Mali

It is possible that, subject to verifiable information, a short-lived international armed conflict (IAC) took place between Mali and Algeria in April 2025. This situation has, however, been declassified.

Three non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) are ongoing in parallel between state forces and non-state armed groups in Mali.¹. These NIACs include:

Mali v Jama’a Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM).
Mali v the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP).
Mali v the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) (formerly known as the Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad – CSP-DPA and before that, the Cadre stratégique permanent pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement – CSP-PSD) coalition.

All parties to the ongoing NIACs are bound by Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions² and customary international humanitarian law applicable to NIACs.

Mali is a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977.³ The NIAC between Mali and JNIM continues to meet the additional requirements of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, and this treaty is applicable to that conflict. It is also arguable that the NIAC between Mali and the ISSP satisfies the additional requirements of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, and, if this is the case, this treaty would also be applicable to that conflict.

For more than a decade, Mali has been embroiled in a complex and evolving landscape of NIACs involving both separatist and Islamist armed groups.⁴ These include sustained hostilities against Tuareg separatist factions in northern Mali,⁵ and Islamist groups such as Jama’a Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM),⁶ and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP)⁷ Although other episodes of armed violence have involved ethnic militias and self-defence groups – including the Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad (MSA), Groupe d’Autodéfense Tuareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA), Dan Na Ambassagou, and Dozo militias – many of these confrontations have not met the requisite organization or intensity thresholds to qualify as NIACs under international humanitarian law (IHL).⁸

Between 2014 and 2015, pro-government and separatist armed groups coalesced into two main coalitions:

The Plateforme des Mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d’Alger (Plateforme), comprising mostly pro-government groups such as GATIA and MSA.⁹
The Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), a coalition of separatist groups led by Bilal ag Acherif, was composed of the Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), the Haut conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) and the Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad (MAA).¹⁰

The confrontations between FAMa (and Plateforme) and the CMA culminated in the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali signed on 20 June 2015 in Algiers (Algiers Accords).¹¹ Despite this agreement, armed clashes between the two coalitions continued. A United Nations Panel of Experts documented violations of the Algiers Accord, including attacks on state forces by a signatory group.¹²

In 2021, the former CMA and Plateforme coalitions merged to form the Cadre Stratégique Permanent pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement (CSP-PSD), aimed at jointly implementing the peace accord.¹³ Ethnic armed groups allied to FAMa, as well as self-proclaimed ‘self-defence groups’ and militias, such as the Arab MSA, Tuareg GATIA, Dongo Dan Na Ambassagou or Dozo, have also been fighting Islamist armed groups for several years.¹⁴

FAMa were initially supported by international partners, the French Armed Forces and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).¹⁵ France ended its mission on 9 November 2022, and MINUSMA completed its withdrawal from Mali on 31 December 2023.¹⁶ Since 2021, FAMa have been supported by the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, which rebranded in late 2023 as the Africa Corps.¹⁷ Mali was also previously part of the G5 Sahel regional security initiative but withdrew from the alliance in June 2022.¹⁸

Malian air force drone suspected of being downed in Algerian territory

On 1 April 2025, both Mali and Algeria reported the destruction of a drone. Both sides acknowledged the event but recounted the facts differently. FAMa claimed that their unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) crashed near the border on Malian territory, without ever leaving the territory. They did not assert, however, that the drone was shot down by Algeria.¹⁹ Algeria, however, asserted that the UAV had breached its airspace near Tin Zaouatine – penetrating 2km before being shot down while allegedly on an ‘attack trajectory’.²⁰ In response, Mali accused Algeria of committing a ‘hostile premeditated action’ and claimed the drone had been conducting surveillance of a terrorist group operating near the frontier. Algeria denied the claim, dismissing the accusations as ‘lacking seriousness’ and being politically motivated.²¹ Diplomatic tensions escalated rapidly. Algeria became the first to suspend flights to and from Mali, with Bamako reciprocating shortly thereafter. The Malian government summoned the Algerian ambassador in Bamako and announced plans to file a formal complaint with international bodies. It also withdrew from regional security arrangements that included Algeria. In solidarity, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) – comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – jointly condemned Algeria, claiming the drone strike had thwarted the neutralization of a terrorist cell threatening regional stability.²² Concerned about the possibility of the conflict spreading to their own borders, Algerian officials have spoken out against Mali’s use of Russian private military (those of Wagner and then the Africa Corps) and armed drones in the area around Tin Zaouatine in the past.²³

The direct use of force between Algeria and Mali could qualify the situation as an IAC under Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions. However, given that the alleged incident appears to have been an isolated incursion rather than sustained hostilities, even if an IAC had been deemed to exist, it would now be considered terminated and the situation declassified.

Tuareg separatist groups in continuous evolution: from to CSP-PSD to CSP-DPA to FLA

The Algiers Accords – initially signed in 2015 to resolve the conflict between the Malian government and Tuareg-led coalitions – formally collapsed on 25 January 2024.²⁴ Prior to this, the CSP-PSD, formed in 2021 through the merger of the former CMA and Plateforme coalitions, served as a unified framework for applying the peace agreement. The CSP-PSD maintained control of Kidal until FAMa recaptured the strategic town in November 2023.²⁵

In August 2023, renewed hostilities erupted between FAMa and former CMA-affiliated Tuareg separatist groups, prompting the Plateforme to withdraw from the CSP-PSD in September.²⁶ In April 2024, the CSP-PSD reconstituted itself as the Cadre stratégique pour la défense du people de l’Azawad (CSP-DPA).²⁷ The CSP-DPA, which brings together separatist armed groups from Northern Mali, including former members of the CMA, such as the MAA and the HCUA, is led by the MNLA, and specifically by the MNLA member and former CMA leader, Bilal ag Acherif.²⁸ By September 2023, there had been clashes between CSP-DPA and FAMa. The first recorded attack launched against FAMa occurred on 12 September 2023.²⁹ In July 2024, FAMa and its Russian allies suffered a major defeat during fighting in Tinzaouaten, resulting in the destruction of a Russian helicopter and the deaths of dozens of Wagner fighters.³⁰

On 30 November 2024, CSP-DPA was dissolved to create the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA).³¹ Its aim is to fight for independence of parts of northern Mali, also known as Azawad territory.³² FLA is composed of members of the former CSP-DPA, including the HCUA, the MNLA, MAA-CMA, and GATIA. Therefore, it could be another name change.³³ The new movement claims to be the sole representatives of the people of Azawad.³⁴

Russian support forces rebranding and setback, and possible Ukrainian involvement

Since December 2021, Mali has been supported by the Wagner Group. In late 2023, the Wagner Group rebranded as the ‘Africa Corps’ (Wagner/Africa Corps).³⁵ In 2023, then-Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin staged a brief mutiny against Russia’s military leadership, before dying in a plane crash after the plane exploded in mid-air in August. In the aftermath, the Kremlin moved swiftly to prevent further insubordination by tightening control over Wagner and other paramilitary groups. These forces have since been more formally integrated into Russia’s military structure, with the newly established Africa Corps emerging as the dominant vehicle for overseas operations.³⁶ The newly named entity appears to have either become independent from the Russian private military company, Redut, or has been absorbed into it and is now overseen by Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. It has also alleged to have been integrated as a unit of the Russian Armed Forces.³⁷

The presence of Wagner/Africa Corps in Mali exemplifies the complex and often opaque structures and relationships of PMSCs and mercenary-related actors and the related challenges for legal analysis of classification and accountability under IHL. One specific question is whether Wagner/Africa Corps functions as an organ of the Russian State or is under its effective control (i.e. whether the Russian State bears responsibility for their actions) and can be considered as combatants, or whether the group operates independently.³⁸

The personnel of PMSCs are combatants if they are incorporated into a state’s armed forces or into groups under a command responsible to a party to the conflict; if not incorporated in either of these places, they will be civilians who may be directly participating in hostilities. In an IAC, civilians accompanying armed forces may have, pursuant to Article 4A(4) of the Third Geneva Convention, prisoner-of-war status upon capture.³⁹ When States contract PMSCs, they retain responsibility for regulating and supervising these services and ensuring respect for IHL by contracted personnel. Under certain circumstances, the conduct of PMSC personnel may be attributable to the contracting State under international law, for example, if the company is incorporated into the armed forces or entrusted with governmental authority.⁴⁰ States can determine which services PMSCs are authorized to perform, for example, by limiting them to support roles without direct participation in hostilities or intelligence activities.⁴¹

Groups like Wagner raise further legal questions, particularly because the legal structure of the group has been unclear. Since PMSCs are not recognized under Russian law, Wagner may not fit the conventional PMSC definition that requires the expression of a corporate form.⁴² Conversely, Africa Corps is under more direct organizational supervision from the Russian Ministry of Defence⁴³ and its members may best be considered as State agents.

