⁰⁶

IS-K

The US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan also resulted in the Afghan Taliban becoming the only force combating IS-K on the ground, allowing IS-K to regroup and expand its operations within and beyond Afghanistan.¹⁰⁷ Since then, an increase in terrorist attacks by IS-K, including in Pakistan, has been seen. For instance, on 4 March 2022, IS-K conducted a suicide bombing at a Shia mosque in Peshawar, killing at least 56 civilians and injuring 194 others.¹⁰⁸ In 2024, IS-K is said to have recruited between 2,000 and 5,000 members across Central Asia.¹⁰⁹

While the Baloch insurgency lost the patronage of the former Afghan government, the Afghan Taliban have continued to help the Baloch insurgents and are said to have been more permissive with the TTP, reflecting their ideological convergence. Conversely, the Afghan Taliban’s return to power has reduced India’s footprint in Afghanistan, which, according to Pakistan, had enabled India to support terrorism in Pakistan, notably the TTP and the Baloch insurgency. Nevertheless, Pakistan has continued to accuse India of funding the TTP and Baloch separatists. Interestingly, although Pakistan has supported the Afghan Taliban and advocated for their international recognition since August 2021, it is also the first State to assert that, under Taliban rule, Afghan soil is being used for international terrorism.¹¹⁰

Escalation of terrorist attacks

Terrorist attacks across Pakistan have increased significantly during the reporting period, resulting in Pakistan being ranked as the country most affected by terrorism worldwide according to the Global terrorism Index.¹¹¹ The majority of attacks were attributed to the TTP and Baloch insurgents, and, to a lesser extent, to IS-K.¹¹²

Baloch insurgency

On 11 March 2025, the BLA-J’s hijacking of the Jaffar Express, during which more than 400 passengers, primarily off-duty security force personnel, were held hostage for more than two days. At least 26 hostages were killed, marking a major escalation in the Baloch insurgency. In response, the Pakistani security forces launched ‘Operation Green Bolan’, reportedly killing more than 30 people, although their identity and any affiliation to BLA-J remain contested.¹¹³ Other military operations by the Baloch insurgency during the reporting period included large-scale attacks coordinated by BRAS. These included Pakistan’s Independence Day (14 August 2024), Baloch Martyr’s Day (13 November 2024), and the anniversary of Baluchistan’s accession to Pakistan (27 March 2025). The BLA-J and the BLF conducted dozens of attacks between 8 and 14 August 2024 that targeted celebrations and Pakistani security forces deployed there.¹¹⁴ Between 12 and 13 November 2024, BRAS claimed 45 attacks carried out by the entire coalitions across Baluchistan. It further claimed 88 attacks between 27 and 30 March 2025 by BRAS, alongside search operations and the establishment of checkpoints by the BLA-J and the BLF.¹¹⁵

Some operations, notably suicide bombings, specifically targeted Chinese nationals and interests as well as infrastructure linked to the CPEC (see above), including parts of Operation Zir Pahazag (intermittent operation currently conducted by BLA-J), other operations carried out by the BLA-J and operations conducted by other key groups of the Baloch insurgency (BLF, BLA-A, BRG and SRA).¹¹⁶ In 2024, several attacks targeted Chinese installations and personnel, most in Baluchistan that were claimed by the BLA. However, the most lethal one, which was carried out against a convoy of Chinese engineers near Besham city in March 2024 and killed five Chinese nationals and a Pakistani, was not claimed by any group,¹¹⁷ although Pakistan blamed the TTP for the attack.¹¹⁸ Between January and February 2024, the BLA-A claimed 70 attacks against polling stations, convoys, election candidates and security installations, postponing twice the election process in its stronghold in Kohlu. In the same period, BRAS said 161 attacks were carried out by its factions across Baluchistan and Punjab provinces.¹¹⁹

TTP

During the reporting period, TTP attacks have not only increased in frequency and complexity but have also expanded geographically.¹²⁰ The TTP also sought to focus on high-value targets in border areas and soft targets in urban areas.¹²¹ However, for the time being, the TTP has not succeeded in controlling territory and is lacking popular support in tribal areas.¹²² Nevertheless, between late 2022, when the TTP ended ceasefire, and the end of 2023, attacks in Pakistani border provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, rose by 93 per cent,¹²³ and during the first half of 2024, more than 800 attacks were ascribed to the TTP in Pakistan.¹²⁴ In January 2023, a suicide bombing against a Peshawar mosque killed more than 100 and injured 200 others. The attack was initially claimed by Jamaat-ul-Ahrar faction of the TTP, but the latter later denied any involvement.¹²⁵ On 12 December 2023, an emerging group called Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP) conducted a gun and car bomb attack against a police station in Kyber Pakhtunkhwa province (in north-western Pakistan), killing at least 23 and injuring 34.¹²⁶ While the TJP is believed to be affiliated with the TTP and was reportedly responsible for at least seven major attacks in 2023, evidence has not confirmed a connection between the two groups.¹²⁷ In July 2024 and March 2025, the TTP carried out bold attacks on military bases in Bannu.¹²⁸ More broadly, in 2025, reportedly nearly 600 attacks were carried out by the TTP, killing over 500 people.¹²⁹ Additionally, although between 2021 and 2022, the TTP focused on targeting security forces, since 2023, violence targeting civilians, mostly those (perceived as) associated with the Pakistani State, has increased, accounting for one quarter of all attacks in 2025.¹³⁰

IS-K

Since 2023, IS-K’s resurgence (see above) has seen a substantial increase in its terror attacks in the region and beyond, reflecting a shift in focus from Afghanistan towards a broader global agenda, including in Iran, Türkiye, and Russia, with plots also targeting Europe and the United States.¹³¹ As regards Pakistan, IS-K reportedly claimed 29 attacks in 2024 that caused the death of 58 and injured 105, with three attacks in the first three months of 2025.¹³²

The Pakistani State response

The intensification and expansion of attacks prompted Pakistan to announce in April 2023 a nationwide military offensive against Islamists insurgents, notably the TTP, the first since 2014.¹³³ However, the military campaign never began. Nevertheless, on 22 June 2024, Pakistani leadership approved a new military operation to quell the peak of attacks, called ‘Azm-e-Istehkam’.¹³⁴ Another and smaller-scale operation was locally launched in July 2025 in Bajaur district.¹³⁵ Yet, such temporary operations have been described by analysts as insufficient to counter insurgents without reinforcing local governance and ensuring ‘boots on the ground’ to hold on territory.¹³⁶

