Somalia

There are two non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) taking place in Somalia:

Somalia (Armed Forces and support forces) v. Al-Shabaab
Somalia (Armed Forces and support forces) v. Islamic State Somalia (ISS) (from December 2024)

All parties to these NIACs are bound by Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,¹ and customary international humanitarian law applicable to NIACs. As Somalia is not a party to Additional Protocol II,², there is no need to investigate whether either Al-Shabaab or ISS, in their separate fighting relationships with Somalia, meet the requirements set out in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II.

Somalia faced various violent power struggles and local armed conflicts between 1991 and 2004 due to an absence of effective government after President Mohamed Siad Barre was ousted.³ United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions and United States (US) forces were deployed to Somalia to try to address the dire security and humanitarian situation. Questions of territory and authority were further accentuated when Somaliland declared independence in 1991, and again when Puntland declared autonomy in 1998.⁴

Despite the establishment of a transitional government in 2004, violence and limited government control over the state’s territory continued. During this period, Islamist armed groups formed, taking control of the capital, Mogadishu, and other areas in 2006, and prompting intervention by Ethiopia and the African Union (AU) in support of the government, as well as the deployment of a new UN peacekeeping force.⁵ The Islamist armed group Al-Shabaab, which had captured key towns during this period, aligned itself with Al-Qaeda and the two groups launched an offensive on the capital and took control of further territory.⁶. Between 2010 and 2012, Al-Shabaab severely restricted humanitarian access and carried out attacks on humanitarian workers, contributing to a famine that killed more than 260,000 people.⁷ The Somali government forces, supported by Kenya and the AU, managed to wrest control of key towns from Al-Shabaab control leading to the establishment of an internationally recognised federal government in Somalia in 2012.⁸ Al-Shabaab continued its intense armed activities both across the border against Kenya and within Somalia against the government (supported by AU peacekeeping forces, Ethiopia, Kenya and the US) as part of an effort to gain territorial control in the state.⁹ Inter-regional tensions within Somalia also sporadically erupted into conflict. The humanitarian situation has remained concerning in recent years, with high levels of civilian casualties, displacement, food insecurity, and attacks on humanitarian missions.¹⁰

During the reporting period, a NIAC continued between Somalia’s state forces – supported by the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), the US, Ethiopia, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – and Al-Shabaab.¹¹ While not directly involved in the conflict, Abu Dhabi has been helping Somalia combat Al-Shabaab since 2015 by funding and supporting various military operations.¹² The UAE has trained Somali soldiers and security forces in Somalia, and, in 2023, signed an agreement to enhance Somalia’s capacity to combat terrorism.¹³ Similarly, Türkiye’s military base, Camp Turksam, in Somalia has trained 16,000 troops since 2017.¹⁴. Türkiye has boosted its presence in Somalia with 500 extra soldiers after Al-Shabaab advances in May 2025.¹⁵

The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) replaced ATMIS when its mandate expired at the end of 2024.¹⁶

As of December 2024, the Somali Armed Forces (and support forces) were also engaged in a NIAC with Islamic State Somalia.¹⁷

In January 2023, a separate conflict between the government of Somaliland, a self-declared independent region of Somalia, and the Dhulbahante clan militias broke out in the disputed Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) regions.¹⁸. This conflict has subsided due to the withdrawal of Somaliland forces and the establishment of the SSC-Khaatumo administration. However, sporadic clashes, including during the reporting period, continued. ¹⁹ During the so-called National Consultative Conference (NCC) convened in Mogadishu on 6 – 7 May 2025, the federal government and the leaders of federal states – with the exception of Puntland and Jubaland, which refrained from participating in the event – agreed to recognise SSC-Khaatumo as a federal member state.²⁰

New non-international armed conflict between Somalia and Islamic State Somalia (ISS)

Clashes between the Somali Armed Forces (with its support forces) and Islamic State Somalia (ISS), initially considered as infrequent and sporadic, escalated during December 2024.²¹ Military operations launched by the Somali Armed Forces in December in northeast Puntland reportedly led to 200 ISS casualties and enabled the Somali Armed Forces to retake villages previously under ISS control.²². Several attacks occurred in December 2024 through February 2025 in north-east Puntland, with ISS conducting drone strikes for the first time in January 2025 in attacks on Puntland security forces.²³ Since the capture of a key ISS base in Buqa Caleed by Puntland security forces in March 2025, however, ISS is reported to be in retreat, with Puntland claiming victory over ISS.²⁴On 3 May 2025, military forces in Puntland successfully repelled an attack in the Dhasaan Sare area of Miraale Valley, reportedly resulting in the killing of ten ISS militants.²⁵

On 31 May 2025, the military claimed to have secured the final militant base in Miraale in the region.²⁶ As a result, military operations shifted to the ISS stronghold of Togga Jecel Valley (as of mid-May 2025).²⁷

Below the threshold clashes between ISS and Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab and ISS clash sporadically.²⁸ ISS claimed that sporadic clashes that occurred from February to December 2023 between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab enabled ISS to take territory in the Bari district.²⁹ In January and February 2024, minor clashes were reported between ISS and Al-Shabaab.³⁰ Another ambush by ISS against Al-Shabaab took place between 3 and 5 March 2024; the purpose appeared to be obtaining weapons from Al-Shabaab.³¹ Light weapons were used during these sporadic attacks and casualties resulting from fighting were said to be low.³² ISS claimed that it killed approximately fifty Al-Shabaab militants in the beginning of 2024.³³ As of 24 March 2025, no other clashes had been reported.

