Sudan

In the reporting period in Mozambique, there was one non-international armed conflict (NIAC) – Mozambique (and support forces) v. Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISM).

Mozambique is a party to Additional Protocol II of 1977 (AP II), and this conflict is regulated directly by the Protocol, as well as by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 ¹, and customary international humanitarian law (IHL).²

Since gaining independence in 1956, Sudan has experienced several substantial armed conflicts, many of which have been marked by significant breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL).³ In 2003, conflict erupted in Darfur between government forces and Janjaweed militias on one hand and rebel forces, particularly the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), on the other. In these conflicts, civilians were subject to severe abuses at the hands of government forces.⁴ The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM-N), which fragmented into two factions in 2017, has, for more than a decade, engaged in armed conflict with the government in Kordofan and the Blue Nile States.⁵

After the military ousted President Omar Al Bashir in April 2019, a transitional government led Sudan.⁶ The leaders of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – a paramilitary body constituted of former Janjaweed fighters – are divided on the issue of the integration of the RSF into the armed forces.⁷ The division triggered the outbreak of hostilities in Khartoum in mid-April 2023 which spread swiftly to other parts of Sudan, especially Darfur and Kordofan.⁸ The hostilities in the NIAC between the SAF and the RSF are intense, with widespread and serious violations of IHL by both sides.⁹ Officially, the Darfur Joint Protection Force (DJPF) remained neutral in the split between the SAF and RSF until many in the group abandoned neutrality to fight alongside the SAF against RSF. The fact that the RSF is mostly composed of former Janjaweed fighters who contributed significantly to the Darfur genocide in 2003 plays a significant role in the tension between Darfurians and the RSF.¹⁰

SAF retakes control of the Presidential Palace and other territorial gains

The SAF has managed to retake several territories held by the RSF during the reporting period.¹¹

The operations in September 2024 that led to the SAF regaining large parts of Khartoum and Khartoum North, which had been held by the RSF since April 2023, were particularly significant.¹² In the course of January 2025, the SAF recaptured Wad Madani which was, as of December 2023, also controlled by the RSF. This city offers logistical capacity to move to Sennar in the south-east, the Blue Nile in the south-east, and the White Nile in the south.¹³ The SAF further alleged that it managed to break the siege of its Signal Corps Kamp located in Kharoum Bahri,¹⁴ although this military gain is disputed by the RSF who termed it propaganda.¹⁵ Both the RSF and the SAF suffered losses in el-Fasher during January,¹⁶ and February 2025,¹⁷ as the RSF continued to seek control of the capital in North Darfur.¹⁸ On 30 January 2025, the SAF recaptured Um Rawaba in North Kordofan state from the RSF.¹⁹

The SAF continued making territorial gains in February,²⁰ and March 2025.²¹ The SAF successfully regained control of el-Obeid after it had been under the control of the RSF for almost two years.²²

After two years of fighting in Khartoum, the SAF finally retook complete control over the Sudanese capital by 20 May 2025.²³ Of symbolic importance to the Government of Sudan and the SAF was the fact that the SAF wrested the Presidential Palace from RSF control.²⁴ In December 2024, the SAF weakened the RSF’s control of cities, including Wad Madini and Omdurman, in a campaign of aerial bombardment.²⁵ As a result, the first major victory by the SAF over the RSF came when they took control of Wad Madani in January 2025.²⁶ Another territory regained during the reporting period includes Gezira,²⁷ which was lost to the RSF during December 2023,²⁸ and recaptured as of mid-January 2025.²⁹ By the end of the reporting period, the Sudanese government continued to maintain control over the north and east of Sudan.³⁰

Despite territorial gains by the SAF, the RSF continues to exercise stable military control over parts of Sudan, including most of the territory in Darfur and much of Kordofan.³¹

Siege of El Fasher continues

As of 15 May 2024, the RSF identified El Fasher as a key battleground in its fight against the SAF.³² This situation triggered a response by the United Nations Security Council, which adopted Resolution 2736 (2024) on 13 June 2024 in which it urged the parties to de-escalate fighting in and around El Fasher.³³ The RSF employs the tactic of ‘siege’ or ‘encirclement’ in which the enemy’s armed forces are encircled and/or cut off from support with the goal of getting the encircled group to surrender the besieged area.³⁴

The RSF strategically acquired military control over territories surrounding El Fasher including all supply routes to enable it to launch sustained and concerted military operations against the capital of North Darfur where the SAF 6^th Infantry Division camp is located.³⁵ The impact on civilians of being in a besieged town such as El Fasher, often means limited or no access to water, food, electricity, and healthcare. The result is that civilians are trapped and subjected to famine, in desperate need of humanitarian aid.³⁶ The situation in El Fasher has indeed led to famine (see below). Fighting in and around El Fasher has intensified to the extent that Doctors without Borders was forced to close its operations at Zamzam, an IDP camp, as hostilities became too dangerous for staff to continue their work.³⁷

Famine in Sudan

During 2024, famine was confirmed in Sudan, specifically parts of North Darfur,³⁸ and the Nuba Mountains.³⁹ The famine was confirmed by the World Food Programme (WFP) in Sudan in Zamzam IDP camp in north Darfur during August 2024. It is calculated that by September 2025, approximately 24.6 million people in Sudan would be categorized as acutely food insecure while 637,000 would face catastrophic levels of hunger. The food crisis in Sudan is at risk of becoming ‘the world’s largest hunger crisis in recent history’.⁴⁰ Due to intensive shelling during February 2025, WFP was forced to suspend operations in Zamzam IDP camp.⁴¹ By April 2025, the United Nations confirmed that famine existed in at least ten locations in Sudan,⁴² and an additional seventeen areas were at risk of famine.⁴³ The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)’s 2025 Global Humanitarian Overview forecasted that Sudan would remain the global epicentre of a need for humanitarian assistance in 2025.⁴⁴ By the end of the reporting period, El Fasher had been under siege for fourteen months, resulting in widespread hunger and malnutrition, with residents having to eat animal feed to survive.⁴⁵

The Lagawa displacement site in East Darfur was also facing severe food shortages by the end of the reporting period.⁴⁶ Similarly, a famine was declared in the Nuba Mountains in the first half of 2025.⁴⁷

Cholera outbreak in Darfur

Sudan experienced several cholera outbreaks as a result of the ongoing NIACs, with the most recent wave reported in January 2025.⁴⁸ The bombing of hospitals and critical infrastructure such as electricity generating plants⁴⁹ led to limited access to clean water, poor sanitation, and overcrowded IDP camps, conditions for the rapid spread of cholera.⁵⁰ Water-treatment facilities in Khartoum state remain largely dysfunctional because of attacks on the Merowe Dam. Attacks in January 2025 against a key water tank, pump, and power equipment in River Nile state cut off water and electricity.⁵¹ Additionally, the attacks on Merowe Dam interrupted electricity supplies to 200 water stations in the Northern State, completely stopping water supply across this region. A missile strike against the main power plant in Rabak in February 2025 led to major power cuts, again preventing water pumps from working, and leading civilians to rely on unsafe water sources.⁵²

The cholera outbreak in North Darfur and other parts of Sudan, including Khartoum,⁵³ was ongoing at the end of the reporting period.⁵⁴

Attacks against critical infrastructure

The RSF employed drones to attack power plants in SAF-controlled areas in mid-January 2025. This was the latest in a series of attacks launched against power infrastructure in central, eastern and northern Sudan.⁵⁵ The attacks on Merowe Dam, which serves as a hydroelectric dam, caused blackouts in several parts of Sudan including Sudan’s northern state, as well as River Nile and Red Sea states. Attacks on the al-Shouk power station rendered Gedaref, Kassala, and Sennar states unable to supply electricity.⁵⁶

These attacks have caused the spread of cholera in White Nile as water treatment plants are affected, and civilians are forced to use untreated river water.⁵⁷ These attacks also impacted Sudan’s healthcare system as hospitals were forced to operate without electricity.⁵⁸ Several attacks were also directly targeted against water treatment facilities, which have contributed to and even escalated the cholera outbreak.⁵⁹

Moves towards a parallel government

In February 2025, the RSF and its allies signed a charter towards forming a parallel government in Sudan.⁶⁰ The RSF claims that its parallel government will ‘represent all of Sudan’.⁶¹ These efforts to form a government in the territory under RSF-control is a parallel process with consultations on the formation of a separate government in the temporary capital of Port Sudan ongoing as of end-June 2025.⁶²

A new coalition, the Darfur Joint Protection Forces (DJPF), joined SAF in its fight against the RSF

SLM/A-AW as a neutral party

A Sudan Liberation Movement faction led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur (SLM/A-AW) remains neutral in the conflict.⁶³ As a protection force, the group deploys its fighters in El Fasher mainly to protect civilians and displacement camps,⁶⁴ but, at some point in the conflict, there was a breach of the “non-aggression pact” between SLM/A-AW and RSF.⁶⁵

There was a report of a clash between SLM/A-AW and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in western Jebel Marra on 23 and 24 December 2023 resulting in the deaths of scores of people and many wounded.⁶⁶ A local news source reported that the armed confrontation, which lasted for two days, ended after both parties agreed to form a committee to resolve their differences.⁶⁷ However, RSF attacked a SLM/A-AW supply convoy in El Fasher, North Darfur in March 2024 which destroyed four combat vehicles and three trucks but did not result in an armed confrontation between the groups.⁶⁸ RSF released a statement claiming the attack was because of ‘miscommunication and inadequate field coordination’.⁶⁹ There is no further report of the group’s involvement in any armed confrontation.

Formation of a new SLM faction: SLM/A-CH

In early January 2025, Major-General Salah Mustafa Abdelrahim Abdelshafi, known as Salah Jok, defected from SLM-AW to form a new faction known as SLM/A-CH (Call of the Homeland) after disagreeing with Abdul Wahid about neutrality.⁷⁰ Not much is known about this faction except that it has declared war on the RSF and pledges to fight alongside the SAF to overthrow ‘mercenaries’ and the RSF.⁷¹ The pledge by SLM/A-CH to fight against the RSF is in line with the original goal of the SLM movement which was to fight the Janjaweed and the genocide that took place in Darfur.⁷² No actual clashes were recorded during the reporting period.

