Mali (2026-08-10)

Three non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) are ongoing in parallel between State forces and non-State armed groups in Mali.¹ These NIACs include:

Mali (supported by Russia through Africa Corps) v Jama’a Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM).
Mali (supported by Russia through Africa Corps) v Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP).
Mali (supported by Russia) v the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) (formerly known as the Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad – CSP-DPA and before that, the Cadre stratégique permanent pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement – CSP-PSD) coalition.

Russia is supporting Mali through the deployment of its Africa Corps, which have been directly engaging in hostilities in support of Mali’s armed forces.

All parties to the ongoing NIACs are bound by Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions² and customary international humanitarian law applicable to NIACs.

Mali is a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977.³ The NIAC between Mali and JNIM continues to meet the additional requirements of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, and this treaty is applicable to that conflict.

For more than a decade, Mali has been embroiled in a complex and evolving landscape of NIACs involving both separatist and Islamist armed groups.⁴ These include sustained hostilities against Tuareg separatist factions in northern Mali,⁵ and Islamist groups such as Jama’a Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM),⁶ and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP)⁷ Although other episodes of armed violence have involved ethnic militias and self-defence groups – including the Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad (MSA), Groupe d’Autodéfense Tuareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA), Dan Na Ambassagou, and Dozo militias – many of these confrontations have not met the requisite organization or intensity thresholds to qualify as NIACs under international humanitarian law (IHL).⁸

Between 2014 and 2015, pro-government and separatist armed groups coalesced into two main coalitions:

The Plateforme des Mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d’Alger (Plateforme), comprising mostly pro-government groups such as GATIA and MSA.⁹
The Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), a coalition of separatist groups led by Bilal ag Acherif, was composed of the Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), the Haut conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) and the Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad (MAA).¹⁰

The confrontations between FAMa (and Plateforme) and the CMA culminated in the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali signed on 20 June 2015 in Algiers (Algiers Accords).¹¹ Despite this agreement, armed clashes between the two coalitions continued. A United Nations Panel of Experts documented violations of the Algiers Accord, including attacks on state forces by a signatory group.¹²

In 2021, the former CMA and Plateforme coalitions merged to form the Cadre Stratégique Permanent pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement (CSP-PSD), aimed at jointly implementing the peace accord.¹³ In August 2023, renewed hostilities erupted between FAMa and former CMA-affiliated Tuareg separatist groups, prompting the Plateforme to withdraw from the CSP-PSD in September.¹⁴ By September 2023, there had been clashes between CSP-PSD and FAMa. The first recorded attack launched against FAMa occurred on 12 September 2023.¹⁵ The CSP-PSD maintained control of Kidal until FAMa recaptured the strategic town in November 2023.¹⁶

The Algiers Accords formally collapsed on 25 January 2024.¹⁷ In April 2024, the CSP-PSD reconstituted itself as the Cadre stratégique pour la défense du people de l’Azawad (CSP-DPA).¹⁸ The CSP-DPA, which brings together separatist armed groups from Northern Mali, including former members of the CMA, such as the MAA and the HCUA, is led by the MNLA, and specifically by the MNLA member and former CMA leader, Bilal ag Acherif.¹⁹ On 30 November 2024, CSP-DPA was dissolved to create the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA).²⁰ Its aim is to fight for independence of parts of northern Mali, also known as Azawad territory.²¹ FLA is composed of members of the former CSP-DPA, including the HCUA, the MNLA, MAA-CMA, and GATIA. Therefore, it could be another name change.²²The new movement claims to be the sole representatives of the people of Azawad.²³

FAMa were initially supported by international partners, the French Armed Forces and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).²⁴ France ended its mission on 9 November 2022, and MINUSMA completed its withdrawal from Mali on 31 December 2023.²⁵

Since December 2021, Mali was supported by the Wagner Group. In late 2023, the Wagner Group was replaced by Russia’s ‘Africa Corps’ (Wagner/Africa Corps).²⁶ In the aftermath of then-Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in a mid-air plane explosion in August 2023, the Kremlin moved swiftly to prevent further insubordination by tightening control over Wagner and other irregular paramilitary groups. The newly established Africa Corps, formally integrated into Russia’s military structure, emerged as the dominant vehicle for overseas operations.²⁷

Conversely, Africa Corps is acknowledged by Russia to form part of the Russian Armed Forces.²⁸

FAMa, supported by Wagner/Africa Corps, significantly intensified their operations against insurgent groups in Mali in 2024.²⁹ In August 2024, fighting near Tin Zaouatine in northern Mali between the Malian army, its Russian auxiliaries (Wagner/Africa Corps), and Tuareg separatists from the CSP-DPA marked the heaviest defeat for Wagner/Africa Corps since its 2021 deployment. The rebels claimed that more than eighty Wagner/Africa Corps fighters and forty-seven Malian soldiers were killed.³⁰ Since the 2024 summer, rebels have used modified quadcopter drones to strike Malian and Wagner positions in Goundam and Léré, allegedly with Ukrainian support (see 2023 version) in the form of intelligence sharing, training and, possibly, equipment.³¹ Mali was also previously part of the G5 Sahel regional security initiative but withdrew from the alliance in June 2022.³²

Russia’s Africa Corps now as a party to several NIACs in Mali

Africa Corps units were targeted in a coordinated offensive by JNIM and the FLA in April 2026 (see below). Africa Corps tried to defend strategic positions, including Kidal and Bamako airport, but could not ward off the JNIM and FLA forces.³⁴ Russia negotiated a withdrawal of Africa Corps from Kidal, Tessalit, and Tessit in response to the April 2026 attacks.³⁵ By 27 April 2026, Africa Corps announced that they had withdrawn all forces from Kidal. They, however, confirmed that their forces remained stationed in other regions in Mali.³⁶ Further, on 30 April 2026, Africa Corps confirmed its commitment to supporting FAMa in security operations in Mali. This announcement was made despite the FLA’s calls for a full withdrawal of all Africa Corps fighters from the territory of Mali shortly after the JNIM/FLA coalition took Kidal.³⁷ Some commentators suggest that the Kidal attacks may have strengthened the relationship between Mali and Russia.³⁸ It is suggested that Russia’s presence in Mali aims to strengthen its geopolitical influence in the Sahel region through curating allied military regimes rather than countering jihadist operations.³⁹ Despite suffering reputational damage due to the fall of Kidal,⁴⁰ Moscow has reaffirmed its support, through Africa Corps, of the Malian government in its security operations.⁴¹ The narrative from Moscow was not one of defeat but rather that Africa Corps successfully fended off a coup d’état planned by the JNIM/FLA coalition.⁴² Russia’s sphere of influence in the Sahel depends on the survival of the current Malian regime⁴³ and, therefore, as of June 2026, Russia remains invested and present in its support of FAMa forces in the ongoing conflict.

The Russian Defence Ministry’s official platforms acknowledge that Africa Corps falls within the security infrastructure of Russia. The Russian Africa Corps website explains on its official recruitment website that the Russian Ministry of Defence established the procedures for recruitment, medical examination, and duty assignments.⁴⁴ Following the 25 April 2026, coordinated attacks by JNIM and the FLA against FAMa and Africa Corps, the Russian Ministry of Defence posted on its official Telegram channel that: ‘The units of the Africa Corps of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation continue to carry out the assigned tasks and are ready to repel the attacks of the militants.⁴⁵

As Africa Corps forms part of the Russian Armed Forces, Russia must be considered a co-belligerent in Mali’s armed conflicts. As detailed below, in supporting FAMa, Russia (through Africa Corps) has become party to all three NIACs in Mali: (a) Mali (supported by Russia) v JNIM, (b) Mali (supported by Russia) v ISSP, and (c) Mali (supported by Russia) v FLA.

Russia as a party to the conflict through Africa Corps: Mali (supported by Russia) v JNIM

Russia intervened on the invitation of Mali in its pre-existing NIAC with JNIM. Its Africa Corps are directly engaging in hostilities by warfighting alongside FAMa against JNIM in Mali. For example, JNIM launched a coordinated military operation against FAMa across Mali’s Ségou and Kayes regions, including Kayes city, on 1 July 2025. JNIM executed simultaneous attacks from seven different directions towards its targets. FAMa, with the support of Africa Corps, fended off the enemy, reporting a death toll of at least eighty JNIM fighters. The death toll on the side of FAMa and Africa Corps was not made public.⁴⁶ Following the coordinated attacks by JNIM and the FLA against different FAMa and Africa Corps targets in April 2026, the Russian Ministry of Defence claimed that Africa Corps had some success in its response to the coordinated attacks. A Telegram post responding to the attacks reported that Inokhodets drones successfully targeted approximately sixty fighters, four vehicles, and five motorcycles belonging to the enemy, Russian Mi-8 and mi-24 helicopters successfully targeted approximately 175 fighters, 23 vehicles, and 33 motorcycles, and Russian SU-24 aircrafts killed at least 70 fighters, damaged 2 vehicles, and 25 motorcycles. It also mentions that its medical team supported injured civilians.⁴⁷

Besides pooling soldiers to fight alongside FAMa and pooling military aircraft in support of operations,⁴⁸ Africa Corps have been assisting FAMa in escorting fuel tankers throughout Mali, ensuring that the fuel reached its intended destinations despite JNIM’s continued coordinated attacks against fuel tankers in transit.⁴⁹

In sum, Russia is a party to the NIAC between Mali and JNIM in Mali and thus bound by IHL.