It appears that ISS has been concentrating its efforts on capturing Al-Shabaab territory in the Bari region of north-eastern Somalia.³⁴ Reports indicate that the US remains concerned about ISS activities in the region.³⁵ Reports suggest that ISS’s main function is to serve as the financial stronghold for Islamic State (IS) as well as a propaganda machine for the IS network as a whole.³⁶ Limited territorial control is employed not for purposes of military operations but rather to ensure financial channels and logistical support for IS affiliates.³⁷

The US in an invited and supporting role

The US, through US Africa Command (US AFRICOM), supports the Somali government in its fight against Al-Shabaab and ISS.³⁸ Several air strikes in support of the Somali Armed Forces were conducted by US AFRICOM at the request of the Federal Government of Somalia.³⁹ Between 1 July 2023 and 30 June 2024, at least twelve airstrikes were executed by US AFRICOM in Somalia. Ten of these were conducted ‘at the request of the Federal Government of Somalia’,⁴⁰ while the remaining two were, according to US AFRICOM, conducted ‘in coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia⁴¹. From 1 July 2024 to 15 March 2025, a minimum of another eleven airstrikes were carried out by US AFRICOM in Somalia.⁴² From 15 March to 23 June 2025, there was a drastic escalation, with at least thirty US AFRICOM airstrikes recorded,⁴³ and with the most recent strike conducted on 19 June 2025 against Al-Shabaab.⁴⁴

The US is also financially supporting the building of new infrastructure (new military bases) for the Somali Army.⁴⁵

As the US is operating in Somalia at the invitation of the Somali Government, its involvement does not affect the classification of the two NIACs in which Somalia is engaged against Al-Shabaab and ISS.

African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) replaces the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)

The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS),⁴⁶ originally the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), completed its third phase of draw-down with the transfer of the Burgavo camp to the Somali National Armed Forces on 14 November 2024.⁴⁷

On 27 December 2024, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2767 (2024) authorizing ATMIS to be replaced by AUSSOM for an initial 12 months starting 1 January 2025. ⁴⁸ Despite starting its mission in January 2025, it was reported on 19 February 2025 that funding for AUSSOM had been delayed because of a variety of challenges; a new funding mechanism for State contributions was being drawn up.⁴⁹On 23 January 2025, Kenya, which was part of ATMIS, expressed interest in contributing troops to the AUSSOM mission.⁵⁰

It is reported that despite AUSSOM becoming de jure effective on 1 January 2025, there has not been much operational change from ATMIS. ⁵¹ A call to ascertain which states expressed interest in contributing troops to AUSSOM was only communicated on 23 January 2025 during the 1238^th session of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council. This is twenty-three days after AUSSOM came into effect. It remains unclear whether Burundi will remain involved in AUSSOM or withdraw.⁵²

On 25 April 2025, a conference was held in Kampala, with the participation of the AUSSOM troop contributing countries Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.⁵³. This conference occurred in the context of significant uncertainties surrounding the financial sustainability of AUSSOM, which had reportedly secured only 15 million USD of the 166 million USD it required for the year 2025 as of May.⁵⁴ Moreover, the United Nations Security Council failed to approve funding for AUSSOM on 15 May 2025 as a result of US opposition.⁵⁵

Ankara Declaration of 11 December 2024

Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Ankara Declaration on 11 December 2025 which aims to renew a bilateral commitment to regional peace and security.⁵⁶ On 17 December 2024, Ethiopian soldiers serving as part of ATMIS were honoured for their contribution to combatting Al-Shabaab and protecting local communities in southwest Somalia.⁵⁷ Towards the end of December 2024, Ethiopia again stated its commitment to a post-ATMIS mission in Somalia.⁵⁸. In early January 2025, Ethiopia announced it will support AUSSOM in its mission against Al-Shabaab.⁵⁹ In February, an agreement was signed between Somalia and Ethiopia, formally recognising the participation of Ethiopian troops in a new AU mission in Somalia.⁶⁰

Kenyan Special Forces border patrol impacted by USAID freeze

Al-Shabaab forces continued to spill into Kenyan territory through 2023, 2024,⁶¹ and 2025.⁶²Kenyan Special Forces continued to patrol border areas in their northeastern province until December 2024.⁶³ However, as one of the former biggest beneficiaries of US aid in anti-terrorism assistance, Kenya currently struggles with financing its critical border programme against Al-Shabaab attacks. Since the end of the aid payments, the border programme has been suspended.⁶⁴

Non-international armed conflict between the Somali Armed Forces (and its support forces) and Al-Shabaab

Background

The NIAC between the Somali Armed Forces and Al-Shabaab has been ongoing since at least 2006.¹ As support forces (which includes AUSSOM, US, Kenya and Ethiopia) joined this pre-existing NIAC by invitation of the government of Somalia, the support forces are considered parties to this NIAC as per the support-based approach to conflict classification.²

Intensity

Fighting during the period 1 July 2023 to June 2025 remained intense.³ During the months of July,⁴ military operations between ATMIS and Al-Shabaab occurred frequently and in close temporal proximity. In July 2023, at least eight clashes occurred where the weapons of choice were often anti-aircraft weapons, drones equipped with missiles and/or bombs, and improvised explosive devices.⁵ The military operations with the highest casualties were launched by ATMIS and US AFRICOM against Al-Shabaab between 1 July and 4 August 2023.⁶

Attacks forming part of this military offensive against Al-Shabaab consisted of a combination of air strikes and ground operations. Although the number of civilian casualties was unclear, a reported 100 Al-Shabaab fighters were killed. At least five military operations were reported during October 2023,⁷ Losses suffered by the Somali Armed Forces were not reported. No attacks were reported in November and December 2023, but infrequent attacks did occur in January,⁸ and military operations seemed to escalate during June,⁹ Al-Shabaab and the Somali Armed Forces frequently clashed during August 2024,¹⁰ with a series of clashes also occurring between October and November 2024.¹¹ A large-scale military operation was launched on 28 January 2025 by the Somali Army in the Hiraan region of Somalia against Al-Shabaab.¹² This military operation allowed the Somalia Armed Forces to recapture several locations of strategic value to Al-Shabaab, including Beera Yabaal, Buur Abooto, Eega Galmaay, Jidcilaan and Cadow Gureey, and resulted in at least sixteen casualties on Al-Shabaab’s side. On 20 February 2025, a military operation by the Somali Armed Forces against Al-Shabaab in the Middle Shabelle region led to 130 casualties.¹³