FAMa, supported by Wagner/Africa Corps, significantly intensified their operations against insurgent groups in Mali in 2024.⁴⁴

As noted above (see ‘Malian air force drone suspected of being downed in Algerian territory’), violent fighting took place in the vicinity of this town in July 2024 between the Malian army, aided by its Russian auxiliaries, and separatist rebel groups allegedly supported by Kyiv.⁴⁵

In August 2024, fighting near Tin Zaouatine in northern Mali between the Malian army, its Russian auxiliaries (Wagner/Africa Corps), and Tuareg separatists from the CSP-DPA marked the heaviest defeat for Wagner/Africa Corps since its 2021 deployment. The rebels claimed that more than eighty Wagner/Africa Corps fighters and forty-seven Malian soldiers were killed.⁴⁶ Since the summer, rebels have used modified quadcopter drones to strike Malian and Wagner positions in Goundam and Léré, allegedly with Ukrainian support in the form of intelligence sharing, training and, possibly, equipment.⁴⁷ Ukrainian military intelligence spokesman Andriy Yusov appeared to confirm collaboration, a confirmation which prompted Mali to sever diplomatic ties with Kyiv on 4 August 2024, accusing the latter state of supporting “terrorism”. Analysts caution that a direct Ukrainian troop presence in Mali is unverified but regard the alleged cooperation as a part of Kyiv’s strategy to undermine Russian influence in Africa.⁴⁸

Ukraine denies the allegation that it has supplied drones to rebels fighting the Malian army and Africa Corps.⁴⁹ In a statement on 14 October 2024, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly rejected the claim of Ukrainian involvement in providing unmanned aerial vehicles to the Malian insurgents. The statement also dismissed the accusation levelled by Malian and Nigerien officials that Ukraine supplies arms, intelligence, or other support to what the officials termed a ‘terrorist coalition’, and called for an end to a campaign of ‘false information’ that echoed the ‘fake narratives of the aggressor state Russia’s propaganda’.⁵⁰ An earlier statement on 5 August by the Ministry described Mali’s decision to sever diplomatic ties with Ukraine as ‘short-sighted and hasty’, declaring that Ukraine, ‘as a victim of an unprovoked full-scale armed aggression of the Russian Federation, with the support of the world community, strives in every way to restore justice and respect for international law, aimed at protecting all countries of the world, including African, from encroachments on their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity’.⁵¹

The sequence of incidents reflected above, though not verified, suggests the Ukraine-Russia conflict has expanded into Africa, adapted as form of asymmetric, extra-regional warfare which aims to counter Russian influence. Arguably, the result for Ukraine is tactical – disrupting Wagner/Africa Corps operations is a signal of Kyiv’s capacity to operate beyond its borders; but there is a significant diplomatic risk. It is reported the Mali operation alienated key African States and damaged Ukraine’s standing in the Global South by reinforcing a Cold War-era perception of Africa as a pawn in external power struggles.⁵² Reports indicate that Ukrainian operatives target Wagner/Africa Corps, private military and security companies (PMSC), and pro-Kremlin units in Sudan. In an apparent confirmation of this, Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence Chief stated: ‘Our operations are aimed at reducing Russian military potential, anywhere where it’s possible. Why should Africa be an exception?’⁵³ Allegedly, Ukrainian special forces train Sudanese government troops in ‘first-person-view’ (FPV) drone tactics to counter offensives by Wagner/Africa Corps operatives.⁵⁴ The Wall Street Journal described the action as ‘an audacious new venture – part of a strategy to disrupt Russia’s military and economic operations abroad, make the war more costly for Moscow, and position itself as a bulwark against Russian incursions’.⁵⁵ But if the Ukraine war spills over into Africa, there will be severe consequences. The Economic Community of West African States has warned against ‘foreign interference in the region as well as any attempt to draw the region into the current geopolitical confrontations’.⁵⁶

Clashes between FAMa and FLA were reported during February 2025 resulting in the death of at least seven FLA fighters near the village of Anefis in the Kidal Region of north-eastern Mali.⁵⁷

In 2025, the Russian Ministry of Defence and Wagner Group veterans were entrusted with resuming some of the group’s activities in Mali.⁵⁸ Reports published on 6 June 2025 suggest that what is left of the former Wagner Group would soon be withdrawing from Mali.⁵⁹ Another report suggests that all Wagner units had been taken over by Africa Corps in June 2025; a diplomatic source told RFI that ‘the Kremlin maintains overall control’. The source added that most Wagner personnel in Mali – primarily Russian nationals – are expected to be reintegrated into the Africa Corps and will remain deployed in northern regional capitals as well as in Bamako.⁶⁰

Evolving below the threshold situation between the ISSP and JNIM

The ISSP and JNIM have clashed on several occasions in the Gao region.⁶¹ One such clash occurred on 3 June 2023 in the area of Tatakarat which resulted in the death of eight ISSP fighters. The following day, JNIM ambushed an ISSP unit at Timatalwayene killing ten people. An attack in Hourara Tandadjdadjorane and Fitili villages lasted for two days, from 8 to 9 July 2023, and resulted in the takeover of a base. The first clash between the groups in 2024 was reported on 22 May, resulting in the death of at least three civilians in Balga village. An ISSP commander was reportedly killed by JNIM in the area of Fitili on 5 June. On 1 December 2024, an ISSP and JNIM clash resulted in the death of seven ISSP and two JNIM fighters.⁶²

Despite this violence, confrontations between the ISSP and JNIM are not considered to meet the threshold of intensity required for a NIAC.

Dan Na Ambassagou (self-defence group) activities

Dan Na Ambassagou (Self-Defense Hunter Militia of the Dogon) is a collection/coalition of organized self-defence armed groups active in Northern Mali. This coalition was formed in December 2016 and has a military wing.⁶³ The military wing is commanded by Youssouf Toloba. Discipline is said to be imposed on the militia men through tribal and militia leaders.⁶⁴ The defensive activities of Dan Na Ambassagou are not yet of a military nature and logistical capacity is limited to the circulation of arms within local communities. Most clashes occur between Dan Na Ambassagou and its Fulani tribal rivals.⁶⁵ There is little evidence suggesting a unified stance.

Political unrest and violence during May 2025

The month of May 2025 saw a surge in both political unrest and violence across Mali. On 3 May, hundreds of demonstrators gathered in Bamako to protest the proposed dissolution of political parties, and more generally, the military’s continued rule for five years without elections, the failure to respect the Constitution, ‘unfair taxes’, and power outages, following a political party meeting scheduled for 3 May in Bamako being prevented by transition supporters and the police.⁶⁶ The authorities responded with a sweeping crackdown; all political activity was suspended on 7 May, and all political parties had been dissolved by 13 May.⁶⁷ In the aftermath, prominent opposition figures Abba Alhassane and El Bachir Thiam, both active participants in the demonstrations, were abducted.⁶⁸ Reports indicate that Abba Alhassane was released in June, nearly a month after his abduction.⁶⁹ However, other sources suggested in July that El Bachir Thiam remained missing and was imprisoned in an undisclosed location.⁷⁰ On 24 July, a Malian journalist wrote an open letter to the Prosecutor highlighting that Thiam was still missing.⁷¹ At the time of writing, there was no indication that El Bachir Thiam had been released, and he remained missing.

