Iran

During the reporting period, Iran was involved in twelve international armed conflicts (IACs):

Iran v Israel and the United States of America (US)
Iran v the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Iran v Qatar
Iran v Bahrain
Iran v Jordan
Iran v Kuwait
Iran v Saudi Arabia
Iran v Iraq
Iran v Oman
Iran v Azerbaijan
Iran v the United Kingdom (UK)

The IACs are regulated by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 to which all States involved are party. Iran is not a party to Additional Protocol I of 1977, meaning that the treaty is not formally applicable to any of the IACs involving Iran. Most of the Protocol’s provisions are, however, customary in nature and therefore bind all States. Customary international humanitarian law (IHL), in particular Hague Law rules governing the conduct of hostilities, apply to all the cases listed above.

The hostile relations between Iran and the United States stem from the 1953 US-backed coup that ousted then Iranian Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh.¹ Mossadegh sought to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which was, at the time, controlled by the United Kingdom.² When he nationalized Iran’s oil in 1951, the United Kingdom began conspiring with the United States to overthrow him and restore power to the deposed pro-Western shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.³ In August 1953, Mossadegh was overthrown and jailed.⁴ This event fuelled anti-Western sentiment in Iran, which ultimately led to the 1979 revolution and the Iran Hostage Crisis,⁵ but only after creating close relations between Washington and Tehran.⁶

Shah Pahlavi ruled Iran as a dictator until 1979, enriching himself and brutally quashing dissent.⁷ Religious discontent grew within Iran against the shah’s project of westernizing Iran; Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a Shiite Muslim, openly called for the overthrow of Pahlavi during the Shah’s rule.⁸ In 1963, Pahlavi imprisoned Khomeini then, in November 1964, expelled him from Iran.⁹ Support for Khomeini continued to grow domestically,¹⁰ and in late 1978, unrest broke out against Pahlavi.¹¹ The shah in January 1979, never to return.¹² On 1 February, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran after fourteen years in exile.¹³ Khomeini’s return is seen as the start of Iran’s Islamic Revolution.¹⁴ Khomeini was later declared Iran’s political and religious leader for life in December 1979 after a new Iranian constitution was adopted.¹⁵

During the Islamic Revolution, the US Embassy in Tehran was attacked twice. In February 1979, gunmen stormed the Embassy, holding Ambassador William Sullivan, two journalists, and up to 150 staff hostage for a few hours.¹⁶ The Embassy was damaged, Americans were wounded, and several Iranians were killed.¹⁷ Sullivan called Iranian authorities for help and Khomeini sent forces to free the hostages.¹⁸

The second incident was spurred by US President Jimmy Carter’s decision to allow Shah Pahlavi to enter the United States for cancer treatment in October 1979.¹⁹ Carter justified the decision on the basis that the Shah was ‘desperately ill’ and on promises from Iranian officials that they would protect Americans in Iran.²⁰ On 4 November, Iranian students protesting outside the Embassy in Tehran stormed it, taking ninety people hostage, including sixty-six Americans.²¹ Although Ayatollah Khomeini did not directly call for the Embassy to be occupied, he did, on 1 November, declare that it was ‘up to the dear pupils, students and theological students to expand their attacks against the United States and Israel’ to force the United States to return the Shah to Iran to stand trial.²² Those involved in the seizure referred to this statement in explaining their actions.²³

On 7 November, President Carter sent representatives to negotiate the release of the hostages, but Ayatollah Khomeini refused to meet with them,²⁴ and on 14 November, Iranian assets in US banks were frozen.²⁵ Despite the release of some American hostages on Khomeini’s orders on 17 November,²⁶ a call from the United Nations (UN) Security Council for the release of the hostages on 4 December,²⁷ a failed rescue attempt by the United States in April 1980,²⁸ and a case at the International Court of Justice,²⁹ at least fifty-two hostages were held for 444 days – until 20 January 1981.³⁰ Washington had cut off diplomatic ties with Iran in April 1980 but upon the release of the hostages, Iranian assets were unfrozen and US sanctions were lifted.³¹ The Shah left the United States for Panama in December 1979 and died in Egypt in July 1980.³²

Other notable incidents that strained relations between the two States include the United States’s support for Iraq and Saddam Hussein in the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, even after the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) found evidence that Hussein had used chemical weapons against Iranians, the United States’s 1984 declaration of Iran as a terrorism-sponsoring State after Hezbollah claimed responsibility for an attack on barracks housing American forces in Lebanon in which 241 US personnel were killed,³³ and the 2002 State of the Union address by then-US President George W Bush in which he termed Iran, North Korea, and Iraq the ‘Axis of Evil’.³⁴

A point of contention between Iran and the United States as well as Iran and Israel has been Iran’s nuclear programme. In 1968, Shah Pahlavi signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, declaring that Iran did not possess nuclear weapons and would not pursue such weapons in the future.³⁵ During the 1990s, Iran started receiving nuclear assistance from Russia and China, including a possible supply of enriched uranium from Russia. While an enrichment plant never officially came into existence due to US pressure, Iran is said to have received enriched uranium from A. Q. Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist. In addition, Iran was able to buy some equipment that could be used in making nuclear bombs for its 1,200-megawatt reactor at Bushehr. In the late 1990s, Iranian officials approved the Amad Plan, a clandestine operation to build five nuclear weapons by 2004. In carrying out this plan, Iran was able to develop and test its own weapons but lacked the necessary uranium and plutonium to fuel the bombs.³⁶

In 2002, Iranian dissident groups revealed that there were two underground nuclear facilities in Iran – one at Natanz that was used to enrich uranium and a second at Arak that was used for producing heavy-water. These facilities can be used both for civilian and military purposes. After negotiations, Iran agreed to stop pursuing its Amad Plan in 2003. However, nuclear development that was plausibly able to be connected to civilian use continued to be pursued and was declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Despite this openness, Iran has not always made complete and consistent declarations to the IAEA, clouding the extent of its nuclear projects and operations. Iran also did not completely cease enrichment.³⁷

In response to Iran’s activities, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States sought to negotiate an end to Iran’s enrichment activities by offering certain incentives. At the same time, the UN Security Council was imposing increasingly harsh sanctions on Iran’s nuclear programme. In 2009, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom announced that Iran had built a new nuclear facility, Fordow, deep within a mountain. Though it was legally obliged to do so, Iran had not declared this to the IAEA. In June 2010, a cyberattack – deployed through a malicious computer worm called ‘Stuxnet’ and widely believed to have been conducted by the United States and Israel – infected the Natanz nuclear enrichment site, destroying 1,000 centrifuges and fourteen industrial plants.³⁸

Negotiations made progress after Hassan Rouhani became Iran’s President in 2013.³⁹ In July 2015, Iran, the United States, and several other States signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known informally as the Iran Nuclear Deal, according to which Iran agreed to restrict enrichment operations and permit inspections at various sites.⁴⁰ Under this deal, Iran was granted relief from some sanctions and a UN weapons embargo.⁴¹

The deal was successful in its early stages – the IAEA certified that Iran met its preliminary pledges in early 2016 and the United States and several European States unfroze $100 billion worth of Iranian assets.⁴² But Israel vehemently opposed the deal; Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered a speech to US Congress in March 2015, calling on Congress to take legislative action that would prevent the deal from entering into force.⁴³

Much like relations between Washington and Tehran, during Shah Pahlavi’s rule, Tehran and Tel Aviv enjoyed good diplomatic relations. Israel needed Arab allies in the Middle East and the Shah wanted to have good relations with the United States.⁴⁴ Iran became a major oil provider to Israel.⁴⁵ The two also covertly cooperated on military and security issues, with Israel’s Mossad training Iran’s security and intelligence service.⁴⁶ Also much like US-Iran relations, the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the dawn of Ayatollah Khomeini’s rule changed Israel-Iran relations, with Iran cutting ties with Israel due to their treatment of Palestine and Palestinians.⁴⁷

Israel began viewing Iran as the source of all their former regional conflicts, in particular those against Hamas and Hezbollah.⁴⁸