Between 11 and 12 March 2025, Al-Shabaab seized a hotel in central Beledweyne.¹⁴ Al-Shabaab created a distraction, detonating a car bomb in order to enter and take over the hotel for a 24-hour period.¹⁵ This situation led to intense fighting between the Somali Armed Forces and security forces and Al-Shabaab.¹⁶ On 18 March 2025, Al-Shabaab aimed a car bomb attack in Mogadishu at the President of Somalia, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.¹⁷ The AU condemned the actions taken by Al-Shabaab and reaffirmed its commitment to AUSSOM.¹⁸

US AFRICOM has also engaged Al-Shabaab on several occasions during the reporting period.¹⁹ An example is the airstrike against Al-Shabaab in the northeast of Mogadishu on 15 March 2025. US Africa Command Public Affairs,²⁰ US AFRICOM supplied air support on these occasions at the request of the Somali Government.²¹

On 15 April 2025, Al-Shabaab re-seized control of Adan Yabal town in the Middle Shabelle region of Hirshabelle state, which is widely regarded as a symbol of the government’s 2022–2023 offensive.²² Additionally, on 24 April 2025, Al-Shabaab fighters temporarily overran the military base at Wargaadhi town, resulting in the disruption of resupply routes.²³ On 18 May 2025, Al-Shabaab carried out a suicide attack on an army recruitment centre in Mogadishu, killing at least thirteen people.²⁴

Organization

Al-Shabaab, ‘the Youth’, is an Al-Qaeda affiliate in Eastern Africa.²⁵ This organized armed group often acts independently of Al-Qaeda although Al-Qaeda’s leadership has supported and endorsed its activities.²⁶ It is reported that foreign Al-Qaeda affiliates comprise more than half of Al-Shabaab’s executive council and that, consequently, Al-Shabaab has embraced the globalised rhetoric and propaganda promoted by Al-Qaeda.²⁷

Al-Shabaab’s sophisticated command structure is both hierarchical and centralised in nature.²⁸ Al-Shabaab is led by its ‘Emir’, Ahmed Umar Abu Abaidah.²⁹ Regional commanders report to the Emir and are tasked with managing the group’s presence in regions including southern Somalia and Mogadishu, Bay and Bokool, Puntland and Somaliland, and Juba Valley.

The leader of Al-Shabaab’s military operations is Yassir Jiis (previously known as Abdullahi Haji Da’ud).³⁰ The military leader’s portfolio includes oversight over two separate military branches which are led by regional military leaders. The first, Jaysh Al-‘Usr (army of hardship), serves as its major external military apparatus. The second, Jaysh Al-Hisbah (army of morality), functions as the group’s religious police force, enforcing Sharia in areas of Al-Shabaab control.

Al-Shabaab’s top leadership structure consists of various ranks.³¹ There are several emirs, an intelligence wing, and other senior officials, including financial and military officials. At the time of writing, the emir ranks were reportedly filled as follows: the Emir (Ahmed Umar Abu Ubaidah),³² the deputy emir (Abukar Ali Adan),³³ the deputy emir responsible for Aminyat, Al-Shabaab’s intelligence wing (Mahad Karate),³⁴ the military emir (Yassir Jiss),³⁵ interior emir (Mohamed Mire,³⁶ deceased December 2024),³⁷ and the weapons procurement emir (Abdullah Jeeri). ³⁸

Senior officials involved in the military and secret services portfolios include the senior official responsible for operational planning (Jehad Serwan Mostafa),³⁹ the senior official serving on the main leadership council (Fuad Mohamed Khalaf),⁴⁰ the senior ideologue (Muhammad Bashar Abdulkarim),⁴¹ the intelligence wing (Yusuf Ahmed Hajji Nurow aka Gees Ade),⁴² and Senior Aminyat official responsible for the attack planning portfolio (Mustaf ’Ato).⁴³

Leadership concerned with finances is also structured and includes the following senior leaders: Khalif Adele, Hassan Afgooye, Abdikarim Hussein Gagaale. Structured financial leadership enhances the logistical capacity of Al-Shabaab.⁴⁴ Al-Shabaab is historically known to have several streams of income.⁴⁵ These are said to include support from locals, sponsors, results of proselytizing, funding from other terrorist groups, piracy, kidnapping, racketeering, and extortion of local businesses, farmers, and aid groups.⁴⁶ Reports claim that Al-Shabaab received funding from other governments including Eritrea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar and Yemen, although these governments tend to deny making financial contributions to the group.⁴⁷ The US Treasury Department estimates that Al-Shabaab generates approximately US$100 million per annum of which around one quarter is used to procure weapons and explosives.⁴⁸

Al-Shabaab is estimated to be the wealthiest and largest Al-Qaeda affiliate,⁴⁹ and had a reported 7,000 to 12,000 fighters as of January 2024.⁵⁰ The group controls large parts of Somali territory which, as of February 2025, included parts of southern and central Somalia.⁵¹

Al-Shabaab’s financial standing and extensive territorial control supports and enhances its logistical capacity. Al-Qaeda supports skills transfer to Al-Shabaab by affording training to Al-Shabaab members not only in Afghanistan but also in parts of Somalia.⁵² Training includes basic infantry and weapons training,⁵³ military tactics development, and advanced explosive and assassination training. Al-Qaeda also facilitates fighter transfers between Yemen and Somalia.⁵⁴

Al-Shabaab’s military tactics enable it to exercise continued control over large parts of Somalia. The group has exerted temporary and, at times, sustained control over strategic locations in those areas by recruiting, sometimes forcibly, regional sub-clans and their militias, using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the Somali government, AMISOM peacekeepers, and non-governmental aid organizations.⁵⁵

Territorial control allows Al-Shabaab to impose strict Sharia law which aligns with its internal disciplinary code and propaganda messaging.⁵⁶ The Shura Council oversees Al-Shabaab’s regional commanders and establishes its policy which must be followed by all local administrators within the group’s territory.⁵⁷ The group’s media branch, al-Kataib (The Brigade), is responsible for producing video recruitment and propaganda content that is then disseminated for international audiences.⁵⁸ The media branch and Ali Mohammed Rage,⁵⁹ the official spokesperson for Al-Shabaab, ensures that the group speaks with one voice.

This overall cohesive organization of Al-Shabaab means that it satisfies the minimum threshold of organization.