Russia as a party to the conflict through Africa Corps: Mali (supported by Russia) v ISSP

The nature of support Russia is providing FAMa in its pre-existing NIAC with ISSP makes it a co-belligerent alongside Mali. Through its Africa Corps, Russia is undertaking actions related to the conduct of hostilities in the context of the pre-existing NIAC between Mali and ISSP. This includes, for example, the execution of multiple airstrikes in support of FAMa against ISSP strongholds throughout June 2025.⁵⁰ Russia is thus actively engaging in warfighting alongside FAMa.

The provision of Russian air support⁵¹ and Russian soldiers through Russia’s Africa Corps to fight alongside FAMa and to provide convoy support demonstrates Russia effectively pooling and mobilizing its resources in support of FAMa.

In sum, Russia is a party to the NIAC between Mali and ISSP in Mali and thus bound by IHL.

Russia as a party to the conflict through Africa Corps: Mali (supported by Russia) v FLA

The nature of support Russia is providing FAMa in its pre-existing NIAC with FLA also makes it a co-belligerent. Russia is undertaking actions related to the conduct of hostilities in the context of the pre-existing NIAC between Mali and the FLA. This includes, for example, joint military operations and operating from joint military bases throughout Mali.⁵² Africa Corps supported FAMa through extensive airstrikes targeting FLA strongholds in June 2025.L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: July 2025’, ACLED, 4 July 2025. During late 2025 ⁵³ through 2026, ⁵⁴ these joint bases have been increasingly targeted by the FLA through kamikaze drones demanding Russia to deploy jamming technologies to counter these attacks. Jamming proved unsuccessful.⁵⁵ FAMa and Russia’s Africa Corps share a joint military base in Aguelhok which illustrates the pooling of military assets and allowing the effective mobilizing of military resources.⁵⁶

In sum, Russia is a party to the NIAC between Mali and the FLA in Mali and is thus bound by IHL.

Coordinated attacks launched by the FLA and JNIM in Kidal in April 2026

Kidal town in northern Mali had been under rebel control until an offensive by FAMa and Wagner Group in 2023 brought it back under government control.⁵⁷ In late April 2026, the FLA and JNIM launched coordinated attacks connected to a broad joint offensive to reclaim Kidal.⁵⁸ This is the first time these groups had officially coordinated their attacks.⁵⁹ A certain degree of operational coordination between groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda, such as JNIM, and Tuareg rebel movements, such as the FLA, has, however, occurred in the past, including the transfer of fighters, forms of logistical coordination, and even occasional joint operations. What was new about the April attacks was the explicit and public recognition of this cooperation, as well as its scale.⁶⁰ In early June 2026, the FLA still held Kidal and Africa Corps and Mali were engaging in operations to recapture the town.⁶¹

The Defence Minister, General Sadio Camara, and his family were killed in the April 2026 attacks.⁶² Other strategic areas, including army bases and civilian airports, and towns surrounding Bamako were also targeted in the attacks.⁶³ Russian mercenaries and Malian soldiers were seen leaving Kidal,⁶⁴ reportedly due to negotiations carried out by Algeria.⁶⁵

Further coordinated attacks across Mali were reported in early July 2026 with both the FLA and JNIM confirming that they participated in the attacks.⁶⁶

A common enemy-specific alliance, but two separate NIACs prevail

The ICRC has set out factual considerations necessary for a collective of non-State armed groups who are sufficiently organized to qualify as an alliance.⁶⁷ These factors are used to determine, on a case-by-case basis, if there is sufficient coordination in a coalition or alliance to become a party to a NIAC and to allow for the aggregation of intensity.⁶⁸ It must be noted, however, that the FLA and JNIM were party to two, separate parallel NIACs which pre-dated their coordinated attacks against Malian soldiers in late-April 2026 in Mali. The first is the ongoing NIAC between Mali and the FLA and the second is the ongoing NIAC between Mali and JNIM.⁶⁹ JNIM and the FLA were opposing a common enemy separately without collaboration. This changed in late-April 2026 when the FLA and JNIM launched coordinated attacks against FAMa to reclaim Kidal town in northern Mali (see above).⁷⁰

The existence of an alliance between the FLA and JNIM will be fleshed out, however, this does not automatically mean that the two pre-existing NIACs are absorbed into a single NIAC between a FLA/JNIM coalition and Mali. Nor does it mean that intensity should be aggregated as each of the pre-existing NIACs already satisfied the required level of intensity. The FLA and JNIM also continue to operate separately.⁷¹

It should be cautioned that the existence of a common enemy does not automatically suggest that the necessary level of coordination for a coalition has been met. Relevant factual indicators include the establishment of a coordination structure for the alliance as a whole, the sharing of operational tasks between organized armed groups who are members of the alliance, common rules of engagement, the coordination of simultaneous attacks against the opposing party, and the launching of joint military operations.⁷²

Coordination structure for the alliance as a whole

There is no unified coordination structure for the ‘alliance’, and the FLA and JNIM remain separate non-State armed groups. The actions and statements following the joint attacks in April by both camps indicate that strategic unified command and control is absent in this relationship. In the aftermath of the April attacks and due to their coordination with JNIM, Malian authorities and international actors referred to the FLA as ‘terrorists’ but the group issued a statement rejecting the label, calling itself a politico-military organization that ‘carries the aspirations of an entire people’, going on to state that it ‘has a political project for the self-determination of the people of Azawad’.⁷³ Making clear that the FLA is different from JNIM, the group stated that their joint attacks with JNIM were ‘a tactical military coordination to confront a common enemy’ and that the FLA is not ‘responsible for the actions carried out by JNIM’.⁷⁴ One analyst has called the relationship an ‘alliance of convenience’ between groups that have ‘different’ and competing agendas’.⁷⁵

Despite the absence of a unified coordination structure for this ‘alliance’, key Tuareg leaders established lines of communication between leadership figures in the FLA and JNIM as early as the beginning of 2025. Al-Ghabass Ag Intalla, an influential personality within the FLA and a close associate of Bilal Ag al-Charif, the leader of the FLA established direct communication between Bilal al-Charif and Ag Ghali, the leader of JNIM.⁷⁶ While JNIM and the FLA have a common enemy, they also have different ideologies, including their approaches to and interpretation of Islam.⁷⁷ The differences in purposes between these groups has made Tuareg separatists historically reluctant to ally with JNIM and similar groups.⁷⁸

Differences in rules of engagement

The FLA and JNIM disagree on rules of engagement. For example, the FLA specifically differentiated itself from JNIM by stating that it does not target civilians while JNIM has been known to do this.⁷⁹

Coordination of simultaneous attacks and joint military operations

FLA leaders opened a line of communication with JNIM leaders before the April 2026 attacks (see above).⁸⁰ The coordinated April attacks (see above) were the first time the FLA and JNIM worked together to attack their common enemy – the Malian government.⁸¹ Some attacks reportedly took place 1,500km from each other, demonstrating how highly coordinated the attacks and groups involved were.⁸² This military operation was carefully planned as strategic areas, including army bases and civilian airports, and towns surrounding Bamako were targeted.⁸³ Further coordinated attacks across Mali were reported in early July 2026 with both the FLA and JNIM confirming that they participated in the attacks.⁸⁴

The strategic alliance between the FLA and JNIM does not demand a reclassification of the pre-existing ongoing parallel NIACs as an overall organizational structure is missing. The alliance is strategic, but command over fighters remains separated. The FLA leadership commands its fighters whilst the JNIM leadership also gives instructions and leads its own fighters. The current classification of a NIAC between Mali and JNIM and a NIAC between Mali and the FLA remains accurate.