TTP’s rapprochement with other insurgent movements and local expansion

TTP collaboration with other insurgents has been observed during the reporting period. In particular, since late 2022, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement/Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIM/TIP)ETIM/TIP is an Islamist organization founded by Hassan Mooshum in China’s Xinjiang province and fighting for the creation of an independent State comprising parts of Türkiye, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China.¹³⁷ It has reportedly collaborated with other Islamist non-State actors, including the TTP, to plan attacks against Chinese interests, notably in Pakistan.¹³⁸

In parallel, the TTP have continued to benefit from support from both al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban,¹³⁹ and, according to the United Nations (UN), support and collaboration between the TTP, the Afghan Taliban, and AQIS increased in the first half of 2024.¹⁴⁰ AQIS and al-Qaeda core fighters as well as Taliban fighters have even assisted the TTP in cross-border operations.¹⁴¹ Notably, AQIS, with the approval of al-Qaeda core, furnished armed fighters for the TTP attack in Chitral in September 2023 and sent 15 commanders to assist TTP operations in Pakistan in late 2023.¹⁴² The TTP also reportedly killed Taliban fighters who defected to IS-K.¹⁴³ The TTP are said to have increasingly directed recruitment efforts towards Afghans.¹⁴⁴

Through their merging efforts (see above), the TTP have also succeed in expanding their territorial footprint into strategically important areas in Pakistan, including Baluchistan and southern parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces as well as Punjab and Sindh, where they have established a presence for the first time, and North Waziristan district.¹⁴⁵ At the same time, the TTP has publicly disavowed any transnational, regional, or global agenda, framing its struggle as directed exclusively against Pakistan and focused on domestic objectives. Although the TTP has always been locally anchored, it initially also had a broader orientation. This was reflected in its participation in the insurgency in Afghanistan and its support for global jihad, including through its role in the suicide attack on a CIA base in Afghanistan in December 2009 and the failed bomb attack in New York City’s Times Square in May 2010.¹⁴⁶

Fragmentation and spill-over of the Baloch insurgency

The Baloch insurgency has further fragmented during the reporting period. Notably, following the arrest of Gulzar Imam by Pakistani security forces in mid-2023, the BNA split into two factions: BNA-Sarfaraz and the BNA faction led by Anwar Chakar. BNA-Sarfaraz left BRAS amid accusations of failures and manipulations directed against the BNA, while the BNA-Anwar continued to operate within BRAS coalition.¹⁴⁷ In December 2023, the BNA-Sarfaraz surrendered to Pakistan. BNA-Anwar split again and a new faction emerged, BNA-Beebarg, claimed attacks in Baluchistan, Sindh, and Punjab provinces in Pakistan, as well as in Iran’s eastern Baloch provinces.¹⁴⁸

Since its revival in Iran in 2021 under Jaishul Adl, the Baloch insurgency has escalated its operations there, both in number and in complexity, especially since 2024.¹⁴⁹ Accordingly, the Baloch insurgency has expanded on both sides of the border, with each States targeting Baloch groups across the border. In January 2024, Iran conducted airstrikes in Pakistan’s Baluchistan, allegedly against Jaish ul Adl’s camps. In response, the Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Iran, allegedly targeting BLA-A and BLF camps. Iran and Pakistan started to coordinate operations after January 2024, first by appointing border liaison offices, and then by conducting joint airstrikes at the border against Jaish Ul Adl’s positions in November.¹⁵⁰

Open hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan

Pakistan has repeatedly accused the Afghan Taliban of providing a safe haven for the TTP, an assertion the Afghan Taliban has systematically denied. The situation escalated in October 2025 when Pakistan conducted airstrikes in Afghanistan, claiming that it served as ‘base of operations for terrorism in Pakistan’.¹⁵¹ Following a fragile ceasefire signed in October 2025, hostilities resumed with new bombardments by each side in February and in March 2026.¹⁵²

Legal classification

Two criteria need to be assessed in order to determine whether a situation of armed violence amounts to a NIAC:

First, the level of armed violence must reach a certain degree of intensity that goes beyond internal disturbances and tensions.
Second, in every NIAC, at least one side in the conflict must be a non-State armed group that exhibits a certain level of organization in order to qualify as a party to the NIAC. Government forces are presumed to satisfy the criteria of organization.¹⁵³

Various indicative factors are used to assess whether a given situation has met the required intensity threshold, such as the number, duration, and intensity of individual confrontations; the types of weapons and military equipment used; the number of persons and types of forces participating in the fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; the number of civilians fleeing; and the involvement of the UN Security Council.¹⁵⁴

A series of indicative factors are also used to assess whether armed groups exhibit the required degree of organization, such as ‘the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the group; the existence of a headquarters; the fact that the group controls territory; the ability of the group to gain access to weapons; its ability to plan, coordinate, and conduct military operations.¹⁵⁵

Several insurgents analysed below – the Baloch insurgency as well as the TTP at least before its centralization efforts – are characterized by a decentralized and often fragmented structure composed of different factions that operate in a semi-autonomous manner. This decentralized nature might fail to meet the organizational requirement.¹⁵⁶ According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), however, such decentralized armed groups, which consist of fluid alliances of small armed groups led by individual commanders who retain considerable decision-making power and responsibility over group members, and where there is loose internal coordination, including for planning and conduct of military operations, can be considered as sufficiently organized to become a party to a NIAC.¹⁵⁷ This is notably the case when the group’s leadership, ‘while not relying on a centralized command structure, has the capacity to exercise operational command over its constitutive subunits – ie, it has the authority to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to redistribute forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control.’¹⁵⁸

In addition, under the support-based approach as developed by the ICRC, an organized armed group or a State supporting parties to a pre-existing NIAC may become a party to this conflict when it undertakes actions related to the conduct of hostilities in the context of the pre-existing NIAC and objectively carries out military operations in support of a party to that conflict, irrespective of whether it itself engages in armed confrontations meeting independently the intensity threshold.¹⁵⁹

Non-international armed conflict between Pakistan and the TTP, supported by Al-Qaeda and AQIS

Organization

Initially, the TTP were structured as an umbrella group bringing together several factions while cooperating with others. Even at that stage, despite their relatively loose structure and the plurality of smaller factions composing them, the TTP reportedly had a common leadership with an identified leader and were able to speak with one voice, as evidenced by the existence of a central spokesperson, unified communications and propaganda, and their capacity to enter into peace talks with the Pakistani government.¹ Originally composed of 40 militant groups in 2007, the TTP accounted for 130 members in 2014, but for only 56 in 2025 following its centralization efforts described below.² The TTP have targeted prominent individuals. They carried out the 2012 shooting of girls’ and women’s rights activist Malala Yousafzai and were allegedly responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007, although the group’s leadership denied involvement in that action.³ Additionally, they claimed responsibility for attacks in neighbouring countries, such as the attack on a CIA station in Afghanistan in 2009.⁴