1
See, ‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict, July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy; P. D. Williams, ‘The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, April 2024. (See conflict overview above for more information.)
2
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 16.
3
‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group.
4
‘Tug of war for Goof Gaduud: Al-Shabaab briefly captured strategic town near Baidoa’, The Somali Digest, 24 July 2023, August, ‘Special Report: Kenya-Somalia Border: Rising al-Shabaab Threat in the Wake of ATMIS Drawdown’, ACLED, 1 September 2023, September, ‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group, September 2023, and October 2023, ‘Situation Update: October 2023: Somalia: Al-Shabaab Strikes Back at Local Administrators’, ACLED, 20 October 2023,
5
‘Situation Update: July 2023: Somalia: Political Crisis Deepens Amid Transition to Direct Elections’, ACLED, 28 July 2023.
6
‘Special Report: Kenya-Somalia Border: Rising al-Shabaab Threat in the Wake of ATMIS Drawdown’, ACLED, 1 September 2023.
7
‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group, including those launched on 5 October 2023, which reportedly resulted in the deaths of 1,650 Al-Shabaab fighters. H. Maruf, ‘Somalia Claims Killing Hundreds of Militants Amid Recent Setbacks’, Voice of America, 4 October 2023.
8
‘Islamic State (ISIS) Reports Driving Al-Qaeda Affiliate Al-Shabab Out Of Mountains In Northeastern Somalia In Three-Month Campaign’, Memri: Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor, 21 April 2024, February, ‘Situation Update: February 2024: Somalia: Al-Shabaab’s Infiltration of a Military Base in Mogadishu and Somaliland’s Conflict’, ACLED, 1 March 2024, and March 2024, ‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group. Multiple attacks occurred in April 2024, ‘Situation Update: May 2024: Somalia: Renewed counter-insurgency operations expected as al-Shabaab regroups’, ACLED, 31 May 2024.
9
‘Al-Shabaab Assault on Somali Forces Leaves Over 60 Dead, Vehicles Destroyed’, Horn Observer, 9 June 2024, and July 2024. ‘Situation Update: July 2024: The looming threat: A resurgence of Islamic State and inter-clan fighting in Somalia’, ACLED, 31 July 2024.
10
‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group.
11
‘Situation Update: November 2024: Al-Shabaab targets civilians in Somalia in retaliation for installing CCTV cameras’, ACLED, 29 November 2024.
12
‘Somali army kills 16 al-Shabaab terrorists’, AA, 29 January 2025.
13
M. O. Hassan, ‘Somali government says attacks on bases repulsed, 130 militants killed’, Voice of America, 20 February 2025.
14
‘Somali forces end a 24-hour siege by al-Shabab militants on a hotel’, Africa News, 12 March 2025.
15
A. Sheikh and F. Omar, ‘Al Shabaab gunmen attack hotel in central Somalia, seven dead’, Reuters, 11 March 2025.
16
F. Hanshi, ‘Somali forces end deadly 24-hour hotel siege’, BBC, 12 March 2025.
17
‘Somali militants target presidential convoy in bomb attack, president safe’, Reuters, 18 March 2025; A. Khalif, ‘Al Shabaab shows potent threat after targeting convoy’, The East African, 22 March 2025.
18
‘African Union Commission Chairperson Condemns Al Shabaab’s Cowardly Attack in Mogadishu and Reaffirms AU’s Support for Somalia’s Stability’, African Union, 19 March 2025.
19
‘Deadly ambush by al-Shabaab targets SNA’s Danab convoy near Afmadow’, The Somali Digest, 13 July 2023; US Africa Command Public Affairs, ‘Federal Government of Somalia engages al Shabaab with support from U.S. Forces’, 2 March 2025; and US Africa Command Public Affairs, ‘Federal Government of Somalia engages al Shabaab with support from U.S. Forces’, 22 February 2025.
20
‘Federal Government of Somalia engages al Shabaab with support from U.S. Forces’, 17 March 2025.
21
US Africa Command Public Affairs,‘U.S. Forces conduct strike targeting ISIS’, 31 May 2025.
22
‘Al-Shabaab Retakes Adan Yabal District in Coordinated Central Somalia Offensive’, Wardheer News, 16 April 2025; ‘Middle Shabelle: Country Guidance: Somalia’, European Union Agency for Asylum, August 2023; ‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group; ‘Al-Shabab fighters attack strategic town in central Somalia’, Al Jazeera, 16 April 2025; and M. Dhaysane, ‘Al-Shabaab terrorist group seizes strategic town in Somalia’, AA, 16 April 2025.
23
‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group; ‘Al-Shabab battles Somalia’s army for strategic military base’, Al Jazeera, 24 April 2025; and Jama, ‘Wargaadhi Base Briefly Overrun by Al-Shabaab’, The Somali Digest, 24 April 2025.
24
‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group; O. Faruk, ‘Suicide attacker in Somali capital kills 13 at a military recruitment center’, AP News, 18 May 2025; and ‘At least 13 reported killed in suicide bomb blast in Somalia’s Mogadishu’, Al Jazeera, 18 May 2025.
25
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project.
26
‘Al-Shabaab’, Australian Government: Australian National Security.
27
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project.
28
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project; ‘Al-Shabaab’, Australian Government: Australian National Security.
29
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project.
30
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal.
31
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal.
32
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal,
33
‘Abukar Ali Adan’, United Nations Security Council,
34
‘Mahad Karate’, United Nations Security Council,
35
A. Blinken, ‘Designation of Mohamed Mire, Yasir Jiis, Yusuf Ahmed Hajji Nurow, Mohamoud Abdi Aden, and Mustaf `Ato as Specially Designated Global Terrorists’, Federal Register, 14 October 2022,
36
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal.
37
M. Dhaysane, ‘Senior al-Shabaab leader, 10 terrorists killed in US airstrikes in Somalia’, AA, 8 January 2025.
38
‘Treasury Designates al-Shabaab Financial Facilitators’, US Department of the Treasury, 17 October 2022.
39
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal.
40
‘Fuad Mohamed Khalaf’, United Nations Security Council.
41
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal. Chief of Aminyat,
42
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project.
43
A. Blinken, ‘Designation of Mohamed Mire, Yasir Jiis, Yusuf Ahmed Hajji Nurow, Mohamoud Abdi Aden, and Mustaf `Ato as Specially Designated Global Terrorists’, Federal Register, 14 October 2022.
44
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal.
45
C. Klobucista, et al, ‘Al-Shabaab’, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 December 2022.
46
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project.
47
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project.
48
P. D. Williams, ‘The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, April 2024; UNSC, ‘Thirty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/92, 29 January 2024; and C. Klobucista, et al, ‘Al-Shabaab’, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 December 2022.
49
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal.
50
P. D. Williams, ‘The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, April 2024; UNSC, ‘Thirty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/92, 29 January 2024.
51
P. D. Williams, ‘The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, April 2024; M. Yusuf, ‘Report: IS-Somalia becomes financial hub; leader could be top IS chief’, Voice of America, 12 September 2024; M. Harper, ‘Why Trump is on the warpath in Somalia’, BBC, 7 February 2025.
52
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project.
53
P. D. Williams, ‘The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, April 2024.
54
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project
55
C. Klobucista, et al, ‘Al-Shabaab’, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 December 2022.
56
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project.
57
C. Klobucista, et al, ‘Al-Shabaab’, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 December 2022.
58
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project.
59
‘Ali Mohammed Rage’, United Nations Security Council.

