Afghanistan

Conflict Overview

The period under review was marked by continued insecurity in several regions of Afghanistan, with civilians caught in violence between non-State armed groups and the Taliban Armed Forces. The violence primarily involved hostilities between the ruling Taliban and Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP),¹ but also with the National Resistance Front (NRF)² and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF).³ In addition, sporadic clashes between Pakistani security forces and the Taliban have caused civilian casualties.

The Taliban’s control over Afghanistan’s territory remained largely unchallenged during the period under review.⁴Under international law, given its effective control of territory and national institutions, the Taliban government continues to be the authority representing Afghanistan, as it has since its takeover of Kabul in August 2021. Successful operations against IS-KP lessened the ability of that group to conduct deadly attacks, especially from the second quarter of 2025 onwards.⁵ IS-KP did not, however, cease all military operations, but continued to target both Taliban forces and civilians, especially those belonging to Shi’a and Hazara religious minorities, as well as foreign nationals.⁶ The NRF and the AFF continued to mount small-scale attacks on Taliban forces, primarily in the centre of the country, especially after announcing their decision to concentrate efforts on fighting the Taliban government in Kabul.⁷ Armed activities by these groups increased in frequency in the second half of 2024, before decreasing in the first half of 2025.⁸

Reports by the United Nations (UN) and other actors documented the increasingly widespread and systematic violations of human rights in Afghanistan, particularly affecting women and girls.⁹ Repressive measures against the media and journalists, including new rules on censorship and a ban on working for Afghan media in exile, combined with the arbitrary arrest of journalists, have had a chilling effect on media reporting of facts related to the armed conflicts and hence also on alleged violations of international humanitarian law (IHL).¹⁰

The Afghan economy remains in a fragile state, with high rates of poverty and limited access to essential goods and services. Extreme weather events, especially droughts and floods, along with cuts in humanitarian aid, contribute to the dire economic situation.¹¹ Funding cuts have caused many health centres to close and interrupted essential humanitarian assistance, including services to treat malnutrition in children and to ensure the provision of water.¹²

Mass returns of Afghan refugees from neighbouring Pakistan pose further challenges.¹³ In September 2025, the UN Secretary-General said: ‘More than 2.1 million Afghans have returned in the first six months of 2025, alone, placing additional strain on humanitarian response and available resources’.¹⁴ He estimated that 22.9 million people from a population of 46 million needed humanitarian assistance.¹⁵ In June 2025, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) assessed that although the situation was slowly improving, more than twelve million people were still facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) in March and April 2025, nearly two million of whom were in a situation of emergency (IPC Phase 4).¹⁶

Conflict Classification and Applicable Law

There were three non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) in Afghanistan throughout the review period:

Afghanistan v Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP)
Afghanistan v National Resistance Front (NRF)
Afghanistan v Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF).¹⁷

The three conflicts are regulated by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary IHL. Afghanistan is also a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977,¹⁸ but none of the NIACs taking place in the country met the criteria for its application as the relevant non-State armed groups did not exercise a level of territorial control that would enable them to sustain military operations and implement the Protocol. Relevant provisions of the Additional Protocol do, though, remain applicable to all those detained in connection with the earlier armed conflict that opposed the Taliban and the security forces of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan before the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021.¹⁹

In addition to the three NIACs, an international armed conflict (IAC) of low intensity persisted between Afghanistan and Pakistan during the reporting period. This conflict is regulated by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary IHL. Additional Protocol I of 1977 is not applicable because Pakistan is not a party to this instrument. Peace talks between the two States broke down in November 2025, although a ceasefire agreed upon in October in Doha was largely holding at the time of writing.²⁰

Afghanistan is a party to the International Criminal Court, having acceded to the Rome Statute in 2003.²¹All events covered in this report are therefore potentially within the material jurisdiction of the Court. As described below, in July 2025, two senior Taliban officials were indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity.²²

Compliance with IHL

Overview

The period under review continued to see serious violations of the protection afforded by IHL to civilians and civilian infrastructure across the territory of Afghanistan with civilians continuing to be subject to regular attacks. Indiscriminate and deliberate attacks, by IS-KP in particular – many targeting ethnic and religious communities – may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The Taliban have arbitrarily detained, tortured, and executed suspected opposition supporters, former Afghan security personnel, journalists, and children, in violation of multiple IHL rules. Civilians also suffered from restricted humanitarian access and reduced healthcare due to discriminatory Taliban policies. Despite the proclamation of a general amnesty in 2021, repression continues, along with a lack of due process for former security officials who are being investigated or charged with criminal offences.

The context of the many violations that continue to occur is one of widespread impunity and lack of accountability for past breaches of IHL. After decades of armed conflict, evidence of these violations is mounting, but thus far, few accountability efforts have proved successful; impunity remaining the rule.²³ On 6 October 2025, the UN Human Rights Council established an independent investigative mechanism for Afghanistan to ‘collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of international crimes and the most serious violations of international law … in order to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with international law standards, in national, regional or international courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction over these crimes’.²⁴

In February and August 2025, reviving earlier practice,²⁵ the US government cited past investigations by the ICC into alleged US war crimes as one of the reasons for imposing sanctions on certain ICC officials.²⁶ Sanctioned individuals include all the judges currently serving at the ICC who had formed part of the Appeals Chamber in 2020. That chamber had authorized the Office of the Prosecutor to initiate investigations into alleged war crimes committed in Afghanistan since 2003, including by US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials and US military personnel.²⁷