Since joining the Israeli Knesset in 1992, Benjamin Netanyahu has maintained that Iran is ‘on the verge of’ developing nuclear weapons.⁴⁹ Netanyahu is not alone in this – in 2021, Israel’s then Minister of Defence Benny Gantz claimed that Iran was ‘two months away’ from developing nuclear weapons.⁵⁰ Over the years, Iran has blamed Israel for sabotage attacks on its nuclear facilities and for killing nuclear scientists.⁵¹ Israel has also repeatedly called for regime change in Iran.⁵²

The late 2010s and early 2020s saw increased acrimony between the United States and Iran and between Israel and Iran. In 2018, US President Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and instituted sanctions on Iran in order to put ‘maximum pressure’ on the State.⁵³ In 2019, the United States declared the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), an elite branch of the Iranian army, a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).⁵⁴ The official purpose of designating groups as FTOs is to deny identified individuals access to the US financial system, thereby cutting off resources that might be used to carry out attacks. Any assets of an identified person that are in the United States or controlled by a person in the United States are frozen, and US persons are not allowed to do business with these identified persons.⁵⁵ In January 2020, the United States fired a drone that killed the head of Iran’s Quds Force, Major General Qassem Soleimani, alleging that he was developing plans to attack US assets in the region in the future.⁵⁶ Iran responded by firing on US bases in Iraq⁵⁷ and by announcing that it would no longer limit its nuclear enrichment plans.⁵⁸

Tensions between the United States and Iran looked like they might be easing when, in March 2025, Trump sent a letter to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei proposing a new round of nuclear talks.⁵⁹ Though initially rejecting the proposed talks on the basis that they were demands, Iran later unofficially came to the negotiating table in Oman.⁶⁰ Despite reported progress in the talks, US and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025 completely derailed them.⁶¹ Iran responded by launching a missile attack on a US-operated air base in Qatar.⁶² Although another series of talks between the United States and Iran was held in February 2026 (see below) tensions between Iran and the United States and Iran and Israel remained high, culminating in the outbreak of the conflict on 28 February 2026 (see below).

Protests in Iran Spark a Deadly Crackdown and Military Threats from Trump

Protests erupted in Iran in late December 2025 in response to a decline in the Iranian Rial, mismanagement of essential services, and the plunge in living conditions brought on by cuts to water and electricity and worsening pollution.⁶³ The protests were started by shopkeepers in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar but quickly spread to all thirty-one provinces.⁶⁴ As the protests spread, their purpose changed – the protestors were now calling for an end to Iran’s clerical rule.⁶⁵

Though initially sympathetic to the protests of the shopkeepers,⁶⁶ the government’s response quickly turned brutal and deadly.⁶⁷ Ayatollah Khamenei called the protesters ‘rioters’ and ‘terrorists working for Israel and the United States’. ⁶⁸ On 8 January, Iran instituted a nationwide internet blackout,⁶⁹ and Iranian security forces began firing on protesters; in Tehran, security forces shot at protesters from the roof of a police station, while in Karaj, live rounds were fired into a march.⁷⁰ Shots were often aimed at the heads and torsos of protestors and were also often fired when protestors were fleeing.⁷¹

Iran admitted that at least 3,000 people were killed in the crackdown,⁷² but some medical sources suggest that the number may be as high as 20,000.⁷³ Several thousand people were also detained and/or disappeared.⁷⁴

Iran continues to use the death penalty. It sentenced several persons detained in the crackdown to death and sought to expedite this process of judicial killing.⁷⁵ By 28 February 2026, at least seven detained protestors had been executed.⁷⁶ Due to the brutal crackdown, the protests came to an end on 12 January 2026.⁷⁷

In response to the protests, Trump threatened US military intervention.⁷⁸ On 2 January, Trump warned that the United States was ‘locked and loaded’ and would ‘come to’ the ‘rescue’ of protestors should Iran start killing them.⁷⁹ On 11 January, he stated that the United States was looking at ‘some very strong options’ to stop the violent crackdown.⁸⁰

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that foreign interference had ‘stoked and fuelled’ the protests.⁸¹ On 14 January, Trump called on Iranian’s to ‘KEEP PROTESTING’ and that ‘HELP [was] ON ITS WAY’⁸² and although he did not clarify what this meant, he did not exclude military action.⁸³ This prompted Amir Saeid Irvani, Iran’s Ambassador to the UN, to state that the United States and Israel ‘bear direct and undeniable legal responsibility for the resulting loss of innocent civilian lives’.⁸⁴ On 14 January, Trump vowed ‘very strong action’ should Iran execute any of the detained protestors.⁸⁵ Ayatollah Khamenei warned that any US action would be met with a regional war.⁸⁶

It was reported that to address the threats and potential military action, exchanges on avoiding a conflict were made through Omani diplomats as well as between US Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi. While this did not produce a meaningful outcome by the end of January 2026.⁸⁷ The two States did have three rounds of indirect talks on Iran’s nuclear programmein February 2026 (see below).

International Responses to Initial Attacks

In the immediate aftermath of the United States and Israeli attack on Iran and on the Iranian response (see below), several States condemned the US and Israeli action, including Pakistan and Brazil. Certain States condemned only the Iranian response, including Germany, and France, while other States openly supported the United States and Israeli action, including Canada, and Australia. Gulf States that condemned the Iranian attacks on their territory, including Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. States that called for diplomacy, the protection of civilians, and an end to hostilities, included Oman, China, India, and Ireland. One State – Norway – explicitly rejected Israel’s justification of pre-emptive self-defense.¹²⁰ Antonio Guterres, the UN Secretary-General, called for an ‘immediate cessation of hostilities’ while the European Union (EU) called for restraint and urged all parties to ‘fully respect international law’.¹²¹

Closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Fluctuating Oil Prices

In response US and Israeli strikes on Iran (see below), on 2 March 2026 the IRGC announced that Iran would be closing the Strait of Hormuz and that any ship attempting to pass through it would be attacked.¹²² Located between Oman and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz is a critical oil transit route through which about twenty per cent of the world’s oil supply passes.¹²³ Iran declared that it would ‘not allow even a single litre of oil’ on its way to the United States, Israel, and their partners to transit the Strait.¹²⁴ Some States reportedly approached Iran to seek safe passage through the Strait, including China, France, and Italy, while ships from some States were able to pass through including from Pakistan, Türkiye, and India (although two Indian ships were struck at some point).¹²⁵

Iran has since struck at least twenty-two ships attempting to traverse the Strait,¹²⁶ using missiles, drones, explosive-laden boats, and mines.¹²⁷

The closure has greatly increased global oil prices. While openly acknowledging that the move was a ‘tool to pressure the enemy’, Iran also called on States to ‘be ready for oil to be $200 a barrel’.¹²⁸ Immediately after the 2 March closure announcement, oil prices went up from $65 to more than $100 per barrel.¹²⁹ On 9 March, oil was trading at almost $120 a barrel.¹³⁰ To address market fluctuations, Trump pledged that the US military would escort ships through the Strait ‘if necessary’.¹³¹ The ability of the United States to do this is, however, doubtful.¹³²

In terms of the conditions of the ceasefire (see below), Iran announced that it had ‘completely opened’ the Strait for commercial ships on 17 April.¹³³ While Trump claimed that Iran had agreed to never close the Strait again, Iran clarified that the Strait would be closed again should the United States naval blockade continue (see below).¹³⁴ Thus, on 18 April, Iran closed the Strait.¹³⁵ On 24 April, Trump declared that the United States had ‘total control over the strait’ after US forces boarded a tanker in the Indian Ocean that was allegedly carrying Iranian oil.¹³⁶ However, at the time of writing, the Strait was still effectively closed.¹³⁷

Drone Attack on Italian Soldiers Stationed in Erbil

On 12 March 2026, an Italian military base called Camp Singara was targeted in Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan. Although it is a joint NATO base, 141 Italian soldiers were stationed at Camp Singara at the time of the attack. It was initially unclear if the camp was hit by a missile or a drone. According to Reuters, the facility was hit by a drone that damaged a military vehicle but that no soldiers were injured. Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani claimed that the attack was probably the work of a pro-Iranian militia based in ⁠Iraq.¹³⁸

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias

Iraqi militia groups have increasingly launched drone strikes across the Gulf region in support of Iran’s military operations since the outbreak of the conflict on 28 February 2026. They were, for example, responsible for more than half of all drone strikes against Saudi Arabia.¹³⁹ They also claimed numerous attacks on US bases in Iraq and other States across the region.¹⁴⁰ In most cases, however, it remains unclear whether the perpetrator was Iran itself or one of the Iraqi militias it backs.¹⁴¹