Non-international armed conflict between Somalia (and support forces) and Islamic State Somalia (ISS)

Background

A new NIAC evolved between Somalia (and support forces) and ISSduring the reporting period. As support forces (which includes AUSSOM, US, Kenya and Ethiopia) joined this pre-existing NIAC by invitation of the government of Somalia, the support forces are considered parties to this NIAC as per the support-based approach to conflict classification.¹

Intensity

Violence has sporadically been erupting between the Somali authorities (supported by ATMIS (now AUSSOM), the US, Kenya, and Ethiopia) and ISS. Sporadic clashes between ISS and Al-Shabaab were reported through February to December 2023 in parts of Puntland.² An airstrike by US AFRICOM targeting ISS on 31 May 2024 was reported, but this single attack was still below the threshold of intensity needed to fulfil the Tadić criteria to trigger a NIAC.³

Clashes between the Somali government and ISS have, however, re-intensified since December 2024.⁴ The severity of fighting as of December 2024 meets the intensity of armed violence requirement. It is claimed that the Somali Armed Forces clashed with ISS in northeast Puntland, killing approximately 130 ISS fighters.⁵ On 13 December 2024, the Somali Armed Forces claimed to have seized eight jihadist ISS outposts and a major outpost in the Cal Miskaad mountains.⁶ The Somali Armed Forces were also able to down nine ISS operated drones during December 2024 and another twelve in January 2025.⁷ On 31 December 2024, ISS attacked a security force base in Bari and security forces launched operation ‘Hilaac’ (lightning) against ISS (which was still ongoing at the time of writing).⁸ The operation aims to force ISS militants out of their hideouts in the mountainous region, and to re-establish peace and stability in the region.⁹ The hideouts are a sophisticated network of cave systems containing a variety of resources that ISS has stockpiled, ranging from standard military equipment to other supplies such as water and medicine.¹⁰ Operation ‘Hilaac’ is comprised of highly trained and well-armed members of the Puntland Defense Forces (or Darawish), the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), and the Counter-Terrorism Police. According to claims by Puntland commanders, more than 150 ISS fighters have been killed in battles since the beginning of the operation¹¹

Additionally, US President Donald Trump announced that the US conducted an airstrike against ISS in Somalia on 1 February 2025.¹² According to a US AFRICOM press statement, fourteen ISS operatives were killed during the strike, including Ahmed Maeleninine, a key ISS recruiter, financier, and external operations leader.¹³ The airstrike was followed by twenty-four hours of fighting from 4 February to 5 February 2025 between Puntland security forces and ISS fighters in the Dharin and Qurac areas of the Cal Miskaad mountains. Over fifty ISS fighters and more than fifteen members of the Puntland security forces were killed.¹⁴

A second airstrike was conducted by the US (and supposedly the UAE) on 16 February 2025, killing sixteen ISS fighters in northern Somalia. M. O. Hassan, ‘Somali officials: US airstrike against Islamic State kills 16 militants’, Voice of America, 17 February 2025. In an effort to hit back, ISS fighters conducted drone attacks against Puntland security forces’ bases in the area during the US air strike. M. O. Hassan, ‘Somali officials: US airstrike against Islamic State kills 16 militants’, Voice of America, 17 February 2025. Two airstrikes were launched against ISS by US AFRICOM on 21 and 22 February 2025. US Africa Command Public Affairs, ‘U.S. Forces Conduct Strikes Targeting ISIS-Somalia’, 23 February 2025. According to the US, three ISS fighters were killed, and an initial assessment reported no civilian casualties. Since February 2025, US AFRICOM has conducted a further nineteen airstrikes against ISS up until 23 June 2025, ‘Press Releases’, US Africa Command. with the most recent air strike conducted on 15 June. US Africa Command Public Affairs, ‘U.S. Forces Conduct Strikes Targeting ISIS-Somalia’, 21 June 2025. The United States acts through AFRICOM by invitation of the Somali government.