In Australia, measures taken by the government also fell short of the duties under international law to investigate and prosecute those responsible for war crimes²⁸and to make full reparation for the loss or injury caused.²⁹ In 2020, a military inquiry had concluded that thirty-nine Afghan civilians had been murdered – in some cases, after being tortured – by Australian soldiers deployed in the framework of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).³⁰ Although the Australian government acknowledged its duty to compensate the families of the victims, it has described this as an ex gratia payment.³¹ More than a decade has already passed since some of the murders and, by February 2025, no valid claim had been filed before the competent body.³² To this day, only one person has been charged with war crimes in relation to the facts unveiled by the 2020 report.³³

In the United Kingdom, no substantial progress was made to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of alleged war crimes in Afghanistan.Gossman, ³⁴ New allegations of earlier British war crimes, including the murder of a child, surfaced in May 2025 in a BBC documentary.³⁵

Civilian Objects Under Attack

Under customary IHL, attacks may only be directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects.³⁶ Civilian objects are all objects that are not military objectives³⁷ and, as such, are protected against attack.³⁸ Military objectives are those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective contribution to military action.³⁹

Attacks directed against civilian objects

Due to the relatively limited weaponry available to armed opposition groups, the effects of their attacks generally fell primarily on civilians rather than on buildings. Attacks by the Pakistan armed forces have, however, caused damage to civilian objects in Afghanistan and raised questions as to their compliance with IHL. The attacks resulted in damage to homes and, seemingly, a religious building. On 1 February 2025, an airstrike hit a mosque in Paktika province, killing three civilians. Pakistan denied having conducted any airstrike at that location.⁴⁰ It appears, however, that only Pakistani manned aircraft and drones were observed overflying Afghanistan during the reporting period.⁴¹ On 28 March, a Pakistan airstrike that hit a home is said to have killed seven civilians, five of whom were children.⁴²

Civilians under attack

Parties to armed conflicts must at all times distinguish between combatants and civilians, and are prohibited from directing attacks against civilians.⁴³ Under customary IHL, civilians enjoy general protection from the effects of hostilities, unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.⁴⁴ In case of doubt, persons should be considered civilians.⁴⁵ Under customary IHL, civilians enjoy general protection from the effects of hostilities, unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.⁴⁶Accordingly, parties to armed conflicts must at all times distinguish between combatants and civilians, and are prohibited from directing attacks against civilians.⁴⁷ Civilians may be incidentally affected by attacks against lawful military objectives. However, such attacks must not be disproportionate, and the attacker must take all feasible precautions to avoid, or at the least to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects.⁴⁸

Hostilities in Afghanistan killed or injured civilians by means of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombings, and as a result of cross-border firing of mortar shells and airstrikes (including drone strikes), as well as small arms fire. Figures advanced by the United Nations range from a few dozen casualties (deaths and injuries) to just under one hundred for each three-month period on which the UN Secretary-General reports to the UN Security Council.⁴⁹ Not all attacks were claimed by, or could otherwise be attributed to, a specific armed actor, including those party to one of the four ongoing armed conflicts.

Direct attacks against civilians, as well as acts of violence aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population, are strictly prohibited under IHL, and can constitute war crimes.⁵⁰ Where such acts form part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack, they may also constitute crimes against humanity under international criminal law.⁵¹

Attacks directed against civilians

IS-KP has claimed several attacks that deliberately targeted civilians.⁵² In some cases, attacks took the form of shootings. For instance, on 12 September 2024, fourteen Hazara Shi’a civilians were killed and four others wounded by IS-KP gunmen in central Afghanistan. The victims, all Hazara Shi’a, were travelling back from a pilgrimage in Kerbala.⁵³ On 21 November 2024, eleven civilians were murdered by gunfire in the Sayed Padshah Sufi shrine in Baghlan.⁵⁴ On 21 January 2025, a Chinese national working for a mining company was ambushed and killed by IS-KP fighters along with a member of Taliban security forces in Khwaja Baha ud Din district, Takhar province.⁵⁵

In other cases, explosive devices were used to target groups of civilians.⁵⁶On 2 September 2024, a member of IS-KP detonated his explosive vest targeting the Taliban prosecution services, killing six civilian men and one woman and wounding at least twenty-nine other civilians.⁵⁷ Al Jazeera reported that an IS-KP social media post explained that: ‘The bomber waited until government employees finished their shifts and then detonated the explosive in the middle of a crowd’.⁵⁸ On 1 December 2024, another suicide bombing killed four, including the Taliban Minister for Refugees and Repatriation, Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani, and wounded four others in a mosque within the headquarters of the ministry in Kabul.⁵⁹ On 13 February 2025, a suicide bomber detonated his explosive vest inside the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing, killing three men and wounding ten others.⁶⁰

Such direct attacks against civilians are serious violations of IHL and war crimes.⁶¹ The nature of these attacks also strongly suggests an intention to spread terror among the civilian population.62 The regularity of the attacks may in the future meet the threshold for this customary law war crime. In addition, to the extent that the attacks are directed at members of ethnic and/or religious communities on ethnic, cultural, or religious grounds, they may also constitute the crime against humanity of persecution under the Rome Statute and customary law. On the occasion of the issuance of arrest warrants against Haibatullah Akhundzada (the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) and Abdul Hakim Haqqani (the Chief Justice), the ICC Prosecutor commented that the ‘investigation in the Situation in Afghanistan continues, focusing on alleged crimes by individual members of the Taliban and the Islamic State – Khorasan Province’.⁶³

Potentially indiscriminate attacks by Afghanistan, IS-KP, and Pakistan

The principle of distinction obligates parties to any armed conflict to distinguish between members of armed forces and civilians. In general, and unless they are incorporated into the State’s armed forces or participate directly in hostilities, the police benefit from a presumption of protection against attacks as civilians.⁶⁴ In the current Afghan context, however, it appears that at least some police forces – such as the forces of the government’s General Directorate of Intelligence – are taking part in armed operations against opposition armed groups.⁶⁵ Attacks against these police forces therefore do not necessarily violate the principle of distinction.