Coordinated Attacks on Israel from Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis

It was reported in early April that Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen had engaged in a coordinated attack against Israel, targeting ‘sensitive Israeli enemy targets’ with ballistic missiles.¹⁴²

US/Israeli Attack on B1 Bridge

On 2 April, the United States and Israelstruck a bridge that connects the cities of Tehran and Karaj as part of a military effort to sever Iranian supply routes.¹⁴³ The B1 Bridge is a major economic link in Iran and a part of Iran’s efforts to modernize its transport network.¹⁴⁴ The attack was reportedly a double-tap strike.¹⁴⁵ The bridge was damaged, while up to eight people were killed and several others were injured.¹⁴⁶

Trump Threatens ‘Hell’ on Iran and Declares Death on ‘A Whole Civilization’

Frustrated with Iran’s control and closure of the Strait of Hormuz (see above), President Trump posted threatening messages on Truth Social in early April. On 5 April he designated 7 April as ‘Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day’, demanding that Iran open the Strait or it would be ‘living in hell’.¹⁴⁷ In a press conference on 6 April, he gave Iran until 8pm Eastern Daylight Time on Tuesday 7 April (which would be 3am on 8 April in Iran) to open the Strait.¹⁴⁸ He went on to state that the United States would decimate every bridge in Iran and burn and explode all Iranian power plants.¹⁴⁹ When pushed on whether he did not see the action as ‘punishing Iranians for the actions of the regime’, Trump responded by stating that Iranians ‘would be willing to suffer in order to have that freedom’.¹⁵⁰

His rhetoric escalated significantly on the morning of 7 April, when he posted that ‘[a] whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again’ going on to state that ’47 years of extortion, corruption, and death, will finally end’.¹⁵¹ This statement drew immediate domestic and international backlash from international organizations and individuals, including the Pope and UN Secretary-General António Guterres.¹⁵² Various Iranian Embassies responded on X, stating that ‘[a] psychopath’s threats [would] not end’ Iran and destroy the Persian people and that the United States and its allies would ‘suffer an unforgettable hit from the ancient civilization of Iran’.¹⁵³ Iran’s UN representative, Amir-Saeid Iravani, stated that Iran would respond immediately and proportionally to any attacks.¹⁵⁴ Trump retreated on these threats later on 7 April when Iran proposed a ‘workable’ ceasefire plan (see below).¹⁵⁵

Ceasefire between Iran and the United States and Israel

A two-week ceasefire between Iran and the United States, mediated by Pakistan, came into effect on 8 April shortly before Trump’s deadline for Iran (see above).¹⁵⁶ Trump called the ten-point plan proposed by Iran ‘workable’.¹⁵⁷ The plan is said to involve Iran continuing to control the Strait of Hormuz, that sanctions on it be lifted, that the US military fully withdraw from the Middle East, and that the UN Security Council adopt a resolution making the final agreement binding.¹⁵⁸

In the Farsi version of the agreement, Iran included the demand that the United States accept enrichment as part of its nuclear programme. This did not appear in the English version shared with journalist by Iran.¹⁵⁹ The United States later said that this was not in the version of the plan submitted to them privately and that it was not on the table.¹⁶⁰ Trump also stated that Iran had agreed to completely and immediately reopening the Strait for Hormuz in exchange for stopping the bombing.¹⁶¹

Israel also agreed to the ceasefire but said that fighting against Hezbollah in Lebanon was excluded from its ambit,¹⁶² and US Vice President JD Vance echoed the claim.¹⁶³ However, Pakistan said that Lebanon was included in the agreement.¹⁶⁴ Iran insisted that the agreement did include Lebanon and stated that continued Israel bombardment of Hezbollah would prevent them from entering into a permanent agreement to end the hostilities.¹⁶⁵ Israel and Lebanon ultimately agreed to a ten-day US-mediated ceasefire on 16 April,¹⁶⁶ and a three-week extension was announced on 24 April.¹⁶⁷

The ceasefire was due to expire on 22 April but on 21 April, Trump announced an extension of the ceasefire, seemingly indefinitely.¹⁶⁸ Although Iran did not publicly agree to Trump’s extension – one of its officials stated that it held little weight¹⁶⁹ – they sent Abbas Araghchi to Pakistan for indirect talks with the United States. But plans by President Trump to send Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner¹⁷⁰ were abandoned on 25 April. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed (see above); the United States is continuing to conduct a naval blockade on ships transporting Iranian oil (see below): and Israel and Hezbollah continue to trade fire.¹⁷¹

US Naval Blockade on Ships Carrying Iranian Oil

Trump announced on Sunday 12 April that the United States would be instituting a blockade of all ships entering and exiting Iranian ports and coasts.¹⁷² Ships from other States on the Strait would be allowed to pass.¹⁷³ The blockade came into effect on 13 April and initial plans were for the blockading ships to be located outside the range of Iranian missiles,¹⁷⁴ although the exact location of the ships is not publicly known.¹⁷⁵ The move drew threats from Iran that it would restart hostilities¹⁷⁶ and that it would deal decisively with any ships that approached it from the blockade.¹⁷⁷ Trump offered the same threats to any Iranian ships that approached the blockade.¹⁷⁸ The United States has attacked and seize an Iranian tanker in the Gulf of Oman that was attempting to bypass the United States blockade.¹⁷⁹

Trump said that the United States would not lift the blockade until the two States came to a deal on the end of the conflict and Iran’s nuclear programme,¹⁸⁰ and on 23 April, despite Iran’s apparent unwillingness to reopen the Strait due to the blockade, Trump expressed that he was ‘satisfied’ with it continuing.¹⁸¹

Iran was involved in fourteen IACs during the reporting period.

Under IHL, an IAC occurs when one or more States resort to armed force against another State, regardless of the motives for the violence.¹⁸² A unilateral use of military force by one State against another is sufficient to trigger an IAC, even if the other State does not retaliate.¹⁸³

Consequently, the situations in which Iran aimed to strike US military bases and assets in sovereign third States across the Gulf region also fall under this definition. The qualification of a situation as an IAC is not affected by whether the third State or the United States successfully intercepted missiles and drones launched by Iran into the third State’s sovereign territory. The decisive criterion is that these actions were part of a hostile offensive operation carried out by Iran and not the result of a mere mistake or an individual acting ultra vires.¹⁸⁴

Put differently, an IAC requires a ‘State’ to oppose at least one other ‘State’. The notion ‘State’ is not limited to the territory of a sovereign State but includes the State’s armed forces.¹⁸⁵ The applicability of IHL is triggered from the moment that force is used by one State against another.¹⁸⁶ In the case of Iran attacking US and other military bases across the Gulf region, this means that it is both the third State and the United States which enter into a belligerent relationship with Iran, triggering two separate IACs. The former because a State’s sovereign territory is being attacked, and the latter, because the attack represents a use of force against the State’s armed forces.

The IACs between Iran and States hosting US military bases include the IAC between Iran and the UAE (28 February 2026),¹⁸⁷ Iran and Qatar (28 February 2026),¹⁸⁸ Iran and Bahrain (28 February 2026),¹⁸⁹ Iran and Jordan (28 February 2026),¹⁹⁰ Iran and Kuwait (28 February 2026),¹⁹¹ Iran and Saudi Arabia (28 February 2026),¹⁹² Iran and Iraq (28 February 2026),¹⁹³ as well as Iran and Oman (1 March 2026).¹⁹⁴

Iran also attacked other sovereign territories where there are no US military bases. This includes the IACs between Iran and Cyprus (1 March 2026),¹⁹⁵ and Iran and Azerbaijan (5 March 2026).¹⁹⁶

Several IACs were additionally triggered with States whose armed forces were attacked by Iran in a third State, namely the IAC between Iran and the United Kingdom (1 March 2026).¹⁹⁷

The IAC between the United States and Israel against Iran was continuing at the time of writing, despite a ceasefire in place.