Armed clashes also escalated sharply. On 23 May, JNIM launched a large-scale assault on the Dioura military camp, reportedly killing forty-one soldiers.⁷² In Mopti, the military faced accusations from local civilians of executing at least twenty Fulani men.⁷³ JNIM continued its campaign of violence with attacks across central and south-western Mali, including a deadly raid on a gold mining site in Narena.⁷⁴ Meanwhile, in the north, the FLA claimed responsibility for a drone strike targeting government and Russian forces in Léré on 9 May.⁷⁵ Tensions with Barrick Gold intensified as the government moved to place the company’s mines under provisional administration.⁷⁶

International armed conflict between Algeria and Mali (early April 2025)

An armed conflict between States constitutes an IAC.¹ In the Appeals Chamber decision in the Tadić case, the concept of ‘armed conflict’ in the context of interstate armed conflict was described as the resort to armed force between states.²

There are conflicting reports on the facts concerning the downing of a Malian air force drone in Algerian territory (or Malian territory).³ Available reports suggest that the drone was indeed intercepted by Algerian armed forces, with sources indicating that the drone was shot down after breaching Algerian airspace near the border town of Tin Zaoutine.⁴ As Sassòli explains: ‘The existence of an IAC is exclusively a question of fact. It exists if someone attributable to a State commits acts of violence against persons or objects representing another State.’⁵ Vité similarly opines that “[i]t is, however, not necessary for the conflict to extend over time or for it to create a certain number of victims”.⁶

The minimal intensity of this single attack (if confirmed) does not impact its classification as an IAC. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), no level of intensity is required from such force to trigger an IAC.⁷ Despite some differing opinions, International Committee of the Red Cross,⁸ the majority view is that a minimum intensity threshold is not required for an international armed conflict to exist.⁹ This conflict did, however, come to an end, and is, therefore, declassified. The ICRC explains that to declassify an international armed conflict, the facts on the ground must be considered and an end of hostilities must end with a degree of stability and permanence.¹⁰ As this situation was seemingly a one-off incident and no military operations followed, this conflict is declassified. Furthermore, according to the ICRC commentaries, armed conflict within the meaning of Common Article 2(1) comes to an end when belligerent states are no longer involved in the confrontation.¹¹ The ICRC then cites the example of a temporary military incursion into another State’s territory where the cessation of such incursions and withdrawal from the territory would put an end to the situation. As there were no subsequent (alleged) drone incursions by Mali into Algerian airspace, nor any other related actions by either country, this conflict has ended.

1
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 9; ‘Article 2 – Application of the Convention’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
2
ICTY, The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Appeals Chamber,Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para 70.
3
D. Baché, ‘Mali: l’armée dément que son drone abattu à Tinzaouatène soit entré en Algérie’, RFI, 3 April 2025.
4
‘Algeria Shoots Down Malian Drone, Escalating Tensions’, Africa Defense Forum, 29 April 2025.
5
M. Sassòli, ‘International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare: Second Edition’, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024, para 6.04.
6
S. Vité, ‘Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual situations’, International Review of the Red Cross, March 2009, 72.
7
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 9.
8
‘Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949: Commentary of 2016’, para 242,
9
See M. Sassòli, ‘International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare: Second Edition’, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024, para 6.0; S. Vité, ‘Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual situations’, International Review of the Red Cross, March 2009, 72; R. Kolb and R. Hyde, ‘An Introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflicts’, Hart Publishing, 2008, 76.
10
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 10.
11
ICRC, ‘Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949: Commentary of 2016’, para 281.

Non-International Armed Conflict between Mali (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) and Jama’a Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM)

Background

As in other Sahelian countries, the roots of the insurgency in Mali lie in a combination of ethnic tensions, fragile state institutions, and limited government control over peripheral region.¹ Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), the main jihadist coalition in Mali, is led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a Tuareg from the Ifoghas clan who once served as a Malian diplomat.² Ghali had previously played a prominent role in the 2012 Tuareg uprising against the Malian state, which sought to establish an independent homeland called Azawad in the north of the country.³

JNIM was officially formed in 2017 through the merger of five jihadist organizations operating in the Sahel, including Ansar Dine and Al-Mourabitoun.⁴ This coalition emerged after French-led operations in 2012 had temporarily rolled back both separatist and jihadist groups that had seized control of northern Mali.⁵ Since its formation, JNIM has pursued an agenda of rejecting the authority of Sahelian governments while imposing its strict interpretation of Islamic law on populations under its influence.⁶ This has included the enforcement of bans on music and smoking, compulsory dress codes, requirements for men to grow beards, and restrictions on women’s freedom of movement.⁷

FAMa have been engaged in a protracted conflict with JNIM as part of broader counterterrorism campaigns.⁸ Their operations have been bolstered at different points by international partners, including France’s Operation Serval and Barkhane,⁹ the United Nations peacekeepers under MINUSMA,¹⁰ and, more recently, Russian military contractors. Despite these efforts, FAMa has struggled to contain JNIM’s insurgency, which thrives on local grievances, cross-border mobility, and the government’s difficulties in providing security and governance in rural areas.¹¹ Indeed, an important objective for JNIM in using violence is to prevent the infiltration of state linked individuals into areas under its control.

The armed conflict between the Malian armed forces is thus part of the broader Mali war which began in 2012 with a Tuareg rebellion.¹² By the first half of 2018, rebel attacks had intensified significantly, and by July of that year, northern Mali had largely slipped from government control.¹³

Intensity

Military operations and clashes between FAMa and JNIM intensified during 2023 and 2024.¹⁴ On 1 June 2023, JNIM launched an attack which FAMa responded to by launching airstrikes on 2 and 3 June and 12 July 2023 in the Mopti region, resulting in at least fifty-seven fatalities, two of whom were civilians and fifty-five of whom were JNIM fighters.¹⁵

During travel from Dambani to Soumpi, a FAMa and Wagner/Africa Corps convoy fired on numerous villages, including Fansara, Hondou-Thie, Madou-Dabai, Dofana, Enekar and Farana. FAMa and Wagner/Africa Corps reportedly killed at least fifty-one civilians during this military operation.¹⁶ On 7 September 2023, JNIM attacked a FAMa military base in the Gao region.¹⁷ The operation is said to have killed between fifteen and forty soldiers and around fifty civilians.¹⁸ The military base in Bamba was destroyed, seven vehicles were burned, and heavy machine-guns and other ammunition and equipment were seized.¹⁹

A major clash occurred on 3 May 2024 where JNIM attacked FAMa positions in the Segou region in the town of Diafarabe. JNIM seized control of the base and killed ten soldiers. Two other soldiers went missing.²⁰

JNIM directly targeted civilians in the month of July 2024, allegedly killing twenty-one civilians at a wedding in Djiguibombo village on 1 July 2024 and twenty-five civilians in the village of Dembo.²¹

JNIM has been launching frequent attacks against FAMa and Wagner/Africa Corps from August 2024 through November 2024.²² On 1 August 2024, both JNIM and CSP-DPA simultaneously conducted offensives against FAMa and Wagner/Africa Corps in the Tin Zaouatine area in Kidal region.²³ In total, around eighty Wagner/Africa Corps and forty-seven FAMa troops died in that attack. It is unclear whether this was a coordinated attack or whether JNIM and CSP-DPA have formed a coalition.²⁴ On 15 August 2024, JNIM militants ambushed a patrol of FAMa forces in the town of Diallassagou (Bankass, Mopti). Fifteen soldiers were killed as a result of this ambush. This ambush allowed JNIM to seize vehicles, weapons and ammunition.²⁵

On 17 September 2024, JNIM launched a significant attack against Bamako International Airport, the adjoining military base, and the police training school. JNIM controlled the airport for several hours. This attack resulted in at least twenty fatalities and left 250 people injured. FAMa retaliated on 20 September by launching airstrikes outside Bamako in Mourdiah village, which resulted in the death of thirty JNIM fighters.²⁶

On 6 October 2024, JNIM launched an attack against a FAMa military base located in Ber village, Timbuktu. These attacks claimed the lives of more than twenty soldiers.²⁷ On 21 November 2024, JNIM ambushed a Wagner/Africa Corps convoy which resulted in seven casualties. JNIM also seized weapons and grenades which belonged to the convoy.²⁸

The fighting continued in January 2025.²⁹ On 8 January 2025, JNIM attacked a FAMa military camp and temporarily took control of this camp, which was located close to Bandiagara town. This military operation led to twenty casualties on FAMa’s side and at least fourteen casualties among JNIM forces.³⁰ On 9 January 2025, JNIM conducted an attack against several government buildings in Nioro du Sahel.³¹ FAMa claims to have successfully repulsed the attack, killing thirty JNIM fighters and losing one Malian soldier.³² On 7 February 2025, an Islamist armed group, suspected to be JNIM, reportedly attacked a civilian convoy that was being escorted by Malian armed forces and allied militias in north-eastern Mali. The attack resulted in the deaths of at least thirty-four civilians and injuries to thirty-four others.³³ The nature of attacks initiated by JNIM are clearly planned and executed frequently, thus constituting sustained and concerted military operations as demanded by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II of 1977.