Although, in some cases, IS-KP appears to have directed attacks against Taliban security forces, including the police, it often used means of warfare that could not distinguish between combatants and civilians. For instance, on 22 August 2024, IS-KP attacked the vehicle of the Chief of Police of Nuristan province in the Dara Noor district of Nangarhar with an IED. It is not known if he was directly participating in hostilities at the time. In any event, the attack killed five boys and one accompanying adult and wounded four other civilians.⁶⁶ Such attacks may violate the customary law prohibition of indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks.⁶⁷

Armed clashes between Pakistani and Taliban armed forces also caused civilian casualties, with some cases indicating that little concern was given to the protection of civilians.⁶⁸ The firing of mortar rounds by Pakistani armed forces due to the limited accuracy of the weapons may also amount to an indiscriminate attack in certain circumstances.‘⁶⁹ In various cases, this resulted in civilian casualties, such as, for instance, on 1 July 2024, in Kunar province, when mortar rounds killed one woman and wounded a man and a boy – all believed to be civilians protected as such.⁷⁰

In communications with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Pakistan tended to deflect responsibility for civilian casualties resulting from their operations and ascribe it to the Taliban regime’s ‘provocations’.⁷¹ For instance, between 3 and 5 March 2025, Taliban and Pakistani forces exchanged fire at the Torkham border crossing.⁷² On 5 March 2025, three journalists on assignment for Afghan media agencies were wounded when Pakistani security forces fired mortar rounds across the border.⁷³ The Embassy of Pakistan in Afghanistan told UNAMA that ‘in the early hours of 3 March 2025, Afghan forces resorted to unprovoked and indiscriminate firing across the border at Torkham (Khyber District), with heavy weapons. The firing continued until 5 March 2025, resulting in several casualties on the Pakistan side, including those of civilians, because of which Pakistani forces were compelled to respond’.⁷⁴

Airstrikes by Pakistan also caused significant numbers of civilian casualties. For instance, the three victims of an airstrike on 1 February 2025 against a mosque in Paktika province were two vaccinators and a local civilian also involved in a polio vaccination campaign in the region.⁷⁵ On 24 December 2024, airstrikes in Paktika province resulted in at least forty-five civilians killed (thirty children, eight women, and seven men) and eight wounded (six children and two women).⁷⁶ The strikes were apparently aimed at Pakistani Taliban (TTP) centres in Afghanistan and, according to media in Pakistan, killed several TTP militants and destroyed four operational centres belonging to the group.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the foreseeable extent of civilian harm appears difficult to reconcile with the customary IHL rule of proportionality in attack.

Attacks against humanitarian workers

Under IHL, personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian aid must not be attacked and must be protected.⁷⁸ Violations of these obligations may amount to war crimes.⁷⁹ On 26 December 2024, an earlier Taliban order from 2023 that banned women from working for domestic and international NGOs or the United Nations, was reiterated, severely impeding delivery of humanitarian assistance.⁸⁰. The UN Human Rights Council strongly condemned the measure.⁸¹ The UN Security Council reiterated that ‘the full, rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access consistent with international humanitarian law and other applicable international legal obligations for all humanitarian personnel, including women and international and national non-governmental organizations, is essential’.⁸²

Attacks against humanitarian workers, including acts of violence, as well as arbitrary detention and abductions of their dependents, occurred often in the reporting period. The Taliban were the primary authors.⁸³ On 2 February 2025, for example, a member of the Taliban security forces fired shots at the UN compound’s observation post in Kabul, wounding a security guard.⁸⁴ In May 2025, dozens of female national UN staff received death threats from unidentified individuals.⁸⁵

Use of landmines

Throughout the reporting period, landmines continued to pose a persistent threat to civilians in Afghanistan. When deployed in populated areas or places frequented by civilians, they may have indiscriminate effects.⁸⁶ If they are not directed at specific military objectives, this renders their use a violation of the principle of distinction.

Afghanistan is a State Party to the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, which prohibits the Taliban from using any anti-personnel mine – defined as a munition that is designed or adapted to be activated by a person. This disarmament treaty does not bind non-State armed groups directly under international law. Nevertheless, these groups are subject to the customary IHL principles of distinction and proportionality in attack, underpinned by the duty to take precautions to protect civilians.

Moreover, Afghanistan is also party to Amended Protocol II of 1996 to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Amended Protocol II), which binds all parties to an armed conflict, including non-State armed groups.⁸⁷ Although the Protocol does not ban all use of anti-personnel mines, it specifically prohibits their indiscriminate use and requires each party to an armed conflict to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians from their effects.⁸⁸ Similarly, customary law mandates that ‘when landmines are used, particular care must be taken to minimize their indiscriminate effects’.⁸⁹ While not inherently indiscriminate, anti-personnel mines, including the improvised devices used by non-State armed groups in Afghanistan, all too often kill or seriously injure civilians.