An unlikely alliance: The RSF and SPLM-N (al-Hilu faction) join forces

The RSF and SPLM-N (Al-Hilu) formed an alliance in February 2025.⁷³ This is an unexpected development because the RSF and this SPLM-N faction have been enemies in their own ongoing NIAC.⁷⁴ SPLM-N, the RSF and other aligned groups signed a charter to form a parallel government in RSF-held territories on 22 February 2025 in Kenya.⁷⁵

As part of this alliance, the SPLM-N faction provides safe haven and access to healthcare to injured RSF fighters.⁷⁶ The RSF also operates a training camp in the territory under control of SPLM-N (Al-Hilu).⁷⁷ This alliance has, however, disrupted aid to the Nuba mountains and has contributed to severe famine in the area.⁷⁸

Possible foreign involvement: Sudan files a case against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at the International Court of Justice

On 5 March 2025, Sudan filed an application at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) instituting proceedings against the UAE.⁷⁹ Sudan alleged that the UAE violated its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Specifically, in its filing, Sudan alleged that the UAE was ‘complicit in the genocide on the Masalit through its direction of and provision of extensive financial, political, and military support for the rebel RSF militia’. It is claimed that the UAE provides support to the RSF, allegedly by providing weapons and ammunition. Sudan further alleged that this direct support enables the RSF to commit breaches of IHL and human rights law.⁸⁰ The SAF alleges that Nyala airport in Darfur is the main airport used by the UAE for drone deliveries and other types of military support to the RSF.⁸¹ However, the UAE denies the accusation.⁸²

Beginning on 4 May 2025, the RSF conducted daily drone strikes on Port Sudan. In addition to being the port in which humanitarian assistance arrived, Port Sudan also served as one of the few safe havens for civilians. The bombardment caused heavy damage to civilian infrastructure, including water installations.⁸³ The Sudanese ambassador to the UN alleges that the UAE is responsible for one of these strikes, asserting that the kamikaze drones and MQ-9 war planes were launched from an Emirati base in the Red Sea.⁸⁴

The ICJ delivered its decision a day after the first Port Sudan attack, declaring that it ‘manifestly lacks jurisdiction’ in the matter due to a reservation made by the UAE to the jurisdictional clause of the Genocide Convention, in its Article IX. As a result, the Court removed the case from its General List.⁸⁵

Activities of Russia’s Africa Corps and the remnants of the ‘Wagner’ Group

The Wagner Group (now replaced by Africa Corps) had been present and militarily active, though deliberately opaque, in Sudan since at least November 2017, where it supported Al Bashir’s regime and partnered with the RSF, including providing training and weapons, in exchange for access to Sudanese gold and the promise of a Russian naval base on the Red Sea.⁸⁶

Before, and in the initial stages of, the current war in Sudan, the Wagner Group reportedly provided weapons to the RSF and participated in gold mining and online disinformation campaigns.⁸⁷ However, Wagner’s involvement appears to have diminished after its brief rebellion in Russia in July 2023, and the group claimed to have ceased operations in Sudan.⁸⁸ Specific instances of active involvement/engagement in armed clashes have not been reported since.

The Russian Ministry of Defence (MOD) subsequently moved to ‘create’ a fully public Russian armed forces branch, ‘Africa Corps’, to replace the operations of Wagner in Africa.⁸⁹ It is unclear whether Africa Corps is more than a ‘rebranding’ of the Wagner Group.⁹⁰ Soon thereafter, the Russian MOD began actively recruiting for Africa Corps, simultaneously absorbing the majority of the returning Wagner forces.⁹¹ In sum, although Russia and the Africa Corps officially support the SAF, notably by supplying arms, remnants of the former Wagner Group continue to support the RSF, including by facilitating the supply of arms by UAE. That being so, it is doubtful that the former Wagner Group is still operating on Sudanese territory.⁹²

Continued presence of Ukrainian Special Forces on the territory

In April 2023, President Al-Burhan of Sudan turned to President Zelenskyy of Ukraine for military assistance.⁹³ The Ukrainian authorities sent military personnel to Sudan in 2023 to participate in ongoing clashes between the SAF and the RSF.⁹⁴ Reports show Ukrainian special forces interrogating captured Russian Wagner fighters in Sudan in March 2024 and Ukrainian drones destroying Russian ‘mercenaries’ in Sudan in January 2024.⁹⁵

The complexity of the situation is expected to increase and to be exacerbated by the upcoming ratification of a Russian deal to establish a naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.⁹⁶ The continued presence of Ukrainian special forces in Sudan is not without risk to Ukraine’s reputation as the SAF have also been involved in various well documented war crimes.⁹⁷

Armed incident between South Sudan’s SPLA-IO and the RSF

In mid-March 2025, the RSF ambushed SPLA-IO fighters who are usually active in South Sudan near Dukduk.⁹⁸ Three high ranking SPLA-IO officers were killed. The alleged reason for the SPLA-IO Unit of about 400 fighters being on Sudanese territory was that these fighters were collecting weapons from the SAF in Bout. While the death toll is unclear, it is suggested that this clash resulted in hundreds of deaths.⁹⁹ This armed incident also suggests that the RSF might itself be operating in Renk County in South Sudan.¹⁰⁰

Local militias and other actors

During the period under review, there were also several communal militias taking armed action against civilians and/or other communal militias. The Darfur Communal Militia (a collective name used by ACLED but it is likely Darfurian Arab majority militia)¹⁰¹ was most active as nearly ninety incidents in the ACLED database can be attributed to this militia and more than one hundred deaths. Other groups such as the Bani Fadol (بني فضل), Misseriya,¹⁰² Rizaygat,¹⁰³ Jawmaa (جوامعة) Ngok,¹⁰⁴ and Awlad Hiban ethnic or clan militias¹⁰⁵ also had recorded incidents but with the number of deaths ranging from six to twenty-one only.

Libyan militias were also present in Sudan, with the Al Isnad, Zawiya, Dabbashi,¹⁰⁶ and Sila militias being active in Sudan. Groups that were present but did not contribute significantly were the Ajayla communal militia,¹⁰⁷ Msallata and Nasrat groups. Groups from South Sudan were also present, such as the Twic,¹⁰⁸ Dinka and Nuer.¹⁰⁹

Non-international armed conflicts between the SAF (supported by the Darfur Joint Protection Forces (DJPF) and the RSF

Background

An Additional Protocol II-type NIAC being fought between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) was ignited on 15 April 2023.¹ Fighting, once concentrated in Khartoum, has spread to the south of Khartoum, particularly to Kordofa, North and Central Darfur.²

Intensity

Various clashes between SAF and RSF were reported throughout the second half of 2023,³ Fighting continued into 2025 and includes reported clashes between the SAF and RSF taking place during the months of January,⁴ February,⁵ March,⁶ April,⁷ May,⁸ and June,⁹

The frequency and brutality of attacks intensified during the first half of 2025.¹⁰ Operations launched by the RSF against the SAF continued to occur frequently and were thus ‘sustained’ throughout the reporting period.¹¹

The conflict has involved significant numbers of soldiers and different types of military units on the SAF side as well as a high number of fighters engaged on behalf of RSF.¹² While it is difficult to estimate the exact number of fighters on the side of RSF, they have claimed to have at least 300,000. The SAF includes regular army units, infantry, artillery and air force divisions; additionally, the RSF has expanded its ranks and capabilities since fighting first commenced. The RSF reportedly receives support from foreign actors in improving their operational capacity. The involvement of diverse military units and the scale of mobilization demonstrate the intensity and complexity of the conflict.¹³

The RSF often employs machine guns while launching attacks from motorcycles when operating in villages.¹⁴ The RSF have access to thousands of military vehicles to deploy to conflict zones.¹⁵ Both the SAF and the RSF employ sophisticated military equipment in the conflict. Such equipment includes the Galix System, manufactured by Lacrois Defence and KNDS France. Mounted on armoured vehicles, the system is designed to hide vehicles from approaching threats as it can release decoys, smoke, and projectiles towards nearby threats.¹⁶ The RSF’s arsenal includes armed drones which have been used against the SAF on several occasions.¹⁷ These drones have been used to target infrastructure in areas controlled by the army, including attacks on power stations and bridges.¹⁸ The SAF is said to rely heavily on airstrikes using Iranian and Turkish drones, which are described as being ‘key to its battlefield strategy’.¹⁹

The conflict has resulted in significant loss of lives and displacement. Not all casualties can be directly attributed to the RSF or SAF due to the multiplicity of ongoing conflicts in Sudan and limitations in data verification, but the intensity and duration of hostilities significantly contribute to civilian suffering. More than 14 million people have been displaced, the majority internally, but millions also across borders. According to WFP, the conflict as a whole has displaced approximately 10 million people.²⁰ Attacks during June 2025 prompted some 137,000 civilians to seek refuge in the SAF-controlled city of el-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, by the end of June 2025.²¹

The fighting between the SAF and the RSF has caused widespread destruction across Sudan. The RSF tends to burn huts and farms as part of their attacks which results in property damage across villages and farms.²² In Khartoum, returning families have found unexploded shells and missiles in homes, schools, and streets. Sudan’s National Mine Action Centre reports that over 12,000 explosive devices have been removed, and another 5,000 are present in recently retaken areas.²³ In January 2025, a drone attack on the Merowe Dam power station led to major power cuts affecting cities like Shendi, Port Sudan, and Omdurman.²⁴ Other infrastructure damage includes the National Museum in Khartoum which was damaged during the conflict and about 90 per cent of its collection destroyed.²⁵ Attacks also damaged, and in some cases destroyed, health care infrastructure resulting in approximately 80 per cent of hospitals in zones of active fighting becoming non-operational.²⁶ It is thus clear that the ongoing fighting between the SAF and the RSF has caused significant structural damage.