At times, the TTP have controlled territory in Pakistan’s tribal areas, ⁵ including the Swat Valley for a number of years.⁶ In areas under their control, they built underground tunnel systems and improvised explosive devices (IED)-production sites.⁷ However, at the time of writing, the TTP have not yet succeed in re-establishing territorial control, aside from erecting roadblocks and conducting patrols (see above).⁸ The TTP have nevertheless succeeded in expanding their areas of operations beyond their original strongholds – former tribal areas, especially Northern Waziristan, that were merged into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – to include other provinces such as Baluchistan, strengthening their organizational foothold.⁹

After their phase of internal fragmentation,¹⁰ when Noor Wali Mehsud became their new leader in 2018, the TTP began to centralize their leadership, merge with splinter and independent factions, and establish an internal reconciliation mechanism.¹¹ Whereas under the umbrella structure the central command depended on local leadership to implement its orders, the new structure more closely resembled that of the Afghan Taliban and combined central organizational units responsible for key matters, with the Leadership Council as the highest authority, and eight to nine shadow provinces.¹²

In 2024, they were estimated to account for between 6,000 and 6,500 fighters, accompanied by around 14,000 family members.¹³ During the 2010s, the TTP also began to actively recruiting and fundraising in Punjab province, where thousands of members of Punjabi militant groups were reportedly affiliated with the TTP.¹⁴ More recently, the TTP have benefited from increased support from both al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban, while progressively focusing their recruitment efforts on Afghan recruits.¹⁵ This trend was further confirmed in 2024, when the TTP opened new training camps in Afghan border provinces.¹⁶

Taken together, these elements indicate that the TTP exhibit a sufficient level of organization to become a party to a NIAC.

Intensity

The TTP have distinguish themselves through their military-type training and deployment tactics. As detailed above, since the 2020s, TTP’s attacks have increased in number and in complexity and have expanded geographically. In early 2026, the UN has observed an increase in attacks launched by the TTP in Pakistan.¹⁷ In addition, the TTP have increased their use of explosive devices and remote attacks since 2023. Similarly, both sides have increasingly used drones, mainly armed quadcopters.¹⁸

The increase in TTP attacks is likely to continue in 2026 since, according to some analysts, the deteriorating situation between Afghanistan and Pakistan may lead to the expansion of different insurgents’ operations.¹⁹ By broadening their geographical presence, the TTP have also complicated counterterrorism operations, embedded themselves in more densely populated areas, improved their access to resources, and improved recruitment.²⁰

Nevertheless, the TTP’s strategic shift has also created new vulnerabilities. In particular, their heavy reliance on specific geographic recruitment corridors may be targeted by counter-recruitment initiatives, their repetitive operational rhythms may be anticipated and exploited by Pakistani forces, their ethnic diversification may generate internal divisions, and their hybrid structure, combining centralized command-and-control and decentralized operations, may be more vulnerable to disruption.²¹ Currently, however, the scale and extent of current attacks carried by the TTP greatly exceed the intensity threshold required for the situation to be classified as a NIAC.

AQIS, the Afghan Taliban and other groups’ involvement and its significance

As indicated above, although the TTP are associated with the Afghan Taliban, they shared tactics as well as an emphasis on Islamic extremist ideology, the two remain distinct, including from a strategic point of view.²² This distinction appears to have been further reinforced following the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan and their attempt to accommodate international community’s concerns regarding the use of Afghan soil to carry out terrorist attacks against international targets. The same applies to AQIS, even though some observers have suggested a merger could occur between the two entities.²³ Nevertheless, the fact that both AQIS and the Afghan Taliban have continued to support the TTP through funding and military equipment and, more decisively, that some of their members have participated in attacks carried out by the TTP (see above), raises the question whether their involvement falls within the support-based approach developed by the ICRC. There is, however, insufficient evidence that either AQIS or the Afghan Taliban have become a party to the pre-existing NIAC between Pakistan and the TTP.

Regarding the TJP, although it may be affiliated with the TTP, there is no clear evidence allowing it to be regarded as a faction of the TTP. The group is known only through its own media releases, and no information is available regarding its leadership, membership, or location.²⁴ Given the opacity surrounding it, as things stand, the TJP cannot be considered as taking part in the NIAC between Pakistan and the TTP.

1
Abbas, ‘A Profile of Therik-i-Taliban Pakistan’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 1, No 2, 2008; S. Mehsud, ‘Taliban Video Highlights Revenge on Pakistan Military’, Reuters, 21 January 2012; ‘Pakistan Enters Peace Talks With Taliban’, BBC News, 6 February 2014; A. Bellal (ed), The War Report. Armed Conflicts in 2014, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp 173–74.
2
S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, p 9; ‘Pakistan: Assessment – 2025’, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)/Institute for Conflict Management (ICM).
3
R. Leiby, M. Langevine Leiby, ‘Taliban Say It Shot Pakistani Teen For Advocating Girls’ Rights’, The Washington Post, 10 October 2012; ‘We killed Benazir Bhutto, TTP claims in its book’, The Express Tribune, 16 January 2018; ‘Detail of Terrorism Update; Pakistan’, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)/Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), 28 June 2018.
4
J. Warrick, ‘Suicide Bomber Attacks CIA Base in Afghanistan, Killing At Least 8 Americans’, The Washington Post, 31 December 2009. These attacks demonstrate that they already possessed significant operational capacity.
5
A. Bellal (ed), The War Report. Armed Conflicts in 2014, Oxford University Press, 2015, p 173; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 29.
6
‘Terik-i-Taliban Pakistan’, Mapping Militants Project, 2022.
7
M. Haider, ‘Zarb-i-Azb: More IED Factories, Explosives Recovered in NWA’, Dawn, 2 July 2014; S. Saifi, ‘Inside Militants’ Secret Tunnels in Pakistan’, CNN, 11 July 2014; A. Bellal (ed), The War Report. Armed Conflicts in 2014, Oxford University Press, 2015, p 176.
8
See also: P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025.
9
S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, p 21; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at pp 3–4.
10
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 31.
11
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at pp 33–34.
12
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at pp 4–5.
13
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 81.
14
S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, p 18.
15
C. Thomas, ‘Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan’, In Focus/Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2024.
16
P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025.
17
‘Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2026/44, 4 February 2026, para 10. See also: A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at pp 5–7; A. Z. Khan, ‘Pakistan’s Security Landscape in 2025’, 27 March 2026; ‘Pakistan: Assessment – 2025’, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)/Institute for Conflict Management (ICM).
18
P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025.
19
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 36.
20
S. Tahir and A. Jadoon, ‘Leaders, Fighters, and Suicide Attackers: Insights on TTP Militant Mobility Through Commemorative Records, 2006-2025’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 5 (May 2025), p 32.
21
S. Tahir and A. Jadoon, ‘Leaders, Fighters, and Suicide Attackers: Insights on TTP Militant Mobility Through Commemorative Records, 2006-2025’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 5 (May 2025), p 32.
22
‘Terik-i-Taliban Pakistan’, Mapping Militants Project, 2022.
23
‘The Resurgence of the Pakistani Taliban – Implications for Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations’, PRIF blog, 21 January 2025.
24
A. Hussain, ‘What explains the dramatic rise in armed attacks in Pakistan?’, Al Jazeera, 21 December 2023.