Afghanistan is obligated by the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention to clear and destroy all anti-personnel mines on its territory as soon as possible.⁹⁰ The takeover of Afghanistan and the subsequent sanctions imposed on the Taliban have had a significant negative impact on clearance rates. Clearance over the last five years totals almost one hundred square kilometres but annual clearance output – at least according to official figures – has halved since 2021. At these lower rates, fulfilling the clearance obligations in the Convention will likely require another fifteen years at least. Mine action has, however, managed so far to escape some of the most draconian Taliban policies on the employment of women.⁹¹

Protection of Persons in the Power of the Enemy

Customary and treaty IHL provide fundamental guarantees for anyone in the power of a party to a conflict, prohibiting acts such as torture or inhuman treatment, collective punishments, sexual violence, enforced disappearance, and unfair trials. Specific protection is afforded to civilians who face a specific risk of harm, such as women, children, refugees, and IDPs.⁹²

Under IHL, any deprivation of liberty must be lawful, non-arbitrary, and carried out with appropriate legal safeguards.⁹³ Persons deprived of liberty must be treated humanely at all times, with absolute prohibitions on torture and other ill-treatment.⁹⁴ Detaining authorities must ensure detainees have access to medical care, are held in humane conditions, and are protected from violence or reprisals.⁹⁵

Murder of civilians and persons hors de combat

The Taliban authorities have detained, tortured, and killed many residents suspected of providing support to armed opposition groups since they took control in 2021, including during the reporting period.⁹⁶ For instance, on 16 May 2025, following an NRF-claimed attack at a Taliban military outpost in a village in the Panjshir province, which is said to have caused seventeen casualties among its forces, the Taliban detained twenty residents, triggering fears of recourse to collective punishment.⁹⁷ In some cases, it appears that residents were targeted by the Taliban ‘because their geographical origin or religion is unjustly conflated with allegiance to armed groups that are in conflict with the Taliban’.⁹⁸

In another case, in June and early July 2025, members of the NRF were detained in Abdullah Khel district, Panjshir province, and summarily executed, after having been tortured for several days.⁹⁹ The families of the deceased were prevented from collecting their bodies.¹⁰⁰ These acts constitute the war crimes of murder, torture, and inhumane treatment, as well serious violations of the IHL duties to facilitate the return of the remains of the deceased upon request of their next of kin¹⁰¹ and to dispose of bodies in a respectful manner.¹⁰²

Treatment of members of former Afghan Defence and Security Forces

Numerous reports indicate that former Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) and other former security officials have been arbitrarily arrested, held in detention, tortured or subjected to other ill-treatment, and, in some cases, summarily executed, because of their affiliation with the former government.¹⁰³ For instance, between 1 July and 30 September 2024, UNAMA documented at least twenty-four instances of arbitrary arrest and detention; ten instances of torture and ill-treatment; and the murder of at least five former ANDSF members.¹⁰⁴

Additional Protocol II of 1977 was applicable to the NIAC that opposed the Taliban to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan from the time Afghanistan became a State Party in 2009.¹⁰⁵ Even though the NIAC that had opposed the (now defunct) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban has ended, former ANDSF members or other former officials of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan who are deprived of liberty for reasons related to the conflict remain protected by Articles 5 and 6 of the Protocol until their final release, even if their deprivation of liberty started after the end of the NIAC.¹⁰⁶ This also encompasses fundamental guarantees under Article 4 of the Protocol, which are referred to in Article 5.

Fair-trial rights

Repressive measures against journalists have also affected those covering events related to the ongoing armed conflicts. On 5 October 2024, the General Intelligence Directorate detained Afghan News Agency’s journalist Mahdi Ansary. He was subsequently sentenced by a court in Kabul to eighteen months in prison for ‘propaganda’ against the Taliban authorities.¹⁰⁷

Although the specific grounds for his arrest and conviction remain unclear, it has been reported that the journalist had been involved in investigative work on a suicide bombing claimed by IS-KP against members of the Hazara community in October 2023, and had published a commemorative message on his social media profile days before his arrest.¹⁰⁸ His detention and subsequent conviction are sufficiently connected with the armed conflicts to be regulated by IHL. Yet, his lawyer was not allowed to be present during his trial,¹⁰⁹ in breach of the fair-trial guarantees due to him under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and customary IHL.¹¹⁰ Reportedly, he was also subjected to ill-treatment during detention, including prolonged solitary confinement.¹¹¹

The conviction of former officials of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for acts that were lawfully committed under the laws in force in Afghanistan at the time would breach the principle of legality as reflected in Article 6(2)(c) of Additional Protocol II.¹¹²

Abductions and hostage-taking

Where an abduction seeks to compel the adverse party in an armed conflict to do or to abstain from any act, this violates the IHL prohibition of hostage-taking.¹¹³ Even where the requisite intent cannot be demonstrated, these acts would amount to arbitrary deprivation of liberty and cruel or inhuman treatment.¹¹⁴In many cases, the fate and whereabouts of detainees in Afghanistan have been concealed by the detaining party, which violates the IHL prohibition on enforced disappearance¹¹⁵. and the obligation to register persons deprived of their liberty in NIAC.¹¹⁶

