Snapshot
For more than a decade, Mali has experienced overlapping non international armed conflicts (NIACs), pitting Malian armed forces (FAMa) and allied militias against Tuareg separatist coalitions and Islamist groups such as Jama’at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP). The 2015 Algiers Accords failed to end violence, and former Plateforme and CMA coalitions reconfigured into Cadre Stratégique Permanent pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement (CSP-PSD), later Cadre stratégique pour la défense du people de l’Azawad (CSP-DPA) and then the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA), which now claims to represent Azawad and seeks independence. External involvement shifted from French and United Nations (UN) support to backing by the Wagner Group, rebranded then as Africa Corps. The period also featured a serious drone incident with Algeria, alleged Ukrainian support to separatists, below threshold clashes between ISSP and JNIM, continuing activity of Dan Na Ambassagou and a surge of repression and armed violence in May 2025.
Classifications and Parties to the Conflicts
- Non-international armed conflict between Mali (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) and Jama’at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)
- Non-international armed conflict between Mali (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) and Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP)
- Non-international armed conflict between Mali (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) and the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) (formerly known as the Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad – CSP-DPA and before that, the Cadre stratégique permanent pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement – CSP-PSD) coalition
Hostilities in Mali continued to be marked by serious violations of IHL. FAMa operations, conducted alongside Africa Corps and Dozo militias, were at times indiscriminate or targeted civilians on the basis of ethnicity, notably Fulani communities, involving killings, the burning of homes and the pillage of livestock. Air and drone strikes hit civilian gatherings, including a market and a wedding procession, raising concerns regarding distinction and precautions. In May and June 2026, Russian-made cluster munitions were used in strikes in Kidal and Tombouctou regions. This was the first confirmed use of cluster munitions by a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. JNIM’s economic warfare caused severe hardship for civilians. Since September 2025 it has imposed a fuel blockade, attacked tanker convoys and civilian vehicles and killed truck drivers. Its attacks on villages in Mopti region were also potentially indiscriminate. JNIM summarily executed civilians and captured soldiers, and abductions and hostage-taking increased. State forces were accused of extrajudicial killings, mutilation of the dead and enforced disappearances of perceived critics. Sexual violence by Africa Corps and JNIM fighters, and the recruitment and use of children, mostly by JNIM, were also reported.
Classification
Historical Background
Origins
For more than a decade, Mali has faced a complex and evolving landscape of non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) involving both separatist and Islamist armed groups. This includes hostilities against Tuareg separatist factions in northern Mali and against Islamist groups, notably Jama’a Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP). Other episodes of armed violence have involved ethnic militias and self-defence groups, but the confrontations have not met the organization or intensity thresholds to qualify as NIACs under IHL.
Coalitions and peace accord
Between 2014 and 2015, armed groups coalesced into two coalitions, the Plateforme des Mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d’Alger (Plateforme), comprising mostly pro-government groups, and the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), a separatist coalition. Confrontations between the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), Plateforme, and the CMA culminated in the Algiers Accords signed on 20 June 2015. Despite the agreement, armed clashes continued.
Evolution of Tuareg separatist groups
In 2021, the former CMA and Plateforme coalitions merged to form the Cadre Stratégique Permanent pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement (CSP-PSD) to support the implementation of the peace accordRenewed hostilities in 2023, the recapture of Kidal by FAMa, and the formal collapse of the Algiers Accords in January 2024 marked a major deterioration. The CSP-PSD then became the Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad (CSP-DPA), before being dissolved into the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) in November 2024, which claimed to represent Azawad and pursue independence in northern Mali.
Foreign involvement
FAMa were initially supported by the French Armed Forces and United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). France ended its mission on 9 November 2022, and MINUSMA completed its withdrawal on 31 December 2023. Since 2021, FAMa have been supported by the Wagner Group and later Africa Corps. Russian-backed operations intensified in 2024. In parallel, Ukraine allegedly assisted Tuareg separatists with intelligence, training and drones, prompting Mali to sever diplomatic ties with Ukraine, while Ukraine denied providing arms, intelligence or drone support.