Non-international armed conflict between Pakistan and the Baloch insurgency

Organization

The Baloch insurgency is characterized by its fragmented nature and has been marked by internal divisions, which has been described as preventing it from being unitary in either its goals or tactics.¹ This fragmentation, coupled with the lack of independent monitoring and, consequently, of data on the Baloch insurgency² may be seen as militating against a sufficient degree of organization. Although such an assessment might be correct when considering the Baloch insurgency as a whole, some of its components, especially the Baloch Raaji Aajohi Sangar (BRAS), a coalition bringing together some of major Baloch armed groups³ may be regarded as meeting the organization threshold.

As observed above, the BRAS was officially formed in November 2018 but emerged from an initial alliance between the BLF and BLA-J in 2017. It was later joined by the BRG in April 2018, the BRA-Beebagr in May 2019, the SRA, a non-Baloch group, in July 2020, the BNA in January 2022, and BNA-Anwar in April 2023. BRA-Beegbar in January 2022 and BNA in April 2023 subsequently left the coalition owing to their disbandment or splintering. While advocating for unity among different groups, the BRAS has also been accused of privileging the BLF and BLA-J’s interests. Likewise, although BRA-Beebagr and its successor, the BNA and its splinter BNA-Anwar, have repeatedly claimed to be affiliated with the BRAS, the BRAS reportedly recognizes only the BLF, BLA-J, BRG, and the SRA as its members.⁴

Despite these claims of inequality and the presence of non-Baloch group within its ranks,⁵ the BRAS has acted as the key coordinator of insurgent operations, carrying out large-scale joint attacks on symbolic dates. For instance, in mid-November 2024, the BRAS claimed 45 attacks across Baluchistan province were conducted by the coalition, and, in total, the coalition claimed 204 attacks in 2024. In late March 2025, the BRAS also claimed 88 attacks, apparently carried out mainly by the BLA-J and BLF.⁶

In total, around ten Baloch insurgent factions are believed to have been operational in 2025. Some groups, including the BLA-J, the BLF, and the BLA-A, regularly claimed attacks, while others, such as the BRG, BNA-Anwar, and BNA-Beebarg, faced significant operational constraints and lost their influence within the insurgency, or even became defunct, as was the case with the UBA.⁷ At present, the BLA-J and the BLF operate as the two dominant groups within the Baloch insurgency, with the BLA-A acting as their key rival. These three main factions have reportedly refined their tactics, introduced new strategies, and expanded their operational capacities during the reporting period.⁸

In particular, the BLA-J is currently the most active Baloch insurgent group. Since 2022, it has steadily increased both the number and the complexity of its operations and is now conducting major military operations while also increasing targeted suicide attacks.⁹ The BLA-J combines multiple tactics with sophisticated guerrilla warfare, maintaining constant pressure on Pakistani security forces through daily attacks on patrols and checkpoints, together with disruption of CPEC-related infrastructure. It also occasionally targets Pakistani military installations as well as Chinese nationals with suicide attacks and gunmen. The BLA-J possesses four special units that play a central role in its strategy, namely the Majeer Brigade, the Special Tactical Operations Squad (STOS), the Fateh Squad and the Zephyr Intelligence Research & Analysis Bureau (ZIRAB). Through the close coordination within these special units, the sophistication and impact of the BLA-J attacks have sharply increased. Since 2024, the BLA-J has also succeeded in controlling significant territory, including urban areas, for extended periods.¹⁰ The BLA-J possesses also a identified leader, Bashir Zaib.¹¹

On a few occasions, the BLF has undertaken large-scale operations, notably in September and November 2024, during which it is said to have coordinated with the BLA-J and the BRF to target security forces and military camps.¹² The BLF has also an identified leader, Allah Nazar.¹³

The BLA-A acts as the third major militant faction and operates outside the BRAS since its splintering in July 2017. Although it traditionally maintained a limited operational scope and refrained for conduct large operations and suicide attacks, since 2024, the BLA-A has sharply escalated its operations, claiming more than 150 attacks in 2024 as compared with six in 2020. It further intensified its operations in 2025 by aligning its tactics with those of the BLA-J. Notably, in early 2025, the BLA-A launched a complex military operation against a military camp, seized parts of it as well as the town of Manguchar before retreating. It carried out its first suicide attack on 3 March 2025.¹⁴

Beyond these three main Baloch insurgent factions and the SRA, which also possesses an identified lead, Syed Ashgar Shah,¹⁵ smaller groups have conducted sporadic attacks, including the BRG, which has primarily supported BLF and BLA-J through coordinated attacks, although it was described in 2025 as being in decline.¹⁶

It appears that the BRAS, at least through its two main factions – the BLF and BLA-J – has acted at the main coordinator of attacks carried out on its behalf. Such coordination may be equated with the exercise of operational command over its constitutive subunits and would support considering the BRAS a decentralized organized armed group. Both the BLF and BLA-J have evidenced a sufficient organization to become parties to a NIAC. In the absence of further information regarding the individual organizational structure of each faction, these elements tend to indicate that, during the reporting period, the BRAS, and alternatively the BLF and BLA-J as such, as well as the BLA-A to a lesser extent, were sufficiently organized.