International Armed Conflict between Iran and the United States and Israel

The IAC between Iran and the United States and Iran and Israel was triggered on 28 February 2026. ¹ The US military operation was called ‘Operation Epic Fury’ ² and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) referred to ‘Operation Roaring Lion’ to describe its operations ³ against the sovereign territory of Iran.⁴

Since 28 February, the United States has carried out a large number of airstrikes on Iranian sovereign territory. US Central Command (CENTCOM) published an update on its military activities within Operation Epic Fury on 6 April 2026. In this update it was communicated that US CENTCOM was striking targets with the purpose of dismantling Iran’s security apparatus and prioritized locations that posed an imminent threat according to US assessments. This fact sheet on Operation Epic Fury asserted that more than 13,000 military targets were struck and more than 155 Iranian vessels were destroyed between 28 February and 6 April. CENTCOM also revealed the United States target priority list which includes Iranian military command and control centres, IRGC headquarter buildings, IRGC intelligence sites, integrated air defence systems, ballistic missile sites, Iranian Navy ships and submarines, Iranian air defence systems, Iranian anti-ship missile sites, Iranian military communication capabilities, Iranian ballistic missile and drone manufacturing sites and infrastructure, Iranian weapons production sites, Iranian storage bunkers, Iranian surface-to-air missile facilities, and Iranian military support infrastructure.⁵

Since 28 February, Iran has targeted several US military bases across the Middle East in its military operations against the United States in retaliation fort Operation Epic Fury. US military bases hit by Iranian drone or missile strikes include those in Kuwait,⁶ Bahrain,⁷ the UAE,⁸ Qatar,⁹ Jordan,¹⁰ and Saudi Arabia.¹¹

The US Ali Al Salem Air Base, Camp Buehring, and Camp Arifjan located in Kuwait were hit by Iranian Shahed-style drones on 28 February. Strikes aimed at Ali Al Salem Air Base resulted in more than a dozen structures being damaged, including four aircraft shelters and military storage equipment. A fire broke out at Camp Buehring, and at Camp Arifjan communication equipment was destroyed.¹² A US logistical support unit working at the Shuaiba port of Kuwait was struck on 29 February, killing six US service members.¹³

The US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, located in Manama, Bahrain, was targeted by Iran on 28 February. It is unclear whether any US service members were injured in the attack.¹⁴ Iran also successfully targeted US military sites and assets in the UAE. Iran targeted the Al Dhafra Air Base on 28 February, as well as a small US military installation near Al Ruwais on 1 March. Two hangers at Al Dhafra suffered heavy damage in the first wave of strikes. Most missiles fired from Iran were, however, successfully intercepted.¹⁵ On 28 February and 3 March, the US Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar was hit by Iranian missile and drone attacks.¹⁶

The Muwaffaq Al Salti Air Base in Jordan was struck by Iran on 6 March.¹⁷ The US military suffered significant damage from two waves of Iranian strikes against the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. The first wave of attacks on 14 March damaged five US Air Force refuelling aircraft.¹⁸ The second wave of strikes carried out by Iran on 27 March injured twelve US soldiers. Two of these soldiers’ injuries were considered serious. At least two KC-135 aerial refuelling planes were also damaged in the attack.¹⁹

On 20 March, Iran launched two intermediate-range ballistic missiles directed at the joint US-UK Diego Garcia military base in the Indian Ocean. However, the first missile malfunctioned during flight, while the second failed to reach its target after being intercepted by a US warship.²⁰

By 5 March, the IDF reported that its Air Force had executed 2,500 strikes aand used 6,000 munitions against Iranian military targets.²¹ The IDF posted an update on Operation Roaring Lion on social media in early March declaring that by 17 April it will have conducted more than 10,000 aerial strikes in Iran, killed at least twenty-eight senior Iranian leaders, and established aerial superiority over the skies of Iran.²²

Iran launched several strikes against Israel in retaliation to Operation Roaring Lion,²³ including those launched on 28 February²⁴ 2 April,²⁵ between 4 and 6 April,²⁶ and 7 April.²⁷ The attack on 1 April was reportedly a coordinated effort between Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis (see above).²⁸

The ceasefire agreement negotiated on 7 April, ongoing at the time of reporting (26 April 2026),²⁹ does not signal the end of the IAC. This is a factual assessment demanding the actual definitive closure of military operations.³⁰

The IAC between Iran and the United States and Israel thus continued at the end of the reporting period.

1
‘Why did US and Israel attack Iran and how long could the war last?’, BBC, 23 April 2026.
2
‘Operation Epic Fury’, U.S. Central Command
3
‘Iran-Israel War: Operation Roaring Lion’, Israeli Defense Forces
4
‘US, Israel launch attack on Iran, explosions in Israel, Arab states’, Al Jazeera, 28 February 2026; K. Campaet al, ‘Iran Update Evening Special Report, February 28, 2026’, Institute for the Study of War, 28 February 2026; PBS News, ‘WATCH: Netanyahu announces ‘Operation Roaring Lion,’ calls on Iranians to ‘rid themselves’ of regime’, YouTube, 28 February 2026.
5
‘Operation Epic Fury’, U.S. Central Command.
6
A. Hortonet al, ‘U.S. troops killed amid Iranian counterattack, fueling air defense fears’, The Washington Post, 2 March 2026; M. Kellyet al, ‘U.S. troops had little protection from drone strike that killed 6, imagery shows’, The Washington Post, 4 March 2026
7
M. Kellyet al, ‘U.S. troops had little protection from drone strike that killed 6, imagery shows’, The Washington Post, 4 March 2026
8
J. Gambrell, ‘Satellite images begin to show damage wrought across the region by Iran war’, The Times of Israel, 31 March 2026; M. Kellyet al, ‘U.S. troops had little protection from drone strike that killed 6, imagery shows’, The Washington Post, 4 March 2026
9
M. Kellyet al, ‘U.S. troops had little protection from drone strike that killed 6, imagery shows’, The Washington Post, 4 March 2026
10
T. Bordeaux and G. Mezzofiore, ‘Radar bases housing key US missile interceptor hit in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, satellite images show’, CNN, 6 March 2026; V. Beauleet al, ‘US and allied radar sites in the Middle East struck at least 10 times: Visual analysis’, ABC News, 18 March 2026
11
‘Five US Air Force refueling planes hit in Iranian strike on Saudi Arabia, WSJ reports’, Reuters, 14 March 2026; ‘Trump says most planes targeted in attack on Saudi Arabia base had little damage’, Reuters, 14 March 2026.
12
M. Kellyet al, ‘U.S. troops had little protection from drone strike that killed 6, imagery shows’, The Washington Post, 4 March 2026.
13
A. Hortonet al, ‘U.S. troops killed amid Iranian counterattack, fueling air defense fears’, The Washington Post, 2 March 2026.
14
M. Kellyet al, ‘U.S. troops had little protection from drone strike that killed 6, imagery shows’, The Washington Post, 4 March 2026.
15
J. Gambrell, ‘Satellite images begin to show damage wrought across the region by Iran war’, The Times of Israel, 31 March 2026; M. Kellyet al, ‘U.S. troops had little protection from drone strike that killed 6, imagery shows’, The Washington Post, 4 March 2026.
16
M. Kellyet al, ‘U.S. troops had little protection from drone strike that killed 6, imagery shows’, The Washington Post, 4 March 2026.
17
T. Bordeaux and G. Mezzofiore, ‘Radar bases housing key US missile interceptor hit in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, satellite images show’, CNN, 6 March 2026; V. Beauleet al, ‘US and allied radar sites in the Middle East struck at least 10 times: Visual analysis’, ABC News, 18 March 2026.
18
‘Five US Air Force refueling planes hit in Iranian strike on Saudi Arabia, WSJ reports’, Reuters, 14 March 2026; ‘Trump says most planes targeted in attack on Saudi Arabia base had little damage’, Reuters, 14 March 2026.
19
E. Schmittet al, ‘12 U.S. Troops Injured in Attack on Saudi Base, Officials Say’, The New York Times, 28 March 2026.
20
C. Kasapoğlu, ‘Iran’s Attempted Strike on Diego Garcia and the Emerging Strategic Threat’, Hudson Institute, 24 March 2026; ‘Iran targeted but did not hit Diego Garcia base with missiles, WSJ reports’, Reuters, 21 March 2026; S. Holliday and A. Dowell, ‘Iran Targeted Diego Garcia Base with Ballistic Missiles’, Iran Watch, 20 March 2026.
21
‘“This is truly historic cooperation..the U.S. Armed Forces and the IDF, the two strongest militaries in the world, control the skies over the world’s largest terror state”’, Israeli Defense Forces, 5 March 2026.
22
‘“This is truly historic cooperation..the U.S. Armed Forces and the IDF, the two strongest militaries in the world, control the skies over the world’s largest terror state”’, Israeli Defense Forces, 5 March 2026.
23
‘Why did US and Israel attack Iran and how long could the war last?’, BBC, 23 April 2026
24
P. Wintour, ‘Iran vows ‘no leniency’ as it launches reprisal attacks on Israel and US air bases’, The Guardian, 28 February 2026 1 April,R. Reddyet al, ‘Iran Update Special Report, April 1, 2026’, Institute for the Study of War, 1 April 2026
25
B. Rezaeiet al, ‘Iran Update Special Report, April 1, 2026’, Institute for the Study of War, 1 April 2026
26
T. Holcman and Y. Etiel, ‘WATCH: IDF confirms Iranian missile fragments hit near Kirya, multiple cars ablaze in Ramat Gan’, The Jerusalem Post, 4 April 2026; S. Frantzman, ‘Iranian ballistic missile cluster munitions strike dozens of sites in Israeli cities’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 7 April 2026
27
Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian, X, 7 April 2026; Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian, X, 8 April 2026; Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian, X, 8 April 2026; Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian, X, 8 April 2026.
28
R. Reddyet al, ‘Iran Update Special Report, April 1, 2026’, Institute for the Study of War, 1 April 2026.
29
‘Why did US and Israel attack Iran and how long could the war last?’, BBC, 23 April 2026.
30
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 10. How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 10; ‘Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Commentary of 2025: Article 2 – Application of the Convention’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases, para 347.