Key Developments (2025–2026)
- Russia now a party to several NIACs in Mali: Russia, through Africa Corps, has become a party to Mali’s NIACs against JNIM, the ISSP and the FLA. In June 2025, Africa Corps replaced Wagner and operates under the direct supervision of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Africa Corps’ direct participation in hostilities, including airstrikes, ground operations, convoy support, joint bases and operations alongside the FAMa, makes Russia a co-belligerent bound by IHL.
- Coordinated attacks launched by the FLA and JNIM in Kidal in April 2026: The April 2026 coordinated attacks marked a significant escalation, including the capture of Kidal and attacks on strategic sites. Although the FLA and the JNIM publicly coordinated against a common enemy, their relationship did not absorb the two pre-existing NIACs into a single conflict. They lacked a unified command structure, maintained separate leadership, pursued different objectives, and differed on rules of engagement, despite operational coordination and further joint attacks.
- JNIM’s new ‘economic conflict strategy’: Targeting oil convoys and gold mines: From late 2025, JNIM increasingly targeted fuel convoys and gold mining operations to exert economic pressure on Mali. The FAMa and Africa Corps responded through convoy escorts and military operations, but attacks continued. JNIM also placed a partial siege around Bamako for many months, exacerbating hardship in the civilian population.
- Mali’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court: Mali formally declared it was withdrawing from the Rome Statute on 24 June 2026. The withdrawal will take effect on 24 June 2027, but will not effect any investigations or prosecutions before the Court prior to that date.
Non-International Armed Conflicts
Mali vs JNIM
The Additional Protocol II (AP II)-type NIAC between Mali, supported by Russia through Africa Corps, and JNIM continued as of June 2026. The conflict forms part of Mali’s broader governance challenges, rooted in weak State control, local grievances and jihadist insurgency. Russia became a party through Africa Corps, which intervened on Mali’s invitation and directly supported FAMa. The intensity threshold was met through sustained and escalating hostilities from 2023 to 2026, including coordinated attacks, ambushes, airstrikes, attacks on military bases, fuel convoys and economic assets, civilian casualties, displacement, territorial contests and repeated operations involving FAMa, Africa Corps and JNIM. JNIM’s operations were planned and frequent, and were seemingly coordinated with other non-State armed groups. The organization requirement was satisfied by JNIM’s tiered command structure, central and regional leadership, internal discipline through the ‘Shura Council’, financing, logistics, and ability to conduct sustained military operations. Its territorial control also allowed implementation of AP II.
Mali vs ISSP
The NIAC between Mali, supported by Russia through Africa Corps, and ISSP, also known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, persisted into 2026. The conflict forms part of Mali’s broader crisis since 2012, with ISSP emerging in 2015 and exploiting ethnic grievances, local rivalries and weak State control. Russia became a party through Africa Corps, which intervened at Mali’s invitation. The intensity threshold was met through protracted armed violence, ambushes of military convoys, assaults on bases, and repeated clashes with FAMa and Africa Corps. Although direct clashes were relatively infrequent, violence continued through June 2026. The organization requirement was satisfied by the group’s consolidated command structure, logistical networks, and territorial control. The conflict may qualify as an AP II-type NIAC.
Mali vs FLA
The NIAC between Mali, supported by Russia through Africa Corps, and the FLA continued after the group’s evolution from the CSP-PSD to the CSP-DPA and then to the FLA in November 2024. The conflict arose from renewed hostilities between northern armed groups and the Malian State, with the FLA pursuing political status and independence for Azawad. The intensity threshold was met through repeated and escalating clashes from September 2023 to April 2026, including attacks on military bases, use of drones and mortars, and the inflicting of casualties among Malian and Africa Corps forces. The April 2026 coordinated operations with JNIM further intensified the conflict. The organization requirement was satisfied by the FLA’s inherited command structure, identifiable leadership, and ability to conduct sophisticated military operations.