Intensity

As detailed above, since 2021, the main factions of the Baloch insurgency have escalated their attacks in both the frequency and complexity, targeting Pakistani security forces, alleged informants, CPEC-related infrastructure, Punjabi workers and Chinese nationals. The Baloch insurgency has carried out large-scale and coordinated attacks, deployed suicide-bombers, and temporarily seized territory,¹⁷ evidencing its evolution from hit-and-run operations to coordinated large-scale operations.¹⁸ Military operations conducted by the Baloch insurgency during the reporting period have included large-scale and coordinated attacks, the deployment of suicide-bombers, including female bombers, and temporary seizures of territory.¹⁹ In particular, attacks against the electoral process in 2024 involved targeted killings, the firing of missiles, remotely controlled bombs, and hand grenades.²⁰

This trend has been further confirmed more recently, with most terror attacks in Pakistan in early 2026 claimed or attributed to the Baloch insurgency.²¹ On 2 March 2025, the BRAS leadership signalled its intention to escalate the conflict.²² Second, China’s growing involvement has resulted in the intensification of the targeting of Chinese nationals and interests by the Baloch insurgency. In response, the Pakistani government has increased its counter-insurgency measures in the province while reinforcing security cooperation with China.²³ Third, the deteriorating situation between Afghanistan and Pakistan might lead to the expansion of various insurgent operations in Baluchistan.²⁴

Whether or not the violence increases in the coming months, the situation already meets the intensity threshold required for the situation to qualify as a NIAC.

1
M. Kupecz, ‘Pakistan’s Baloch Insurgency: History, Conflict Drivers, and Regional Implications’, International Affairs Review, 16 May 2024; A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 30.
2
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27-41, p 36.
3
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at pp 27 and 31.
4
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at pp 31 and 37.
5
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at pp 27 and 31
6
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 31.
7
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at pp 31–41.
8
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 32.
9
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 32.
10
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at pp 32–33.
11
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 37.
12
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 33.
13
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 37.
14
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, pp 33 and 37.
15
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27-41, p 37.
16
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 33.
17
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 27.
18
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at pp 27–29, 31, and 34.
19
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at pp 27 and 34–35.
20
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at pp 31 and 35.
21
‘Pakistan: Timeline (Terrorist Activities)-2026’, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)/ Institute for Conflict Management (ICM).
22
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 31.
23
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at pp 31, 34, and 36.
24
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 36.

Non-international armed conflict between Pakistan and Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K)

Organization

Operating across Afghanistan and Pakistan, IS-K remains principally anchored in Afghanistan where it conducts its main recruitment and training activities.¹ Nevertheless, it aspires to create a province within the self-proclaimed caliphate across ‘Khorasan’, a territory encompassing Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan,² and carries out most of its attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also in Iran and Tajikistan.³

Since June 2020, the group has been headed by Sanaullah Ghafari, also known as Shahab al-Muhajir.⁴ IS-K produces radio broadcasts, publishes an English-language magazine (‘Voice of Khorasan’) translated into Pashtun, Persian, and Arabic, and mounts online propaganda campaigns including ones aimed at Pakistan.⁵

Its members, who are estimated to number between 2,000 and 6,000, are recruited from within Afghanistan and beyond, among Central Asian States and the Russian North Caucasus. In North Afghanistan and along the Pakistani borders, IS-K also reportedly indoctrinated children in madrassas and established a suicide training course for children aged 14 and above.⁶ IS-K personnel in Afghanistan were reportedly based in the northern and north-eastern provinces of Afghanistan, and the group has sought to establish operations in neighbouring States as well as globally.⁷ During the reporting period, IS-K has been striving to recruit more members from both the Afghan population and foreign nationals, notably from regional countries.⁸2.

Since its resurgence, IS-K has displayed the capacity to conduct concerted and sustained military operations. It has developed several sources of funding which, beyond IS central, include the Afghan community in Turkey and online supporters indoctrinated through online propaganda, and it has maintained the ability to transfer funds despite mounting pressure from the Taliban and Turkey.⁹

Taken together, these elements indicate that IS-K displays a sufficient organization as required by IHL.

Intensity

As detailed above, following its resurgence after the Afghan Taliban’s return to power, IS-K attacks in Pakistan have increased. In particular, IS-K claimed 29 attacks in 2024, killing 58 and injuring 105, and three attacks in the first three months of 2025.¹⁰ It mounted further attacks in early 2026.¹¹ Its main targets are the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani government, and religious and ethnic minorities. But no major attacks were reported in 2025 or early 2026 and thus the situation no longer qualifies as a NIAC in Pakistan.

1
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025, para 88; US National Counterterrorism Center, ‘ISIS-KHORASAN (ISIS-K)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, March 2025.
2
US National Counterterrorism Center, ‘ISIS-KHORASAN (ISIS-K)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, March 2025,
3
E. Trager-Lewis, ‘The Resurgence of the Islamic State in the Khurāsān Province: A Transnational Security Threat’, Atlas Institute for International Affairs, 19 July 2025.
4
‘Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP)’, Mapping Militants Project (MMP), August 2024; US National Counterterrorism Center, ‘ISIS-KHORASAN (ISIS-K)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, March 2025; ‘Thirty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/482, 24 July 2025, para 87.
5
A. Rousselle, ‘Pakistan Under Threat: Why ISKP’s Online Campaign Against Pakistan is a Global Concern’, Global Network on Extremism & Technology, 1 February 2024; ‘Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP)’, Mapping Militants Project (MMP), August 2024. See also: C. winter, ‘ISKP: A Primer’, The Center for Justice & Accountability, May 2025.
6
‘Thirty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/482, 24 July 2025, para 86; ‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 74.
7
‘Thirty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/482, 24 July 2025, para 87.
8
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/78/628-S/2023/941, 1 December 2023, para 19; ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/78/789-S/2024/196, 28 February 2024, para 2
9
A. Rousselle, ‘Pakistan Under Threat: Why ISKP’s Online Campaign Against Pakistan is a Global Concern’, Global Network on Extremism & Technology, 1 February 2024; ‘Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP)’, Mapping Militants Project (MMP), August 2024.
10
‘Pakistan: Assessment – 2025’, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)/ Institute for Conflict Management (ICM).
11
‘Pakistan: Timeline (Terrorist Activities)-2026’, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)/ Institute for Conflict Management (ICM).

As regards other insurgent groups operating in Pakistan, including al-Qaeda and its affiliates, notably AQIS and the TJP, as well as fighting occurring between them, especially clashes between IS-K and the TPP reported in February and March 2026,¹⁶⁰ given the low-intensity of violence together with the lack of available information on the organization of the TJP, these situations are not classified as NIACs. In other words, although the organization criterion appears to be fulfilled individually by some of the remaining insurgent groups, the persisting uncertainty as to whether the intensity threshold has been reached, either with respect to the violence between them and the Pakistani State or, alternatively, among the groups themselves, does not allow us to conclude that additional NIACs are ongoing.