JNIMs new ‘economic conflict strategy’: Targeting oil convoys and goldmines

Patterns of JNIM purposefully targeting fuel convoys started emerging between mid-September and beginning December 2025.⁸⁵ Bellingcat reported that during this period, JNIM launched six separate attacks across three regions in Mali leading to the destruction of at least 130 fuel tankers.⁸⁶ Reports suggest that JNIM targets fuel convoys from Ivory Coast and Senegal that are en route to Bamako and other key regions in Mali in order to exert economic pressure on the current Malian government.⁸⁷ On 21 October 2025, General Abdoulaya Maiga, on behalf of the Malian government, denounced the tanker attacks by JNIM, labelling them as attempts to destabilize the country.⁸⁸

Convoy attacks continued in 2026 with a convoy of approximately fifty tankers set alight by JNIM on 29 January 2026.⁸⁹ Besides material destruction, several soldiers and fighters were killed.⁹⁰ At least ten civilian truck drivers also lost their lives.⁹¹ This attack took place on the Senegalese border towards Kayes, a city in Mali.⁹² Reports suggests that JNIM’s tanker attacks peaked again in April 2026.⁹³

In October 2025, FAMa appointed a Brigadier, General Famouke Camara, to lead ‘Operation Fuka Kene’ in response to JNIM’s attempted fuel blockade.⁹⁴ FAMa and Africa Corps act as security escorts, providing, among other security, aerial support⁹⁵ as part of Mali’s ‘military-first’ counterterrorism approach. JNIM is, however, not completely deterred by these security escorts. For example, during early July 2026, JNIM attacked a convoy of oil tankers secured by more than 200 Africa Corps security personnel and more than 100 Malian soldiers.⁹⁶ The Malian government denies that it had, in March 2026, engaged in a prisoner release-deal with JNIM to stop tanker attacks.⁹⁷

Mali is the third-largest gold producer in Africa.⁹⁸ In January 2026, JNIM seized a major gold mine operation, the Morila mine, operated by US company ‘Flagship Gold’.⁹⁹ JNIM has since refocused on attacking artisanal and illegal gold mining areas including illegal Chinese mining operations.¹⁰⁰

Non-International Armed Conflict between Mali (supported by Russia through Africa Corps) and Jama’a Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM)

Background

As in other Sahelian countries, the roots of the insurgency in Mali lie in a combination of ethnic tensions, fragile State institutions, and limited government control over peripheral region.¹ Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), the main jihadist coalition in Mali, is led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a Tuareg from the Ifoghas clan who once served as a Malian diplomat.² Ghali had previously played a prominent role in the 2012 Tuareg uprising against the Malian State, which sought to establish an independent homeland called Azawad in the north of the country.³

JNIM was officially formed in 2017 through the merger of five jihadist organizations operating in the Sahel, including Ansar Dine and Al-Mourabitoun.⁴ This coalition emerged after French-led operations in 2012 had temporarily rolled back both separatist and jihadist groups that had seized control of northern Mali.⁵ Since its formation, JNIM has pursued an agenda of rejecting the authority of Sahelian governments while imposing its strict interpretation of Islamic law on populations under its influence.⁶ This has included the enforcement of bans on music and smoking, compulsory dress codes, requirements for men to grow beards, and restrictions on women’s freedom of movement.⁷

FAMa have been engaged in a protracted conflict with JNIM as part of broader counterterrorism campaigns.⁸ Their operations have been bolstered at different points by international partners, including France’s Operation Serval and Barkhane,⁹ the United Nations peacekeepers under MINUSMA,¹⁰ and, more recently, Russian military contractors. Russia has since become party to this pre-existing NIAC owing to the nature of Africa Corps’ involvement on invitation of the Malian government (see above). Despite these efforts, FAMa has struggled to contain JNIM’s insurgency, which thrives on local grievances, cross-border mobility, and the government’s difficulties in providing security and governance in rural areas.¹¹ Indeed, an important objective for JNIM in using violence is to prevent the infiltration of State linked individuals into areas under its control.

The armed conflict between the Malian armed forces is thus part of the broader Mali war which began in 2012 with a Tuareg rebellion.¹² By the first half of 2018, rebel attacks had intensified significantly, and by July of that year, northern Mali had largely slipped from government control.¹³

Intensity

Fighting between Mali (supported by Russia) and JNIM continued throughout 2025 and 2026.¹⁴ On 8 January 2025, JNIM attacked and temporarily took control of a FAMa military camp located close to Bandiagara town. This military operation led to twenty casualties on FAMa’s side and at least fourteen casualties among JNIM forces.¹⁵ On 9 January 2025, JNIM conducted an attack against several government buildings in Nioro du Sahel.¹⁶ FAMa claims to have successfully repulsed the attack, killing thirty JNIM fighters and losing one Malian soldier.¹⁷ On 7 February 2025, an Islamist armed group, suspected to be JNIM, reportedly attacked a civilian convoy that was being escorted by Malian armed forces and allied militias in north-eastern Mali. The attack resulted in the deaths of at least thirty-four civilians and injuries to thirty-four others.¹⁸

On 1 July 2025, JNIM launched a coordinated military operation against FAMa across Mali’s Ségou and Kayes regions, including Kayes city. JNIM executed simultaneous attacks from seven different directions towards its targets. FAMa, with the support of Africa Corps, fended off the enemy, reporting of the deaths of at least eighty JNIM fighters. The death toll on the side of FAMa and Africa Corps was not made public.¹⁹ Multiple violent clashes between JNIM and FAMa (with Africa Corps) were reported during August 2025.²⁰ The first incident occurred on 13 August 2025, when JNIM used an anti-vehicle improvised explosive device (IED) to ambush a convoy consisting of FAMa and Africa Corps vehicles and soldiers in Bourem and Al-Moustarat towns, in the Gao region of Mali. Casualties were not publicly reported.²¹ On 19 August 2025, JNIM simultaneously attacked two FAMa bases in Farabougou and Biriki-Were.²² These attacks triggered an aerial response from FAMa on 22 August 2025.²³

As of September 2025, JNIM started targeting oil tankers transiting through Mali.²⁴ To curb these initial attacks, FAMa launched airstrikes against JNIM strongholds in the Mopti and Nara regions between 18 and 20 September 2025.²⁵ JNIM continued targeting fuel tankers, despite FAMa escort, throughout October²⁶ and December 2025.²⁷ On 23 and 24 October 2025, FAMa launched coordinated attacks against JNIM strongholds in response to JNIM’s continued attacks on oil tankers. Ground forces launched attacks in Diakoro-Wèrè,²⁸ and the Malian Air Force executed aerial strikes on the banks of the Banifing, and at Kolondièba in the Bougouni region, killing at least thirty JNIM fighters.²⁹ FAMa launched further airstrikes during November 2025 against JNIM strongholds from where the fuel tanker attacks were allegedly planned and orchestrated.³⁰ The first aerial strikes took place on 2 November 2025 near Kolondiébain in the Bougouni region. This was followed by a ground forces operation targeting JNIM fighters. The death toll is uncertain and was simply described as ranging in the ‘dozens’.³¹ Further airstrikes and ground incursions by FAMa against JNIM positions in Timbuktu and Sikasso occurred on 7 November 2025.³² FAMa airstrikes in Timbuktu against JNIM on 13 November 2025 killed civilians, including children.³³

JNIM initiated several clashes with FAMa during November 2025.³⁴ This could be in response to FAMa’s successful aerial campaign throughout November. Fighting between the JNIM and traditional Dozohunters in the Loulouni farm district also erupted from 11 November to 12 November 2025.³⁵ JNIM employed suicide drones against civilians, raising the death toll.³⁶ This triggered a security response by FAMa on 14 November 2025, who subsequently regained control of the district.³⁷ These events were sufficiently intense to cause the temporary displacement of villagers.³⁸ JNIM also fired several rockets and armed drones into Kidal towards FAMa and Africa Corps strategic positions, specifically attempting to disrupt the second celebration of the liberation of Kidal from JNIM control on 14 November 2025.³⁹ Clashes between JNIM and FAMa continued throughout December 2025.⁴⁰

Fighting continued further in January 2026.⁴¹ JNIM strategically targeted a goldmine and other economic assets in January,⁴² triggering a FAMa response.⁴³ On 29 January 2026, JNIM launched coordinated attacks against FAMa fuel escorts in western Mali, killing at least three soldiers and civilians⁴⁴ and destroying several tankers by setting them alight.⁴⁵ JNIM again attacked a FAMa and Russian convoy on 9 March 2026 in the village of Lugel, killing at least 3 Russian soldiers.⁴⁶ Violence peaked again in May 2026 after JNIM launched two attacks in Korikori and Gomossogou villages in the Mopti region in central Mali.⁴⁷ As of June 2026, violence remained intense and continued escalating.

The nature of attacks initiated by JNIM are clearly planned and executed frequently, thus constituting sustained and concerted military operations as demanded by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II of 1977.

The intensity of violence generated by the engagements between JNIM and FAMa satisfies the requirements for a NIAC under IHL.

Organization

JNIM is the Sahel branch of al-Qaeda. It is a Salafi-jihadist group that has, as a parent organization, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which originates from the 1990s Algerian civil war.⁴⁸

JNIM has an organized command structure which resembles a top-down hierarchy. Essentially, there are three overall hierarchical tiers: central leadership, regional commanders, and local commanders.⁴⁹ Central leadership includes its emir, Iyad Ag Ghaly(aka Abu al-Fadl), who founded Ansar Dine.⁵⁰ Deputy leaders include Yahya Abu Hammam (Djamel Okacha), the leader of AQIM Sahara, Amadou Koufa, the leader of the Katibat Macina (Macina Liberation Front or FLM), and Abu Hassan al-Ansari, the deputy leader of al-Mourabitoun.⁵¹ Another deputy leader is Abu Abdul Rahman Ali al-Sanhaji (Ali Maychou) who is a representative of AQIM Sahara, as well as being a senior judge in JNIM and its religious advisor, ‘Koufa’.⁵²

Different subgroups are at the disposal of top leadership but are able to operate with some flexibility as subgroups are divided into regionally separate areas.⁵³ These subgroups are organized so as to facilitate coordination and deepen cooperation in the group.