The international community has spoken out against the consequences of continued intense fighting. The UN Security Council has introduced multiple actions in response to the conflict. In June 2024, it adopted Resolution 2736 which demanded an end to the siege of El-Fasher and called for humanitarian access and civilian protection.²⁷ In April 2025, the Security Council condemned RSF attacks on civilians and aid workers in Darfur.²⁸ The African Union has also expressed concern over attacks against critical infrastructure during the course of this conflict.²⁹ The Peace and Security Council of the African Union has held several meetings concerning the situation in Sudan which led it to express grave concern regarding the continued escalation of this conflict.³⁰

The RSF continued to exercise territorial control over parts of Sudan from 2023, throughout 2024 and continued to do so at the end of this reporting period.³¹ An AP II-type NIAC is not declassified if some territory is regained by the territorial state, as was the case with the SAF regaining some territory during the reporting period. The nature of the control the RSF continues to exercise must be assessed to ascertain if control remains ‘functional’.³² This requires that authority be exercised with a degree of stability which enables the armed group to launch sustained and concerted military operations and to implement AP II from territory under its control.³³ Areas under the stable control of the RSF by the end of the reporting period include Geneina, Nyala, Ed Daein, Zurrug, Zilingei, Kasm Babanusa, En-Nahud, al Fulah, Bara, Umm Ruwaba.³⁴

Specifically, the RSF continues to exercise stable control in the areas surrounding El Fasher in North Darfur.³⁵ Such territorial control has enabled the RSF to conduct sustained and concerted military operations as required under article 1(1) of AP II.³⁶ The RSF is fighting for control over El Fasher thanks to its control of the surrounding areas; in fact, the only territory that the RSF does not control in North Darfur is the city of El Fasher itself.³⁷

As of 21 January 2025, the RSF was continuously launching drone strikes and encircled El Fasher from both the east and west.³⁸ The RSF also attacked the Zamzam refugee camp which is in proximity of El Fasher as part of its military campaign to siege the city.³⁹

On and around 14 and 15 June 2025, the RSF launched another targeted military operation against SAF forces in El Fasher. This military operation was strategically started on 14 June 2025 when the RSF used artillery shells and intense aerial attacks by drone as preparation for a ground assault on 15 June 2025. Despite SAF holding El Fasher, this military operation caused a high death toll and resulted in a large number of wounded fighters and soldiers.⁴⁰ This attack was of such an intense nature that the UN Human Rights High Commissioner called for de-escalation.⁴¹

The above examples of military strategy employed during ongoing military operations launched by the RSF against the SAF illustrates that the RSF executes ‘sustained and concerted military operations’ as required by Article 1(1) of AP II⁴² Fighting between the SAF and the RSF continued to fulfil the notion of intensity as demanded by IHL throughout the reporting period.

Organization

The RSF is, as of 14 April 2013, a dissident armed force primarily opposing the SAF.⁴³ ‘Dissident armed force’ is a reference to sections in the armed forces that rebel against the government and break the ties that bind them to government control.⁴⁴ Consequently, this type of non-state armed group, which is constituted by former state military personnel, displays rather sophisticated organizational structure, discipline and training. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (‘Hemedti’) is the leader of the RSF and continues to follow the Rapid Support Forces Act of 2017.⁴⁵ Discipline is exercised by individual commanders over the troops under their control, but guidance is provided by chapter 5 of the Rapid Support Forces Act which determines the reasons to suspend services.⁴⁶ Although sophisticated in organization and thus able to comply with IHL, the RSF shows a lack of commitment to promote and ensure compliance among its fighters. Logistics is supported and facilitated through looting and smuggling, as well as by external actors.⁴⁷

The RSF demonstrates a clear and hierarchical command structure, led by Hemedti, with operational control delegated to figures such as Abdulrahim Dagalo and regional field commanders.⁴⁸

The RSF does not appear to maintain a single, permanent headquarters; reporting indicates that it has repeatedly used seized military installations, including former SAF bases, to coordinate operations across Sudan. Following its territorial gains in Khartoum, Darfur, Gezira, and Sennar, the RSF appears to have functionally adapted these sites into local operational hubs. The pattern of establishing, relocating, and reusing command points across multiple regions reflects a decentralised but stable command infrastructure, which remains sufficient to meet the ‘headquarters’ threshold for organization.⁴⁹

The RSF has access to military-grade equipment, a steady supply of recruits, and training facilities. Following their formal integration into Sudan’s security system in 2013, the RSF inherited substantial state resources, including heavy vehicles and anti-aircraft weaponry.⁵⁰ During the current conflict, they have deployed Soviet- and Chinese-manufactured armoured personnel carriers and mobile artillery and have reportedly received drones and advanced munitions from foreign sources such as the UAE and China.⁵¹ Recruitment efforts have expanded both inside Sudan, especially in Darfur and Kordofan, and across borders, with fighters reportedly mobilized from Chad and South Sudan. Allegations of child recruitment have also resurfaced.⁵² The RSF is now undergoing a strategic transformation, shifting from tribal mobilization towards the creation of a professional army, supported by the establishment of training camps in RSF-held areas.⁵³ This change demonstrates not only their operational maturity but also their ability to sustain a complex and structured armed campaign. The RSF shows a capability to use modern drone warfare in response to the loss of Khartoum.⁵⁴

The RSF continues to speak with one voice. The RSF, under the leadership of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, has actively engaged in high-level ceasefire and peace negotiations, participating in talks held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, facilitated by the United States and Saudi Arabia. These negotiations aimed to establish humanitarian corridors and ceasefires, reflecting the RSF’s capacity for centralized decision-making and diplomatic engagement.⁵⁵ In addition to international negotiations, the RSF has issued official communiqués and accepted humanitarian pauses although there have been subsequent violations. Furthermore, the RSF has made political declarations, including the proposal of a ‘new Sudan’, indicating a coherent political-military strategy.⁵⁶ These actions demonstrate the RSF’s ability to engage in diplomacy, sign agreements, and exemplify a unified command structure with strategic intent. The RSF has announced that they want to establish a parallel government to that of the SAF.⁵⁷ Finally, the RSF frequently updates its website, using it as a communications platform.⁵⁸

Territorial control is one of the requirements needed to trigger Additional Protocol II. This requirement was met prior to⁵⁹ and throughout this reporting period. Despite territory changing hands, the RSF exercised sufficient stable and functional control over parts of territory which continued to enable it to comply with the requirements for AP II set out in Article 1(1) of this Protocol.

Between 1 July 2023 and 30 June 2025, the RSF exercised control over significant parts of Sudan, including both urban centres and strategically located towns, notably Geneina, Zurrug in West Darfur,⁶⁰ Nyala (which is now RSF’s capital), and Ed Daein in South Darfur,⁶¹ Kasm Babanusa, En-Nahud, al-Fulah, Bara and Umm Ruwaba in Kordofan region, Sinja anWad an-Nail in Blue Nile/White Nile, Jabal Mayya, Mazmoun and Dinder.⁶²

Between April and June 2024, RSF operations in eastern Sudan and Sennar further consolidated its territorial gains. For example, on 29 June 2024, RSF seized Singa, followed rapidly by Dinder, Mazmoun, and Wad an-Nail, after an SAF collapse in southern Sennar. Although SAF/JEM forces briefly recaptured Dinder on 1 July 2024, RSF retook it days later, demonstrating operational resilience and territorial entrenchment.⁶³ This stable military control enabled RSF to cut off Khartoum from the south, west, and east and severely limited SAF mobility and logistics in mid-2024.⁶⁴

The SAF has, however, retaken key areas such as Wad Madani, parts of Gezira (in January 2025), much of central Khartoum, and much of the central regions of Sudan.⁶⁵

By the end of the reporting period, the RSF continued to control the majority of the western region of Darfur and much of the Kordofan region to the south.⁶⁶ The RSF controls four of five regions in Darfur.⁶⁷ Furthermore, by the end of June 2025, the RSF controlled the tri-border area of Egypt, Libya and Sudan which enables this armed group to expand its supply line through Libya and extend its fighting into the Nile Valley and Northern state.⁶⁸

Territorial control is an ‘enabling’ requirement of Article 1(1) of AP II as in practice it provides confirmation of a form of responsible command exercised by RSF.⁶⁹ Responsible command is a further requirement under Article 1(1) of AP II. Moreover, control of territory places the RSF in a position to implement Additional Protocol II, as is demanded by the provision.⁷⁰ Actual implementation is not required.⁷¹

Lastly, from the intensity assessment above, clearly the territory controlled by the RSF facilitates planning frequent military operations and fulfils the final requirement inherent to Article 1(1) of AP II which requires the RSF to be sufficiently organized to launch sustained and concerted attacks.⁷²

The organizational structure of the RSF is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of AP II. Hence, the NIAC between Sudan and the RSF remains an AP II-type NIAC.

The Darfur Joint Protection Force as a party to this pre-existing NIAC through the support-based approach

The Darfur Joint Protection Force (DJPF) (also known as the ‘Joint Force’ or the Joint Forces of Armed Struggle Movements) is a joint force of former rebel groups from the Darfur region that signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement with the Sudanese government, which, at the time, was aligned with both the SAF and the RSF prior to the current NIAC.⁷³ This coalition, which formed in April 2023,⁷⁴ includes nearly all significant rebel factions in Sudan, with the exception of the Sudan Liberation Movement-Abdul Wahid (SLM-AW), which did not sign the agreement, and the SPLM-N, whose ‘Agar’ faction signed under different terms.⁷⁵

Direct clashes between the RSF and DJPF do not meet the intensity threshold required for their fighting to constitute a sperate NIAC. Specific instances of active involvement in individual armed clashes are not always reported. Reported clashes include those which occurred in May,⁷⁶ an RSF attack on the DJPF in Jabal Umm on 30 September 2024 and one in Kulbus on 1 October 2024.⁷⁷ The DJPF managed to repel the RSF’s attempts to retake Kulbus.⁷⁸ Clashes between the RSF and DJPF in early October 2024 enabled the DJPF to send reinforcements into El Fasher, an RSF stronghold.⁷⁹ Clashes continued throughout October 2024, enabling the DJPF to retake territory in West Darfur previously under RSF control.⁸⁰ Clashes were also reported in November 2024,⁸¹ and December 2024⁸² Clashes between the DJPF and RSF persisted during January 2025 as both sides tried to keep control of El Fasher city.⁸³ Finally, clashes were also reported in February 2025.⁸⁴ It is often the case that the DJPF act in defence of civilians rather than taking part in armed conflict. The level of intensity remains too low to qualify as a separate NIAC between the RSF and the DJPF.

It is, however, important to determine whether the DJPF has, due to its support for the SAF, become a party to the pre-existing NIAC between the SAF and the RSF under the support-based approach. The International Committee of the Red Cros (ICRC) is of the opinion that this approach should complement the Tadić approach in the case of third-party operations in NIACs that existed prior to the involvement of the third party. According to the support-based approach, a supporting entity to a pre-existing NIAC (that may not independently qualify as a party to the NIAC due to being unable to meet the required intensity threshold) can become a party to the NIAC if the entity is providing a party with support that has a direct impact on the opposing party’s ability to carry out military operations.

The ICRC suggests a three-tier cumulative test for the support-based approach to apply. First, there must be a pre-existing NIAC in which a state, international organization or organized armed groups intervenes. Second, the supporting entity must undertake actions that are related to the ongoing NIAC. Third, the supporting entity’s military actions must be objectively conducted in support of a party to the NIAC. Of particular importance for this criterion is whether the supporting group and the party to the NIAC are pooling and mobilizing military resources.⁸⁵ This section will now continue to determine if the DJPF’s involvement satisfies these criteria.