State Parties

Pakistan

Non-State parties

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Baloch Raaji Aajohi Sangar (BRAS), alternatively the Baloch Liberation Army, Jeeyand (BLA-J), and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF)
Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K)

Other Non-State Actors

Jaishul Adl faction (Iran)
al-Qaeda core, AQIS and Jamaat un Ansar al-Sharia Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP)

Foreign involvement

Afghanistan
China
India
Iran

1
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
2
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
3
S. G. Jones and C. C. Faire, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, RAND Corporation, 2010, p 25, B. Brumfield, N. Ng, ‘Who Are the Pakistani Taliban?’, CNN, 17 December 2014; A. Bellal (ed) The War Report. Armed Conflicts in 2014, Oxford University Press, 2015, p 172.
4
S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, pp 8–11; ‘Pakistan profile – Timeline’, BBC, 4 March 2019.
5
N. Noormal, ‘Root Causes of Conflict in Baluchistan, Pakistan’, Beyond Intractability.
6
A. Hashim, ‘Bomb Attack Kills at Least 25 in Pakistan’s Balochistan’, Al Jazeera, 12 May 2017, Jamaat-ur-Ahrar (a TTP splinter faction)A. Hashim, ‘Roadside Bomb Kills Bus Passengers in Kurram District’, Al Jazeera, 25 April 2017.
7
N. Zahid, ‘Who is Lashkar-e-Jhangvi?’, VOA Extremism Watch, 25 October 2016
8
A. Bellal (ed) The War Report. Armed Conflicts in 2014, Oxford University Press, 2015, p 174; ‘Pakistan profile – Timeline’, BBC, 4 March 2019.
9
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 28. See also: S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, p 15.
10
S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, p 15; A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 28.
11
S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, p 15; M. Kupecz, ‘Pakistan’s Baloch Insurgency: History, Conflict Drivers, and Regional Implications’, International Affairs Review, 16 May 2024; A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 28.
12
I. Baloch, ‘Timeline of Insurgency in Balochistan’, The Khorasan Diary, 4 April 2023; A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 28.
13
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 28.
14
S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, p 15; I. Baloch, ‘Timeline of Insurgency in Balochistan’, The Khorasan Diary, 4 April 2023; A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 28.
15
I. Baloch, ‘Timeline of Insurgency in Balochistan’, The Khorasan Diary, 4 April 2023; A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 28.
16
S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, pp 14 and 16; I. Baloch, ‘Timeline of Insurgency in Balochistan’, The Khorasan Diary, 4 April 2023; A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 28.
17
I. Baloch, ‘Timeline of Insurgency in Balochistan’, The Khorasan Diary, 4 April 2023; A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at pp 28–29.
18
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 29.
19
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at pp 29–30.
20
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 30.
21
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 30.
22
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 30. See also: S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, p 15.
23
S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, p 15; I. Baloch, ‘Timeline of Insurgency in Balochistan’, The Khorasan Diary, 4 April 2023; A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, pp 28 and 30.
24
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 30. See also: S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, p 15.
25
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 30.
26
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 30.
27
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27-41, p 30.
28
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at pp 29–30.
29
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 30.
30
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 31.
31
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 31.
32
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, p 31.
33
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 31.
34
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at pp 27–29.
35
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 35.
36
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 36.
37
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at pp 28–29, 30, and 34.
38
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27-41, p 31.
39
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, p 34.
40
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 34.
41
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 35.
42
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 28; S. Tahir and A. Jadoon, ‘Leaders, Fighters, and Suicide Attackers: Insights on TTP Militant Mobility Through Commemorative Records, 2006-2025’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 5 (May 2025), p 26.
43
S. G. Jones and C. C. Faire, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, RAND Corporation, 2010, pp 25, 33–34, and 46–81; P. Bergen and K. Tiedemann, ‘Washington’s Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan’, Foreign Affairs, Vol 90, No 4 (July/August 2011), pp 12–18; S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, pp 10–13; Z. A. Khan, ‘Military operations in FATA and PATA: implications for Pakistan’, Strategic Studies, Vol 33, No 2 (Summer 2014), 129–46, at pp 129–36; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 28; ‘Who are the Pakistan Taliban?’, Reuters, 18 February 2023; S. Tahir and A. Jadoon, ‘Leaders, Fighters, and Suicide Attackers: Insights on TTP Militant Mobility Through Commemorative Records, 2006-2025’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 5 (May 2025), p 26; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
44
S. G. Jones and C. C. Faire, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, RAND Corporation, 2010, p 33; S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, p 9; Z. A. Khan, ‘Military operations in FATA and PATA: implications for Pakistan’, Strategic Studies, Vol 33, No 2 (Summer 2014), 129–46, at p 133; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at pp 28–29; ‘Who are the Pakistan Taliban?’, Reuters, 18 February 2023; C. Thomas, ‘Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan’, In Focus/Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2024; S. Tahir and A. Jadoon, ‘Leaders, Fighters, and Suicide Attackers: Insights on TTP Militant Mobility Through Commemorative Records, 2006-2025’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 5 (May 2025), p 26; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
45
S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, pp 8–22; S. Tahir and A. Jadoon, ‘Leaders, Fighters, and Suicide Attackers: Insights on TTP Militant Mobility Through Commemorative Records, 2006-2025’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 5 (May 2025), p 26; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
46
S. G. Jones and C. C. Faire, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, RAND Corporation, 2010, pp 28–29 and 34; Z. A. Khan, ‘Military operations in FATA and PATA: implications for Pakistan’, Strategic Studies, Vol 33, No 2 (Summer 2014), 129–46, at pp 136–43.
47
S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, pp 9–10; S. Tahir and A. Jadoon, ‘Leaders, Fighters, and Suicide Attackers: Insights on TTP Militant Mobility Through Commemorative Records, 2006-2025’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 5 (May 2025), 26.
48
R. Gunaratna and A. Nielsen, ‘al-Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol 31 (2008), 775–807, at p 777.
49
R. Gunaratna and A. Nielsen, ‘al-Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol 31 (2008), 775–807, at pp 777–78; Y. J. Dreazen, ‘al-Qaeda’s Global Base Is Pakistan, Says Petraeus’, The Wall Street Journal, 11 May 2009; S. G. Jones and C. C. Faire, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, RAND Corporation, 2010, p 30.
50
S. G. Jones and C. C. Faire, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, RAND Corporation, 2010, p 33.
51
R. Gunaratna and A. Nielsen, ‘al-Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol 31 (2008), 775–807, at pp 782–83. In parallel, al-Qaeda conducted most of its operations in Afghanistan from Pakistani tribal areas, its ‘hub for its operation in Afghanistan’.R. Gunaratna and A. Nielsen, ‘al-Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol 31 (2008), 775–807, at pp 785–86.
52
R. Gunaratna and A. Nielsen, ‘al-Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol 31 (2008), 775–807, at pp 788–89.
53
Z. Imran, ‘al-Qaeda’s Ambitions in Pakistan: Changing Goals, Changing Strategies’, Jamestown, Vol 8, No 31 (2010).
54
Z. Imran, ‘al-Qaeda’s Ambitions in Pakistan: Changing Goals, Changing Strategies’, Jamestown, Vol 8, No 31 (2010).
55