Its organizational structure has been described as ‘strategically coherent’ with senior regional commanders deployed to external JNIM subgroups to ensure cooperation and discipline.⁵⁴ Some analysts, though, dispute whether this level of coherence exists between subgroups,⁵⁵ instead describing JNIM as essentially an umbrella group.⁵⁶

Discipline is enforced at the highest level by a ‘Majlis Shura’ (Consultative Council) which publicly responds to accusations of atrocities. JNIM’s Shura Council ensures Islamic governance and strict adherence to Islamic law in areas under JNIM control.⁵⁷ These bodies, as well as the tiered command structure, enable JNIM to implement IHL. Training is offered to fighters by highly mobile units using motorcycles to facilitate training where and when needed across the Sahel region.⁵⁸ Training camps create the opportunity to implement IHL and enhance discipline among fighters.

Military tactics employed by JNIM are described as purposeful encircling of isolated strategic zones, weakening State presence and creating power vacuums.⁵⁹ JNIM also relies on motorcycles for manoeuvrability during ambushes.⁶⁰ JNIM prefers remote violence such as using explosives, artillery and mortar fire over swarming tactics and ambushes, the modus operandi of ISSP.⁶¹ JNIM also employs suicide drones to limit the loss of life of its own fighters.⁶² Part of its military tactics include using IEDs to destroy military and other infrastructure.⁶³ JNIM also maintains a high operational tempo to ensure it outpaces its adversaries as part of its military strategy.⁶⁴ JNIM has evolved in its military tactics as it increasingly launched carefully planned, simultaneous military attacks against multiple FAMa targets in order to overwhelm its enemy.⁶⁵

JNIM is able to facilitate logistics through an extended network across central Sahel into the West African littoral States including parts of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, Ivory Coast and Togo.⁶⁶ Weapons and munitions are replenished through large-scale attacks on garrisons or auxiliary camps belonging to State armed forces in the operational area.⁶⁷ Weapons and other military needs are also met using profits from artisanal mining, livestock theft, fundraising, taxation and looting.⁶⁸ JNIM also raises funds for its military operations through kidnapping wealthy foreigners for ransom.⁶⁹ Ransom takes the form of money and weaponry.⁷⁰ Part of JNIM’s tactics include targeting sites of economic value to the government such as goldmines.⁷¹

JNIM‘s vast territorial reach ⁷² gives it a larger recruitment pool.⁷³ It is reported that JNIM has between 5,000 and 6,000 fighters in its ranks.⁷⁴ JNIM uses its media wing, al-Zallaqa,⁷⁵ and propaganda channels, ⁷⁶ to communicate with the outside world and to control its narrative. JNIM also has an official spokesperson, who, as of June 2026, was Mahmoud Barry. ⁷⁷

Territorial control is a requirement of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. JNIM is continuously expanding its control over parts of western and southern Mali.⁷⁸ JNIM has specifically gained more territory in in the Kayes Region and along the south-western border between Mali and Guinea.⁷⁹ In Southern Mali JNIM controls the majority of rural areas in northern Koulikoro along the Koulikoro and Segou regional border north of the Niger River.⁸⁰ The acquisition of more territory in 2025 and 2026 aligns with JNIM’s refined military strategy; it no longer engages primarily in guerilla tactics but rather aims to take military outposts around urban centres in order to advance its influence over Malians.⁸¹

Territorial control, as depicted above, enables JNIM to implement IHL, including Additional Protocol II, as required by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Article 1(1) demands the ability to implement Additional Protocol II, not its actual implementation.⁸²

Lastly, from the intensity assessment above, clearly the territory controlled by JNIM facilitates the planning of military operations, fulfilling the final requirement in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, which requires JNIM to be sufficiently organized to launch sustained and concerted attacks.⁸³

The organizational structure of JNIM is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II of 1977. Hence, the NIAC between Mali and JNIM constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

As such, the Additional Protocol II-type NIAC between Mali and JNIM continued as of June 2026.