In 2023, JEM renounced its neutrality in the conflict and joined a coalition to fight against the RSF in Darfur.⁸⁶ On 16 November 2023, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-MM) led by Minni Minawi, and JEM led by Jibril Ibrahim, jointly announced their active involvement in military operations alongside the SAF against the RSF.⁸⁷ JEM joined the SAF in its fight against the RSF following successful attacks launched by the RSF in Darfur in November 2023. Several military operations have been jointly executed by the SAF and JEM against the RSF.⁸⁸ By April 2024, fighters from the SLM-MM, JEM, and SLM-Tambour who belong to DJPF fought alongside the SAF in Omdurman.⁸⁹ In other words, the DJPF, as an alliance of organised armed groups, intervened in the pre-existing NIAC between SAF and RSF. Thus, the first criterion for the support-based approach is met. The joint attacks were executed in the context of this pre-existing NIAC and are carried out in support of SAF against its enemy, the RSF. The second criterion of the support-based approach is, therefore, also satisfied. In these actions, the DJPF was effectively pooling and mobilizing its military resources, its fighters, and its arsenal to the benefit of SAF. The final criterion of the support-based approach is also met.

On 15 February 2024, representatives from former Darfuri rebel groups allied with the SAF convened with SAF leaders near Omdurman to discuss their involvement in the conflict against the RSF.⁹⁰ The delegation reportedly comprised members from the SLM-MM, JEM-Jibril, and a breakaway faction from the otherwise neutral Ground Support Liberation Forces (GSLF).⁹¹ In March 2024, the SLM-MM, JEM-Jibril, and SLM-Tambour were reported to have conducted a large-scale recruitment drive in eastern Sudan in support of the SAF against the RSF.⁹² Also, new JEM-Jibril recruits were set to join the SAF-led coalition gathering in the El Fau area.⁹³ This initiative expanded and diversified JEM’s ranks, which previously comprised mainly Zaghawa and Arab tribesmen from western Sudan, particularly Darfur and Kordofan. JEM’s military activities primarily focused on recruitment, training and support operations in Omdurman.⁹⁴ Recruitment drives by the DJPF benefit the SAF because these fighters are pooled to support SAF in its pre-existing NIAC against the RSF. These facts confirm the that the three criteria demanded by the ICRC’s support-based approach are met. The nature of support the DJPF provides the SAF qualifies the DJPF as a party to the pre-existing NIAC between SAF and RSF.⁹⁵

1
J. Lefolle and J. Nikolic, ‘Armed conflict in Sudan: a recap of the basic IHL rules in non-international armed conflict’, Humanitarian Law and Policy, 15 June 2023; M. M. Bradley, ‘Mass Grave in Sudan: Revisiting the Rules on the Treatment and Disposal of the Dead’, Lieber Institute West Point: Articles of War, 9 August 2023.
2
‘Sudan: A Year of War’, International Crisis Group, 11 April 2024.
3
‘Africa: Sudan’, International Crisis Group, and in 2024. ‘Africa: Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks – Sudan October 2024’, ACLED, 14 October 2024;‘Africa: Sudan’, International Crisis Group.
4
U. Jamal, ‘How strategic is Wad Madani city, retaken by Sudanese army?’, Al Jazeera, 12 January 2025; ‘Khartoum clashes persist after army breaks HQ siege’, Sudan Tribune, 25 January 2025; ‘Africa: Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Sudanese army claims major victory in Khartoum; RSF disputes’, Reuters, 25 January 2025,
5
‘Sudanese army claims major victory in Khartoum; RSF disputes’, Reuters, 25 January 2025,
6
‘Sudanese army claims major victory in Khartoum; RSF disputes’, Reuters, 25 January 2025; M. Nashed, ‘Sudan’s army retakes presidential palace in Khartoum, strikes blow to RSF’, Al Jazeera, 21 March 2025; ‘Sudan’s RSF confirms retreat from Khartoum, eyes ‘stronger’ return’’, Al Jazeera, 30 March 2025,
7
V. Turk, ‘Hundreds killed in RSF attacks in Sudan’s North Darfur’, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 14 April 2025; E. Dafallah, ‘How the RSF attack on Sudan’s biggest displacement camp tore my family apart’, The New Humanitarian, 3 July 2025,
8
‘ACAPS Thematic report – Sudan: Risk of continued drone strikes on Port Sudan’, Reliefweb, 23 May 2025; A. Abdelrheem and M. Sio, ‘Sudan’s army retakes strategic area in North Darfur from paramilitary RSF’, AA, 19 May 2025; ‘The Sudan Conflict, 2 Years On’, Human Rights Watch,
9
‘Sudan’s army, allies say they repelled new RSF attack on El Fasher’, Sudan Tribune, 25 June 2025; ‘Africa: Sudan’, International Crisis Group.
10
‘‘Only hunger and bombs’ for besieged civilians in Sudan’s El Fasher’, United Nations News, 13 August 2025; ‘Sudan: Türk outraged after RSF kills at least 57 civilians in El Fasher and Abu Shouk IDP camp’, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 13 August 2025; CGTN Africa, ‘Sudan’s El-Fasher faces new violence as army clashes with RSF’, YouTube, 13 July 2025.
11
M. M. Bradley, ‘Additional Protocol II: Elevating the minimum threshold of intensity?’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2020.
12
J. Craze and R. Makawi, ‘The Republic of Kadamol: A Portrait of the Rapid Support Forces at War’, Small Arms Survey, January 2025.
13
‘RSF embarks on massive recruitment to build new army’, Darfur24, 20 April 2025.
14
M. Nashed, ‘RSF attacks compound humanitarian crisis in Sudan’s strategic city’, Al Jazeera, 29 July 2025.
15
‘Sudan: French-manufactured weapons system identified in conflict – new investigation’, Amnesty International, 14 November 2024.
16
‘Sudan: French-manufactured weapons system identified in conflict – new investigation’, Amnesty International, 14 November 2024.
17
K. Tyson and L. Karr, ‘Africa File, May 8, 2025: RSF Drone Strikes on Port Sudan; Iran Exports Regime Security to Africa; Burkina Faso Looks for Additional Partners’, Critical Threat, 8 May 2025; ‘ACAPS Thematic report – Sudan: Risk of continued drone strikes on Port Sudan’, Reliefweb, 23 May 2025.
18
B. P. Usher, ‘Drone attacks raise stakes in new phase of Sudan’s civil war’, BBC, 15 May 2025; ‘Drone strikes on civilian infrastructure in Port Sudan must end: UN expert’, United Nations News, 19 May 2025; E. G. Ojo-Ami and M. Plichta, ‘Drones Pose Growing Threat to African Ports’, African Defense Forum, 26 August 2025.
19
Reuters, ‘Drone attacks cut power across Khartoum state two years into Sudan war’, 15 May 2025; ‘Sudan’s civil war deepens as drones transform battlefield’, Financial Times, 15 May 2025.
20
‘Sudan’, World Food Programme.
21
M. Nashed, ‘RSF attacks compound humanitarian crisis in Sudan’s strategic city’, Al Jazeera, 29 July 2025.
22
M. Nashed, ‘RSF attacks compound humanitarian crisis in Sudan’s strategic city’, Al Jazeera, 29 July 2025.
23
K. Abdelaziz and E. Siddig, ‘Families find a new danger in Sudan’s battered capital, unexploded shells’, Reuters, 19 May 2025.
24
‘The environmental costs of the war in Sudan’, Conflict and Environment Observatory, 21 May 2025.
25
F. Khaled, ‘Home to centuries of heritage, Sudan’s biggest museum is looted and wrecked by a 2-year war’, AP News,24 April 2025.
26
‘Crisis in Sudan: What is happening and how to help’, International Rescue Committee 17 April 2023, last updated 24 July 2025.
27
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2736 (2024)’, UN Doc S/Res/2736 (2024), 13 June 2024.
28
‘Security Council Press Statement on Sudan’, United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 17 April 2025.
29
‘Communique by the African Union on the attack of Port Sudan’, African Union, 4 May 2025.
30
‘Press Statement of the 1264th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held on 11 March 2025, on the Situation in Sudan’, African Union, 12 March 2025; African Union Peace and Security Council, ‘Communiqué: Adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 1156th meeting, held at the level of Heads of State and Government, on 27 May 2023, on the Situation in Sudan’, Doc PSC/HoSG/COMM.1156 (2023), 27 May 2023; African Union Peace and Security Council, ‘Communiqué: Adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 1235th meeting held on 9 October 2024 on Consideration of the Report of the Field Mission to Egypt and to Port Sudan conducted from 1 to 4 October 2024’, Doc PSC/PR/COMM.1235 (2024), 9 October 2024; African Union Peace and Security Council, ‘Communiqué: Adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 1261st meeting held on 14 February 2025 on Consideration of the Situation in Sudan’, Doc PSC/HoSG/COMM.1261.1 (2025), 14 February 2025; African Union Peace and Security Council, ‘Press Statement: The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 1213th meeting held on 21 May 2024, considered the situation in the Darfur region of Western Sudan’, Doc PSC/PR/BR.1213 (2024), 21 May 2024; African Union Peace and Security Council, ‘Press Statement: The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 1228^th meeting, held on 19 August 2024, on Briefing on the Situation in Sudan’, Doc PSC/PR/BR.1228 (2024), 19 August 2024.
31
‘As Sudan War Continues, Fighting Splits Along Ethnic Lines in Darfur’, Africa Defense Forum, 28 May 2024.
32
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, December 2020.
33
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, December 2020.
34
K. Tyson, ‘Africa File, May 22, 2025: SAF Advances Across Sudan Despite RSF Drone Strikes’, Critical Threats, 22 May 2025.
35
M Nashed, ‘As Sudan’s RSF surrounds Darfur’s el-Fasher, ethnic killings feared’, Al Jazeera, 3 February 2025.
36
M. M. Bradley, ‘Additional Protocol II: Elevating the minimum threshold of intensity?’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2020.
37
News Africa, ‘The battle for El Fasher: Why is it so crucial? BBC Africa’, YouTube, 4 February 2025; H. Bitar, ‘Sudan’s years of war – BBC smuggles in phones to reveal hunger and fear’, BBC, 15 April 2025.
38
M Nashed, ‘As Sudan’s RSF surrounds Darfur’s el-Fasher, ethnic killings feared’, Al Jazeera, 3 February 2025. During February 2025.
39
L. Bader, ‘Civilians Around Sudan’s El Fasher Face New Attacks’, Human Rights Watch, 11 April 2025; ‘RSF escalates attacks on Sudan’s famine-stricken Zamzam refugee camp’, Al Jazeera, 16 February 2025; ‘Sudan: RSF must stop attacks on famine-stricken Zamzam camp’, Amnesty International, 14 February 2025.
40
‘Sudan’s army, allies say they repelled new RSF attack on El Fasher’, Sudan Tribune, 15 June 2025.
41
‘Sudan: Türk warns of catastrophic surge in violence’, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 20 June 2025.
42
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
43
J. Pejic, ‘The Fighting in Sudan is an Armed Conflict: Here’s What Law Applies’, Just Security, 20 April 2023.
44
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases; A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 137.
45
National Assembly of the Republic of Sudan, ‘Rapid Support Forces Act 2017’, Redress, 19 February 2018 (informal translation by Redress).
46
National Assembly of the Republic of Sudan, ‘Rapid Support Forces Act 2017’, Redress, 19 February 2018 (informal translation by Redress).
47
G. K. Adams, ‘Reports of ‘large-scale looting’ at Sudan National Museum’, Museums Association, 4 September 2024.
48
‘General Features of the RSF Act’, Rapid Support Forces; A. Latif, ‘Sudan’s armed rivals fight on another front: international legitimacy’, Al Jazeera, 17 September 2023.
49
A. Latif, ‘Sudan’s armed rivals fight on another front: international legitimacy’, Al Jazeera, 17 September 2023; M. Nur, ‘The Rapid Support Forces take control of Wad Madani, including the army headquarters, after the latter fled to Sennar and Damazin’, Dabanga, 19 December 2023.
50
‘Safeguarding Sudan’s Revolution’, International Crisis Group, 21 October 2019; H. Ali, ‘The War in Sudan: How Weapons and Networks Shattered a Power Struggle’, German Institute for Global and Area Studies, 2024.
51
W. Wallis, ‘Military briefing: the foreign drones that turned Sudan’s civil war’, Financial Times, 18 May 2025.
52
‘Are RSF recruiting children to fight Sudan’s war?’, The New Arab,3 August 2023.
53
‘Sudan’s RSF stoke ethnic tensions with tribal recruitment’, Dabanga,11 November 2024; ‘RSF confirms arrival of troops in Khartoum for training’, Sudan Tribune,1 March 2025; ‘RSF embarks on massive recruitment to build new army’, Darfur24,20 April 2025.
54
K. Tyson and L. Karr, ‘Africa File, May 8, 2025: RSF Drone Strikes on Port Sudan; Iran Exports Regime Security to Africa; Burkina Faso Looks for Additional Partners’, Critical Threat, 8 May 2025.
55
‘Paramilitary RSF agrees to US-mediated talks on Sudan war’, Al Jazeera, 24 July 2024.
56
K. Abdelaziz, ‘Sudan’s RSF, allies sign charter to form parallel government, two signatories say’, Reuters,22 February 2025.
57
‘Sudanese coalition led by paramilitary RSF announces parallel government’, Reuters, 26 July 2025.
58
‘The RSF issues a 48-hour ultimatum to armed groups in El Fasher to surrender and vacate the city’, Rapid Support Forces, 4 April 2025.
59
J. Pejic, ‘The Fighting in Sudan is an Armed Conflict: Here’s What Law Applies’, Just Security, 20 April 2023,
60
‘Sudan army claims major advances against RSF in greater Khartoum’, Al Jazeera, 8 February 2025; ‘MAP: Sudanese military reclaims full control of East Nile locality from RSF’, Sudans Post, 10 March 2025,
61
N. Eltahir and K. Abdelaziz, ‘The two rival governments that could split Sudan’, Reuters, 31 July 2025,
62
K. Tyson and L. Karr, ‘Africa File, May 8, 2025: RSF Drone Strikes on Port Sudan; Iran Exports Regime Security to Africa; Burkina Faso Looks for Additional Partners’, Critical Threat, 8 May 2025.
63
‘Sudan army, RSF clash over strategic mountain in Sennar’, Sudan Tribune, 3 October 2024.
64
‘RSF claims victory in Al-Dinder, second capture in days’, Sudan Tribune, 5 July 2024.
65
P. Mwai, ‘Five key moments in the battle for Khartoum’, BBC, 22 March 2025.
66
M. Nashed, ‘War in Sudan: Humanitarian, fighting, control developments, August 2025’, Al Jazeera, 31 August 2025; ‘Briefing on the situation in Sudan’, Amani Africa, 3 August 2025.
67
M. Nashed, ‘Sudan’s army retakes presidential palace in Khartoum, strikes blow to RSF’, Al Jazeera, 21 March 2025.
68
‘Briefing on the situation in Sudan’, Amani Africa, 3 August 2025.
69
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.
70
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.
71
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.38.
72
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021; A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40.
73
‘Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight – June 2024’, Political Geography Now, 11 June 2024; ‘Sudan, Chad agree to strengthening operations of joint border force’, Sudan Tribune, 29 January 2023.
74
‘Darfur joint force, RSF clash outside the capital of North Darfur’, Sudan Tribune, 3 July 2023
75
‘As Sudan War Continues, Fighting Splits Along Ethnic Lines in Darfur’, Africa Defense Forum, 28 May 2024.
76
‘Darfur joint forces recapture crucial water reservoir from RSF in El-Fasher’, Sudan Tribune, May 27 2024,
77
‘Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks – Sudan October 2024’, ACLED, 14 October 2024.
78
‘Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks – Sudan October 2024’, ALCED, 14 October 2024.
79
‘Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks – Sudan October 2024’, ACLED, 14 October 2024.
80
‘Darfur’s Joint Force Helps Sudan’s Army Retake Key Areas’, African Defense Forum, 22 October 2024.
81
‘Darfur Joint Force seize weapons convoy, accuse UAE of arming RSF’, Sudan Tribune, 12 November 2024
82
‘Darfur Joint Force claims control of key RSF base in al-Zurq’, Sudan Tribune, 21 December 2024.
83
‘Africa: Sudan’, International Crisis Group.
84
‘Darfur Joint Force say s they repelled RSF attack on El Fasher’, Sudan Tribune, 2 February 2025.
85
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” is Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 16.
86
‘Darfur armed movements renounce neutrality in Sudan war’, Dabanga, 17 November 2023.
87
‘Key Darfur groups join Sudanese army in its war against RSF paramilitary forces’, Sudan Tribune, 16 November 2023.
88
M. Amin, ‘Sudanese take up arms against RSF as army begins to push back’, Middle East Eye, 5 February 2024.
89
M. Amin and O. Rickett, ‘What is the future of the Sudanese Armed Forces?’, Middle East Eye, 4 April 2024.
90
‘Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight – June 2024’, Political Geography Now, 11 June 2024.
91
‘Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight – June 2024’, Political Geography Now, 11 June 2024.
92
‘Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight – June 2024’, Political Geography Now, 11 June 2024.
93
Sudan War Monitor, ‘سقوط قتلى وجرحى في تجدد الاشتباكات بين الجيش وقوات الدعم السريع بالفاشر’, Substack, 8 March 2024.
94
Sudan War Monitor, ‘Justice and Equality Movement troops arrive in Omdurman’, Substack, 18 February 2024.
95
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” is Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 16.