Protection of children

Under IHL, children are afforded special protection in armed conflicts, recognizing their particular vulnerability. Core rules prohibit the recruitment and use of children under the age of 15 in hostilities, whether in State armed forces or non-State armed groups, and forbid their participation in combat.¹¹⁷ Children are entitled to general protection as civilians, including against direct attack, arbitrary detention, sexual violence, and ill-treatment, as well as specific guarantees such as access to food, medical care, and education. If detained, they must be held separately from adults (unless with their family) and treated in a manner appropriate to their age. Reunification of separated children with their families are also prioritized.¹¹⁸

During the reporting period, children continued to be especially affected by the ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan. Incidents of their recruitment and use, the killing and maiming of children, rape and other forms of sexual violence against them, and their abduction have all been documented. The United Nations verified 1,647 grave violations against 559 children (434 boys, 125 girls) having occurred in 2024. The killing (180) and maiming (363) of 543 children (422 boys, 121 girls) was mainly attributed to unidentified perpetrators (454), although cross-border shelling and airstrikes by the Pakistani armed forces accounted for fifty victims and acts by the Taliban for twenty-two. IS-KP was considered responsible for ten victims and the NRF for seven.¹¹⁹ The recruitment and use of eleven boys by the Taliban was also verified, four who were used in combat and the other seven who were used in support roles.¹²⁰

The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the UN Security Council reported that: ‘In North Afghanistan and areas close to the Pakistani borders, ISIL-K indoctrinated children in madrassas, establishing a suicide training course for minors aged approximately 14 years old.’¹²¹ Subjecting children to such training manifestly violates the duty under customary IHL on all parties to armed conflict to afford special respect and protection to children affected by armed conflict.¹²²

Sexual and gender-based violence

Although not directly related to the ongoing armed conflicts, discriminatory measures against women, girls, and LGBTI people not only remained in force in Afghanistan but were amplified with the promulgation on 21 August 2024 of a ‘Law on the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice’. The law codifies a set of regulations and policies which the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan has described as an ‘institutionalized system of oppression, discrimination and control’.¹²³ The UN treaty body, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, termed the systematic persecution in Afghanistan as ‘gender apartheid’.¹²⁴

On 8 July 2025, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the Chief Justice for the crime against humanity of persecution on gender grounds against ‘girls, women and other persons non-conforming with the Taliban’s policy on gender, gender identity or expression’ and on political grounds against persons ‘perceived as “allies of girls and women”’.¹²⁵

In September, Heather Barr, Associate Director of the Women’s Rights Division at Human Rights Watch, wrote in the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs that:

The situation in Afghanistan is the most serious women’s rights crisis in the world. An inadequate international response poses grave dangers to the rights of women and girls everywhere. It signals to other armed groups and governments that wholesale attacks on women’s rights will meet little resistance by the international community. It accepts a drastic lowering of the bar on what level of dehumanization of women and girls can be tolerated and even seen as normal.¹²⁶