1
M. DeAngelo, ‘Counterterrorism Shortcomings in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3 March 2025. ↩︎
2
K. M. Baker and A. Clark, ‘Mali: 2012 coup and warfare in the north’, Britannica, 23 September 2025. ↩︎
3
P. Sippy and J. Boswall, ‘How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups’, BBC, 7 July 2025. ↩︎
4
P. Sippy and J. Boswall, ‘How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups’, BBC, 7 July 2025. ↩︎
5
P. Sippy and J. Boswall, ‘How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups’, BBC, 7 July 2025. ↩︎
6
‘Mali: Enabling Dialogue with the Jihadist Coalition JNIM’, International Crisis Group, 10 December 2021. ↩︎
7
P. Sippy and J. Boswall, ‘How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups’, BBC, 7 July 2025. ↩︎
8
‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Mali’, U.S. Department of State. ↩︎
9
‘France’s action in the Sahel’, Consulat Général de Franca à Johannesburg, 17 February 2022, ↩︎
10
‘MINUSMA Fact Sheet’, United Nations Peacekeeping, July 2023, ↩︎
11
P. Sippy and J. Boswall, ‘How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups’, BBC, 7 July 2025. ↩︎
12
‘Mali Besieged by Fighters Fleeing Libya’, Rane, 2 February 2012. ↩︎
13
D. Nicholls, ‘Britain risks ‘open ended’ conflict in Mali in bid to protect European security’, The Telegraph, 20 July 2018. ↩︎
14
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: February 2025’, ACLED, 10 February 2025. ↩︎
15
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
16
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: February 2025’, ACLED, 10 February 2025. ↩︎
17
A. Elghoubachi, ‘Southern Mali Attack Follows Alleged Death of Religious Leader’, Barlaman Today, 9 January 2025. ↩︎
18
‘Mali: Armed Islamist Attack on Convoy Kills 34 Civilians’, Human Rights Watch, 20 February 2025. ↩︎
19
B. Bembeeva, ‘Africa Corps and Malian army repel terrorist attack in Segou’, African Initiative, 1 July 2025; ‘Mali’s armed forces say they killed 80 militants after series of attacks on military posts’, African News, 2 July 2025; The African Corps, Telegram, 1 July 2025. ↩︎
20
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group, August 2025. ↩︎
21
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group, August 2025. ↩︎
22
E. Mylnikova, ‘Au Mali, des combattants ont attaqué les positions de l’armée dans deux localités’, African Initiative, 19 August 2025. ↩︎
23
L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: September 2025’, ACLED, 5 September 2025. ↩︎
24
E. Mylnikova, ‘Au Mali, des combattants ont attaqué les positions de l’armée dans deux localités’, African Initiative, 19 August 2025; ‘JNIM attacks on fuel tanker convoys in western Mali underline broader risks to government and social stability’, Janes, 30 September 2025. ↩︎
25
‘Mali : Les forces armées maliennes annoncent des frappes réussies contre les groupes armés dans le centre du pays’, Sahara Media, 20 September 2025; I. Kouwonou, ‘Le blocus du JNIM sur les camions d’essence provoque une pénurie à Mopti au Mali’, BBC, 25 September 2025. ↩︎
26
D. Baché, ‘Mali: le Jnim poursuit son offensive, le Premier ministre dénonce «une tentative de déstabilisation»’, RFI, 22 October 2025; N. Milnes and R. Lyammouri, ‘AI-Enabled Purple Teaming for Sahel Convoy Security: Case of Fuel Blockade by JNIM’, Policy Center for the New South, December 2025; ‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group, October 2025. ↩︎
27
D. Baché, ‘Mali: nouvelles opérations du Jnim et de l’armée, l’approvisionnement en carburant reste assuré mais limité’, RFI, 11 December 2025; 15000 nigerien sur facebook, Facebook, 12 December 2025. ↩︎
28
‘Sécurisation du territoire : Les FAMa intensifient les opérations et neutralisent plusieurs terroristes dans différentes localités’, Maliweb.net, 27 October 2025; Kassim Traoré, X, 24 October 2025. ↩︎
29
‘Sécurisation du territoire : Les FAMa intensifient les opérations et neutralisent plusieurs terroristes dans différentes localités’, Maliweb.net, 27 October 2025; Aziz Maiga 12, Facebook, 25 October 2025. ↩︎
30
Maliweb Infos, Facebook, 3 November 2025. ↩︎
31
Maliweb Infos, Facebook, 3 November 2025; A. R. Ouedraogo, ‘Mali : Une base servant à la planification d’attaques contre les convois de citernes de carburant, a été détruite’, Aconews.net, 3 November 2025; ‘Mali : l’armée neutralise plusieurs combattants terroristes planifiant des attaques contre les convois de camions-citernes de carburant dans la région de Bougouni’, Maliko, 3 November 2025. ↩︎
32
‘Tombouctou et Sikasso : D’importantes pertes humaines et matérielles infligées aux terroristes’, Maliweb.net, 9 November 2025; ‘Hermakono et Soumpi : de « belles opérations » FAMa’, Bamada.net, 11 November 2025. ↩︎
33
I. Allegrozzi, ‘A Family Erased in Mali’, Human Rights Watch, 18 November 2025; F. K, ‘Mali : treize civils, dont sept enfants, tués dans des frappes de drones de l’armée à Tombouctou’, Afrik.com, 15 November 2025. ↩︎
34
D. Baché, ‘Mali: les habitants de Loulouni fuient les combats entre chasseurs traditionnels dozos et jihadistes du Jnim’, Yahoo News, 13 November 2025; ‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group, November 2025. ↩︎
35
M. Kane, ‘A Loulouni, les agriculteurs s’inquiètent pour les récoltes’, Deutsche Welle, 24 November 2025; D. Baché, ‘Mali: les habitants de Loulouni fuient les combats entre chasseurs traditionnels dozos et jihadistes du Jnim’, Yahoo News, 13 November 2025. ↩︎
36
‘L’œil De Le Matin : Loulouni, un grenier à protéger de l’insécurité’, Bamada.net, 21 November 2025; Mali24, Facebook, 11 November 2025. ↩︎
37
‘Escalation of JNIM Operations in Mali and Burkina Faso’, African Security Studies, 22 November 2025; ‘Mali : les Famas « reprennent le contrôle » de Loulouni’, Studio Tamani, 17 November 2025. ↩︎
38
D. Baché, ‘Mali: les habitants de Loulouni fuient les combats entre chasseurs traditionnels dozos et jihadistes du Jnim’, Yahoo News, 13 November 2025. ↩︎
39
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group, November 2025; D. Baché, ‘Mali: des frappes de drones de l’armée tuent treize civils dont sept enfants dans la région de Tombouctou’, RFI, 15 November 2025. ↩︎
40
D. Baché, ‘Mali: nouvelles opérations du Jnim et de l’armée, l’approvisionnement en carburant reste assuré mais limité’, RFI, 11 December 2025; ‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group, December 2025; B. Seydi, ‘Le Mali à genoux : Comment le JNIM a fait du carburant une arme de guerre économique (1/2)’, Seneweb, 3 April 2026. ↩︎
41
‘Industrial hubs in Mali’s Kayes Region under terror attack’, APA News, 12 January 2026. ↩︎
42
‘Industrial hubs in Mali’s Kayes Region under terror attack’, APA News, 12 January 2026; ‘Jihadists attack Mali gold mine and seize workers’, Mining M^x, 6 January 2026 ↩︎
43
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group, January 2026. ↩︎
44
‘Au Mali, le Jnim reprend ses attaques : un convoi de camions-citernes incendié’, Jeune Afrique, 30 January 2026; M. Ouitona, ‘Mali : un convoi de carburant lourdement frappé dans la région de Kayes’, Afrik.com, 31 January 2026 ↩︎
45
‘Au Mali, le Jnim reprend ses attaques : un convoi de camions-citernes incendié’, Jeune Afrique, 30 January 2026. ↩︎
46
D. Baché, ‘Mali: une dizaine de militaires maliens et russes tués par le Jnim près de Nampala’, C.R.I.DE.M, 11 March 2026; T. Safronov, ‘Group of Militants from Russia’s Africa Corps Eliminated in Mali’, Military NYI, 11 March 2026. ↩︎
47
‘Armed fighters kill at least 30 people in attacks in central Mali’, Al Jazeera, 7 May 2026; W. Muia, ‘Des dizaines de morts dans des attaques djihadistes contre des villages du centre du Mali’, BBC, 8 May 2026; ‘Twin jihadist-claimed attacks kill more than 30 in central Mali’, Africa News, 8 May 2026. ↩︎
48
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023; L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024. ↩︎
49
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023. ↩︎
50
J. Thompson, ‘Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 July 2021; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025. ↩︎
51
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025. ↩︎
52
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025. ↩︎
53
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024; H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023; J. Thompson, ‘Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 July 2021; ‘Mapping armed groups in Mali and the Sahel’, European Council on Foreign Relations; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025. ↩︎
54
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023. ↩︎
55
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025; D. Eizenga and W. Williams, ‘The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, December 2020 ↩︎
56
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025. ↩︎
57
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025; H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023. ↩︎
58
‘JNIM Training Camp in Burkina Faso Shows Terror Group’s Deadly Ambition’, Africa Defense Forum, 18 June 2024; C. Weiss, ‘JNIM documents training camp in Burkina Faso’, Online Article, Long War Journal, 25 May 2024. ↩︎
59
‘After Tillabéri, Is Niamey the Next Target?’, Zagazola, 9 April 2025. ↩︎
60
‘Le JNIM frappe au Niger: offensive éclair contre la base militaire de Mossipaga, l’AES en difficulté’, Daily Motion, 20 May 2025. ↩︎
61
J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023. ↩︎
62
‘L’œil De Le Matin : Loulouni, un grenier à protéger de l’insécurité’, Bamada.net, 21 November 2025. ↩︎
63
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023. ↩︎
64
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023. ↩︎
65
E. Mylnikova, ‘Au Mali, des combattants ont attaqué les positions de l’armée dans deux localités’, African Initiative, 19 August 2025; B. Bembeeva, ‘Africa Corps and Malian army repel terrorist attack in Segou’, African Initiative, 1 July 2025. ↩︎
66
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023. ↩︎
67
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 18. ↩︎
68
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023. ↩︎
69
‘JNIM Targets Wealthy Foreigners for Ransoms’, African Defense Forum, 16 December 2025; P. Sippy, ‘Comment le JNIM est devenu l’un des groupes militants le plus meurtier d’Afrique’, BBC, 11 June 2025, Updated 8 July 2025. ↩︎
70
M. Maillard, ‘In Mali, three JNIM hostages freed in exchange for ransom and arms’, The Africa Report, 30 October 2025. ↩︎
71
P. Crowe, ‘Suspected jihadists attack Mali’s Morila mine’, Reuters, 5 January 2026; P. Sippy, ‘Comment le JNIM est devenu l’un des groupes militants le plus meurtier d’Afrique’, BBC, 11 June 2025, Updated 8 July 2025. ↩︎
72
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023. ↩︎
73
P. Sippy, ‘Comment le JNIM est devenu l’un des groupes militants le plus meurtier d’Afrique’, BBC, 11 June 2025, Updated 8 July 2025; ‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025, para 12. ↩︎
74
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 10. ↩︎
75
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025. ↩︎
76
M. Laplace, ‘Al‑Qaeda affiliate JNIM claims attack near Niamey’, The Africa Report, 19 October 2024; ‘Mapping armed groups in Mali and the Sahel’, European Council on Foreign Relations. ↩︎
77
LSI Africa, X, 26 November 2024; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025. ↩︎
78
P. Sippy and J. Boswall, ‘How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups’, BBC, 7 July 2025; ‘JNIM Expands Frontlines with a Coordinated Offensive Across Western Mali’, The Soufan Center, 15 July 2025; D. Eizenga, ‘JNIM Attacks in Western Mali Reshape Sahel Conflict’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 29 September 2025. ↩︎
79
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025. ↩︎
80
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024. ↩︎
81
‘Al Qaeda-linked group says 21 soldiers killed in widescale attacks in Mali’, KFGO, 20 August 2025. ↩︎
82
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.38. ↩︎
83
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40; M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between Mali (supported by Russia through Africa Corps) and Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP)

Background

The conflict between FAMa and Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP), also known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), must be understood within the broader dynamics of Mali’s multilayered conflicts that started in 2012.¹ ISSP emerged in 2015 following a split within Al-Mourabitoun, under the leadership of Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi.² At times, the ISSP has operated in proximity, and possibly in cooperation, with fighters from JNIM, despite their respective allegiances to ISIS and al-Qaeda.³ Mali’s crisis dates back to 2012, when the fall of Gaddafi’s regime in Libya accelerated a rebellion in northern Mali where Tuareg separatists and jihadist groups – including AQIM, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine – seized control of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal and declared the State of Azawad, while driving FAMa from the north.⁴ The separatists were quickly sidelined by jihadists who threatened Bamako, triggering French military intervention.⁵ Both JNIM and ISSP have since exploited ethnic grievances and local rivalries, particularly by presenting themselves as defenders of the Fulani community, thereby deepening recruitment bases and fuelling the ongoing NIAC between FAMa and the ISSP.⁶ As with its confrontations with JNIM, FAMa’s clashes with the ISSP form part of its broader counterterrorism campaign. However, experts caution against a simplistic ‘terrorist’ label, noting that ISSP primarily targets security forces to consolidate territorial control, a hallmark of insurgency. While the group does employ terrorist tactics, these are instrumental rather than defining, serving its wider objective of expelling Western influence and establishing an Islamist State.⁷ Russia has since become party to this pre-existing NIAC through Africa Corps’ involvement on invitation of the Malian government (see above).