The intensity of violence generated by the engagements between JNIM and FAN satisfies the requirements for a NIAC under IHL.

Organization

JNIM is the Sahel branch of al-Qaeda. It is a Salafi-jihadist group that has, as a parent organization, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which originates from the 1990s Algerian civil war.³⁴

JNIM has an organized command structure which resembles a top-down hierarchy. Essentially, there are three overall hierarchical tiers: central leadership, regional commanders, and local commanders.³⁵ Central leadership includes its emir, Iyad Ag Ghaly(aka Abu al-Fadl), who founded Ansar Dine.³⁶ Deputy leaders include Yahya Abu Hammam (Djamel Okacha), the leader of AQIM Sahara, Amadou Koufa, the leader of the Katibat Macina (Macina Liberation Front or FLM), and Abu Hassan al-Ansari, the deputy leader of al-Mourabitoun.³⁷ Another deputy leader is Abu Abdul Rahman Ali al-Sanhaji (Ali Maychou) who is a representative of AQIM Sahara, as well as being a senior judge in JNIM and its religious advisor, ‘Koufa’.³⁸

Different subgroups are at the disposal of top leadership but are able to operate with some flexibility as subgroups are divided into regionally separate areas.³⁹ These subgroups are organized so as to facilitate coordination and deepen cooperation in the group.

Its organizational structure has been described as ‘strategically coherent’ with senior regional commanders deployed to external JNIM subgroups to ensure cooperation and discipline.⁴⁰ Some analysts, though, dispute whether this level of coherence exists between subgroups,⁴¹ instead describing JNIM as essentially an umbrella group.⁴²

Discipline is enforced at the highest level by a ‘Majlis Shura’ (Consultative Council) which publicly responds to accusations of atrocities. JNIM’s Shura Council ensures Islamic governance and strict adherence to Islamic law in areas under JNIM control.⁴³ These bodies, as well as the tiered command structure, enable JNIM to implement IHL. Training is offered to fighters by highly mobile units using motorcycles to facilitate training where and when needed across the Sahel region.⁴⁴ Training camps create the opportunity to implement IHL and enhance discipline among fighters.

Military tactics employed by JNIM are described as purposeful encircling of isolated strategic zones, weakening state presence and creating power vacuums.⁴⁵ JNIM also relies on motorcycles for manoeuvrability during ambushes.⁴⁶ JNIM prefers remote violence such as using explosives, artillery and mortar fire over swarming tactics and ambushes, which are the modus operandi of the ISSP.⁴⁷ Part of its military tactics include using IEDs to destroy military and other infrastructure.⁴⁸ JNIM also maintains a high operational tempo to ensure it outpaces its adversaries as part of its military strategy.⁴⁹

JNIM is able to facilitate logistics through an extended network across central Sahel into the West African littoral states including parts of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, Ivory Coast and Togo.⁵⁰ Weapons and munitions are replenished through large-scale attacks on garrisons or auxiliary camps belonging to State armed forces in the operational area.⁵¹ Weapons and other military needs are also met using profits from artisanal mining, livestock theft, fundraising, taxation and looting.⁵²

JNIM‘s vast territorial reach⁵³ gives it a larger recruitment pool.⁵⁴ It is reported that JNIM has between 5,000 and 6,000 fighters in its ranks.⁵⁵ JNIM uses its media wing, al-Zallaqa⁵⁶ and propaganda channels,⁵⁷ to communicate with the outside world and to control its narrative. JNIM also has an official spokesperson, who, at the time of reporting, was Mahmoud Barry.⁵⁸

Territorial control is a requirement of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. JNIM is continuously expanding its control over parts of western and southern Mali.⁵⁹ JNIM has specifically gained more territory in in the Kayes Region and along the south-western border between Mali and Guinea.⁶⁰ In Southern Mali JNIM controls the majority of rural areas in northern Koulikoro along the Koulikoro and Segou reginal border north of the Niger River.⁶¹

Territorial control, as depicted above, enables JNIM to implement IHL, including Additional Protocol II, as required by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Article 1(1) demands the ability to implement Additional Protocol II, not its actual implementation.⁶²

Lastly, from the intensity assessment above, clearly the territory controlled by JNIM facilitates the planning of military operations, fulfilling the final requirement in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, which requires JNIM to be sufficiently organized to launch sustained and concerted attacks.⁶³

The organizational structure of JNIM is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II of 1977. Hence, the NIAC between Niger and JNIM constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

As such, the Additional Protocol II-type NIAC between Mali and JNIM continued throughout the reporting period.

1
M. DeAngelo, ‘Counterterrorism Shortcomings in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3 March 2025.
2
K. M. Baker and A. Clark, ‘Mali: 2012 coup and warfare in the north’, Britannica, 23 September 2025.
3
P. Sippy and J. Boswall, ‘How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups’, BBC, 7 July 2025.
4
P. Sippy and J. Boswall, ‘How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups’, BBC, 7 July 2025.
5
P. Sippy and J. Boswall, ‘How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups’, BBC, 7 July 2025.
6
‘Mali: Enabling Dialogue with the Jihadist Coalition JNIM’, International Crisis Group, 10 December 2021.
7
P. Sippy and J. Boswall, ‘How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups’, BBC, 7 July 2025.
8
‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Mali’, U.S. Department of State.
9
‘France’s action in the Sahel’, Consulat Général de Franca à Johannesburg, 17 February 2022,
10
‘MINUSMA Fact Sheet’, United Nations Peacekeeping, July 2023,
11
P. Sippy and J. Boswall, ‘How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups’, BBC, 7 July 2025.
12
‘Mali Besieged by Fighters Fleeing Libya’, Rane, 2 February 2012.
13
D. Nicholls, ‘Britain risks ‘open ended’ conflict in Mali in bid to protect European security’, The Telegraph, 20 July 2018.
14
L. Karr, ‘Africa File, March 7, 2024: JNIM Strengthening Near Bamako; Kremlin and Nigeria Discuss Partnership’, Institute for the Study of War, 7 March 2024.
15
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
16
‘Mali: Islamist Armed Groups, Army Target Civilians’, Human Rights Watch, 1 November 2023.
17
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
18
B. Ahmed, ‘Mali military camp is attacked a day after 49 civilians and 15 soldiers were killed in assaults’, AP News, 8 September 2023.
19
H. Nsaibia, ‘Fact Sheet: Attacks on Civilians Spike in Mali as Security Deteriorates Across the Sahel’, ACLED, 21 September 2023.
20
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
21
‘Mali: Armed group kills dozens at wedding celebration’, DW, 3 July 2024.
22
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
23
L. Serwat and H. Nsaibia ‘Regional Overview: Africa: August 2024’, ACLED, 6 September 2024.
24
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
25
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
26
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
27
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
28
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
29
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: February 2025’, ACLED, 10 February 2025.
30
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
31
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: February 2025’, ACLED, 10 February 2025.
32
A. Elghoubachi, ‘Southern Mali Attack Follows Alleged Death of Religious Leader’, Barlaman Today, 9 January 2025.
33
‘Mali: Armed Islamist Attack on Convoy Kills 34 Civilians’, Human Rights Watch, 20 February 2025.
34
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023; L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024.
35
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
36
J. Thompson, ‘Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 July 2021; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
37
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
38
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
39
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024; H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023; J. Thompson, ‘Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 July 2021; ‘Mapping armed groups in Mali and the Sahel’, European Council on Foreign Relations; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
40
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
41
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025; D. Eizenga and W. Williams, ‘The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, December 2020
42
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
43
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025; H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
44
‘JNIM Training Camp in Burkina Faso Shows Terror Group’s Deadly Ambition’, Africa Defense Forum, 18 June 2024; C. Weiss, ‘JNIM documents training camp in Burkina Faso’, Online Article, Long War Journal, 25 May 2024.
45
‘After Tillabéri, Is Niamey the Next Target?’, Zagazola, 9 April 2025.
46
‘Le JNIM frappe au Niger: offensive éclair contre la base militaire de Mossipaga, l’AES en difficulté’, Daily Motion, 20 May 2025.
47
J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023.
48
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
49
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
50
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
51
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 18.
52
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
53
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023
54
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025, para 12.
55
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 10.
56
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025
57
M. Laplace, ‘Al‑Qaeda affiliate JNIM claims attack near Niamey’, The Africa Report, 19 October 2024; ‘Mapping armed groups in Mali and the Sahel’, European Council on Foreign Relations,
58
LSI Africa, X, 26 November 2024; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
59
P. Sippy and J. Boswall, ‘How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups’, BBC, 7 July 2025; ‘JNIM Expands Frontlines with a Coordinated Offensive Across Western Mali’, The Soufan Center, 15 July 2025; D. Eizenga, ‘JNIM Attacks in Western Mali Reshape Sahel Conflict’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 29 September 2025.
60
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025.
61
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024.
62
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.38.
63
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40; M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.