Z. Imran, ‘al-Qaeda’s Ambitions in Pakistan: Changing Goals, Changing Strategies’, Jamestown, Vol 8, No 31 (2010).
56
F. Zahid, ‘al-Qaeda’s New Hope on the Run: A Profile of Ansar al-Sharia Pakistan Emir Abdul Karim Saroush Siddiqui’, Jamestown, Vol 8, No 10, 11 July 2017; F. Zahid, ‘The Return of al-Qaeda to Pakistan’, Middle East Institute, 24 August 2017; C. Thomas, ‘Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan’, In Focus/Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2024.
57
C. Thomas, ‘Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan’, In Focus/Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2024.
58
F. Zahid, ‘The Return of al-Qaeda to Pakistan’, Middle East Institute, 24 August 2017
59
F. Zahid, ‘al-Qaeda’s New Hope on the Run: A Profile of Ansar al-Sharia Pakistan Emir Abdul Karim Saroush Siddiqui’, Jamestown, Vol 8, No 10 (11 July 2017).
60
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 30.
61
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 30; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
62
C. Thomas, ‘Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan’, In Focus/Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2024.
63
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 31.
64
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 32.
65
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 30.
66
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 30.
67
C. Thomas, ‘Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan’, In Focus/Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2024
68
J. Boone, ‘Pakistani Taliban claim Karachi attack and leave peace talks in crisis’, The Guardian, 9 June 2014; ‘Pakistan profile – Timeline’, BBC, 4 March 2019; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
69
F. Zahid, ‘The Successes and Failures of Pakistan’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb’, Jamestown, Vol 13, No 14 (7 October 2015).
70
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
71
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
72
S. Yamin and S. Malik, ‘Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan’, Peaceworks No 93, US Institute of Peace, 2014, pp 9–10; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 29; ‘Who are the Pakistan Taliban?’, Reuters, 18 February 2023; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
73
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at pp 28–30 and 35–36; C. Thomas, ‘Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan’, In Focus/Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2024.
74
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
75
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
76
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 29, A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at p 3; C. Thomas, ‘Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan’, In Focus/Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2024; S. Tahir and A. Jadoon, ‘Leaders, Fighters, and Suicide Attackers: Insights on TTP Militant Mobility Through Commemorative Records, 2006-2025’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 5 (May 2025), p 26.
77
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 32; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at p 5; P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025, Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
78
‘Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2021/68, 3 February 2021, para 68, A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, pp 29 and 32, A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at p 5; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
79
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at pp 32–33; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, pp 3 and 5, Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
80
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, p 35; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, pp 5–6; P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025.
81
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, p 33.
82
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, pp 4–5.
83
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 33.
84
Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2021/68, 3 February 2021, para 68; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at pp 33–34; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at pp 3–4; C. Thomas, ‘Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan’, In Focus/Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2024.
85
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at pp 35–36; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at p 6; S. Tahir and A. Jadoon, ‘Leaders, Fighters, and Suicide Attackers: Insights on TTP Militant Mobility Through Commemorative Records, 2006-2025’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 5 (May 2025), pp 24–25; P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025.
86
‘Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2021/68, 3 February 2021, para 68; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at pp 29, 32, and 36; C. Thomas, ‘Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan’, In Focus/Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2024; P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025.
87
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, pp 35–36.
88
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at p 5; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
89
P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025.
90
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28–38, at p 36; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at p 9.
91
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 4 (April/May 2021), 28-38, p 36; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
92
‘Thirty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/92, 29 January 2024, para 79; S. Tahir and A. Jadoon, ‘Leaders, Fighters, and Suicide Attackers: Insights on TTP Militant Mobility Through Commemorative Records, 2006-2025’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 5 (May 2025), p 26; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
93
‘The big question: The return of the Taliban’, Contact Magazine/University of Queensland, 2021; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at p 2; S. Tahir and A. Jadoon, ‘Leaders, Fighters, and Suicide Attackers: Insights on TTP Militant Mobility Through Commemorative Records, 2006-2025’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 5 (May 2025), p 26.
94
S. Massod and Z. ur-Rehman, ‘To Preserve Its Own Stability, Pakistan Must Stabilize Afghanistan First’, The New York Times, 22 February 2022.
95
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at pp 6–7.
96
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at p 7; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
97
‘Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2022/547, 15 July 2022, para 74; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at p 7.
98
‘Thirty-first report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2023/95, 13 February 2023, para 74; A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at pp 7–8; ‘Thirty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2023/549, 25 July 2023, para 4 and 74; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
99
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at p 2; ‘Thirty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/92, 29 January 2024, paras 79 and 116; ‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, paras 82 and 118.
100
F. Gardner, ‘Afghanistan withdrawal stokes fears of al-Qaeda comeback’, BBC news, 7 July 2021.
101
A. Mir, ‘al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Future of U.S. Counterterrorism in Afghanistan’, GW Program on Extremism/Georgetown Washington University, 8 September 2022.
102
E. Pilkington, ‘How Ayman al-Zawahiri’s ‘pattern of life’ allowed the US to kill al-Qaida leader’, The Guardian, 2 August 2022.
103
A. Mir, ‘al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Future of U.S. Counterterrorism in Afghanistan’, GW Program on Extremism/Georgetown Washington University, 8 September 2022.
104
A. Mir, ‘al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Future of U.S. Counterterrorism in Afghanistan’, GW Program on Extremism/Georgetown Washington University, 8 September 2022.
105
A. Mir, ‘al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Future of U.S. Counterterrorism in Afghanistan’, GW Program on Extremism/Georgetown Washington University, 8 September 2022.
106
A. Mir, ‘al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Future of U.S. Counterterrorism in Afghanistan’, GW Program on Extremism/Georgetown Washington University, 8 September 2022.
107
K. Spencer, ‘IS-K terrorists already pose a global threat. Now Russia might be making the danger worse’, New Atlanticist, 27 November 2024.
108
US National Counterterrorism Center, ‘ISIS-KHORASAN (ISIS-K)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, March 2025.