Further clashes between ISS fighters and security forces were reported on 7, 11, and 13 February 2025.¹⁵ In Puntland, on 3 May 2025, Somali troops successfully repelled an ISS attack in the Dhasaan Sare area of Miraale valley, reportedly killing ten militants.¹⁶ On 31 May 2025, Somali forces claimed to have captured the last ISS base in Miraale.¹⁷

Organization

ISS is a group which broke away from Al-Shabaab. ISS first appeared in Somalia in the second half of 2015.¹⁸ The Emir of ISS, Abdulqadir Mumin, is also head of Al-Karrar (the administrative hub).¹⁹ Emir Mumin previously served Al-Shabaab in its northern Puntland branch.²⁰ Abdirahman Fahiye Isse Mohamud is the deputy emir of both entities.²¹ It is suggested that Emir Mumin has risen to the position of caliph for IS internationally.²²

ISS is organized into a command structure that, at a minimum, exercises control over its military wing and its assassination squad.²³ Little is known about ISS’s internal structures.²⁴ Secrecy concerning commanding officers and its internal structures is necessary for ISS to limit the targeting of its senior leadership. What is known is that ISS has its own assassination squad,²⁵ previously led by Abdirahman Shirwa Aw-Said, who surrendered to Puntland Security Forces in February 2025.²⁶

As of late 2018, ISS hosted the ISS al-Karrar regional offices in Somalia. The purpose of these offices is to coordinate IS regional activities for eastern, central and southern Africa. IS reportedly leverages the caliph position to lend ideological and historical credibility to the group but there is a highly bureaucratized structure called the General Directorate of Provinces that contains a variety of leadership styles that shape the organization and how it behaves.²⁷.

Not much is known about the internal disciplinary structure of ISS. Given the existing leadership structure, ISS does have the ability to implement IHL. ISS also speaks with one voice through Emir Abdulqadir Mumin.²⁸ The Emir, however, rarely makes public pronouncements as ISS prefers to operate in secret.

ISS is considered a ‘linchpin’ in the global IS network despite the fact that the fighting wing of ISS remains small in size (100 to 400 fighters) and does not control significant territory in Somalia.²⁹ Little is known about the military tactics employed by ISS despite its increased activity in waging attacks against security forces and business centres.³⁰ Small-scale attacks by ISS have been reported in Mogadishu where improvised explosive devices, specifically vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs), are often ISS’s weapon of choice.³¹ Military operations are coordinated from strongholds in Puntland’s Al Madow Mountains.³² As of February 2025, an increased use of armed drones by ISS operatives was seen.³³

ISS recruits fighters from other countries.³⁴ Indeed, foreign fighters are said to constitute between 50 and 80 per cent of ISS fighters.³⁵ Foreign fighters originate predominantly from North Africa, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and the Middle East. The recruitment of local fighters in Somalia has been difficult because of the presence of Al-Shabaab, and ISS’s narrow clan base.³⁶

ISS is considered a growing international threat owing to the role it plays in the financial structure of IS globally.³⁷ According to experts from the US, the UN and Somalia, the al-Karrar office, based in Puntland, is a key part of IS’s financial infrastructure because it disburses funds as well as expertise to IS branches on the African continent and elsewhere.³⁸ ISS engages in extortion and illicit taxation which, according to the United Nations, nets the group around USD360,000 a month, which if true, would net the group at least USD4.3 million in annual income.³⁹ It is suggested that several international terrorist plots have been financed by ISS, including terror attacks in other African countries.⁴⁰ Its financial structure and regional headquarters are evidence of ISS’s logistical capacity, which also facilitates operations in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and other areas on the African continent.

1
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 16.
2
A. Y. Zelin, ‘The Islamic State on the March in Africa’, The Washington Institute, 1 March 2024.
3
US Africa Command Public Affairs, ‘U.S. Forces conduct strike targeting ISIS’, US Africa Command, 31 May 2024.
4
P. van Ostaeyen and P. Wójcik, ‘The Islamic State in Puntland, Somalia’, Online article, Counter Extremism Project, 21 February 2025.
5
M. O. Hassan, ‘Somali government says attacks on bases repulsed, 130 militants killed’, Voice of America, 20 February 2025.
6
‘Somalia: Puntland Offensive’, Africa Research Bulletin, 10 February 2025.
7
‘Somalia: Puntland Offensive’, Africa Research Bulletin, 10 February 2025.
8
‘Islamic State claims responsibility for attack on Somalia’s Puntland military base’, Reuters, 1 January 2025.
9
Jama, ‘Puntland Unleashes ‘Hilac’ Offensive, Targeting IS-Somalia and Al-Shabab’, The Somali Digest, 26 December 2024.
10
P. van Ostaeyen and P. Wójcik, ‘The Islamic State in Puntland, Somalia’, Online article, Counter Extremism Project, 21 February 2025.
11
.Jama, ‘Puntland Unleashes ‘Hilac’ Offensive, Targeting IS-Somalia and Al-Shabab’, The Somali Digest, 26 December 2024; M. O. Hassan ‘Scores killed in Somalia in clash between security forces, Islamic State’, Voice of America, 5 February 2025.
12
D. J. Trump, Post on X, 1 February 2025.
13
US Africa Command Public Affairs, ‘Update: U.S. Forces Strike on ISIS-Somalia’, US Africa Command, 11 February 2025.
14
M. O. Hassan ‘Scores killed in Somalia in clash between security forces, Islamic State’, Voice of America, 5 February 2025.
15
‘Islamic State attacks military bases in Somalia’s Puntland’, The New Arab, 12 February 2025; P. van Ostaeyen and P. Wójcik, ‘The Islamic State in Puntland, Somalia’, Online article, Counter Extremism Project, 21 February 2025.
16
‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group; and K. Aweys, ‘Puntland Forces Kill 10 ISIS Terrorists in Al-Miskaad Mountains’, Somalia National News Agency, 3 May 2025.
17
‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group; K. Aweys, ‘Puntland Forces Kill 10 ISIS Terrorists in Al-Miskaad Mountains’, Somalia National News Agency, 3 May 2025.
18
‘The Islamic State in Somalia: Responding to an Evolving Threat’, International Crisis Group, 12 September 2024; C. Weiss and L. Webber, ‘Islamic State-Somalia: A Growing Global Terror Concern’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, September 2024.
19
A. Doctor and G. Ligon, ‘The Death of an Islamic State Global Leader in Africa?’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, July/August 2024.
20
‘The Islamic State in Somalia: Responding to an Evolving Threat’, International Crisis Group, 12 September 2024.
21
C. Weiss and L. Webber, ‘Islamic State-Somalia: A Growing Global Terror Concern’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, September 2024.
22
M. Yusuf, ‘Report: IS-Somalia becomes financial hub; leader could be top IS chief’, Voice of America, 12 September 2024.
23
‘Over 40 ISIS Terrorists Killed as Puntland Troops Advance’, Puntland Post, 4 February 2025.
24
‘The Islamic State in Somalia: Responding to an Evolving Threat’, International Crisis Group, 12 September 2024.
25
M. Harper, ‘Why Trump is on the warpath in Somalia’, BBC, 7 February 2025.
26
‘Over 40 ISIS Terrorists Killed as Puntland Troops Advance’, Puntland Post, 4 February 2025.
27
C. Weiss and L. Webber, ‘Islamic State-Somalia: A Growing Global Terror Concern’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, September 2024
28
‘The Islamic State in Somalia: Responding to an Evolving Threat’, International Crisis Group, 12 September 2024.
29
C. Babb, et al, ‘Islamic State in Somalia poses growing threat, US officials say’, Voice of America, 18 June 2024.
30
M. Yusuf, ‘Report: IS-Somalia becomes financial hub; leader could be top IS chief’, Voice of America, 12 September 2024.
31
P. van Ostaeyen and P. Wójcik, ‘The Islamic State in Puntland, Somalia’, Online article, Counter Extremism Project, 21 February 2025; ‘The Islamic State in Somalia: Responding to an Evolving Threat’, International Crisis Group, 12 September 2024.
32
C. Weiss and L. Webber, ‘Islamic State-Somalia: A Growing Global Terror Concern’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, September 2024.
33
P. van Ostaeyen and P. Wójcik, ‘The Islamic State in Puntland, Somalia’, Online article, Counter Extremism Project, 21 February 2025.
34
M. Harper, ‘Why Trump is on the warpath in Somalia’, BBC, 7 February 2025.
35
M. Yusuf, ‘Report: IS-Somalia becomes financial hub; leader could be top IS chief’, Voice of America, 12 September 2024.
36
‘The Islamic State in Somalia: Responding to an Evolving Threat’, International Crisis Group, 12 September 2024.
37
M. Yusuf, ‘Report: IS-Somalia becomes financial hub; leader could be top IS chief’, Voice of America, 12 September 2024.
38
M. Harper, ‘Why Trump is on the warpath in Somalia’, BBC, 7 February 2025.
39
C. Weiss and L. Webber, ‘Islamic State-Somalia: A Growing Global Terror Concern’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, September 2024.
40
C. Weiss and L. Webber, ‘Islamic State-Somalia: A Growing Global Terror Concern’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, September 2024; and M. Yusuf, ‘Report: IS-Somalia becomes financial hub; leader could be top IS chief’, Voice of America, 12 September 2024.