Intensity

Fighting between Mali (supported by Russia) and ISSP continued throughout 2025 and 2026. In January 2025, FAMa announced the capture of two leading figures of the ISSP, Mahamad Ould Erkehile (alias Abu Rakia) and Abu Hash, during an operation that also killed several militants.⁸ On 7 February 2025, a suspected ISSP attack on a civilian convoy that was being escorted by the military in Kobe village (Gao region) reportedly killed dozens.⁹

June 2025 marked a violent turning point in Mali’s conflict, as the Wagner Group exited the country to be replaced by Africa Corps under more direct organizational supervision from the Russian Ministry of Defence. The deployment of Africa Corps coincided with a sharp escalation of violence on several fronts. Over the course of the month, Africa Corps and FAMa launched a series of airstrikes and ground offensives targeting the ISSP, FLA, and JNIM strongholds in the northern and central regions.¹⁰ ISSP launched its first major attack in several months on June 2025, which it was arguably able to do because of the territory under its control. It attacked Tessit military camp (Gao region, north), killing ninety-four people including over forty soldiers.¹¹

ISSP has managed to hold onto territory in northern Mali as of June 2026. ISSP is opportunistic, seizing towns where there are power vacuums.¹² One example is when ISSP ambushed FAMa and Africa Corps on 26 and 27 April 2026 to take control of Labbezenga.¹³ By June 2026, ISSP was holding the area.¹⁴ ISSP also briefly seized Manaka, a Malian town bordering Niger around 25 April 2026.L. Karr, ‘Mali’s Fracture Will be Felt in West Africa and Beyond’, Orion Policy, 6 May 2026. FAMa managed to liberate Manaka by 29 April 2026.¹⁵

The fighting reported up until June 2026 equates to protracted armed violence.

Organization

ISSP is a Salafi-jihadist militant group and the Sahelian affiliate of Islamic State.¹⁶ ISSP’s leadership structure integrates foreign and local leadership from diverse ethnic backgrounds, including from the Arab, Dawsahak, Djerma Fulani, Songhai, and Tuareg ethnic groups.¹⁷ The ISSP has a consolidated chain of command and senior leadership roles are held by Western Saharan and Malian Arabs. One such senior official is Abu al-Bara al-Sahrawi, who, in addition to serving as the current governor, is the emir (leader) in one of the core military zones operating out of the In-Araban area of Mali.¹⁸

ISSP’s organizational structure is divided into four regions which are Burkina Faso, Muthalath (the tri-State border region), Anderamboukane, and Azawagh (Mali/Niger borderlands between Menaka, Tillabéri, and Tahoua). Five distinct military zones (at an operational level) are spread across the four regions with each military zone given specific geographical and operational tasks. The military zones all have a similar operational command structure. At the head of each zone is the emir who governs the zone. Other senior leadership mirrored in each zone includes a cadi (judge) and military commanders. Zone 1 covers areas in Burkina Faso and the Gourma; Zone 2 covers the Haoussa area; Zone 3 extends to the area between Amalaoulou, Akabar, and In-Delimane; Zone 4 constitutes the area between Menaka, Anderamboukane, and Abala; and Zone 5 (the Eastern zone) covers Azawagh.¹⁹ ISSP’s command structure is very sophisticated and akin to responsible command as necessitated by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II.²⁰ The group can discipline fighters through its Law and Sanctions Office, which is composed of judges and Islamic police.²¹ The existence of such a discipline office can also promote compliance with IHL.

ISSP’s logistical support comes from a series of strongholds in the Sahel. The group has support bases in Tillabéri and a control hub in Mali’s Ménaka region, a region that includes the border town adjacent to Niger, Andéramboukane.²² The Malian border villages of Akabar, Tabankort and In-Araban in the Menaka region, and Amalaoulou and In-Delimane in the Gao region along the border with Niger constitute key ISSP bases and the group’s traditional stronghold.²³ The ISSP has various supply routes and support zones over a vast area,²⁴ to facilitate logistics. For example, the routes are used to ensure supply and resupply of weapons and ammunition, and to allow for the movement of fighters. Such support zones and critical supply corridors cover the area between Tillabéri, Tahoua and Dosso in south-western Niger, and areas in Sokoto and Kebbi states in north-western Nigeria.²⁵

The ISSP is organized in close geographic proximity to ensure fluidity between military zones as a means of maintaining high levels of interconnectedness. This enables the coordination of major attacks and offensives between military zones. Often, the strategy of force concentration between different zones enables the ISSP to deploy large numbers of fighters from different zones into the same general direction if the need arises.²⁶ ISSP fighters set up camp in dense forest areas to escape aerial surveillance.²⁷ When the ISSP mounts large-scale attacks seeking to take control over enemy military bases or territory, vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) are employed to overrun the defences.²⁸ The ISSP also employs multi-front attacks to put pressure on its enemy. This shows the ability of the group to execute planned military operations.²⁹ Such military operations are, however, mostly conducted in Niger and not in Mali.

Using motorcycles enables fighters to move around swiftly and gives greater mobility in reaching and retreating from military objectives. The ISSP fights an ‘asymmetric’ conflict, largely relying on ambushes using IEDs planted where military patrols are expected to pass and attacking once the IEDs are remotely detonated.³⁰ Other tactics employed by the ISSP include mortar attacks, roadside bombs, suicide bombings, and attaching explosive devices to vehicles.³¹

Operating in marginalized communities with weakened resistance offers the ISSP ripe opportunities to recruit. The ISSP has been accused of actively recruiting children as fighters, training them, and deploying them on the front line.³² There has also been active recruitment in north-western Nigeria.³³ The ISSP unifies communication through its media branch, responsible for its IS weekly Al-Naba news platform where official communiqués are released.³⁴ It is clear that the ISSP meets the threshold of organization demanded by IHL.

While ISSP met the criteria set out in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II in Niger during 2023 to 2026, ISSP’s military operations in were less frequent in Mali. It is, however, arguable that ISSP may still meet the requirements set out in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Territorial control is an requirement for application in the Protocol.³⁵ By mid-2025, ISSP did increase its territorial footprint across the tri-border area, called the Liptako-Gourma tri-border region, which covers parts of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger,³⁶ Control exercised by ISSP is reported as mostly consolidated along the Mali/Niger border in north-eastern Mali and north-western Niger.³⁷ In Mali, where ISSP controls a major portion of the Menaka region, this territory is mostly used as an operational and economic control hub for this group’s activities in the greater Sahel.³⁸ The Maneka region is rich in gold mines, and this territory offers ISSP economic stability.³⁹ While the profits from taxing the mines are used to finance the conflict, this is not a military hub.⁴⁰ The nature of military operations executed up until June 2026 was neither sustained nor concerted. However, scholars dispute whether Additional Protocol II demands a higher level of intensity than mere protracted armed violence.⁴¹ It is thus possible that the conflict between Mali and ISSP could qualify as an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

In sum, despite the relatively limited number of direct clashes reported between ISSP and FAMa, ISSP continued to exercise stable control over parts of Mali and the NIAC between Mali and ISSP persisted throughout 2023, 2024, 2025 and into 2026.

1
K. M. Baker and A. Clark, ‘Mali: 2012 coup and warfare in the north’, Britannica, 23 September 2025. ↩︎
2
‘Rewards for ISIS-GS Leader Adnan Abu Walid’, Voice of Africa, 10 October 2019. ↩︎
3
‘Mapping Armed Groups in Mali and the Sahel’, European Council on Foreign Relations. ↩︎
4
S. M. Cold-Ravnkilde and B. Ba, ‘Actors and drivers of conflict in the Sahel: Unpacking ‘new climate wars’’, Danish Institute for Security Studies, 2022. ↩︎
5
S. M. Cold-Ravnkilde and B. Ba, ‘Actors and drivers of conflict in the Sahel: Unpacking ‘new climate wars’’, Danish Institute for Security Studies, 2022. ↩︎
6
L. Bortoluzzi Garcia, ‘MINUSMA – Actors of Conflict in Mali’, SFASID. ↩︎
7
M. DeAngelo, ‘Counterterrorism Shortcomings in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3 March 2025. ↩︎
8
‘Mali army claims arrest of IS-linked group leader’, DW, 5 January 2025. ↩︎
9
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
10
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: July 2025’, ACLED, 4 July 2025. ↩︎
11
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
12
L. Karr, ‘Mali’s Fracture Will be Felt in West Africa and Beyond’, Orion Policy, 6 May 2026. ↩︎
13
Brant, X, 27 April 2026. ↩︎
14
L. Karr, ‘Mali’s Fracture Will be Felt in West Africa and Beyond’, Orion Policy, 6 May 2026. ↩︎
15
‘Islamic State-linked insurgents leave Mali town as army tries to reassert control’, Reuters, 29 April 2026. ↩︎
16
J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023. ↩︎
17
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024. ↩︎
18
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024. ↩︎
19
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024. ↩︎
20
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases. ↩︎
21
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024. ↩︎
22
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024. ↩︎
23
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024. ↩︎
24
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024, ↩︎
25
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024. ↩︎
26
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024. ↩︎
27
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024. ↩︎
28
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024; ‘West Africa and the Sahel’, Security Council Report, 30 July 2025; ‘ISIS-Sahel’, Director of National Intelligence: Counter Terrorism Guide, September 2024. ↩︎
29
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: July 2025’, ACLED, 4 July 2025. ↩︎
30
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024. ↩︎
31
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024; ‘ISIS-Sahel’, Director of National Intelligence: Counter Terrorism Guide, September 2024; J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023. ↩︎
32
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024. ↩︎
33
J. Barnett et al, ‘Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry, or a “Banditization” of Jihad?’, Online Article, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, January 2022. ↩︎
34
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024. ↩︎
35
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases. ↩︎
36
A. Shtuni, ‘The Islamic State in 2025: an Evolving Threat Facing a Waning Global Response’, International Center for Counter-Terrorism, 11 July 2025. ↩︎
37
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024. ↩︎
38
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024. ↩︎
39
‘IS Sahel: Consolidating territory and reviving economies’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 11 October 2024. ↩︎
40
‘IS Sahel: Consolidating territory and reviving economies’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 11 October 2024; J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023. ↩︎
41
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.4; M. M. Bradley, ‘Additional Protocol II: Elevating the minimum threshold of intensity?’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2020; Y. Dinstein, ‘Non-International Armed Conflicts in International Law, Second Edition’, Cambridge University Press, 2021, para 175; A. Clapham, ‘War’, Oxford University Press, 2021, 256. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between Mali (supported by Russia through Africa Corps) and the FLA (formerly known as the CSP-DPA and before that, the CSP-PSD) coalition