International Armed Conflict between Iran and the UAE

The IAC between Iran and the UAE was triggered on 28 February 2026 when Iran started launching retaliatory attacks against US bases and assets located in the sovereign territory of the UAE.¹ The Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE is a critical airbase for the United States; it uses the base to launch attacks on Islamic State and for reconnaissance missions.² Although multiple missiles fired from Iran were intercepted, satellite imagery later revealed that two of Al Dhafra’s hangars sustained heavy damage in the initial wave of attacks.³ The 28 February 2026 attacks also targeted the luxury Fairmont The Palm hotel in proximity to Dubai’s Palm Island tourist attraction,⁴ a building in Dubai’s financial district,⁵ the US consulate,⁶ and a port facility in Fujairah.⁷ A fire broke out at the Fairmont hotel, the airport sustained minor damage, and debris from an intercepted missile caused a fire in Dubai’s largest commercial port.⁸ Six civilians of Emirati, Pakistani, Nepalese, and Bangladeshi nationality were killed in the initial attacks, and at least 141 people were injured.⁹ According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the UAE has seen daily drone, ballistic, and cruise missile attacks by Iran between 28 February and 8 April 2026.¹⁰ At the time of writing, Iranian drone and missile attacks continued in the UAE. The IAC between Iran and the UAE is ongoing.

1
‘Multiple Arab states that host US assets targeted in Iran retaliation’, Al Jazeera, 28 February 2026.
2
‘Where Are US Forces Stationed in the Middle East?’, Modern Diplomacy, 28 February 2026; L. Korte, ‘Here’s what’s going on at US bases in Middle East amid Iran attacks’, Stars and Stripes, 1 March 2026.
3
J. Gambrell, ‘Satellite images begin to show damage wrought across the region by Iran war’, The Tomes of Israel, 31 March 2026; M. Kelly et al, ‘U.S. troops had little protection from drone strike that killed 6, imagery shows’, The Washington Post, 4 March 2026.
4
S. Renfroe, ‘Iranian drones strike apartments in city that’s home to NSA Bahrain’, Stars and Stripes, 6 March 2026; M. Thomas and P. Brown, ‘Explosion at Dubai hotel captured in phone footage’, BBC, 28 February 2026 Dubai International Airport,T. Bennett et al, ‘Luxury Dubai hotel hit as Iran launches retaliatory strikes across region’, BBC, 28 February 2026
5
L. Korte, ‘Here’s what’s going on at US bases in Middle East amid Iran attacks’, Stars and Stripes, 1 March 2026
6
‘Hundreds of drones target Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE amid Iran war’, Al Jazeera, 4 March 2026
7
‘Hundreds of drones target Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE amid Iran war’, Al Jazeera, 4 March 2026.
8
T. Bennett et al, ‘Luxury Dubai hotel hit as Iran launches retaliatory strikes across region’, BBC, 28 February 2026.
9
L. Korte, ‘Here’s what’s going on at US bases in Middle East amid Iran attacks’, Stars and Stripes, 1 March 2026.
10
P. Hempel et al, ‘Iran Update Special Report, April 8, 2026’, Institute for the Study of War, 8 April 2026.

International Armed Conflict between Iran and Qatar

The IAC between Iran and Qatar was triggered on 28 February 2026 when Iran started launching missiles against the sovereign territory of Qatar. The country hosts the biggest US air base in the Middle East, the Al Udeid Air Base. Al Udeid serves as the forward headquarters for CENTCOM.¹ During the drone and missile attacks on 28 February, communications equipment was damaged at Al Udeid.² The initial wave of attacks also targeted a Qatari long-range early detection missile in northern Qatar. Qatar claimed to have intercepted missiles based on a pre-approved security plan.³ The IAC between Iran and Qatar was ongoing at the time of reporting.

1
‘Where Are US Forces Stationed in the Middle East?’, Modern Diplomacy, 28 February 2026; L. Korte, ‘Here’s what’s going on at US bases in Middle East amid Iran attacks’, Stars and Stripes, 1 March 2026.
2
M. Kelly et al, ‘U.S. troops had little protection from drone strike that killed 6, imagery shows’, The Washington Post, 4 March 2026.
3
‘Multiple Arab states that host US assets targeted in Iran retaliation’, Al Jazeera, 28 February 2026; Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait: Gulf countries targeted by Iran after US-Israeli strikes’, The Times of India, 1 March 2026.

International Armed Conflict between Iran and Bahrain

The IAC between Iran and Bahrain was triggered on 28 February 2026 when the first strike launched by Iran on the sovereign territory of Bahrain against the United States base in Manama, which houses the Navy’s Fifth Fleet, took place.¹ This air base is the headquarters of the United States Naval Forces Central Command which oversees operations in the Gulf and surrounding areas.² The base was struck by a drone, causing material damage.³ In the same wave of initial attacks, Iran also targeted high-rise residential buildings in Manama, hotels, a water desalination plant, and a State-run oil refinery, causing damage to the surrounding neighborhoods.⁴ Bahrain saw near-daily drone, ballistic, and cruise missile attacks from Iran between 28 February and 13 April 2026.⁵ The IAC between Iran and Bahrain was ongoing at the time of reporting.

1
‘Multiple Arab states that host US assets targeted in Iran retaliation’, Al Jazeera, 28 February 2026; T. Bennett et al, ‘Luxury Dubai hotel hit as Iran launches retaliatory strikes across region’, BBC, 28 February 2026.
2
L. Korte, ‘Here’s what’s going on at US bases in Middle East amid Iran attacks’, Stars and Stripes, 1 March 2026; ‘Where Are US Forces Stationed in the Middle East?’, Modern Diplomacy, 28 February 2026.
3
M. Kelly et al, ‘U.S. troops had little protection from drone strike that killed 6, imagery shows’, The Washington Post, 4 March 2026.
4
L. Korte, ‘Here’s what’s going on at US bases in Middle East amid Iran attacks’, Stars and Stripes, 1 March 2026; S. Renfroe, ‘Iranian drones strike apartments in city that’s home to NSA Bahrain’, Stars and Stripes, 6 March 2026; S. Renfroe, ‘Bahrain desalination plant struck as water infrastructure becomes latest front in Iran war’, Stars and Stripes, 8 March 2026; S. Renfroe, ‘‘My stomach is still in knots’: Bahrain residents endure Iran’s attacks aimed at US naval base’, Stars and Stripes, 1 March 2026; ‘Multiple Arab states that host US assets targeted in Iran retaliation’, Al Jazeera, 28 February 2026.
5
B. Schmida et al, ‘Iran Update Special Report, April 13, 2026’, Institute for the Study of War, 13 April 2026; BDF Bahrain, X, 9 April 2026; BDF Bahrain, 13 April 2026.