Non-international armed conflict between Mali (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) and Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP)

Background

The conflict between FAMa and Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP), also known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), must be understood within the broader dynamics of Mali’s multilayered conflicts that started in 2012.¹ ISSP emerged in 2015 following a split within Al-Mourabitoun, under the leadership of Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi.² At times, the ISSP has operated in proximity, and possibly in cooperation, with fighters from JNIM, despite their respective allegiances to ISIS and al-Qaeda.³ Mali’s crisis dates back to 2012, when the fall of Gaddafi’s regime in Libya accelerated a rebellion in northern Mali where Tuareg separatists and jihadist groups – including AQIM, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine – seized control of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal and declared the state of Azawad, while driving FAMa from the north.⁴ The separatists were quickly sidelined by jihadists who threatened Bamako, triggering French military intervention.⁵ Both JNIM and the ISSP have since exploited ethnic grievances and local rivalries, particularly by presenting themselves as defenders of the Fulani community, thereby deepening recruitment bases and fuelling the ongoing NIAC between FAMa and the ISSP.⁶ As with its confrontations with JNIM, FAMa’s clashes with the ISSP form part of its broader counterterrorism campaign. However, experts caution against a simplistic ‘terrorist’ label, noting that ISSP primarily targets security forces to consolidate territorial control, a hallmark of insurgency. While the group does employ terrorist tactics, these are instrumental rather than defining, serving its wider objective of expelling Western influence and establishing an Islamist State.⁷

Intensity

Attacks where the ISSP specifically targeted civilians were reported throughout 2023 2024 and continued into 2025.⁸

On 3 August 2023, the ISSP ambushed a FAMa-escorted truck convoy near the village of Essailal (Menaka, Menaka).⁹ Six FAMa soldiers were killed, eight FAMa soldiers were wounded and seventeen FAMa soldiers were reported missing. The ambush allowed the ISSP to seize six vehicles, three 12.7mm machine guns and two PKM light machine guns. On 7 December 2023, ISSP announced that three of the soldiers captured during the 3 August attacks had been executed. The ISSP launched air and ground operations against a FAMa military base in Labbezanga at Ansongo, Gao on 3 December 2023.¹⁰ The level of violence of this attack allowed fighters to take control of this FAMa base and acquire weapons, ammunition and vehicles. Thirty soldiers were killed in this attack.

The first reported incident in 2024 involving the ISSP and FAMa occurred on 6 March 2024 in Labbezanga, reportedly resulting in one dead and thirteen injured in FAMa.¹¹ The Niger Armed Forces intervened to assist FAMa. Between late May and mid-June 2024, ISSP militants carried out major attacks in Tessit, Mali, where forty-two soldiers were killed.¹² Other reported incidents of ISSP activity during the 2024 and early 2025 period were limited to direct attacks against civilians and civilian objects.¹³

In January 2025, FAMa announced the capture of two leading figures of the ISSP, Mahamad Ould Erkehile (alias Abu Rakia) and Abu Hash, during an operation that also killed several militants.¹⁴ On 7 February 2025, a suspected ISSP attack on a civilian convoy that was being escorted by the military in Kobe village (Gao region) reportedly killed dozens.¹⁵

June 2025 marked a violent turning point in Mali’s conflict, as the Wagner Group exited the country to be replaced by Africa Corps under more direct organizational supervision from the Russian Ministry of Defence. The deployment of Africa Corps coincided with a sharp escalation of violence on several fronts. Over the course of the month, Africa Corps and FAMa launched a series of airstrikes and ground offensives targeting the ISSP, FLA, and JNIM strongholds in the northern and central regions.¹⁶ ISSP launched its first major attack, which it was arguably able to do because of the territory under its control, in several months on 4 June 2025 when the ISSP attacked Tessit military camp (Gao region, north), killing ninety-four people including over forty soldiers.¹⁷

The fighting reported during the review period equates to protracted armed violence.

Organization

The ISSP is a Salafi-jihadist militant group and the Sahelian affiliate of Islamic State.¹⁸ ISSP’s leadership structure integrates foreign and local leadership from diverse ethnic backgrounds, including from the Arab, Dawsahak, Djerma Fulani, Songhai, and Tuareg ethnic groups.¹⁹ The ISSP has a consolidated chain of command and senior leadership roles are held by Western Saharan and Malian Arabs. One such senior official is Abu al-Bara al-Sahrawi, who, in addition to serving as the current governor, is the emir (leader) in one of the core military zones operating out of the In-Araban area of Mali.²⁰

ISSP’s organizational structure is divided into four regions which are Burkina Faso, Muthalath (the tri-state border region), Anderamboukane, and Azawagh (Mali/Niger borderlands between Menaka, Tillabéri, and Tahoua). Five distinct military zones (at an operational level) are spread across the four regions with each military zone given specific geographical and operational tasks. The military zones all have a similar operational command structure. At the head of each zone is the emir who governs the zone. Other senior leadership mirrored in each zone includes a cadi (judge) and military commanders. Zone 1 covers areas in Burkina Faso and the Gourma; Zone 2 covers the Haoussa area; Zone 3 extends to the area between Amalaoulou, Akabar, and In-Delimane; Zone 4 constitutes the area between Menaka, Anderamboukane, and Abala; and Zone 5 (the Eastern zone) covers Azawagh.²¹ ISSP’s command structure is very sophisticated and akin to responsible command as necessitated by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II.²² The group can discipline fighters through its Law and Sanctions Office, which is composed of judges and Islamic police.²³ The existence of such a discipline office can also promote compliance with IHL.

ISSP’s logistical support comes from a series of strongholds in the Sahel. The group has support bases in Tillabéri and a control hub in Mali’s Ménaka region, a region that includes the border town adjacent to Niger, Andéramboukane.²⁴ The Malian border villages of Akabar, Tabankort and In-Araban in the Menaka region, and Amalaoulou and In-Delimane in the Gao region along the border with Niger constitute key ISSP bases and the group’s traditional stronghold.²⁵ The ISSP has various supply routes and support zones over a vast area,²⁶ to facilitate logistics. For example, the routes are used to ensure supply and resupply of weapons and ammunition, and to allow for the movement of fighters. Such support zones and critical supply corridors cover the area between Tillabéri, Tahoua and Dosso in south-western Niger, and areas in Sokoto and Kebbi states in north-western Nigeria.²⁷

The ISSP is organized in close geographic proximity to ensure fluidity between military zones as a means of maintaining high levels of interconnectedness. This enables the coordination of major attacks and offensives between military zones. Often, the strategy of force concentration between different zones enables the ISSP to deploy large numbers of fighters from different zones into the same general direction if the need arises.²⁸ ISSP fighters set up camp in dense forest areas to escape aerial surveillance.²⁹ When the ISSP mounts large-scale attacks seeking to take control over enemy military bases or territory, vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) are employed to overrun the defences.³⁰ The ISSP also employs multi-front attacks to put pressure on its enemy. This shows the ability of the group to execute planned military operations.³¹ Such military operations are, however, mostly conducted in Niger and not in Mali.