State Parties

Somalia
United States of America (US)
African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) (Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda)
Ethiopia
Kenya

Non-state parties

Al-Shabaab
Islamic State Somalia (ISS)

Foreign Involvement

Türkiye
United Arab Emirates (UAE)

1
‘Article 3 – Conflicts not of an international character’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases,
2
‘States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 19 June 2025’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases
3
See, ‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict, July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy.
4
‘Somalia profile – Timeline’, BBC News, 4 January 2018.
5
L. Sekhu, ‘Somalia’, African Transitional Justice Hub, 5 June 2024.
6
See, ‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict, July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy
7
M. Tran, ‘Al-Shabaab in Somalia exploited aid agencies during 2011 famine – report’, The Guardian, 9 December 2024.
8
‘Somalia: 2012 – 2014’, US Department of State; and ‘Press Release: IMF Recognizes the Federal Government of Somalia After 22-year Interval’, International Monetary Fund, 12 April 2013.
9
See, ‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict, July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy.
10
‘Somalia profile – Timeline’, BBC News, 4 January 2018.
11
US Africa Command Public Affairs, ‘U.S. Forces conduct strike targeting ISIS’, 31 May 2024; and ‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group.
12
‘The UAE as a security partner in Africa’, The Institute for Security Studies, December 2024.
13
‘The UAE as a security partner in Africa’, The Institute for Security Studies, December 2024.
14
‘Turkey Deploys More Forces to Help in al-Shabaab Fight’, Africa Defense Forum, 20 May 2025
15
‘Turkey Deploys More Forces to Help in al-Shabaab Fight’, Africa Defense Forum, 20 May 2025.
16
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2767 (2024)’ UN Doc S/RES/2767 (2024), 27 December 2024.
17
M. O. Hassan, ‘Somali government says attacks on bases repulsed, 130 militants killed’, Voice of America, 20 February 2025.
18
‘The Islamic State in Somalia: Responding to an Evolving Threat’, International Crisis Group, 12 September 2024
19
See, ‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict, July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy.
20
‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group; ‘National Consultative Conference concluded with a promise to support security and elections’, Somalia Standard, 8 May 2025; and ‘Somalia’s National Consultative Council strikes new deal on security and elections’, Shabelle Media Network, 8 May 2025.
21
‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict, July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy; and M. O. Hassan, ‘Somali government says attacks on bases repulsed, 130 militants killed’, Voice of America, 20 February 2025.
22
M. O. Hassan, ‘Somali government says attacks on bases repulsed, 130 militants killed’, Voice of America, 20 February 2025
23
P. van Ostaeyen and P. Wójcik, ‘The Islamic State in Puntland, Somalia’, Online article, Counter Extremism Project, 21 February 2025; ‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group; and J. G. Birru, ‘Expert Comment: January saw the first use of drone strikes by IS Somalia’, ACLED, 13 February 2025.
24
‘Islamic State Retreats as Puntland Captures Key Strongholds’, All Africa.
25
‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group; K. Aweys, ‘Puntland Forces Kill 10 ISIS Terrorists in Al-Miskaad Mountains’, Somalia National News Agency, 3 May 2025.
26
‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group; and K. Aweys, ‘Puntland Forces Capture Final ISIS Stronghold in Miiraale’, Somalia National News Agency, 31 May 2025.
27
‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group.
28
‘Islamic State (ISIS) Reports Driving Al-Qaeda Affiliate Al-Shabab Out Of Mountains In Northeastern Somalia In Three-Month Campaign’, Memri: Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor, 21 April 2024.
29
A. Y. Zelin, ‘The Islamic State on the March in Africa’, Online article, The Washington Institute, 1 March 2024.
30
‘Islamic State (ISIS) Reports Driving Al-Qaeda Affiliate Al-Shabab Out Of Mountains In Northeastern Somalia In Three-Month Campaign’, Memri: Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor, 21 April 2024.
31
M. Osman, ‘ISIS Expansion in Puntland Escalates Jihadist Infighting in Somalia’, Horseed Media, 26 May 2024.
32
‘Islamic State (ISIS) Reports Driving Al-Qaeda Affiliate Al-Shabab Out Of Mountains In Northeastern Somalia In Three-Month Campaign’, Memri: Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor, 21 April 2024.
33
L. Karr and M. Gianitsos, ‘Africa File, April 25, 2024: IS Somalia Expansion Benefits IS Global Network; Togo Constitutional Changes’, Institute for the Study of War, 25 April 2024.
34
‘Islamic State (ISIS) Reports Driving Al-Qaeda Affiliate Al-Shabab Out Of Mountains In Northeastern Somalia In Three-Month Campaign’, Memri: Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor, 21 April 2024.
35
C. Babb, et al, ‘Islamic State in Somalia poses growing threat, US officials say’, Voice of America, 18 June 2024.