1
IS-KP is believed to have been founded in 2015 as a splinter group from the Pakistani Taliban – the TTP. E. Schmitt, ‘What We Know About ISIS-K, the Group That Has Been Linked to the Moscow Attack’, The New York Times, 22 March 2024; L. J. Campbell, P. L. Bunker, and R. J. Bunker, ‘The Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISK): an assessment of current operations’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 12 August 2024, pp 3–5.
2
The NRF was launched as a political movement in 2019 by Ahmad Massoud, the son of the late anti-Taliban leader of the Northern Alliance, Ahmad Shah Massoud. The movement is based on elements of the Northern Alliance, incorporating some of its former guerrilla commanders of various ethnic origins. J. Glasse, ‘Son of Famed Afghan Resistance Fighter Launches New Political Movement’, CBC News, 11 September 2019.
3
The AFF, which was founded in the aftermath of the 2021 fall of Kabul, is mainly composed of former members of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF). ‘AFF Claims Killing 229 Taliban Members in 87 Attacks Over the Past Year’, KabulNow, 27 February 2025. The AFF aims to overthrow the Taliban regime and restore Afghanistan’s sovereignty ‘to the people’. Manifesto of the Freedom Front of Afghanistan: Political Narrative and the Struggle Outlook of the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), 2024, pp 2 and 4.
4
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/80/366-S/2025/554, 5 September 2025, para 3; UN Doc A/79/947-S/2025/372, 11 June 2025, para 3; UN Doc A/79/797-S/2025/109, 21 February 2025, para 3; UN Doc A/79/675-S/2024/876, 6 December 2024, para 14; and UN Doc A/79/341-S/2024/664, 9 September 2024, para 16.
5
International Crisis Group, ‘The Islamic State in Afghanistan: A Jihadist Threat in Retreat?’, Asia Briefing No 183, 16 July 2025, pp 7–8.
6
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/341-S/2024/664, para 17; UN Doc A/79/675-S/2024/876, para 15; UN Doc A/79/797-S/2025/109, para 20; and UN Doc A/80/366-S/2025/554, para 18.
7
Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, ‘Afghan Resistance opens “Kabul Front”’, News release, 28 May 2024.
8
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/675-S/2024/876, para 14; UN Doc A/79/797-S/2025/109, para 19; UN Doc A/79/947-S/2025/372, para 20; and UN Doc A/80/366-S/2025/554, para 17.
9
‘Situation of human rights in Afghanistan: Report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’, UN Doc A/HRC/60/23, para 56; Human Rights Watch, ‘Afghanistan: Events of 2024’, World Report 2025, pp 10–14; Amnesty International, ‘The State of the World’s Human Rights’, London, April 2025, pp 70–73; ‘Situation of human rights in Afghanistan: Report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’, UN Doc A/HRC/57/22, 4 February 2025, paras 5–12.
10
‘Media Freedom in Afghanistan’, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), November 2024, p 18. In 2024, the international NGO Reporters without Borders ranked Afghanistan 178^th of 180 States in its annual World Press Freedom Index in 2024, down 56 places from 2021, and 175^th of 180 in 2025. Reporters without Borders, ‘Afghanistan’, 14 August 2025.
11
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/947-S/2025/372, para 54; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘Afghanistan: Overview of Funding Shortfall and Impact on Humanitarian Operations (as of 14 August 2025)’, ReliefWeb, 14 August 2025.
12
Ibid; and see also Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), ‘After First 100 Days of US Aid Budget Cuts’, Press release, 25 April 2025.
13
UNAMA, ‘No safe haven: Human rights risks faced by persons involuntarily returned to Afghanistan’, 24 July 2025, p 4.
14
‘Situation of human rights in Afghanistan: Report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’, UN Doc A/HRC/60/23, para 5.
15
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Docs A/80/366-S/2025/554, para 3; and A/79/797-S/2025/109, para 70.
16
IPC, ‘Afghanistan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for March–April 2025 and Projection for May–October 2025’, Report, 4 June 2025, p 1.
17
A number of smaller non-State armed groups were also reportedly active on Afghan territory, committing sporadic acts of violence against the Taliban. These were not sufficiently intense to qualify as armed conflicts even if the criterion of ‘organization’ were met in any specific group.
18
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts; adopted at Geneva, 8 June 1977; entered into force, 7 December 1978.
19
Art 2(2), Additional Protocol II.
20
‘Afghanistan-Pakistan peace talks collapse, ceasefire continues, Taliban says’, Reuters, 9 November 2025.
21
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; adopted at Rome, 17 July 1998; entered into force, 1 July 2002 (hereafter, ICC Statute).
22
ICC, ‘Situation in Afghanistan: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II Issues Arrest Warrants for Haibatullah Akhundzada and Abdul Hakim Haqqani’, Press release, 8 July 2025.
23
See eg F. Abaasi, ‘Waiting for Justice for Afghanistan’s Forcibly Disappeared’, Human Rights Watch, 29 August 2024; Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017’, ICC, The Hague, 4 December 2017, paras 230–81; P. Gossman and B. Rubin, ‘UN Mapping Report on Afghanistan’, 2004.
24
Human Rights Council Resolution 60/2: ‘Situation of human rights in Afghanistan’, adopted without a vote on 6 October 2025, para 25.
25
Human Rights Watch, ‘US Sanctions International Criminal Court Prosecutor’, 2 September 2020.
26
‘Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court’, Press release, The White House, 6 February 2025;‘Trump Launches Sanctions against the ICC’, JusticeInfo.net, 6 February 2025.
27
‘Imposing Sanctions in Response to the ICC’s Illegitimate Actions Targeting the United States and Israel’, US Department of State, 5 June 2025; ‘Imposing Further Sanctions in Response to the ICC’s Ongoing Threat to Americans and Israelis’, US Department of State, 20 August 2025.
28
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 158: ‘Prosecution of War Crimes’.
29
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 150: ‘Reparation’. See also ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law’, UN General Assembly Resolution 60/147, 21 March 2006.
30
Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, ‘Afghanistan Inquiry Report’, Public Release Version, November 2020, p 29.
31
‘Experts Urge Australia to Pay Compensation Owed to Victims of War Crimes in Afghanistan’, Press release, OHCHR, 7 August 2024. See also ‘Letter of Special Mandate Holders Addressed to the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations in Geneva’, OHCHR, Geneva, 6 June 2024; B. Saul, ‘Australian Compensation for War Crimes in Afghanistan: A Rights-Based Approach, Not Military Charity, Is Needed’, Articles of War, Lieber Institute, West Point, 14 March 2025.
32
E. Camins, ‘Australia’s Afghanistan Inquiry Compensation Scheme: A Pragmatic Model for Individual Reparations’, Articles of War, Lieber Institute, West Point, 25 July 2025; P. Gossman, ‘Afghan War Crimes Victims Still Awaiting Justice: Australia, United Kingdom Make Slow but Unsteady Progress’, Human Rights Watch, 19 May 2025.