Non-international armed conflict between the SAF and the SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction)

Background

The SPLM-North has been militarily active since the 1980s, when it emerged out of a tribal self-defence militia.¹ In 2017, the SPLM-North split into two rival factions.² On the one hand, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army–North Agar (SPLM/North Agar) is based in the White Nile state and is led by Malik Agar. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army–North Hilu (SPLM-North al-Hilu faction‘³) is led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu and is based in the Nuba Mountains.⁴ Since its inception, SPLM-North has been seeking self-determination which, according to them, requires a united Sudan but the confusion surrounding its relationships with the newly established South Sudan and Sudan is the cause of its splintering and its conflict with the SAF.⁵

Intensity

Fighting between the SAF and SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction) continued in the South Kordofan region through this reporting period.⁶

A significant clash was reported early in February 2025 when the SPLM-North launched an attack on Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan state in southern Sudan.⁷ At least forty-four civilians were killed and twenty-eight wounded as this clash seemed to target mainly civilians and not the SAF.⁸ Other reports suggest that fighting killed up to eighty people.⁹ The SAF, however, responded and reportedly inflicted heavy losses on the SPLM-North fighters, enabling the SAF to seize weapons and ammunition.¹⁰

The SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction) managed to seize most of the SPLM’s military and material assets which included tanks, machine guns, and artillery when the SPLM splintered in 2017.¹¹ The SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction) also obtained heavy weaponry during the term under review. It was confirmed on 8 April 2024 that SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction) possessed armoured and military vehicles which it had captured from the SAF in Kega, South Kordofan.¹²The group possesses several rocket launchers and proudly displays them on hilltops in the Nuba mountains.¹³ It is also reported that this non-state armed group often uses heavy artillery in its attacks that¹⁴ the SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction) employed heavy shelling against the SAF in attempts to isolate Kadugli from Dilling. This resulted in casualties as well as structural damage. The exact extent of damage was not reported.¹⁵

Decades of fighting between the SPLM-N and SAF has resulted in a surge of displacement. Similarly, fighting between this SPLM-N, the SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction), and the SAF continues to drive displacement numbers in the southern state of South Kordofan.¹⁶

The SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction) continues to control a significant amount of territory in Sudan which this group calls the ‘New Sudan’.¹⁷ The territory of ‘New Sudan’ comprises mostly areas in South Kordofan where the front line of their territory currently reaches as far as the regional capital of Kadugli.¹⁸ The SPLM-N (al-Hilu faction) also continues to exercise control over its stronghold in the Nuba mountains.¹⁹

The continued application of AP II demands stable control over parts of the territory of the relevant state.²⁰ Defensive engagement with the SAF which satisfies the notion of intensity under IHL has enabled the SPLM-N to continue such level of control. Therefore, fighting between the SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction) and the SAF remains sufficiently intense to fulfil the requirements under IHL.