International Armed Conflict between Iran and Jordan

The IAC between Iran and Jordan was triggered on 28 February 2026 when Iran launched missiles against the Muwaffaq Al Salti Air Base in Amman, which is officially a Jordanian air base hosting US forces.¹. Specifically, the base supports the United States Air Force Central’s 33 2^nd Air Expeditionary Wing responsible for missions in the Levant and a key hub for US air power in the Gulf.² On 6 March, an Iranian drone strike hit buildings on the Muwaffaq Al Salti Air Base that house AN/TPY-2 radar equipment.³ The strike damaged a Thaad radar, which forms a crucial part of the ground-based missile-defense system that intercepts ballistic missiles.⁴ By end March, Jordan claimed to have intercepted over 240 missiles and drones since the start of the conflict.⁵

An actual definitive closure of military operations, as displayed above, cannot be observed in the belligerent relationship between Iran and Jordan at the time of writing. The IAC between Iran and Jordan was thus ongoing at the time of writing.

1
‘Military Bases in Jordan’, Military Base Guides
2
L. Korte, ‘Here’s what’s going on at US bases in Middle East amid Iran attacks’, Stars and Stripes, 1 March 2026; ‘Multiple Arab states that host US assets targeted in Iran retaliation’, Al Jazeera, 28 February 2026.
3
T. Bordeaux and G. Mezzofiore, ‘Radar bases housing key US missile interceptor hit in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, satellite images show’, CNN, 6 March 2026; V. Beauleet al, ‘US and allied radar sites in the Middle East struck at least 10 times: Visual analysis’, ABC News, 18 March 2026.
4
A. Capaccio and G. Doyle, ‘Iran Hits Key US Radar, Deepening Gulf Missile Defense Woes’, Bloomberg, 6 March 2026; M. Scanlon, ‘Iranian strikes target the infrastructure behind US airpower’, Defense News, 1 April 2026; S. Holliday, ‘U.S. Rushing to Replace Thaad Radar in Jordan’, The Wall Street Journal, 6 March 2026.
5
L. Aljindy, ‘Jordan says over 240 missiles and drones intercepted since start of war’, AA, 28 March 2026; ‘Jordan says downs vast majority of incoming missiles, drones during regional conflict’, Xinhua, 4 April 2026.

International Armed Conflict between Iran and Kuwait

The IAC between Iran and Kuwait was triggered on 28 February 2026 when Iran launched ballistic missiles at the Ali Al Salem Air Base, Camp Buehring, and Camp Arifjan located on the sovereign territory of Kuwait.¹ Camp Arifjan is the US Army’s central headquarters and Kuwait hosts several critical US military sites, including forwarding bases servicing Iraq and Syria.² Most missiles were intercepted by Kuwaiti air defence systems.³ Nonetheless, more than a dozen structures were damaged at Ali Al Salem Air Base, including four aircraft shelters and storage structures for military equipment. A fire broke out at Camp Buehring as a result of an Iranian Shahed-style drone attack, and at Camp Arifjan communications equipment was destroyed.⁴ In the same wave of initial attacks, an Iranian drone targeted Kuwait International Airport, resulting in minor injuries and material destruction.⁵Kuwait experienced daily drone, ballistic, and cruise missile attacks by Iran between 28 February and 10 April.⁶ The IAC between Iran and Kuwait was ongoing at the end of the reporting period.

1
‘Multiple Arab states that host US assets targeted in Iran retaliation’, Al Jazeera, 28 February 2026.
2
‘Where Are US Forces Stationed in the Middle East?’, Modern Diplomacy, 28 February 2026.
3
T. Bennett et al, ‘Luxury Dubai hotel hit as Iran launches retaliatory strikes across region’, BBC, 28 February 2026.
4
M. Kelly et al, ‘U.S. troops had little protection from drone strike that killed 6, imagery shows’, The Washington Post, 4 March 2026.
5
‘Multiple Arab states that host US assets targeted in Iran retaliation’, Al Jazeera, 28 February 2026; M. Butt and A. Croft, ‘Iran-US war mapped as more countries dragged into widening Middle East conflict’, The Independent, 10 March 2026.
6
B. Rezaei et al, ‘Iran Update Special Report, April 10, 2026’, Institute for the Study of War, 10 April 2026.

International Armed Conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia

The IAC between Iran and Saudi Arabia was triggered on 28 February 2026 when Iran launched several strikes against Saudi Arabia targeting Prince Sultan Air Base.¹ Where US soldiers and the Saudi government collaborate on air and missile defence. The missiles directed at this base were intercepted.² The US Embassy in Riyadh was also targeted in the initial wave of attacks.³ Saudi Arabia saw near-daily drone, ballistic, and cruise missile attacks from Iran between 28 February and 8 April.⁴ The IAC between Iran and Saudi Arabia was ongoing at the time of reporting.

1
‘What are the implications of Iran’s strikes on Gulf Arab states?’, Al Jazeera, 3 March 2026.
2
‘Photos show aftermath from Iran’s waves of retaliatory strikes’, Reuters, 30 March 2026.
3
L. Korte, ‘Here’s what’s going on at US bases in Middle East amid Iran attacks’, Stars and Stripes, 1 March 2026; ‘Drones strike US base in Iraq, Doha explosions, as Iran hits region in war’, Al Jazeera, 5 March 2026; ‘Hundreds of drones target Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE amid Iran war’, Al Jazeera, 4 March 2026.
4
P. Hempel et al, ‘Iran Update Special Report, April 8, 2026’, Institute for the Study of War, 8 April 2026.

International Armed Conflict between Iran and Iraq

The IAC between Iran and Iraq was triggered on 28 February 2026 when Iran launched drone and missiles attacks against Erbil International Airport, which hosts US military facilities,¹ as well as the US Consulate General in Erbil. No injuries or major damages were reported as most missiles and drones were successfully intercepted.² The United States has a military presence in Iraq. The US Ain Al Asad Air Base in western Iraq supports NATO missions while US training and coordination efforts take place at the Erbil Air Base in Iraqi Kurdistan.³ There has been an increase in attacks by Iran-backed Iraqi militias since the outbreak of the conflict (see above).⁴ The IAC between Iran and Iraq was ongoing at the time of reporting.

1
P. Wintour, ‘Iran vows ‘no leniency’ as it launches reprisal attacks on Israel and US air bases’, The Guardian, 28 February 2026; T. Bennettet al, ‘Luxury Dubai hotel hit as Iran launches retaliatory strikes across region’, BBC, 28 February 2026; M. Kellyet al, ‘U.S. troops had little protection from drone strike that killed 6, imagery shows’, The Washington Post, 4 March 2026
2
‘Attack on U.S. base at Erbil International Airport blocked’, Reuters Connect, 28 February 2026.
3
‘Multiple Arab states that host US assets targeted in Iran retaliation’, Al Jazeera, 28 February 2026.
4
R. Reddy et al,‘Iran Update Special Report, April 21, 2026’, Institute for the Study of War, 21 April 2026.

International Armed Conflict between Iran and Oman

The IAC between Iran and Oman was triggered on 1 March 2026 when Iran directed drone strikes against Omani territory.¹ The attacks struck the commercial port in Duqm,² and a Palau-flagged oil tanker (Skylight) off Oman’s coast near Musandam/Khasab.³

The IAC between Iran and Oman was ongoing at time of reporting.

1
M. Butt and A. Croft, ‘Iran-US war mapped as more countries dragged into widening Middle East conflict’, The Independent, 10 March 2026; V. Nerein and O. Al Desoukie, ‘Iran’s Attacks on Persian Gulf Countries Crack Their Safe Haven Image’, The New York Times, 1 March 2026; ‘Two killed in Oman by drones, several also fired at Saudi Arabia’, Al Jazeera, 13 March 2026.
2
M. Kelly and A. Cheeseman, ‘Where Iran has retaliated across the Middle East, according to satellite images and videos’, The Washington Post, 1 March 2026
3
‘US-sanctioned oil tanker hit off Oman coast’, Reuters, 1 March 2026; ‘Indian-crewed tanker hit off Oman coast; four injured’, On Manorama, 1 March 2026. One worker was injured in the strikes.E. Kourdiet al, ‘Oman’s Duqm Port targeted by drones, state media reports’, CNN, 1 March 2026.