33
L. Tingle, ‘“Broken System”: Why Allegations of War Crimes by ADF Soldiers May Never Result in Charges’, ABC News, 9 October 2024.
34
‘Afghan War Crimes Victims Still Awaiting Justice: Australia, United Kingdom Make Slow but Unsteady Progress’.
35
H. O’Grady, J. Gunter and R. Tinman, ‘Ex-UK Special Forces Break Silence on War Crime Claims’, BBC Panorama, 12 May 2025.
36
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 7: ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives’.
37
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 9: ‘Definition of Civilian Objects’.
38
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 10: ‘Civilian Objects’ Loss of Protection from Attack’.
39
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 8: ‘Definition of Military Objectives’. In addition, the object’s partial or total destruction, capture, or neutralisation must offer a definite military advantage in the prevailing circumstances.
40
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/947-S/2025/372, para 31.
41
See eg ‘Pakistan Violated Afghan Airspace 55 Times In 17 Days, Leaked Taliban Documents Reveal’, Afghanistan International, 19 February 2025.
42
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/947-S/2025/372, 11 June 2025, para 31.
43
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 1: ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants‘.
44
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’.
45
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’. The accompanying commentary states that in NIACs, ‘the issue of doubt has hardly been addressed in State practice, even though a clear rule on this subject would be desirable as it would enhance the protection of the civilian population against attack’. One ‘cannot automatically attack anyone who might appear dubious….’ The same approach with respect to IACs ‘seems justified’ in NIACs.
46
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’.
47
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 1: ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants‘.
48
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 14: ‘Proportionality in Attack’; and Rule 15: ‘Principle of Precautions in Attack’.
49
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/341-S/2024/664, para 28; UN Doc A/79/675-S/2024/876, para 25; UN Doc A/79/797-S/2025664/109, para 32; and UN Doc A/79/947-S/2025/372, para 30.
50
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 2: ‘Violence Aimed at Spreading Terror among the Civilian Population’; and Rule 156: ‘Definition of War Crimes’.
51
Art 7(1), ICC Statute.
52
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Docs A/79/797-S/2025/109, para 20; A/80/366-S/2025/554, para 8.
53
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/675-S/2024/876, para 26; F. Abbasi, ‘Afghanistan’s Hazara Community Needs Protection’, Human Rights Watch, 13 September 2024.
54
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/797-S/2025/109, para 32; Q. Azizi, ‘ISIS Claims Responsibility for Deadly Attack on Sufi Shrine in Afghanistan’, Amu TV, 24 November 2024.
55
A. Gul, ‘Islamic State Claims Killing of Chinese National in Afghanistan’, Voice of America, 22 January 2025; ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/797-S/2025/109, para 20.
56
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/675-S/2024/876, para 26.
57
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/797-S/2025/109, para 20.
58
‘ISIL Claims Responsibility for Deadly Kabul Attack’, Al Jazeera, 3 September 2024.
59
‘Afghan Refugee Minister Killed in Kabul Blast’, Al Jazeera, 11 December 2024; ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/797-S/2025/109, para 20.
60
‘Update on the Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan: January–March 2025 Update’, OHCHR and UNAMA, 1 May 2025, p 4.
61
Art 8(2)(e)(i), ICC Statute.
62
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 2: ‘Violence Aimed at Spreading Terror among the Civilian Population’.
63
‘Statement of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor on the Issuance of Arrest Warrants in the Situation in Afghanistan’, ICC, 8 July 2025.
64
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor vSesay, Kallon and Gbao, Judgment (Trial Chamber) (Case No SCSL-04-15-T), 2 March 2009, para 87.
65
E. Taylor, ‘General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU): Taliban Special Police?’, Grey Dynamics, 25 May 2025.
66
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/675-S/2024/876, para 26; F. Rahmati, ‘Six Killed, Five Injured in Explosion in Eastern Afghanistan’, Khaama Press, 22 August 2024.
67
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 11: ‘Indiscriminate Attacks’; and Rule 14: ‘Proportionality in Attack’.
68
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Docs A/79/341-S/2024/664, para 28; A/79/675-S/2024/876, para 28; A/79/797-S/2025/109, para 35; and A/79/947-S/2025/372, para 31.
69
Update on the Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan: April–June 2025 Update’, OHCHR and UNAMA, p 6.
70
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/341-S/2024/664, para 28.
71
‘Update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan: July–September 2024 Update’, OHCHR, 31 October 2024, p 5.
72
‘Update on the Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan: January–March 2025 Update’, p 5.
73
Q. Azizi, ‘Clashes Erupt Again between Taliban, Pakistani Border Forces at Torkham’, Amu TV, 5 March 2025; S. Sirat, ‘Three Journalists Wounded in Cross-Border Gunfire at Torkham, Sources Say’, Amu TV, 5 March 2025.
74
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/947-S/2025/372, para 31.
75
‘Update on the Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan: January–March 2025 Update’, p 5.
76
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/797-S/2025/109, para 35. See also: ‘World News in Brief: Civilian Killings in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan Air Crash, More Syrian Refugees Return Home’, UN News, 26 December 2024.
77
‘Pakistan Airstrikes in Paktika Claim 46 Lives, Majority Women and Children’, Afghanistan International, 25 December 2024.
78
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 31: ‘Humanitarian Relief Personnel’.
79
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 156: ‘Definition of War Crimes’.
80
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee), Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Afghanistan, UN Doc CEDAW/C/AFG/CO/4, 10 July 2025, para 33; ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/797-S/2025/109, 21 February 2025, para 57
81
Human Rights Council Resolution 57/3: ‘Situation of human rights in Afghanistan’, adopted without a vote on 9 October 2024, para 3.
82
UN Security Council Resolution 2777, adopted on 17 March 2025, seventh preambular para.
83
See eg: ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/797-S/2025/109, paras 23 and 64; and UN Doc A/79/947-S/2025/372, paras 24 and 62.
84
‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/797-S/2025/109, para 23.
85