109
C. Thomas, ‘Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan’, In Focus/Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2024.
110
S. Massod and Z. ur-Rehman, ‘To Preserve Its Own Stability, Pakistan Must Stabilize Afghanistan First’, The New York Times, 22 February 2022.
111
Global Terrorism Index 2026¸Institute for Economics & Peace, 2026, p 6; ‘Pakistan: Assessment – 2025’, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)/ Institute for Conflict Management (ICM).
112
‘Pakistan: Assessment – 2025’, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)/ Institute for Conflict Management (ICM); Pakistan: Timeline (Terrorist Activities)-2026’, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)/ Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025.
113
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at pp 27–28.
114
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 31.
115
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 31. In total, 204 joint claimed attacks were recorded in 2024.
116
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 34.
117
A. Hussain, ‘March of ‘terror’: Pakistan grapples with deadly attacks on China interests’, Al Jazeera, 29 March 2024; A. Hussain, ‘‘Azm-e-Istehkam’: Can new Pakistani military operation curb armed attacks?’, Al Jazeera, 24 June 2024.
118
‘The Resurgence of the Pakistani Taliban – Implications for Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations’, PRIF blog, 21 January 2025.
119
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 35.
120
S. Tahir and A. Jadoon, ‘Leaders, Fighters, and Suicide Attackers: Insights on TTP Militant Mobility Through Commemorative Records, 2006-2025’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 5 (May 2025), pp 24–25 and 30; P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025.
121
Thirty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2023/549, 25 July 2023, para 74. See also: A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at pp 5–6.
122
Thirty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2023/549, 25 July 2023, para 74; P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025.
123
A. Hussain, ‘What explains the dramatic rise in armed attacks in Pakistan?’, Al Jazeera, 21 December 2023. See also: P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025.
124
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 82.
125
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at p 9; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
126
‘At least 23 killed as fighters storm police station in northwest Pakistan’, Al Jazeera, 12 December 2023; A. Hussain, ‘What explains the dramatic rise in armed attacks in Pakistan?’, Al Jazeera, 21 December 2023.
127
A. Hussain, ‘What explains the dramatic rise in armed attacks in Pakistan?’, Al Jazeera, 21 December 2023.
128
S. Tahir and A. Jadoon, ‘Leaders, Fighters, and Suicide Attackers: Insights on TTP Militant Mobility Through Commemorative Records, 2006-2025’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 5 (May 2025), p 24.
129
A. Z. Khan, ‘Pakistan’s Security Landscape in 2025’, The Friday Times, 27 March 2026. See also: P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025.
130
P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025.
131
K. Spencer, ‘IS-K terrorists already pose a global threat. Now Russia might be making the danger worse’, New Atlanticist, 27 November 2024; US National Counterterrorism Center, ‘ISIS-KHORASAN (ISIS-K)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, March 2025.
132
‘Pakistan: Assessment – 2025’, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)/ Institute for Conflict Management (ICM).
133
A. Shahzad and G. N. Peshimam, ‘Pakistan to launch new military operation against Islamist militants -statement’, Reuters, 7 April 2023 ; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
134
A. Hussain, ‘“Azm-e-Istehkam”: Can new Pakistani military operation curb armed attacks?’, Al Jazeera, 24 June 2024; I. Ahmed and C. Karikalan, ‘Operation Azm-i-Istehkam Launched: Pakistan Combats Terrorism’, ISAS Briefs, 5 July 2024.
135
P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025.
136
P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025.
137
See: S. Naseer, ‘East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and its expanding web of Militancy’, Afghan Studies Center, CRRS, 15 August 2025.
138
‘Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2022/83, 3 February 2022, para 64.
139
C. Thomas, ‘Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan’, In Focus/Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2024
140
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 82.
141
‘Thirty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/92, 29 January 2024, para 79.
142
‘Thirty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/92, 29 January 2024, para 80.
143
‘Thirty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/92, 29 January 2024, para 80.
144
C. Thomas, ‘Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan’, In Focus/Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2024.
145
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at pp 3–4; S. Tahir and A. Jadoon, ‘Leaders, Fighters, and Suicide Attackers: Insights on TTP Militant Mobility Through Commemorative Records, 2006-2025’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 5 (May 2025), pp 24–25 and 30–32; P. Pandya, ‘The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control’, ACLED, 6 October 2025; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Pakistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2 February 2026.
146
A. Sayed and T. Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 16, No 5 (May 2023), 1–13, at p 8.
147
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 31.
148
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 31.
149
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 35.
150
A. Verma, I. Baloch, and R. Valle, ‘The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications’, CTC Sentinel, Vol 18, No 4 (April 2025), 27–41, at p 35.
151
See ‘Armed conflicts in Afghanistan’. See also: H. Mahroof, C. Davies and F. Drury, ‘Afghanistan accuses Pakistan of “violating Kabul’s sovereign territory” ’, BBC, 10 October 2025. See also: C. Fong, ‘Why Are the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan in an ‘Open War’?’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 March 2026.
152
C. Fong, ‘Why Are the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan in an ‘Open War’?’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 March 2026.
153
ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Case No IT-94-1-AR72), 2 October 1995, para 70; ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Judgment (Trial Chamber) (Case No IT-94-1-T), 7 May 1997, para 562.
154
For a summary, see ICTY, Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Judgment (Trial Chamber) (Case No IT-04-82-T), 10 July 2008, para 177.
155
ICTY, Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj et al., Judgment (Trial Chamber) (Case No IT–04–84), 3 April 2008, para 60.
156
C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
157
ICRC, The Roots of Restraint in War, 2018, pp 45–47.
158
S. Vité and I. Gallino, ‘Decentralized armed groups: Can they be classified as parties to non-international armed conflicts?’, International Review of the Red Cross, No 926 (August 2024), pp 938–39.
159
ICRC, How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, 2024, p 16.
160
Pakistan: Timeline (Terrorist Activities)-2026’, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)/ Institute for Conflict Management (ICM)

Pakistan

Reporting period: 2023 - 2026

Overview

Historical background

Baluchistan’s separatist aspirations

Fragmentation, unification and regional dimension of the Baloch insurgency

Targeting of Chinese nationals and interests by the Baloch insurgency

Anti-election operations by Baloch armed groups

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emergence

Al-Qaeda and its affiliates’ fluctuating presence and significance in Pakistan

The rise and decline of Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K)

Operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ and the decline of the TTP

The revival of the TTP

The Taliban return to power in Afghanistan and its influence on the TTP, al-Qaeda, and IS-K

Key developments (between 2023 and 2026)

Escalation of terrorist attacks

Baloch insurgency

TTP

IS-K

The Pakistani State response

TTP’s rapprochement with other insurgent movements and local expansion

Fragmentation and spill-over of the Baloch insurgency

Open hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan

Non-International Armed Conflicts

Legal classification

Organization

Intensity

AQIS, the Afghan Taliban and other groups’ involvement and its significance

Organization

Intensity

Organization

Intensity

Below the Threshold Situations

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-State parties

Other Main actors

Other Non-State Actors

Foreign involvement