International Armed Conflict between Iran and Azerbajian

The IAC between Iran and Azerbaijan was triggered on 5 March 2026 when Iran breached Azerbaijan’s sovereign territory by deploying four drones at Nakhchivan.¹ The attacks targeted Nakhchivan International Airport and a children’s school in the village of Shakarabad, injuring several civilians and causing material damage to critical civilian infrastructure.²

As set out above, for an IAC to end, there needs to be a degree of stability and permanence in the closure of military operations. Since 5 March there has been no confirmed Iranian drone or missile activity within the sovereign territory of Azerbaijan. The IAC between Iran and Azerbaijan has thus ended.

1
‘Multiple Arab states that host US assets targeted in Iran retaliation’, Al Jazeera, 28 February 2026; K. Khalilova, ‘Azerbaijan furious with Iran as war spills over its border’, BBC, 6 March 2026.
2
T. Pigott, ‘The United States Condemns Iranian Drone Attack on the Republic of Azerbaijan’, U.S. Department of State, 7 March 2026; ‘No:072/26, Statement on drone attacks against the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of the Republic of Azerbaijan from the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Republic of Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 March 2026; O. G. Daniel and A. Brezar, ‘Iranian drones strike Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan international airport’, Euro News, 5 March 2026; E. Benedis-Grab, ‘Iran’s Strike on Azerbaijan Tests Central Asia’s Balancing Act’, Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute, 30 March 2026.

International Armed Conflict between Iran and the United Kingdom

The IAC between Iran and the United Kingdom was triggered on 2 March 2026 when Iran (or its agent) used launched a drone strike against the RAF base in Akrotiri.¹ Minor damage was caused to a hangar.² In accordance with a host State agreement between the United Kingdom and Cyprus, the United Kingdom exercises British sovereign rights over ninety-eight square miles on the Island of Cyprus, which extends to bases at Akrotiri, Episkopi, Dhekelia, and Ayos Nikolaos. These bases are treated as British sovereign territory.³ Akrotiri is the United Kingdom’s primary airbase for operations in the Middle East. In recent years, it has been used by British warplanes for operations against Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, as well as for strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen.⁴

On 20 March, Iran launched two intermediate-range ballistic missiles directed at the joint US-UK Diego Garcia military base in the Indian Ocean. The first missile malfunctioned during flight, while the second failed to reach its target after being intercepted by a US warship.⁵ Diego Garcia was thus not hit.

An IAC was triggered between Iran and the United Kingdom at the same time as the armed aerial drone entered into Cyprus airspace and triggered an IAC between Iran and Cyprus (see above).

As set out above, for an IAC to end there needs to be a degree of stability and permanence in the closure of military operations. Even though there has been no confirmed impactful attack by Iran on the United Kingdom since 2 March, its attempt to strike Diego Garcia on 20 March indicates that a risk of resumption cannot be ruled out. The IAC between Iran and the United Kingdom was thus ongoing at the end of the reporting period.

1
C. Sutherland, ‘British Base Hit in Cyprus, U.K. Terror Threat Under Review as Iran War Spreads’, Time, 2 March 2026, Updated 3 March 2026.
2
S. Corbet and M. Hadjicostis, ‘Europe rallies around Cyprus after Iranian drone hits island’, PBS, 9 March 2026; C. Sutherland, ‘British Base Hit in Cyprus, U.K. Terror Threat Under Review as Iran War Spreads’, Time, 2 March 2026, Updated 3 March 2026; G. Blackburn, ‘UK says it is not at war after Iranian drone strikes RAF Akrotiri base in Cyprus’, Euro News, 2 March 2026.
3
‘Integrated Global Defence Network’, Gov.UK, 2 September 2025.
4
J. Lawless and M. Hadjicostis, ‘Britain says it’s not at war after a drone strikes its Akrotiri base in Cyprus’, Associated Press, 2 March 2026.
5
C. Kasapoğlu, ‘Iran’s Attempted Strike on Diego Garcia and the Emerging Strategic Threat’, Hudson Institute, 24 March 2026; ‘Iran targeted but did not hit Diego Garcia base with missiles, WSJ reports’, Reuters, 21 March 2026; S. Holliday and A. Dowell, ‘Iran Targeted Diego Garcia Base with Ballistic Missiles’, Iran Watch, 20 March 2026.

State Parties

Iran
US
Israel
UAE
Qatar
Bahrain
Jordan
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Oman
Cyprus
Azerbaijan
United Kingdom