UN Security Council Verbatim Records, 23 June 2025, UN Doc S/PV.9942, p 4 (Ms Roza Otunbayeva, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNAMA); and ‘Situation of human rights in Afghanistan: Report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’, UN Doc A/HRC/60/23, para 25.
86
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 11: ‘Indiscriminate Attacks’; and Rule 12: ‘Definition of Indiscriminate Attacks’.
87
Art 1(2), Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 annexed to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; adopted at Geneva, 3 May 1996; entered into force, 3 December 1998.
88
Art 3(8) and (10), Amended Protocol II of 1996.
89
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 81: ‘Restrictions on the Use of Landmines’.
90
Art 5, Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction; adopted at Oslo, 18 September 1997; entered into force, 1 March 1999.
91
Mine Action Review, ‘Afghanistan’, Report, Norwegian People’s Aid, 2024.
92
ICRC, Customary IHL Rules 134–138: ‘Chapter 39. Other Persons Afforded Specific Protection’.
93
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 99: ‘Deprivation of Liberty’.
94
Common Article 3, Geneva Conventions; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 90: ‘Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment’.
95
Common Article 3, Geneva Conventions; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 89: ‘Violence to Life’.
96
‘Situation of human rights in Afghanistan: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’, UN Doc A/HRC/57/22, para 18; ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/341-S/2024/664, para 30; ‘NRF Claims Deadly Attack on Taliban in Panjshir; Taliban Detains Residents’, KabulNow, 17 May 2025.
97
S. Qudosi, ‘Taliban Detain 20 Residents of Panjshir, Sources Say’, Amu TV, 17 May 2025.
98
‘Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett’, UN Doc A/HRC/58/80, 20 February 2025, para 52; World Organisation against Torture (OMCT), Civil Society and Human Rights Network (CSHRN), and Human Rights Defenders Plus (HRD+), ‘Every Hour Felt as Long as a Year: Voices of Detainees Held by Afghanistan’s de Facto General Directorate of Intelligence’, Report, Geneva, 2025, p 45.
99
‘NRF Confirms Execution of Two Commanders by Taliban in Panjshir’, Kabul Now, 6 July 2025.
100
Ibid.
101
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 114: ‘Return of the Remains and Personal Effects of the Dead’.
102
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 115: ‘Disposal of the Dead’.
103
‘Taliban Detains Two Former Soldiers in Takhar for Alleged Ties with Resistance Groups’, KabulNow, 25 July 2024; ‘M. Evstatieva, ‘Three Years after the U.S. Withdrawal, Former Afghan Forces Are Hunted by the Taliban’, NPR, 25 September 2024; ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/79/675-S/2024/876, paras 29 and 68; UN Doc A/79/341-S/2024/664, para 30; UN Doc A/79/797-S/2025/109, paras 36 and 75; and UN Doc A/79/947-S/2025/372, para 33; ‘Update on the Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan: January–March 2025 Update’, p 5; ‘Update on the Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan: April–June 2025 Update’, OHCHR and UNAMA, 10 August 2025, p 5.
104
‘Update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan: July–September 2024 Update’, p 5.
105
D. Akande, ‘Afghanistan accedes to Additional Protocols to Geneva Conventions: Will AP II govern the conflict in Afghanistan?’, EJIL: Talk!, 30 June 2009; A. Bellal, G. Giacca and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘International Law and Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol 93, No 881 (2011), pp 57–59; J. Plamenac, Unravelling Unlawful Confinement in Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Belligerents’ Detention Practices in Afghanistan, Syria and Ukraine, Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2022, 94–95.
106
According to Art 2(2) of the Protocol: ‘At the end of the armed conflict, all the persons who have been deprived of their liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to such conflict, as well as those deprived of their liberty or whose liberty is restricted after the conflict for the same reasons, shall enjoy the protection of Articles 5 and 6 until the end of such deprivation or restriction of liberty’.
107
Reporters without Borders, ‘Afghanistan: Journalist Mahdi Ansary, Imprisoned by the Taliban’s General Intelligence Directorate, Must Be Released Immediately’, 23 October 2024.
108
Ibid.
109
Amnesty International, ‘Afghanistan: Release Journalist Convicted of Propaganda: Mahdi Ansari’, Press release, 4 February 2025.
110
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 100: ‘Fair Trial Guarantees’.
111
Amnesty International, ‘Afghanistan: Release Journalist Convicted of Propaganda: Mahdi Ansari’.
112
According to Art 6(2)(c) of Additional Protocol II, ‘no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under the law, at the time when it was committed’. See also ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 101: ‘The Principle of Legality’.
113
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 96: ‘Hostage-Taking’.
114
Common Article 3, Geneva Conventions; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 99: ‘Deprivation of Liberty’; and Rule 90: ‘Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment’.
115
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 98: ‘Enforced Disappearance’
116
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 123: ‘Recording and Notification of Personal Details of Persons Deprived of their Liberty’.
117
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 136: ‘Recruitment of Child Soldiers’.
118
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 135: ‘Children’.
119
‘Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General’, UN Doc A/79/878-S/2025/247, 17 June 2025, paras 13, 15.
120
Ibid, para 14.
121
‘Thirty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/482, 24 July 2025, para 86.
122
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 135: ‘Children’.
123
‘Study on the so-called law on the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett’, UN Doc A/HRC/58/74, 12 March 2025, paras 1 and 87. See also ‘Situation of human rights in Afghanistan: Report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’, UN Doc A/HRC/60/23, paras 11–17; Human Rights Defender Plus (HRD+), ‘HRD+ Legal Analysis: A Review of the Law on Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice’, 23 August 2024.
124
CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Afghanistan, paras 13–14. See also ‘Situation of human rights in Afghanistan: Report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’, UN Doc A/HRC/60/23, paras 18–21; H. Litty, The Taliban’s ‘Gender Apartheid: The Reality of Women in Afghanistan‘, North Carolina Journal of International Law, Vol 50, No 2 (January 2025), 349–74.
125
ICC, ‘Situation in Afghanistan: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II Issues Arrest Warrants for Haibatullah Akhundzada and Abdul Hakim Haqqani’, Press release.
126
H. Barr, ‘Gender Apartheid as an International Crime: Taliban Oppression in Afghanistan Triggers Campaign’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 2 September 2025.