Organization

Abdel Aziz al-Hilu holds central authority as commander of this group, leading it from his headquarters across the border in South Sudan.²¹ Joseph Tika acts as al-Hilu’s first deputy.²² The SPLM/A-N (al-Hilu faction) has a relatively sophisticated disciplinary structure.²³ Fighters are held to a code of conduct and incur penalties for violations of this code.²⁴ The SPLM/A-N Hilu has a human rights court.²⁵ This group has the capability to adhere to IHL and has, on occasion, expressed an intention to comply with it. For example, it came to an agreement with the Sudanese government to facilitate delivery of humanitarian relief in areas under its control.²⁶ Military tactics are akin to guerilla warfare and the group’s modus operandi includes hit and run ambushes.²⁷ Little information on logistical capacity is available, but it is suggested that sympathetic local populations support the group.²⁸ This group has appointed spokespersons, Sanaa Matar²⁹ and Jatigo Amoja Dalman,³⁰ who issue statements on behalf of the group. This group also hosts a website for official statements.³¹

SPLM/A-N (al-Hilu faction) continues to exercise stable military control over territory in the Nuba Mountains.³² This group also controls large parts of South Kordofan at the foothold in the Nuba Mountains but not any major towns in this region.³³ The SPLM/A-N (al-Hilu faction) further controls pockets of Blue Nile state bordering Ethiopia.³⁴ This non-state armed group furthermore holds control over Kadugli’s outskirts.³⁵

Territorial control serves as a confirmation that the SPLM/A-N (al-Hilu faction) leadership is akin to responsible command.³⁶ Responsible command is a further requirement under Article 1(1) of AP II. Moreover, control of territory places SPLM/A-N (al-Hilu faction) in a position to implement AP II, as is demanded by the provision.³⁷ Actual implementation is not required.³⁸

Lastly, from the intensity assessment above, clearly the territory controlled by SPLM/A-N (al-Hilu faction) facilitates the planning of defensive military operations, fulfilling the final requirement in Article 1(1) of AP II which requires the SPLM/A-N (al-Hilu faction) to be sufficiently organized to launch sustained and concerted attacks.³⁹

The organizational structure of SPLM/A-N (al-Hilu faction) is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of AP II. Hence, the NIAC between Sudan and SPLM/A-N (al-Hilu faction) constitutes an AP II-type NIAC.

1
‘From guerrilla movement to political party: The restructuring of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in three southern states’, ReliefWeb, 12 July 2007.
2
‘Agar and Arman announce split in Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North’, Dabanga, 21 August 2022.
3
Country policy and information note: security situation, Sudan, January 2025 (accessible)’, Gov.UK, 4 February 2025
4
A. Popoviciu, ‘Deep in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, Al Jazeera, 19 August 2025; D. P. Sullivan, ‘The Nuba Mountains: A Window into the Sudan Crisis’, Refugees International, 22 August 2024.
5
J. Young, ‘SPLM-NORTH: What went wrong?’, Sudan Tribune.
6
‘SPLM-N Al Hilu mobilization and attacks on SAF garrisons’, Small Arms Survey; M. Sio, ‘At least 44 killed in attack by rebel faction in Sudan’, AA, 4 February 2025; ‘Sudan’s army, rebels clash in South Kordofan, official says’, Sudan Tribune, 18 June 2025; ‘SPLM-N El Hilu renews attacks on South Kordofan capital’, Dabanga, 5 September 2023; ‘New Frontlines and the Rising Role of Emerging Actors’, Insights: Sudan Data Program’, 9 July 2025.
7
M. Sio, ‘At least 44 killed in attack by rebel faction in Sudan’, AA, 4 February 2025; ‘At Least 80 Killed in Southern Sudan Violence: UN’, The Defense Post, 6 February 2025; H. Alnaser, et al, ‘Sudan Nashra: Military tightens grip on RSF in Khartoum’s final battle; 44 killed in SPLM-N (al-Hilu) attack on military-held Kadugli; RSF continues amassing forces for Fasher battle’, Mada, 7 February 2025.
8
M. Sio, ‘At least 44 killed in attack by rebel faction in Sudan’, AA, 4 February 2025.
9
‘At Least 80 Killed in Southern Sudan Violence: UN’, The Defense Post, 6 February 2025.
10
M. Sio, ‘At least 44 killed in attack by rebel faction in Sudan’, AA, 4 February 2025; ‘SPLM-N El Hilu accuses Sudan army of shelling South Kordofan capital’, Dabanga, 5 February 2025.
11
A. A. Ibrahim, ‘Abdul Aziz al-Hilu: How the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Let Him Down in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005)’, Sudan Events, 28 February 2025.
12
‘Sudan: ‘Over 100 dead’ in South Kordofan attacks’, Dabanga, 8 April 2024.
13
N. Casey, ‘Who Are the S.P.L.M., the Rebel Group Fighting for Democracy in Sudan?’, New York Times, 8 August 2024.
14
H. Alnaser, et al, ‘Sudan Nashra: Military tightens grip on RSF in Khartoum’s final battle; 44 killed in SPLM-N (al-Hilu) attack on military-held Kadugli; RSF continues amassing forces for Fasher battle’, Mada, 7 February 2025 cause significant structural damage. For example, in June 2025,
15
‘SPLM-N rebels shell South Kordofan’s Dilling, sources say’, Sudan Tribune, 20 June 2025; ‘SAF pushes back SPLM-N fighters in South Kordofan’, Sudans Post, 18 June 2025.
16
‘Tales of violence and forced displacement from Sudan’, Médecins Sans Frontiers, 9 April 2025; ‘Sudan: Stories of violence, forced displacement from South Kordofan’, Médecins Sans Frontiers, 9 April 2025.
17
N. Casey, ‘Who Are the S.P.L.M., the Rebel Group Fighting for Democracy in Sudan?’, New York Times, 8 August 2024.
18
‘Sudan SPLM-N El Hilu leader: ‘We will defend our people and let the army know’’, Dabanga, 22 March 2024; Sudan War Monitor, ‘Map of the Areas of Control in Sudan’, Substack, 2 November 2023.
19
A. Popoviciu and G. Peterson, ‘Aid blocked as “unimaginable suffering” grips Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, The New Humanitarian, 25 June 2025; A. Popoviciu, ‘Deep in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, Al Jazeera, 19 August 2025.
20
Y. Dinstein, ‘Non-International Armed Conflicts in International Law, Second Edition’, Cambridge University Press, 2021, para 169.
21
‘Dilling town falls to SPLM-N in South Kordofan’, Sudan Tribune, 7 January 2024;A. Popoviciu, ‘Deep in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, Al Jazeera, 19 August 2025.
22
‘RSF commander opens training camp in SPLM-N area of Blue Nile’, Sudan Tribune, 1 March 2025.
23
A. Popoviciu, ‘Deep in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, Al Jazeera, 19 August 2025.
24
Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM-N) Office of the Chair Person, ‘Resolution No. (6) – 2013’, Their Words.
25
Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM-N) Office of the Chair Person, ‘Resolution No. (6) – 2013’, Their Words.
26
‘Statement on the Agreement for Humanitarian Aid Delivery between the Sudanese Government and SPLM-N al-Hilu’, Sudan International Human Rights Organization, 8 May 2024.
27
UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Sudan pursuant to Security Council resolution 2715 (2023)’, UN Doc A/2024/204, 29 February 2024.
28
J. Horner, ‘Nuba Hopes and Fears: Fuelling SPLA-North Mobilization in South Kordofan’, Small Arms Survey, March 2024.
29
‘Sudan army, SPLM-N clash in South Kordofan’, Sudan Tribune, 13 January 2025,
30
‘SPLM’s Alhilu announces deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the two areas’, Darfur24, 8 August 2024,
31
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement North.
32
A. Popoviciu and G. Peterson, ‘Aid blocked as “unimaginable suffering” grips Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, The New Humanitarian, 25 June 2025; A. Popoviciu, ‘Deep in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, Al Jazeera, 19 August 2025; ‘Overview’, Small Arms Survey.
33
Sudan War Monitor, ‘Who’s who in Sudan’s new civil war?’, Substack, 31 August 2023.
34
‘Surprise rebel alliance could give Sudan’s beleaguered RSF a boost’, France24, 24 February 2025.
35
H. Alnaser, et al, ‘Sudan Nashra: Military tightens grip on RSF in Khartoum’s final battle; 44 killed in SPLM-N (al-Hilu) attack on military-held Kadugli; RSF continues amassing forces for Fasher battle’, Mada, 7 February 2025.
36
M.M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.
37
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.
38
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.38.
39
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40; M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.

Non-international armed conflict between the RSF and the SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction)

Background

The SPLM-N (al-Hilu) and RSF have been engaged in a NIAC from as early as April 2023,¹ as the SPLM-N (al-Hilu faction) formed a defensive posture to retain control over the Nuba Mountain Regions and defend villagers living in areas under its control.² In February 2025, the RSF and SPLM-N (al-Hilu faction) formed an unexpected alliance which breached the SPLM-N’s neutral stance in the NIAC between the SAF and the RSF.³ This development does not, however, constitute the end of the NIAC between the SPLM-N (al-Hilu faction) and the RSF as there are insufficient indicators of a lasting cessation of armed confrontations without real risk of resumption between these two parties.⁴

Intensity

Clashes between the SPLM-N (al-Hilu) and the RSF include those that took place in December 2023,⁵ January,⁶ February,⁷ August and September 2024.⁸

The December 2023⁹ and January 2024 clashes¹⁰ caused internal displacement with thousands of villagers reported to have fled from Dilling.¹¹

Both the RSF and the SPLM-N (al-Hilu faction) have military weaponry in their arsenals. This examination first turns to the RSF and then the SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction). When operating in villages, the RSF often employs machine guns while launching attacks from motorcycles.¹² The RSF has access to thousands of military vehicles that they can deploy to conflict zones.¹³ Other sophisticated military grade weaponry used in this conflict by the RSF against its enemies are munitions such as the Norinco AH4 gun howitzers and other modern munitions.¹⁴ The RSF’s arsenal includes armed drones.¹⁵

Fighting between the RSF and SPLM-N (al-Hilu faction) intensified in early January 2024. The SPLM-N (al-Hilu faction) and the SAF were fighting for control over South Dilling and other parts of South Kordofan.¹⁶ The SPLM-N (al Hilu faction) has made it clear that it is fighting to defend the territory under its control in South Kordofan.¹⁷ The fact that this group is able to maintain control over territory that the State cannot wrest back from them shows that the intensity of fighting from this group equates to a NIAC.¹⁸

The nature of fighting equated to protracted armed violence and thus fulfil the intensity requirement under IHL.

Organization

As established above both the SPLM-N (al-Hilu) and the RSF is sufficiently organized under IHL.

The pre-existing NIAC between SPLM-N (al-Hilu) and the RSF continued throughout the reporting period.