1
‘History of US-Iran relations: From the 1953 regime change to Trump strikes’, Al Jazeera, 23 June 2025; D. T. Potts, ‘Decades of hostility between Iran and the United States were preceded by a little‑remembered century‑long friendship’, The Conversation, 30 March 2026; B. Allen, ‘64 Years Later, CIA Finally Releases Details of Iranian Coup’, Foreign Policy, 20 June 2017; J. Fields, ‘US and Iran have a long, complicated history, spanning decades before US strikes on nuclear sites’, The Conversation, 18 June 2025; M. Ferragamo and K. Robinson, ‘U.S. Relations With Iran’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 March 2026.
2
‘History of US-Iran relations: From the 1953 regime change to Trump strikes’, Al Jazeera, 23 June 2025; B. Allen, ‘64 Years Later, CIA Finally Releases Details of Iranian Coup’, Foreign Policy, 20 June 2017; J. Fields, ‘US and Iran have a long, complicated history, spanning decades before US strikes on nuclear sites’, The Conversation, 18 June 2025; M. Ferragamo and K. Robinson, ‘U.S. Relations With Iran’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 March 2026.
3
‘History of US-Iran relations: From the 1953 regime change to Trump strikes’, Al Jazeera, 23 June 2025; B. Allen, ‘64 Years Later, CIA Finally Releases Details of Iranian Coup’, Foreign Policy, 20 June 2017; J. Fields, ‘US and Iran have a long, complicated history, spanning decades before US strikes on nuclear sites’, The Conversation, 18 June 2025; M. Ferragamo and K. Robinson, ‘U.S. Relations With Iran’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 March 2026; ‘Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran’, History, 9 May 2010, Updated 27 May 2025.
4
B. Allen, ‘64 Years Later, CIA Finally Releases Details of Iranian Coup’, Foreign Policy, 20 June 2017.
5
B. Allen, ‘64 Years Later, CIA Finally Releases Details of Iranian Coup’, Foreign Policy, 20 June 2017
6
J. Fields, ‘US and Iran have a long, complicated history, spanning decades before US strikes on nuclear sites’, The Conversation, 18 June 2025; ‘AP WAS THERE: Shah leaves Iran as 1979 revolution looms’, Associated Press, 16 January 2019.
7
J. Fields, ‘US and Iran have a long, complicated history, spanning decades before US strikes on nuclear sites’, The Conversation, 18 June 2025.
8
‘Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran’, History, 9 May 2010, Updated 27 May 2025.
9
‘Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran’, History, 9 May 2010, Updated 27 May 2025.
10
‘Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran’, History, 9 May 2010, Updated 27 May 2025
11
‘History of US-Iran relations: From the 1953 regime change to Trump strikes’, Al Jazeera, 23 June 2025; ‘Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran’, History, 9 May 2010, Updated 27 May 2025; L. Steinzova and S. Greer, ‘In Pictures: Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 8 February 2019.
12
J. Fields, ‘US and Iran have a long, complicated history, spanning decades before US strikes on nuclear sites’, The Conversation, 18 June 2025; M. Ferragamo and K. Robinson, ‘U.S. Relations With Iran’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 March 2026; ‘AP WAS THERE: Shah leaves Iran as 1979 revolution looms’, Associated Press, 16 January 2019; L. Steinzova and S. Greer, ‘In Pictures: Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 8 February 2019.
13
J. Fields, ‘US and Iran have a long, complicated history, spanning decades before US strikes on nuclear sites’, The Conversation, 18 June 2025; ‘Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran’, History, 9 May 2010, Updated 27 May 2025; ‘AP WAS THERE: Shah leaves Iran as 1979 revolution looms’, Associated Press, 16 January 2019; L. Steinzova and S. Greer, ‘In Pictures: Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 8 February 2019.
14
‘Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran’, History, 9 May 2010, Updated 27 May 2025; L. Steinzova and S. Greer, ‘In Pictures: Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 8 February 2019.
15
‘Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran’, History, 9 May 2010 (Updated 27 May 2025).
16
L. Steinzova and S. Greer, ‘In Pictures: Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 8 February 2019; N. Cumming-Bruce, ‘US Embassy stormed by Tehran mob’, The Guardian, 15 February 1979; N. Gage, ‘Armed Iranians Rush U.S. Embassy’, The New York Times, 15 February 1979.
17
N. Cumming-Bruce, ‘US Embassy stormed by Tehran mob’, The Guardian, 15 February 1979; N. Gage, ‘Armed Iranians Rush U.S. Embassy’, The New York Times, 15 February 1979.
18
N. Gage, ‘Armed Iranians Rush U.S. Embassy’, The New York Times, 15 February 1979; ‘Why Carter Admitted the Shah’, The New York Times, 17 May 1918; S. Maloney and K. Razipour, ‘The Iranian revolution—A timeline of events’, Brookings Institute, 24 January 2019.
19
J. Fields, ‘US and Iran have a long, complicated history, spanning decades before US strikes on nuclear sites’, The Conversation, 18 June 2025; ‘Why Carter Admitted the Shah’, The New York Times, 17 May 1918; S. Maloney and K. Razipour, ‘The Iranian revolution—A timeline of events’, Brookings Institute, 24 January 2019; ‘Iran Hostage Crisis Fast Facts’, CNN, 22 October 2025.
20
‘Why Carter Admitted the Shah’, The New York Times, 17 May 1918.
21
S. Maloney and K. Razipour, ‘The Iranian revolution—A timeline of events’, Brookings Institute, 24 January 2019; ‘Iran Hostage Crisis Fast Facts’, CNN, 22 October 2025; S. Lennie, ‘In Pictures: Iran marks 1979 hostage crisis’, Al Jazeera, 9 February 2014.
22
‘Case Concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v Iran)’, International Court of Justice, 24 May 1980, par 59.
23
‘Case Concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v Iran)’, International Court of Justice, 24 May 1980, para 59.
24
S. Maloney and K. Razipour, ‘The Iranian revolution—A timeline of events’, Brookings Institute, 24 January 2019; ‘Iran Hostage Crisis Fast Facts’, CNN, 22 October 2025
25
S. Maloney and K. Razipour, ‘The Iranian revolution—A timeline of events’, Brookings Institute, 24 January 2019; ‘Iran Hostage Crisis Fast Facts’, CNN, 22 October 2025.
26
S. Maloney and K. Razipour, ‘The Iranian revolution—A timeline of events’, Brookings Institute, 24 January 2019
27
UNSC, ‘Resolution 457 (1979)’, 4 December 1979
28
S. Maloney and K. Razipour, ‘The Iranian revolution—A timeline of events’, Brookings Institute, 24 January 2019
29
‘Case Concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v Iran)’, International Court of Justice, 24 May 1980
30
J. Fields, ‘US and Iran have a long, complicated history, spanning decades before US strikes on nuclear sites’, The Conversation, 18 June 2025; M. Ferragamo and K. Robinson, ‘U.S. Relations With Iran’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 March 2026; S. Maloney and K. Razipour, ‘The Iranian revolution—A timeline of events’, Brookings Institute, 24 January 2019; ‘Iran Hostage Crisis Fast Facts’, CNN, 22 October 2025; S. Lennie, ‘In Pictures: Iran marks 1979 hostage crisis’, Al Jazeera, 9 February 2014.
31
S. Maloney and K. Razipour, ‘The Iranian revolution—A timeline of events’, Brookings Institute, 24 January 2019; ‘Iran Hostage Crisis Fast Facts’, CNN, 22 October 2025.
32
S. Maloney and K. Razipour, ‘The Iranian revolution—A timeline of events’, Brookings Institute, 24 January 2019; ‘Iran Hostage Crisis Fast Facts’, CNN, 22 October 2025.
33
‘History of US-Iran relations: From the 1953 regime change to Trump strikes’, Al Jazeera, 23 June 2025; J. Fields, ‘US and Iran have a long, complicated history, spanning decades before US strikes on nuclear sites’, The Conversation, 18 June 2025; M. Ferragamo and K. Robinson, ‘U.S. Relations With Iran’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 March 2026
34
‘History of US-Iran relations: From the 1953 regime change to Trump strikes’, Al Jazeera, 23 June 2025; J. Fields, ‘US and Iran have a long, complicated history, spanning decades before US strikes on nuclear sites’, The Conversation, 18 June 2025; M. Ferragamo and K. Robinson, ‘U.S. Relations With Iran’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 March 2026.
35
M. Field, ‘A simple timeline of Iran’s nuclear program’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 19 June 2025.
36
‘A History of Iran’s Nuclear Program’, Iran Watch, 19 December 2023.
37
M. Field, ‘A simple timeline of Iran’s nuclear program’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 19 June 2025; ‘A History of Iran’s Nuclear Program’, Iran Watch, 19 December 2023.
38
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J. Borger, ‘US starts naval blockade of Iranian ports after deadline passes’, The Guardian, 14 April 2026
177
‘What does a US naval blockade of Iran mean for oil flows?’, Reuters, 13 April 2026; ‘Trump says Iranian ships to be ‘eliminated’ as US naval blockade begins’, Al Jazeera, 13 April 2026.
178
‘Trump says Iranian ships to be ‘eliminated’ as US naval blockade begins’, Al Jazeera, 13 April 2026.
179
J. Lapham and A. Lamche, ‘Why and how is US blockading Iranian ports in Strait of Hormuz?’, BBC, 20 April 2026.
180
S. F. Santos, ‘Trump says US will not lift Hormuz blockade until deal made with Iran’, BBC, 20 April 2026
181
N. Slawson, ‘First Thing: ‘Impossible’ to reopen strait of Hormuz amid ‘flagrant’ ceasefire breaches, Iran says’, The Guardian, 23 April 2026; M. Matzaet al, ‘Iran says Strait of Hormuz cannot be opened due to ceasefire breaches’, BBC, 23 April 2026.
182
ICTY, ‘Prosecutorv Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule”’, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para 70; ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 9–10.
183
‘Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Commentary of 2025: Article 2 – Application of the Convention’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases, para 293; ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 9.
184
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 10.
185
J. K. Kleffner, ‘Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law’ in D. Fleck (ed) The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (4^th Edition, 2021, Oxford University Press), 52.
186
J. K. Kleffner, ‘Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law’ in D. Fleck (ed) The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (4^th Edition, 2021, Oxford University Press), 52; ‘Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Commentary of 2025: Article 2 – Application of the Convention’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases, paras 306 and 307.
187
‘Multiple Arab states that host US assets targeted in Iran retaliation’, Al Jazeera, 28 February 2026
188
‘Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait: Gulf countries targeted by Iran after US-Israeli strikes’, The Times of India, 1 March 2026
189
H. Scribner, ‘Here are all the countries now involved in the Iran war’, Axios, 5 March 2026
190
M. Butt and A. Croft, ‘Iran-US war mapped as more countries dragged into widening Middle East conflict’, The Independent, 10 March 2026
191
M. Butt and A. Croft, ‘Iran-US war mapped as more countries dragged into widening Middle East conflict’, The Independent, 10 March 2026
192
‘What are the implications of Iran’s strikes on Gulf Arab states?’, Al Jazeera, 3 March 2026
193
H. Regan and A. Radford, ‘Iran launches fresh wave of strikes around the region’, CNN, 1 March 2026
194
‘Iran rejects any military attack on Oman amid Gulf conflict’, Daily Sabah, 3 March 2026.
195
M. Kambas and S. Young, ‘Iranian-made drone hits British air base in Cyprus’, Reuters, 2 March 2026
196
K. Khalilova, ‘Azerbaijan furious with Iran as war spills over its border’, BBC, 6 March 2026.
197
M. Kambas and S. Young, ‘Iranian-made drone hits British air base in Cyprus’, Reuters, 2 March 2026.

Reporting period: January 2026 - April 2026

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between January to April 2026)

Protests in Iran Spark a Deadly Crackdown and Military Threats from Trump

US Military Build-up in the Arabian and Mediterranean Seas

Continued US-Iran Engagement on Iran’s Nuclear Program

Assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other High-Ranking Iranian Figures

Strike on Elementary School in Minab and the Use of Artificial Intelligence