Background

When it was founded in 2021, the CSP-PSD brought together the independence movements of the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and the pro-government groups of the Platforme. Currently meeting in a secret location for security reasons, the rebel leaders have dissolved the CMA and the Platforme, as well as the CSP-PSD that brought them together. A sort of alignment emerged within the current context: the new CSP-DPA unites under its banner all the armed groups in the North at war with the Malian State.¹

The FLA was created on 30 November 2024, composed of the members of the former CSP-DPA. On 1 December 2024, five leaders of the FLA were killed by FAMa drone attacks. Among the victims were Fahad Ag Almahmoud, the former secretary-general of GATIA, as well as two senior members of the former MNLA.²

Intensity

Fighting between Mali (supported by Russia) and FLA continued throughout 2025 and 2026. A statement issued by the General Staff of the Malian Armed Forces revealed that on 26 January 2025, FAMa forces intercepted and retrieved a drone bearing FLA inscriptions, which was purportedly targeting military installations.³ Another significant attack occurred on 12 June 2025 where clashes between FLA fighters and Malian forces – supported by Russian auxiliaries – resulted in dozens of deaths in the Kidal region.⁴

On 20 August 2025, the FLA launched several drone strikes against a joint FAMa and Africa Corps base in Aguelhok, in the Kidal region of Mali. At least twenty-one soldiers were killed. In a media statement issued by its media branch, the FLA confirmed that it will continue aerial operations in the form of precision strikes on all FAMa or foreign military elements on ‘Azawad soil’.⁵ The FLA managed to impose a two-month blockade on Kidal town around October 2025. This is, however, underreported. The blockade coincided with separate proximate attacks by JNIM which resulted in the temporary displacement of civilians between 2 and 5 October 2025.⁶

On 18 February 2026, the FLA launched drone strikes targeting a FAMa and Africa Corps convoy between Anefis and Aguelhok in the northern Kidal region of Mali, causing material damage as well as an unreported number of casualties.⁷ Later that day, JNIM also launched attacks against the oil convoy⁸ but at this time it was not yet clear if the two non-State actors coordinated these attacks. The type of kamikaze drones used by the FLA are allegedly akin to drones used by Ukraine against Russia.⁹ The FLA continued carrying out kamikaze drone strikes against FAMa positions during March 2026.¹⁰ FAMa managed to repel most of the strikes against their positions in the Gao region on 11 March 2026.¹¹ The FLA’s spokesperson, Ramadane, explained to Sahara 24 that the operation was carried out due to the strategic advantage of the Goa base as it is both a Malian army camp and Africa Corps centre as well as a place where Turkish drones are kept. The FLA stressed that they purchased commercially available drones and then equipped the drones for military purposes.¹² The FLA launched a second series of drone strikes on 24 March 2026 against a military camp east of Augelhok occupied by FAMa and Africa Corps. The drones were categorised as first-person-view drones. Ground support was supplied by FLA gunners using 60mm morters.¹³

Intensity escalated when the FLA and JNIM joined forces to launch a coordinated military operation against FAMa in Bomako specifically Kati, Sévaré, Gao, Mopti and Kidal on 25 April 2026.¹⁴ Fighting intensified through 26 and 27 April 2026,¹⁵ triggering aerial strikes by the Alliance of Sahel States on 4 May 2026 at the request of the Malian government.¹⁶ If confirmed, this could make the other Alliance members party to the armed conflict. Attacks led to the displacement of at least 100 households and at least 600 additional refugees sought assistance in neighbouring Niger.¹⁷

The fighting between FAMa and FLA equates to protracted armed violence and satisfies the intensity demanded by IHL.

Organization

Given that the FLA is made up of groups from the former CSP-DPA, the requisite level of organization is evident. Formerly, the CSP-DPA met the criteria of organization. Indeed, the CSP-DPA coalition was led by Bilal ag Acherif and possessed a command structure.¹⁸ The CSP-DPA’s primary objective was to obtain ‘a political and legal status for the territory of Azawad’.¹⁹ The CSP-DPA coalition (now FLA) has its own spokesperson, Mohamed Elmaouloud Radamadane, who issued press releases.²⁰ This serves as evidence that CSP-DPA spoke with one voice, which is said by the ICTY to be an indicative factor of organization.²¹

CSP-DPA also acknowledged that they were being assisted by Ukraine with training in drone operations.²² This illustrated the logistical capacity of the CSP-DPA as it had drones in its arsenal²³ and the ability to facilitate the training of its fighters with the support of Ukraine.

In the Katanga case, the ICC found that, at a minimum, a group needs to be able to organize itself to the extent that it can execute a military attack.²⁴ The FLA/CSP-DPA has conducted several sophisticated military attacks including drone attacks against FAMa.²⁵

Therefore, if the functional approach towards organization as suggested in Katanga is followed, it can be argued that the FLA fulfils the organizational criteria demanded by the Tadić case.

The pre-existing NIAC between FAMa and the FLA continues as of June 2026.

1
D. Baché, ‘Mali: les rebelles du Nord créent le Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad’, RFI, 25 April 2024. ↩︎
2
M. Le Cam, ‘Au Mali, les chefs rebelles de l’Azawad s’unissent et subissent un bombardement mortel’, Le Monde, 2 December 2024. ↩︎
3
‘Malian Army Neutralizes Top Terrorist Leader Abou Azimane in Timbuktu Region’, Zagazola, 28 January 2025. ↩︎
4
‘Several killed as separatists clash with Malian army, Russian allies in the conflict-hit north’, ABC News, 13 June 2025. ↩︎
5
‘Azawad Liberation Front: We dealt heavy losses to the Maliam army and African Corps in Aguelhok during a drone attack’, Tanakra, 20 August 2025; ‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group, August 2025. ↩︎
6
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group, October 2025. ↩︎
7
D. Chan,‘Mali: Rebels attack army with drone strike’, Maghrebi, 20 February 2026. ↩︎
8
D. Chan,‘Mali: Rebels attack army with drone strike’, Maghrebi, 20 February 2026. ↩︎
9
D. Chan,‘Mali: Rebels attack army with drone strike’, Maghrebi, 20 February 2026; L. Kouider, ‘Rebels in Mali harness Ukrainian intelligence and tactics’, Maghrebi, 7 October 2025. ↩︎
10
A. Diop, ‘Mali : l’armée repousse une attaque au drone dans la région de Gao et neutralise un groupe armé à Mopti’, Afrik.com, 12 March 2026. ↩︎
11
A. Diop, ‘Mali : l’armée repousse une attaque au drone dans la région de Gao et neutralise un groupe armé à Mopti’, Afrik.com, 12 March 2026; Digital Manden, Facebook, 11 March 2026. ↩︎
12
‘Mali : le FLA lance des drones Kamikazes sur les forces maliennes et russes dans la ville de Gao’, Sahara Media, 12 March 2026. ↩︎
13
ASA_Alliance du Sahel (officiel), Facebook, 25 March 2026; ‘Malian Insurgents Attack with Drones’, African Defense Forum, 28 April 2026. ↩︎
14
‘Mali rattled by ongoing armed attacks: What to know’, Al Jazeera, 26 April 2026. ↩︎
15
‘Attacks in Mali Mark Long Trajectory of Worsening Security’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 27 April 2026. ↩︎
16
History Of All Southern African Tribes, Facebook, 4 May 2026; A. Zondi, ‘Sahel alliance launches airstrikes after Mali attacks’, Channel Africa, 1 May 2026. ↩︎
17
‘Mali: Humanitarian situation following the attacks on 25 April 2026’, Reliefweb, 12 May 2026. ↩︎
18
‘Tuareg coalition threatens continued instability in Northern Mali’, Africa Defense Forum, 21 May 2024. ↩︎
19
‘Tuareg coalition threatens continued instability in Northern Mali’, Africa Defense Forum, 21 May 2024. ↩︎
20
D. Wabwireh, Clashes in Mali: Tuareg rebels inflict losses on Government and mercenary forces’ Africa News, 13 August 2024; ‘Mali : le FLA lance des drones Kamikazes sur les forces maliennes et russes dans la ville de Gao’, Sahara Media, 12 March 2026. ↩︎
21
ICTY,Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarčulovski, Trial Judgment,10 July 2010. ↩︎
22
B. Roger, ‘In Mali, the shadow of Ukraine behind rebels at war with Wagner’s Russian mercenaries’, Le Monde, 2 August 2024. ↩︎
23
‘Malian Insurgents Attack with Drones’, African Defense Forum, 28 April 2026 ↩︎
24
ICC, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, 7 March 2014. ↩︎
25
H. Nsaibia, ‘Fact Sheet: Attacks on Civilians Spike in Mali as Security Deteriorates Across the Sahel’, ACLED, 21 September 2023;; ‘Malian Insurgents Attack with Drones’, African Defense Forum, 28 April 2026. ↩︎