1
‘Report Documents RSF War Crimes in Sudan’s South Kordofan Region’, Africa Defense Forum, 14 January 2025; S. Šturdík, ‘Sudan Ravaged by Famine: Is an End to Civil War Possible?’, Adapt Institute, 25 November 2024
2
‘RSF Atrocities Persist Unabated in South Kordofan and Nuba Mountains’, Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa Network, 22 March 2024; ‘Sudan’s Kiir in talks with SPLM-N over South Kordofan attacks’, Sudan Tribune, 20 July 2023; ‘Specter of ethnic killing looms in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, Operation Broken Silence, 22 February 2025; ‘Sudanese army, SPLA-N clash with RSF in South Kordofan’, Sudan Tribune, 8 January 2024; A. M. Ali, ‘Sudan Situation Update: August 2023: Heightened Violence in Kordofan Region as More Militia Groups Step Into the Conflict’, ACLED, 11 August 2023.
3
A. Popoviciu, ‘Deep in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, Al Jazeera, 19 August 2025; ‘Surprise rebel alliance could give Sudan’s beleaguered RSF a boost’, France24, 24 February 2025.
4
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” is Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 19.
5
‘Delling in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains fears expansion of SPLM-N/RSF fighting’, Dabanga, 8 December 2023,
6
‘Specter of ethnic killing looms in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, Operation Broken Silence, 22 February 2025; ‘Sudanese army, SPLA-N clash with RSF in South Kordofan’, Sudan Tribune, 8 January 2024,
7
‘Specter of ethnic killing looms in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, Operation Broken Silence, 22 February 2025,
8
‘Artillery shelling and airstrikes surge in Sudan – September 2024’, ACLED, 16 September 2024.
9
‘Delling in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains fears expansion of SPLM-N/RSF fighting’, Dabanga, 8 December 2023
10
‘Specter of ethnic killing looms in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, Operation Broken Silence, 22 February 2025,
11
‘DTM Sudan Flash Alert: Conflict in Abassiya (Qurdud Nyama Village), South Kordofan’, Displacement Tracking Matrix: Sudan, 19 March 2024.
12
M. Nashed, ‘RSF attacks compound humanitarian crisis in Sudan’s strategic city’, Al Jazeera, 29 July 2025.
13
‘Sudan: French-manufactured weapons system identified in conflict – new investigation’, Amnesty International, 14 November 2024.
14
M. Nashed, ‘As Sudan’s RSF surrounds Darfur’s el-Fasher, ethnic killings feared’, Al Jazeera, 3 February 2025.
15
‘ACAPS Thematic report – Sudan: Risk of continued drone strikes on Port Sudan’, Reliefweb, 23 May 2025; K. Tyson and L. Karr, ‘Africa File, May 8, 2025: RSF Drone Strikes on Port Sudan; Iran Exports Regime Security to Africa; Burkina Faso Looks for Additional Partners’, Critical Threat, 8 May 2025.
16
‘Sudanese army, SPLA-N clash with RSF in South Kordofan’, Sudan Tribune, 8 January 2024; A. M. Ali, ‘Sudan Situation Update: August 2023: Heightened Violence in Kordofan Region as More Militia Groups Step Into the Conflict’, ACLED, 11 August 2023.
17
‘Sudan’s Kiir in talks with SPLM-N over South Kordofan attacks’, Sudan Tribune, 20 July 2023.
18
Y. Dinstein, ‘Non-International Armed Conflicts in International Law, Second Edition’, Cambridge University Press, 2021, para 174.

State Parties

Sudan

Non-state parties

SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction)
Rapid Support Force (RSF)
Darfur Joint Protection Forces (DJPF)