Parties to the Conflict
State Parties
- Mali
- Russia
Non-State Parties
- Jama’at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)
- Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)
- Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) (formerly known as Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad – CSP-DPA)
Other Main Actors:
Other Non-State Actors Involved:
- Dan Na Ambassagou self-defence groups
Foreign Involvement
- Ukraine (potentially)
- Alliance of Sahel States members Burkina Faso and Niger (potentially)
Civilian Harm
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
There have been continued to be serious violations of IHL by many parties to the conflicts in Mali. Jama’a Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) waged a violent campaign against civilians, but often, the counterinsurgency operations of the Mali Armed Forces (FAMa) have also been indiscriminate or have targeted civilian populations on the basis of ethnicity. In May and June 2026, there was compelling evidence of the use of cluster munitions, either by the FAMa or by Africa Corps in Kidal and Tombouctou regions, making Mali responsible for the first serious violation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
There have been incidents where the armed forces have attacked civilians, seemingly on the basis of ethnicity, identifying Fulani communities as supportive of the local armed groups. For example, on 14 May 2026, dozens of Malian soldiers in trucks, accompanied by Dozo militiamen on about twenty motorbikes, entered Sarkala Werè village and fired on civilians trying to flee or hide. They killed at least thirty-one Fulani civilians, of whom twenty-three were children. While JNIM operates around the village, no fighters were there before or during the attack, which they believe targeted residents solely because they were Fulani.
Indiscriminate attacks
A number of attacks have occurred where the attacking party has failed to distinguish between military objectives and the civilian population, making the attack indiscriminate. For example, airstrikes in Kyrnia, in the Mopti region on 15 June 2026 killed eight civilians. Africa Corps subsequently publicised via its social media channels that it had carried out a successful airstrike on a ‘gathering place of terrorist groups’ in Mopti region, killing several ‘field commanders’. Witnesses said about 100 JNIM fighters were in the village at the time of the strikes, most at the mosque, about 150 metres from the strike sites. JNIM has also mounted potentially indiscriminate attacks, for example those following the coordinated April assaults, in the villages of Korokori and Gomossogou in Mopti region. At least thirty people were killed. Local journalists believe that the attacks may have been retaliation for acts committed by the Dan Nan Ambassagou militia, the best-known of the self-defence groups (dozos). The victims were mostly militiamen, but there were also teenagers and younger children killed.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
Armed groups, particularly JNIM, have implemented a blockade on civilian transport, including attacks on fuel tankers and buses. They have also continued to expropriate civilian property to sustain their campaign by way of a zakat tax.
Attacks against Villages and Shelters
During an attack on Sarkala Werè village in May 2026, witnesses reported that the military and the militia burned at least ten straw huts, and stole livestock, an instance of wanton destruction and pillage. Satellite imagery from 20 May analysed by Human Rights Watch shows at least twenty-five burned straw huts in the village. During the attack on Bombori, discussed above, Africa Corps fighters were also reported to have looted the houses of the Fulani neighbourhood.
VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY
Both JNIM and government forces have perpetrated serious violations against persons in their power, including murder, summary executions and torture, often seemingly aimed at terrorising the population. State forces have also been implicated in acts of enforced disappearances, and violations of the dignity of the dead.
- Murder
- Torture
- Acts of terrorism
- Sexual Violence
- Treatment of the Dead
- Enforced Disappearances
- Protection of Children
JNIM has murdered both civilians and summarily executed soldiers. In January 2026, they summarily executed ten long-haul truck drivers and two teenage apprentices after attacking a military-escorted fuel convoy. The victims’ bodies were recovered two weeks later, blindfolded, with their hands tied behind their backs and their throats slit. On 21 May 2026, two JNIM fighters abducted Abdoul Salam Maïga, an ethnic Songhoy Quranic teacher, and about one hour later brought him back blindfolded to the central square and executed him in front of terrified residents. Following an ambush on 18 July 2026 in the area of Tabrichat, videos circulated via social media showed JNIM fighters summarily executing a group of at least nineteen Malian soldiers.
There have also been several reports of extrajudicial killings by Government troops, or those fighting alongside them. On 23 June 2026, a patrol of Malian soldiers and Africa Corps mercenaries passed through the village of Zarho between the Tombouctou and Gao regions and killed two Tuareg herders, and then mutilated one of their bodies.