Using motorcycles enables fighters to move around swiftly and gives greater mobility in reaching and retreating from military objectives. The ISSP fights an ‘asymmetric’ conflict, largely relying on ambushes using IEDs planted where military patrols are expected to pass and attacking once the IEDs are remotely detonated.³² Other tactics employed by the ISSP include mortar attacks, roadside bombs, suicide bombings, and attaching explosive devices to vehicles.³³

Operating in marginalized communities with weakened resistance offers the ISSP ripe opportunities to recruit. The ISSP has been accused of actively recruiting children as fighters, training them, and deploying them on the front line.³⁴ There has also been active recruitment in north-western Nigeria.³⁵ The ISSP unifies communication through its media branch, responsible for its IS weekly Al-Naba news platform where official communiqués are released.³⁶ It is clear that the ISSP meets the threshold of organization demanded by IHL.

While the ISSP met the criteria set out in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II in Niger during the same reporting period, the ISSP’s military operations in were less frequent in Mali. It is, however, arguable that the ISSP may still meet the requirements set out in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Territorial control is an requirement for application in the Protocol.³⁷ During the period under review, the ISSP did increase its territorial footprint across the tri-border area, called the Liptako-Gourma tri-border region, which covers parts of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger,³⁸ Control exercised by the ISSP is reported as mostly consolidated along the Mali/Niger border in north-eastern Mali and north-western Niger.³⁹ In Mali, where the ISSP controls a major portion of the Menaka region, this territory is mostly used as an operational and economic control hub for this group’s activities in the greater Sahel.⁴⁰ The Maneka region is rich in gold mines, and this territory offers the ISSP economic stability.⁴¹ While the profits from taxing the mines are used to finance the conflict, this is not a military hub.⁴² The nature of military operations executed during the reporting period is neither sustained nor concerted. However, scholars dispute whether Additional Protocol II demands a higher level of intensity than mere protracted armed violence.⁴³ It is thus possible that the conflict between Mali and the ISSP could qualify as an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

In sum, despite the relatively limited number of direct clashes reported between the ISSP and FAMa, the ISSP continued to exercise stable control over parts of Mali and the NIAC between Mali and the ISSP persisted throughout 2023, 2024, and into 2025.

1
K. M. Baker and A. Clark, ‘Mali: 2012 coup and warfare in the north’, Britannica, 23 September 2025.
2
‘Rewards for ISIS-GS Leader Adnan Abu Walid’, Voice of Africa, 10 October 2019.
3
‘Mapping Armed Groups in Mali and the Sahel’, European Council on Foreign Relations.
4
S. M. Cold-Ravnkilde and B. Ba, ‘Actors and drivers of conflict in the Sahel: Unpacking ‘new climate wars’’, Danish Institute for Security Studies, 2022.
5
S. M. Cold-Ravnkilde and B. Ba, ‘Actors and drivers of conflict in the Sahel: Unpacking ‘new climate wars’’, Danish Institute for Security Studies, 2022.
6
L. Bortoluzzi Garcia, ‘MINUSMA – Actors of Conflict in Mali’, SFASID.
7
M. DeAngelo, ‘Counterterrorism Shortcomings in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3 March 2025.
8
‘Daesh affiliate blamed for deadly attack on civilians in Mali’, TRTWorld, 2023; S. A. Bonny, ‘Daesh/ISIS-affiliated terrorists kill at least 17 civilians in northern Mali’ AA, 29 June 2023; ‘Mali: Islamist Armed Groups, Army Target Civilians’, Human Rights Watch, 1 November 2023.
9
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
10
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
11
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
12
‘West Africa and the Sahel’, Security Council Report, 30 July 2025.
13
H. Nsaibia ‘Expert Comment: Is the Islamic State Sahel Province kidnapping more foreigners?’, ACLED, 12 February 2025.
14
‘Mali army claims arrest of IS-linked group leader’, DW, 5 January 2025.
15
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
16
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: July 2025’, ACLED, 4 July 2025.
17
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
18
J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023.
19
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
20
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
21
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
22
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
23
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
24
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
25
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
26
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024,
27
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
28
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
29
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024.
30
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024; ‘West Africa and the Sahel’, Security Council Report, 30 July 2025; ‘ISIS-Sahel’, Director of National Intelligence: Counter Terrorism Guide, September 2024.
31
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: July 2025’, ACLED, 4 July 2025.
32
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024.
33
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024; ‘ISIS-Sahel’, Director of National Intelligence: Counter Terrorism Guide, September 2024; J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023.
34
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
35
J. Barnett et al, ‘Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry, or a “Banditization” of Jihad?’, Online Article, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, January 2022.
36
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
37
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
38
A. Shtuni, ‘The Islamic State in 2025: an Evolving Threat Facing a Waning Global Response’, International Center for Counter-Terrorism, 11 July 2025.
39
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024.
40
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
41
‘IS Sahel: Consolidating territory and reviving economies’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 11 October 2024.
42
‘IS Sahel: Consolidating territory and reviving economies’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 11 October 2024; J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023.
43
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.4; M. M. Bradley, ‘Additional Protocol II: Elevating the minimum threshold of intensity?’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2020; Y. Dinstein, ‘Non-International Armed Conflicts in International Law, Second Edition’, Cambridge University Press, 2021, para 175; A. Clapham, ‘War’, Oxford University Press, 2021, 256.

Non-international armed conflict between Mali (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) (formerly known as the CSP-DPA and before that the CSP-PSD) coalition

Background

When it was founded in 2021, the CSP-PSD brought together the independence movements of the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and the pro-government groups of the Platforme. Currently meeting in a secret location for security reasons, the rebel leaders have dissolved the CMA and the Platforme, as well as the CSP-PSD that brought them together. A sort of alignment emerged within the current context: the new CSP-DPA unites under its banner all the armed groups in the North at war with the Malian State.¹

The FLA was created on 30 November 2024, composed of the members of the former CSP-DPA. On 1 December 2024, five leaders of the FLA were killed by FAMa drone attacks. Among the victims were Fahad Ag Almahmoud, the former secretary-general of GATIA, as well as two senior members of the former MNLA.²

Intensity

The first recorded attack launched by CSP-DPA against FAMa occurred on 12 September 2023.³ It was sufficient to allow the CSP-DPA to take control over FAMa and Wagner/Africa Corps strongholds in the town of Bourem and resulted in at least nineteen casualties: nine CSP-DPA fighters and ten FAMa soldiers. CSP-DPA fighters only relinquished control after an aerial intervention. On 17 September 2023, CSP-DPA again attacked a FAMa military camp, this time in Léré.⁴ Several soldiers and six CSP fighters were killed, while twenty-three soldiers were captured. CSP-DPA shot down a Malian Air Force jet and hit a second jet which was forced to make an emergency landing.⁵

The existence of a NIAC between CSP-DPA can be established in relation to the September 2023 clashes between CSP-DPA and FAMa supported by Wagner/Africa Corps, based on the intensity of the violence, regardless of its limited duration.

The next reported clashes involving CSP-DPA were reported at the end of July 2024.⁶ On 27 and 28 July, the CSP-DPA clashed with FAMa and Wagner/Africa Corps resulting in reported casualties of between twenty and eighty Wagner/Africa Corps fighters, and two FAMa soldiers.⁷ The CSP-DPA spokesperson claimed that the group had inflicted greater casualties than previously reported, stating that total of 131 soldiers and Wagner/Africa Corps members were killed in the attack.⁸ CSP-DPA had the necessary skill and military equipment to down a Malian Air Force helicopter and to hit a second air force helicopter, forcing it to make an emergency landing.⁹ These attacks resulted in several casualties, and given these military successes, the type of weaponry used can certainly be considered military.

Another significant offensive was launched by CSP-DPA and JNIM against FAMa and Wagner/Africa Corps on 1 August 2024.¹⁰ This operation resulted in the killing of 84 Wagner/Africa Corps fighters and 47 FAMa soldiers. There is insufficient information to establish the level of coordination and/or cooperation between CSP-DPA and JNIM, making it premature to try and assess if this was a planned one-off attack, a mere coincidence, or if the groups can be classified as a coalition. On 4 October 2024, the CSP-DPA attacked FAMa with drones near Gondam town. The casualties from this attack were not reported.¹¹ The use of drones by CSP-DPA is significant as these weapons are of a military nature. A statement issued by the General Staff of the Malian Armed Forces revealed that on 26 January 2025, FAMa forces intercepted and retrieved a drone bearing FLA inscriptions, which was purportedly targeting military installations.¹² Another significant attack occurred on 12 June 2025 where clashes between FLA fighters and Malian forces – supported by Russian auxiliaries – resulted in dozens of deaths in the Kidal region.¹³

The fighting between FAMa and FLA equates to protracted armed violence and satisfies the intensity demanded by IHL.