36
C. Weiss and L. Webber, ‘Islamic State-Somalia: A Growing Global Terror Concern’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, September 2024.
37
P. van Ostaeyen and P. Wójcik, ‘The Islamic State in Puntland, Somalia’, Online article, Counter Extremism Project, 21 February 2025.
38
‘Out of the Box: How to Rebalance U.S. Somalia Policy: United States Report Nº7’, International Crisis Group, 27 June 2025.
39
US Africa Command Public Affairs, ‘U.S. Forces provide assistance to Somalia National Army’, 9 July 2023.
40
US Africa Command Public Affairs, ‘U.S. Forces provide assistance to Somalia National Army’, 9 July 2023,
41
US Africa Command Public Affairs, ‘Federal Government of Somalia, AFRICOM target al Shabaab’, 28 December 2023
42
‘Press Releases’, US Africa Command.
43
‘Press Releases’, US Africa Command; and ‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group,
44
US Africa Command Public Affairs, ‘U.S. Forces Conduct Strikes Targeting al Shabaab’, 23 June 2025.
45
O. Faruk, ‘US to build 5 new military bases for Somali army, which faces a rebellion by an extremist group’, AP News, 15 February 2024. During February 2025, the 173^rd Airborne Brigade of the US Army conducted training operations in Kenya in support of the Somali Army. J. French, ‘173rd Airborne Brigade, Somali Army train together at Justified Accord’, US Army, 20 February 2025.
46
P. D. Williams, ‘The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment’, Online article, Terrorism Center at Westpoint, April 2024,
47
‘Burgavo FOB handover marks completion of ATMIS phase three drawdown’, defenceWeb, 19 November 2024.
48
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2767 (2024)’ UN Doc S/RES/2767 (2024), 27 December 2024.
49
T. Zeyede, et al,‘Funding for Somalia’s new AU peace mission hangs in the balance’, Institute for Security Studies, 19 February 2025.
50
‘The new AU Somalia mission (AUSSOM) is ATMIS by another name but with more problems’, Amani Africa, 5 February 2025.
51
‘The new AU Somalia mission (AUSSOM) is ATMIS by another name but with more problems’, Amani Africa, 5 February 2025.
52
B. Verelst, ‘Can Burundi afford to pull its troops out of Somalia?’, Institute for Security Studies, 14 January 2025.
53
‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group; ‘Communique of the Extra-Ordinary Summit of the Troop Contributing Countries to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia and the Federal Government of Somalia’, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 25 April 2025; ‘President Hassan Sheikh Arrives in Kampala for AUSSOM Plus Somalia Summit’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation: Federal Republic of Somalia; and ‘Statement of H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the African Union Commission at the Heads of State Session of the Extraordinary Summit of Troop Contributing Countries to AUSSOM and Somalia’, African Union, 25 April 2025
54
‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group; ‘Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM’, Amani Africa, 28 April 2025; and ‘Somalia: Closed Consultations on the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM)’, Security Council Report, 10 May 2025.
55
‘Africa: Somalia’, International Crisis Group; J. Barigaba, ‘Security Council impasse puts AU mission in Somalia on quick sand’, The East African, 15 June 2025; and ‘UN misses deadline to fund new AU mission in Somalia, raising concerns over peacekeeping future’, Hiraan Online, 16 May 2025.
56
B. Bogale, ‘Making Sense of the Ethiopia-Somalia Rapprochement’, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Institute of Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2025.
57
‘ATMIS Honours Ethiopian Troops for Contributions to Somalia’, African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, 17 December 2024.
58
‘Ethiopia Prepares for Post-ATMIS Mission in Somalia, Warns of ‘External Actors’ Destabilizing Horn of Africa’, Garowe Online, 29 December 2024
59
‘Ethiopia Backs New Peacekeeping Force in Somalia’, The Defence Post, 3 January 2025.
60
H. Maruf, ‘AU, Somalia agree on troop numbers for new mission’, Voice of America, 25 February 2025.
61
‘Somalia & Kenya Situation Update | August 2024: What’s next for the fight against Al-Shabaab?’, ReliefWeb, 5 September 2024.
62
A. Wasike, ‘Al-Shabaab gunmen abduct 5 officials in Kenya’s border region’, AA, 2 February 2025.
63
‘Kenyan soldiers injured in Al-Shabaab bomb attack’, Garowe Online, 23 December 2024.
64
R. Otinga, ‘How Kenya’s War on Al-Shabaab Will Be Affected By Trump Aid Freeze’, Kenyans.co.ke, 16 February 2025.

Somalia

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (2023-2025)

New non-international armed conflict between Somalia and Islamic State Somalia (ISS)

Below the threshold clashes between ISS and Al-Shabaab

The US in an invited and supporting role

African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) replaces the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)

Ankara Declaration of 11 December 2024

Kenyan Special Forces border patrol impacted by USAID freeze

Non International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-state parties

Foreign Involvement