Non-State Actors

SPLM/A (Agar)
SLM/A-AW
SLM/A-CH

Foreign Involvement

Ukrainian Special Forces
Russian Africa Corps
United Arab Emirates

1
‘Article 3 – Conflicts not of an international character’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases
2
M.M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol ii in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, December 2020.
3
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Civil War in Sudan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 15 April 2025; M. Öhm ‘Sudan’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 12 November 2024.
4
Human Rights Council, ‘Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023’, UN Doc A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024.
5
K. A. Hassan, ‘Spilling Over: Conflict Dynamics in and around Sudan’s Blue Nile State. 2015-19’, Small Arms Survey, March 2020.
6
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Civil War in Sudan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 15 April 2025; M. Taha, P. Knopf, and A. Verjee, ‘Sudan, One Year After Bashir’, United States Institute of Peace, 1 May 2020.
7
A. M. Ali and E. Kazemi, ‘Sudan Situation Update: April 2023 | Political Process to Form a Transitional Civilian Government and Shifting Disorder Trends’, ACLED, 14 April 2023; ‘Janjaweed militias’, United Nations Department for General Assembly and Conference Management; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Civil War in Sudan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 15 April 2025.
8
‘Fighting in Sudan: A timeline of key events’, Al Jazeera, 31 May 2024; ‘At least 40 killed in air strike on Khartoum market, volunteers say’, Reuters, 10 September 2023; ‘UNITAMS Statement on the Killing of the Governor of West Darfur’, United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan, 15 June 2023; G. Joselow and M. Fiorentino, ‘Fire used as ‘weapon of war’ in Sudan as entire towns and villages burned to the ground’, NBC News, 16 June 2024; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Civil War in Sudan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 15 April 2025.
9
‘Sudan: Events of 2024’, Human Rights Watch; ‘2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan’, US Department of State; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Civil War in Sudan’, Council of Foreign Relations, 15 April 2025.
10
K. Ferguson, ‘The RSF are out to finish the genocide in Darfur they began as the Janjaweed. We cannot stand by’, The Guardian, 24 July 2023; M. Nashed, ‘‘Can’t trust the Janjaweed’: Sudan’s capital ravaged by RSF rule’, Al Jazeera, 20 January 2024.
11
M. Nashed, ‘War in Sudan: Humanitarian, fighting, control developments, August 2025’, Al Jazeera, 31 August 2025; N. Booty and F. Chothia, ‘Sudan war: A simple guide to what is happening’, BBC, 4 July 2025.
12
‘Sudan’s army launches major offensive on Khartoum’, Al Jazeera, 26 September 2024.
13
U. Jamal, ‘How strategic is Wad Madani city, retaken by Sudanese army?’, Al Jazeera, 12 January 2025; ‘Africa: Sudan’, International Crisis Group.
14
‘Khartoum clashes persist after army breaks HQ siege’, Sudan Tribune, 25 January 2025,
15
‘Sudanese army claims major victory in Khartoum; RSF disputes’, Reuters, 25 January 2025.
16
‘Sudanese army claims major victory in Khartoum; RSF disputes’, Reuters, 25 January 2025,
17
M Nashed, ‘As Sudan’s RSF surrounds Darfur’s el-Fasher, ethnic killings feared’, Al Jazeera, 3 February 2025,
18
M. Nashed, ‘War in Sudan: Humanitarian, fighting, control developments, August 2025’, Al Jazeera, 31 August 2025.
19
‘Sudanese army retakes key city in North Kordofan state’, Sudan Tribune, 30 January 2025; ‘Sudan Army Says Retakes Key Southern City From Paramilitaries’, The Defense Post, 31 January 2025.
20
B. Rukanga, ‘Sudan army ends two-year siege of key city’, BBC, 24 February 2025,
21
M. Nashed, ‘Sudan’s army retakes presidential palace in Khartoum, strikes blow to RSF’, Al Jazeera, 21 March 2025; M. Motamedi, ‘What’s happened in Sudan’s civil war after new Khartoum battles?’, Al Jazeera, 27 March 2025.
22
B. Rukanga, ‘Sudan army ends two-year siege of key city’, BBC, 24 February 2025.
23
‘Sudan’s army declares Khartoum state ‘completely free’ of paramilitary RSF’, Al Jazeera, 20 May 2025; C. Macaulay, ‘Sudan rebels entirely pushed out of Khartoum state, army says’, BBC, 20 May 2025; Al Jazeera English, ‘Sudan’s army declares Khartoum state ‘completely free’ of paramilitary RSF’, YouTube, 21 May 2025.
24
‘Sudan army retakes presidential palace but RSF militia fights back’, BBC News, 21 March 2025; K. Burke, ‘Sudan’s military take control of presidential palace’, DW, 21 March 2025.
25
‘Sudan army says its forces enter Wad Madani in push to retake city from RSF’, Al Jazeera, 11 January 2025.
26
U. Jamal, ‘How strategic is Wad Madani city, retaken by Sudanese army?’, Al Jazeera, 12 January 2025.
27
N. Booty and F. Chothia, ‘Sudan war: A simple guide to what is happening’, BBC, 4 July 2025,
28
Z. M. Salih, ‘Sudan conflict: Hundreds of thousands flee Wad Madani safe-haven – UN’, BBC, 19 December 2023,
29
E. Siddig, ‘Celebrations in Sudan’s Wad Madani as army takes over strategic city’, Reuters, 13 January 2025; U. Jamal, ‘How strategic is Wad Madani city, retaken by Sudanese army?’, Al Jazeera, 12 January 2025.
30
N. Booty and F. Chothia, ‘Sudan war: A simple guide to what is happening’, BBC, 4 July 2025.
31
N. Booty and F. Chothia, ‘Sudan war: A simple guide to what is happening’, BBC, 4 July 2025; M. Nashed, ‘War in Sudan: Humanitarian, fighting, control developments, August 2025’, Al Jazeera, 31 August 2025.
32
E. Dafalla, ‘No food, no medicine, no escape: Sudan’s El Fasher is desperately fighting for survival’, The New Arab, 28 August 2025; T. A. Adam, ‘Understanding Sudan’s Conflict by Focusing on Darfur’, Just Security, 21 February 2025.
33
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2736 (2024)’, UN Doc S/Res/2736 (2024), 13 June 2024.
34
‘The protection of the civilian population during sieges: what the law says’, International Committee for the Red Cross, 5 February 2024. M. Sassòlli, ‘International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare, 2^nd edition’, Edward Elgar, para 10.250.
35
‘May 2024: Sudan: The RSF sets its eyes on North Darfur’, ACLED, 17 May 2024.
36
A. Gouja, ‘Inside the battle for El Fasher: “Innocent lives are lost every day”’, The New Humanitarian, 27 November 2024; M. Nashed, ‘War in Sudan: Humanitarian, fighting, control developments, August 2025’, Al Jazeera, 31 August 2025.
37
B. Rukanga, ‘Sudan army ends two-year siege of key city’, BBC, 24 February 2025.
38
‘Famine in Sudan: IPC Famine Review Committee Confirms Famine in parts of North Darfur’, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, July 2024
39
A. Popoviciu and G. Peterson, ‘Aid blocked as “unimaginable suffering” grips Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, The New Humanitarian, 25 June 2025; ‘Sudan: Famine expands as conflict drives catastrophic hunger to more areas’, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, December 2024.
40
‘Sudan’, World Food Programme.
41
M. Nashed, ‘Sudanese starve as soup kitchens close and warring parties block aid’, Al Jazeera, 5 March 2025.
42
V. Mishra, ‘Sudan faces unprecedented hunger and displacement as war enters third year’, United Nations News, 10 April 2025,
43
‘Sudan on brink of famine as fighting ravages Darfur, UN warns’, United Nations News, 1 April 2025.
44
T. Fletcher, ‘Global Humanitarian Overview 2025’, United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 4 December 2024.
45
‘Sudan gripped by deadly crisis as hunger, disease and heat intensify’, United Nations News, 30 July 2025; B. P. Usher, ‘’Our children are dying’: Rare footage shows plight of civilians in besieged Sudan city’, BBC, 14 August 2025; M. Nashed, ‘Why are people starving in Sudan’s el-Fasher?’, Al Jazeera, 6 August 2025; Al Jazeera English, ‘‘We’re suffering’: People in Sudan’s el-Fasher eat animal fodder to survive’, YouTube, 5 August 2025.
46
‘Sudan gripped by deadly crisis as hunger, disease and heat intensify’, United Nations News, 30 July 2025.
47
A. Popoviciu and G. Peterson, ‘Aid blocked as “unimaginable suffering” grips Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, The New Humanitarian, 25 June 2025; ‘Sudan: Famine expands as conflict drives catastrophic hunger to more areas’, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, December 2024.
48
V. Mishra, ‘Cholera spreads in North Darfur, 640,000 children under threat, UNICEF warns’, United Nations News, 3 August 2025; ‘The fight against Cholera in Sudan’, UNICEF.
49
‘Over 1 million children at risk as cholera spreads in Sudan’s Khartoum State’, UNICEF, 28 May 2025
50
V. Mishra, ‘Cholera spreads in North Darfur, 640,000 children under threat, UNICEF warns’, United Nations News, 3 August 2025.
51
‘Power outages hit Sudan areas after drone attack on Merowe Dam’, Sudan Tribune, 6 April 2025.
52
‘The fight against Cholera in Sudan’, UNICEF.
53
‘Sudan reports 70 cholera deaths in Khartoum in two days’, 29 May 2025,
54
‘War fuels cholera outbreak across Sudan with MSF seeing over 2,300 patients and 40 dead in one week’, Médecins Sans Frontières, 14 August 2025; V. Mishra, ‘Cholera spreads in North Darfur, 640,000 children under threat, UNICEF warns’, United Nations News, 3 August 2025; ‘Cholera spreads to all but one of Sudan’s states’, World Health Organization: Eastern Mediterranean Region, 14 July 2025.
55
‘Power outages hit Sudan areas after drone attack on Merowe Dam’, Sudan Tribune, 6 April 2025.
56
‘Power outages hit army-controlled Sudan after drone attacks’, Reuters, 18 January 2025; ‘Protest in Sudan capital by Merowe Dam-affected’, Dabanga, 12 March 2025; H. Hendawi and A. S. Ahmed, ‘Power outages in Khartoum and northern Sudan after attack on hydroelectric dam’, The National, 5 April 2025.
57
‘Power outages hit Sudan areas after drone attack on Merowe Dam’, Sudan Tribune, 6 April 2025.
58
‘Saving lives ‘in whatever way we can’: Amid power crisis, Sudan’s hospitals strive to keep running’, France24, 28 February 2025; SAPA-Sudanese America Physicians Association, X, 3 February 2025.
59
‘The fight against Cholera in Sudan’, UNICEF; ‘Water Wars: How Sudan’s Conflict Weaponizes a Basic Human Need’, Geneva Academy, 4 August 2025.
60
‘Surprise rebel alliance could boost Sudan’s beleaguered RSF’, New Indian Express, 24 February 2025.
61
M. Nashed, ‘Sudan’s competing authorities are beholden to militia leaders, say analysts’, Al Jazeera, 23 July 2025.
62
‘Sudan’s SPLM-N may quit RSF-led alliance over government posts, sources say’, Sudan Tribune, 9 June 2025.
63
‘Darfur holdout group denounces RSF attack on its supply convoy in El Fasher’, Sudan Tribune, 29 March 2024.
64
A. M. Ali and N. Eltayeb, ‘April 2024: One Year of War in Sudan’, ACLED, 15 April 2024,
65
‘January 2024: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Gains Ground in Sudan’, ACLED, 12 January 2024.
66
‘January 2024: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Gains Ground in Sudan’, ACLED, 12 January 2024.
67
‘Sudan conflict: RSF clash with SLM-AW in western Jebel Marra’, Dabanga, 26 December 2023.
68
‘Darfur holdout group denounces RSF attack on its supply convoy in El Fasher’, Sudan Tribune, 29 March 2024.
69
‘RSF says incident involving SLM-AW rebels due to miscommunication’, The Sudan Times, 1 April 2024.
70
Sudan War Monitor, ‘General defects from neutral SLA-AW’, Substack, 1 January 2025.
71
‘High-ranking SLA-AW commander defects, forms pro-SAF faction’, Sudans Post, 2 January 2025.
72
‘The Darfur Region of Sudan, 2003 – Present’, The Holocaust Museum.
73
A. Popoviciu, ‘Deep in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, Al Jazeera, 19 August 2025; M. Nashed, ‘War in Sudan: Humanitarian, fighting, control developments, August 2025’, Al Jazeera, 31 August 2025.
74
‘Surprise rebel alliance could boost Sudan’s beleaguered RSF’, New Indian Express, 24 February 2025.
75
‘Africa: Sudan’, International Crisis Group.
76
A. Popoviciu, ‘Deep in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, Al Jazeera, 19 August 2025.
77
‘RSF commander opens training camp in SPLM-N area of Blue Nile’, Sudan Tribune, 1 March 2025.
78
A. Popoviciu and G. Peterson, ‘Aid blocked as “unimaginable suffering” grips Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, The New Humanitarian, 25 June 2025.
79
‘Application: Instituting Proceedings filed in the Registry of the Court on 5 March 2025 – Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in Sudan (Sudan v. United Arab Emirates’, International Court of Justice, 5 March 2025.
80
P. Zengerle, ‘US lawmakers find UAE provides weapons to Sudan RSF; UAE denies this’, Reuters, 24 January 2025; ‘Van Hollen, Jacobs Confirm UAE Providing Weapons to RSF in Sudan, in Contradiction to its Assurances to US’, Chris van Hollen: US Senator for Maryland, 24 January 2025.
81
‘RSF detains own members in Nyala after army strike, sources say’, Sudan Tribune, 7 May 2025; UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan’, UN Doc S/2025/239, 17 April 2025.
82
‘Statement by the UAE Assistant Minister for Security and Military Affairs, H.E. Salem Aljaberi’, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2025.
83
M. Osman and P. Sippy, ‘No water, no power – Port Sudan reeling after weeks of attacks’, BBC, 10 May 2025.
84
See ‘Sudan accuses UAE of May 4 drone attacks on Port Sudan’, Reuters, 20 May 2025.
85
‘World court says lacks jurisdiction to rule on Sudan’s genocide case against UAE’, Reuters, 6 May 2025; International Court of Justice, ‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in Sudan (Sudan v. United Arab Emirates)’, Order, 5 May 2025.
86
Wagner PMC a ‘journalist alias,’ never legally existed – Putin’, TASS, 5 October 2023; D. Gurin, ‘From Wagner to Africa Corps: ambiguity of the legal status’, Armed Groups and International Law, 4 June 2025.
87
N. Elbagir, et al, ‘Exclusive: Evidence emerges of Russia’s Wagner arming militia leader battling Sudan’s army’, CNN, 21 April 2023; ‘Drones, Wagner Missiles Help RSF Match Sudanese Army’s Might’, Africa Defense Forum, 8 August 2023.
88
‘Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight – June 2024’, Political Geography Now, 11 June 2024.
89
‘Threatologist Profile: African Corps – The Russian Ministry of Defence’s replacement for Wagner in Africa’, Threatologist, 6 February 2024.
90
S. Ritter ‘The New ‘Africa Corps’: Russia’s Wagner Rebranding’, Energy Intelligence, 24 May 2024.
91
‘Russia recruits for armed force ‘Africa Corps’ to replace Wagner’, Eurafrica, 31 January 2024.
92
N. Elbagir, et al, ‘Exclusive: Evidence emerges of Russia’s Wagner arming militia leader battling Sudan’s army’, CNN, 21 April 2023.
93
I. Lovett, et al, ‘Ukraine Is Now Fighting Russia in Sudan’, The Wall Street Journal, 6 March 2024.
94
‘Ukraine deployed troops to Sudan to partake in war: WSJ’, Al Mayadeen, 6 March 2024.
95
I. Lovett, et al, ‘Ukraine Is Now Fighting Russia in Sudan’, The Wall Street Journal, 6 March 2024; K. Zakharchencko and C. York, ‘Ukrainian Drones ‘Destroy Russian Mercenaries’ in Sudan’, Kyiv Post, 30 January 2024.
96
B. Rukanga, ‘‘No obstacles’ to Russian Red Sea base – Sudan’, BBC, 13 February 2025.
97
D. Kirichencko, ‘How Ukraine Is Challenging Russia in Africa and the Middle East’, Lawfare, 2 July 2025.
98
Sudan War Monitor, ‘Sudan’s RSF clashes with South Sudan’s SPLA-IO’, Substack, 18 March 2025.
99
‘SPLA-IO generals killed in clashes with RSF in Renk County village’, Sudans Post, 17 March 2025.
100
Sudan War Monitor, ‘Sudan’s RSF clashes with South Sudan’s SPLA-IO’, Substack, 18 March 2025.
101
A. Carboni, ‘Conflict Watchlist 2024: Sudan: Setting the Stage for a Long War’, ACLED, 17 January 2024), M. A. Hussein, ‘Animated maps show two years of war in Sudan’, Al Jazeera, 14 April 2025
102
‘Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock’, Conflict Sensitivity Resources Facility: South Sudan, 12 October 2017,
103
H. Young, et al, ‘Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur, Sudan’, Feinstein International Center, January 2009,
104
J. Craze, ‘Attacked from Both Sides: Abyei’s Existential Dilemma’, Smalls Arms Survey, July 2023,
105
‘80 killed in Misseriya clan clashes in South Kordofan – witness’, Sudan Tribune, 8 December 2013
106
‘Ahmad Oumar Imhamad Al-Fitouri’, United Nations Security Council
107
S. T. Williams, ‘Libya’s hybrid armed groups dilemma’, Brookings, 27 January 2023,
108
‘Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka youth commit to cease hostilities and build peace at a landmark conference’, United Nations Peacekeeping, 15 April 2025,
109
‘ACLED Brief: Violence Rises Across South Sudan’s Disputed Abyei State’, Reliefweb, 9 February 2024.

Sudan

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (2023-2025)

Non International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-state parties

Other main actors

Non-State Actors

Foreign Involvement