Organization

Given that the FLA is made up of groups from the former CSP-DPA, the requisite level of organization is evident. Formerly, the CSP-DPA met the criteria of organization. Indeed, the CSP-DPA coalition was led by Bilal ag Acherif and possessed a command structure.¹⁴ The CSP-DPA’s primary objective was to obtain ‘a political and legal status for the territory of Azawad’.¹⁵ The CSP-DPA coalition had its own spokesperson, Mohamed Elmaouloud Radamadane, who issued press releases.¹⁶ This serves as evidence that CSP-DPA spoke with one voice, which is said by the ICTY to be an indicative factor of organization.¹⁷

CSP-DPA also acknowledged that they were being assisted by Ukraine with training in drone operations.¹⁸ This illustrated the logistical capacity of the CSP-DPA as it had drones in its arsenal and the ability to facilitate the training of its fighters with the support of Ukraine.

In the Katanga case, the ICC found that, at a minimum, a group needs to be able to organize itself to the extent that it can execute a military attack.¹⁹ The FLA/CSP-DPA has conducted several military attacks against FAMa.²⁰ Therefore, if the functional approach towards organization as suggested in Katanga is followed, it can be argued that the FLA fulfils the organizational criteria demanded by the Tadić case.

The situation between FAMA and the FLA constitutes a NIAC.

1
D. Baché, ‘Mali: les rebelles du Nord créent le Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad’, RFI, 25 April 2024.
2
M. Le Cam, ‘Au Mali, les chefs rebelles de l’Azawad s’unissent et subissent un bombardement mortel’, Le Monde, 2 December 2024.
3
H. Nsaibia, ‘Fact Sheet: Attacks on Civilians Spike in Mali as Security Deteriorates Across the Sahel’, ACLED, 21 September 2023.
4
H. Nsaibia, ‘Fact Sheet: Attacks on Civilians Spike in Mali as Security Deteriorates Across the Sahel’, ACLED, 21 September 2023.
5
H. Nsaibia, ‘Fact Sheet: Attacks on Civilians Spike in Mali as Security Deteriorates Across the Sahel’, ACLED, 21 September 2023.
6
D. Dembele and K. Hoije, ‘Mali Rebels Say They Killed 131 Wagner, Army Soldiers in Clashes’, Bloomberg, 2 August 2024.
7
D. Wabwireh, Clashes in Mali: Tuareg rebels inflict losses on Government and mercenary forces’ Africa News, 13 August 2024.
8
D. Dembele and K. Hoije, ‘Mali Rebels Say They Killed 131 Wagner, Army Soldiers in Clashes’, Bloomberg, 2 August 2024; ‘Mali rebels say they killed 131 soldiers and Russians in July clashes’, Reuters, 1 August 2024.
9
H. Nsaibia, ‘Fact Sheet: Attacks on Civilians Spike in Mali as Security Deteriorates Across the Sahel’, ACLED, 21 September 2023.
10
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
11
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
12
‘Malian Army Neutralizes Top Terrorist Leader Abou Azimane in Timbuktu Region’, Zagazola, 28 January 2025.
13
‘Several killed as separatists clash with Malian army, Russian allies in the conflict-hit north’, ABC News, 13 June 2025.
14
‘Tuareg coalition threatens continued instability in Northern Mali’, Africa Defense Forum, 21 May 2024.
15
‘Tuareg coalition threatens continued instability in Northern Mali’, Africa Defense Forum, 21 May 2024.
16
D. Wabwireh, Clashes in Mali: Tuareg rebels inflict losses on Government and mercenary forces’ Africa News, 13 August 2024.
17
ICTY,Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarčulovski, Trial Judgment,10 July 2010.
18
B. Roger, ‘In Mali, the shadow of Ukraine behind rebels at war with Wagner’s Russian mercenaries’, Le Monde, 2 August 2024.
19
ICC, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, 7 March 2014.
20
H. Nsaibia, ‘Fact Sheet: Attacks on Civilians Spike in Mali as Security Deteriorates Across the Sahel’, ACLED, 21 September 2023.

State parties

Mali
Algeria (up until 1 April 2025; now declassified)

Non-state parties

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)
Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP)
Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) (formerly known as Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad – CSP-DPA)

Foreign involvement

Russia Africa Corps
Ukraine (potentially)

Other actors

Dan Na Ambassagou self-defence groups

1
‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict, July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy, p 137
2
‘Article 3 – Conflicts not of an international character’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases
3
‘States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 9 September 2025’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
4
‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict, July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy, p 136; ‘Mali profile – Timeline’, BBC News, 26 August 2020; E. Barabanova, ‘Africa’s Forgotten Wars: Mali’, Isituto Analisi Relazioni Internazionali, 2 September 2024.
5
‘Northern Mali: A Conflict with No Victors’, International Crisis Group, 13 October 2023,
6
H. Nsaibia, ‘Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’, ACLED, 12 December 2024,
7
L. Karr, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel: November 2024’, Institute for the Study of War, 21 November 2024.
8
C. Dufka, ‘We Used to be Brothers’, Human Rights Watch, 7 December 2018.
9
‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict, July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy, p 136.
10
‘Mali : les mouvements de l’Azawad créent une coordination militaire’, RFI, 29 October 2014.
11
‘Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers Process’; G. Nyirabikali, ‘Mali Peace Accord: Actors, Issues and Their Representation’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 27 August 2015; See International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Mali (The Sahel): Military and Security Updates – 2015’, The IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2015.
12
‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali’, UN Doc S/2018/581, 9 August 2018, p 2.
13
F. Bendhaou, ‘Mali : Les mouvements armés du nord créent le “Cadre stratégique permanent”’, AA, 6 May 2021.
14
C. Dufka, ‘We Used to be Brothers’, Human Rights Watch, 7 December 2018.
15
‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict, July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy, p136.
16
‘Last UN peacekeepers poised for complete withdrawal from Mali’, United Nations News, 31 December 2023.
17
N. Minde, ‘Russia’s Africa Corps – more than old wine in a bottle’, Institute for Security Studies, 7 March 2024.
18
‘Mali’s withdrawal from G5 Sahel, Joint Force ‘a setback’ for the region’, United Nations News, 18 May 2022.
19
‘Mali : l’armée malienne dément que son drone abattu à Tinzaouatène soit entré en Algérie’, RFI, 3 April 2025 ; ‘Algérie: l’armée annonce avoir abattu un drone près de la frontière avec le Mali’, Le Monde, 2 April 2025.
20
‘Sécurisation des frontières Un drone de reconnaissance armé abattu’, Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire: Ministère de la Défense Nationale, 1 April 2025.
21
D. Ehl, ‘How an intercepted drone escalated Mali-Algeria tensions’, DW, 11 April 2025.
22
C. Ewokor, ‘Algeria and Mali block flights from each other after drone shot down’, BBC, 8 April 2025; ‘Algeria closes airspace to Mali aircraft as drone row escalates’, Al Jazeera, 7 April 2025.
23
‘Algérie: l’armée annonce avoir abattu un drone près de la frontière avec le Mali’, Le Monde, 2 April 2025.
24
‘Mali: Events of 2024’, Human Rights Watch.
25
‘Mali junta seizes strategic northern stronghold of Kidal’, France 24, 14 November 2023.
26
I. Allegrozzi, ‘Mali’s Peace Deal Ends’, Human Rights Watch, 26 January 2024.
27
D. Baché, ‘Mali: les rebelles du Nord créent le Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad’, RFI, 25 April 2024.
28
D. Baché, ‘Mali: les rebelles du Nord créent le Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad’, RFI, 25 April 2024.
29
H. Nsaibia, ‘Fact Sheet: Attacks on Civilians Spike in Mali as Security’, ACLED, 21 September 2023.
30
J. Kilner, ‘Dozens of Wagner fighters killed and Russian helicopter destroyed in Mali Ambush’, The Telegraph, 28 July 2024.
31
M. Maillard ‘Can Azawad Liberation Front push Mali and Russian ‘invaders’ out?’ The Africa Report, 5 February 2025; ‘Mali: Reorganization of Tuareg armed groups within the Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA)’ Intelligence Security Analysis Operations, 11 December 2024.
32
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
33
‘Creation of Azawad Liberation Front deepens crisis in Sahel region’, The Arab Weekly, 2 December 2024.
34
‘Creation of Azawad Liberation Front deepens crisis in Sahel region’, The Arab Weekly, 2 December 2024.
35
S. Ritter ‘The New ‘Africa Corps’: Russia’s Wagner Rebranding’ Energy Intelligence, 24 May 2024.
36
N. Vorobyov, ‘Wagner vs Africa Corps: The future of Russian paramilitaries in Mali’, Al Jazeera, 16 June 2025; S. Daniel ‘Mali: le groupe paramilitaire russe Wagner annonce son départ et est remplacé par Africa Corps’, RFI, 7 June 2025.
37
G. Borshchevskii, ‘Qu’est-ce que l’Africa Corps russe et remplace-t-il le groupe Wagner?’, BBC News Afrique, 12 June 2025.
38
A. Rácz, ‘Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 21 September 2023; T. Neethling, ‘Russian Para-Military Operations in Africa: The Wagner Group as a De Facto Foreign Policy Instrument’, Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 51(1), 2023; J. Maddocks, ‘Russia, the Wagner Group, and the Issue of Attribution’, Lieber Institute West Point, 28 April 2021; W. Letrone and T. Cabus, ‘The Wagner Group and the Question of the Legal Attribution of the Acts of Private Actors to a State’, Cambridge Core Blog, 24 July 2023.
39
‘Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict’, European Parliament, 17 September 2008, 36.
40
‘Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict’, European Parliament, 17 September 2008, 32-33, 35.
41
UNGA, ‘Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination: Regulatory environment for mercenaries, mercenary-related actors, and private military and security companies: a call to action’, UN Doc A/78/535, 17 October 2023.
42
‘The Wagner Group: Options for Justice’, Geneva Academy, 9 June 2022.
43
S.Ritter, ‘The New “Africa Corps”: Russia’s Wagner Rebranding’, Energy Intelligence, 24 May 2024
44
L. Serwat and H. Nsaibia ‘Q&A: The Wagner Group’s new life after the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin’, ACLED,21 August 2024.
45
‘Algérie: l’armée annonce avoir abattu un drone près de la frontière avec le Mali’, Le Monde, 2 April 2025; I. Burdyga, ‘Le conflit russo-ukrainien s’exporte-t-il vers le Mali?’, DW, 30 July 2024; M. Faye, ‘Pourquoi le Mali a rompu ses relations diplomatiques avec l’Ukraine et quels sont les impacts sécuritaires’, BBC News Afrique, 5 August 2025; B. Roger and E. Grynszpan, ‘Dans le nord du Mali, les drones ukrainiens éclaircissent l’horizon des rebelles’, Le Monde, 10 October 2024.
46
M. Faye, ‘Pourquoi le Mali a rompu ses relations diplomatiques avec l’Ukraine et quels sont les impacts sécuritaires’, BBC, 5 August 2024.
47
B. Roger and E. Grynszpan, ‘Ukrainian drones provide support for northern Mali’s rebels’, Le Monde, 13 October 2024.
48
P. Melly, ‘Was Ukraine’s role in big Wagner defeat an own goal in Africa?’, BBC, 12 August 2024; A. Durbin, ‘Mali cuts diplomatic ties with Ukraine over Wagner ambush claims’, BBC, 5 August 2024; I. Burdyga, ‘Le conflit russo-ukrainien s’exporte-t-il vers le Mali?’, DW, 30 June 2024.
49
B. Rukanga, ‘Ukraine denies supplying drones to Mali rebels’, BBC, 15 October 2024.
50
B. Rukanga, ‘Ukraine denies supplying drones to Mali rebels’, BBC, 15 October 2024; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, ‘Comment of the MFA on the Spread of Russian narratives and accusations against Ukraine of supporting rebel movements in Mali’, 14 October 2024.
51
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, ‘Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the decision of the Transitional Government of the Republic of Mali to break off diplomatic relations with Ukraine’, 5 August 2024.
52
T. Mhaka, ‘Ukraine is losing the plot in Africa’, Al Jazeera, 20 August 2024.
53
D. Ignatius, ‘This defiant Ukrainian general has no smile – and surprising remarks on Trump’, The Washington Post, 17 April 2024; D. Kirichenko, ‘How Ukraine Is Challenging Russia in Africa and the Middle East’, Lawfare, 2 July 2025.
54
V. Butenko, et al, ‘Exclusive: Ukraine’s special services ‘likely’ behind strikes on Wagner-backed forces in Sudan, a Ukrainian military source says’, CNN, 20 September 2023.
55
I. Lovett, et al, ‘Ukraine Is Now Fighting Russia in Sudan’, The Wall Street Journal, 6 March 2024.
56
P. Fabricius, ‘Is Russia’s war against Ukraine spilling over into Africa?’, Institute for Security Studies, 9 August 2024; ‘Communique on the Violent Attacks against Members of the Malian Defense and Security Forces in Tin Zaouatine’, ECOWAS, 6 August 2024.
57
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
58
‘The Wagner Group and Russian PMCs: Where Do They Operate Now?’, Global Guardian, 5 July 2024.
59
M. Banchereau, ‘Wagner Group leaving Mali after heavy losses but Russia’s Africa Corps to remain’, AP News, 6 June 2025.
60
‘RFI Wagner replaced in Mali by Africa Corps, another Russian military group’, RFI, 9 June 2025.
61
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
62
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.
63
H. Nsaibia ‘Actor Profile: Dan Na Ambassagou’ ACLED, 9 May 2022.
64
‘“They executed some and brought the rest with them”: human rights violations by security forces in Sahel’, Amnesty International, 2020.
65
‘Mali: Despicable killings of civilians must be investigated’, Amnesty International, 10 June 2019.
66
D. Baché, ‘Mali: des membres du CNT en appellent à la violence pour défendre la Transition’, RFI, 7 May 2025; D. Baché, ‘Mali: l’inédite contestation de la transition du 3-4 mai peut-elle se poursuivre?’, RFI, 5 May 2025.
67
‘Qu’est-ce que la dissolution des partis politiques signifie pour les Maliens?’, BBC News Afrique, 22 May 2025; F. R. Koné and F. M. Dramé, ‘Dissolution des partis politiques au Mali: une manœuvre risquée’, Institute for Security Studies, 19 May 2025.
68
I. Allegrozzi, ‘Mali Opposition Politicians Feared Forcibly Disappeared’, Human Rights Watch, 9 May 2025.
69
‘Relief in Mali as CODEM leader released from detention’, West Africa Democracy Radio, 9 June 2025; News Central TV, X, 7 June 2025.
70
‘The removal of El Bachir Thiam highlights the growing tensions of political repression in Mali since the 2020 coup’, Fatshimetrie, 7 July 2025; D. Baché, ‘Mali: la détention d’El Bachir Thiam se durcit, deux mois après son enlèvement par la Sécurité d’État’, RFI, 7 July 2025.
71
‘“Entre Nous’’: Libérez El Bachir Thiam!!!’, Mali24, 24 July 2025.
72
D. Baché, ‘Mali: les jihadistes du Jnim déciment le camp militaire de Dioura’, RFI, 26 May 2025.
73
‘Mali: 22 Men Found Dead After Arrest by Soldiers’, Human Rights Watch, 20 May 2025.
74
B. Ahmed, ‘Armed group mounts double attack on artisanal mining site in Mali, leaving 3 dead and abducting 2’, AP News, 12 May 2025.
75
C. Werb, Post on X, 10 May 2025.
76
‘Barrick Opposes Mali Government’s Attempt to Take Over the Day-to-Day Operations at Loulo-Gounkoto, Has Continued to Support the Workforce’, Barrick, 26 May 2025; ‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group.

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (2023-2025)

Malian air force drone suspected of being downed in Algerian territory

Tuareg separatist groups in continuous evolution: from to CSP-PSD to CSP-DPA to FLA

Russian support forces rebranding and setback, and possible Ukrainian involvement

Evolving below the threshold situation between the ISSP and JNIM

Dan Na Ambassagou (self-defence group) activities

Political unrest and violence during May 2025

Non International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State parties

Non-state parties

Foreign involvement

Other actors