State parties

Mali
Russia (through Africa Corps)

Non-State parties

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)
Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP)
Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) (formerly known as Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad – CSP-DPA)

Foreign involvement

Ukraine (potentially)
Alliance of Sahel States members Burkina Faso and Niger (potentially)

Other actors

Dan Na Ambassagou self-defence groups

1
‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict, July 2023–June 2024’, Geneva Academy, p 137. ↩︎
2
‘Article 3 – Conflicts not of an international character’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases ↩︎
3
‘States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 9 September 2025’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases. ↩︎
4
‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict, July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy, p 136; ‘Mali profile – Timeline’, BBC News, 26 August 2020; E. Barabanova, ‘Africa’s Forgotten Wars: Mali’, Isituto Analisi Relazioni Internazionali, 2 September 2024. ↩︎
5
‘Northern Mali: A Conflict with No Victors’, International Crisis Group, 13 October 2023, ↩︎
6
H. Nsaibia, ‘Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’, ACLED, 12 December 2024, ↩︎
7
L. Karr, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel: November 2024’, Institute for the Study of War, 21 November 2024. ↩︎
8
C. Dufka, ‘We Used to be Brothers’, Human Rights Watch, 7 December 2018. ↩︎
9
‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict, July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy, p 136. ↩︎
10
‘Mali : les mouvements de l’Azawad créent une coordination militaire’, RFI, 29 October 2014. ↩︎
11
‘Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers Process’; G. Nyirabikali, ‘Mali Peace Accord: Actors, Issues and Their Representation’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 27 August 2015; See International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Mali (The Sahel): Military and Security Updates – 2015’, The IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2015. ↩︎
12
‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali’, UN Doc S/2018/581, 9 August 2018, p 2. ↩︎
13
F. Bendhaou, ‘Mali : Les mouvements armés du nord créent le “Cadre stratégique permanent”’, AA, 6 May 2021. ↩︎
14
I. Allegrozzi, ‘Mali’s Peace Deal Ends’, Human Rights Watch, 26 January 2024. ↩︎
15
H. Nsaibia, ‘Fact Sheet: Attacks on Civilians Spike in Mali as Security’, ACLED, 21 September 2023. ↩︎
16
‘Mali junta seizes strategic northern stronghold of Kidal’, France 24, 14 November 2023. ↩︎
17
‘Mali: Events of 2024’, Human Rights Watch. ↩︎
18
D. Baché, ‘Mali: les rebelles du Nord créent le Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad’, RFI, 25 April 2024. ↩︎
19
D. Baché, ‘Mali: les rebelles du Nord créent le Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad’, RFI, 25 April 2024. ↩︎
20
M. Maillard ‘Can Azawad Liberation Front push Mali and Russian ‘invaders’ out?’ The Africa Report, 5 February 2025; ‘Mali: Reorganization of Tuareg armed groups within the Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA)’ Intelligence Security Analysis Operations, 11 December 2024. ↩︎
21
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
22
‘Creation of Azawad Liberation Front deepens crisis in Sahel region’, The Arab Weekly, 2 December 2024. ↩︎
23
‘Creation of Azawad Liberation Front deepens crisis in Sahel region’, The Arab Weekly, 2 December 2024. ↩︎
24
‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict, July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy, p136. ↩︎
25
‘Last UN peacekeepers poised for complete withdrawal from Mali’, United Nations News, 31 December 2023. ↩︎
26
S. Ritter ‘The New ‘Africa Corps’: Russia’s Wagner Rebranding’ Energy Intelligence, 24 May 2024. ↩︎
27
N. Vorobyov, ‘Wagner vs Africa Corps: The future of Russian paramilitaries in Mali’, Al Jazeera, 16 June 2025; S. Daniel ‘Mali: le groupe paramilitaire russe Wagner annonce son départ et est remplacé par Africa Corps’, RFI, 7 June 2025; G. Borshchevskii, ‘Qu’est-ce que l’Africa Corps russe et remplace-t-il le groupe Wagner?’, BBC News Afrique, 12 June 2025. ↩︎
28
S. Ritter, ‘The New “Africa Corps”: Russia’s Wagner Rebranding’, Energy Intelligence, 24 May 2024. ↩︎
29
L. Serwat and H. Nsaibia ‘Q&A: The Wagner Group’s new life after the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin’, ACLED,21 August 2024. ↩︎
30
M. Faye, ‘Pourquoi le Mali a rompu ses relations diplomatiques avec l’Ukraine et quels sont les impacts sécuritaires’, BBC, 5 August 2024. ↩︎
31
B. Roger and E. Grynszpan, ‘Ukrainian drones provide support for northern Mali’s rebels’, Le Monde, 13 October 2024. ↩︎
32
‘Mali’s withdrawal from G5 Sahel, Joint Force ‘a setback’ for the region’, United Nations News, 18 May 2022. ↩︎
33
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: July 2025’, ACLED, 4 July 2025; ‘RFI Wagner replaced in Mali by Africa Corps, another Russian military group’, RFI, 9 June 2025; S. Ambrose, ‘JNIM and FLA Coordinate Attacks Across Mali’, Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute, 19 May 2026. ↩︎
34
W, Nasr, ‘Mali: What Were the Reasons and the Consequences of the 25 April Attacks?’, International Center for Counter-Terrorism, 28 May 2026. ↩︎
35
W, Nasr, ‘Mali: What Were the Reasons and the Consequences of the 25 April Attacks?’, International Center for Counter-Terrorism, 28 May 2026. ↩︎
36
S. Ambrose, ‘JNIM and FLA Coordinate Attacks Across Mali’, Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute, 19 May 2026. ↩︎
37
S. Ambrose, ‘JNIM and FLA Coordinate Attacks Across Mali’, Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute, 19 May 2026. ↩︎
38
W, Nasr, ‘Mali: What Were the Reasons and the Consequences of the 25 April Attacks?’, International Center for Counter-Terrorism, 28 May 2026. ↩︎
39
W, Nasr, ‘Mali: What Were the Reasons and the Consequences of the 25 April Attacks?’, International Center for Counter-Terrorism, 28 May 2026. ↩︎
40
S. A. Salem, ‘Mali Attacks: Aggravating the Sahel Security Crisis’, Stimson, 7 May 2026 ↩︎
41
‘The Limits of Russia’s Africa Corps: Mali and the JNIM-FLA Offensive’, The Soufan Center, 12 May 2026. ↩︎
42
‘The Limits of Russia’s Africa Corps: Mali and the JNIM-FLA Offensive’, The Soufan Center, 12 May 2026. ↩︎
43
D. Cisse, ‘Mali : le régime peut-il résister à la pression insurrectionnelle?’, Fondation Pour la Rechecher Stratégique, 4 May 2026 ↩︎
44
‘Как попасть в Африканский Корпус’, African Corps. ↩︎
45
’Russian Ministry of Defense, Telegram, 28 April 2026 ↩︎
46
B. Bembeeva, ‘Africa Corps and Malian army repel terrorist attack in Segou’, African Initiative, 1 July 2025; ‘Mali’s armed forces say they killed 80 militants after series of attacks on military posts’, Africa News, 2 July 2025; Russian Africa Corps, Telegram, 1 July 2025. ↩︎
47
Russian Ministry of Defense, Telegram, 28 April 2026. ↩︎
48
Russian Ministry of Defense, Telegram, 28 April 2026 ↩︎
49
‘Africa: Mali’, International Crisis Group, January 2026. ↩︎
50
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: July 2025’, ACLED, 4 July 2025. ↩︎
51
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: July 2025’, ACLED, 4 July 2025 ↩︎
52
‘Malian Insurgents Attack with Drones’, African Defense Forum, 28 April 2026. ↩︎
53
‘Azawad Liberation Front: We dealt heavy losses to the Malian army and African Corps in Aguelhok during a drone attack’, Tanakra, 20 August 2025 ↩︎
54
‘Insécurité: Panique dans la Ville de Gao les FAMa Neutralisent une Dizaine de Drones Kamikazes Lancés Contre le Camp Militaire’, Le Soir de Bamako, 12 March 2026 ↩︎
55
‘Malian Insurgents Attack with Drones’, African Defense Forum, 28 April 2026. ↩︎
56
‘Azawad Liberation Front: We dealt heavy losses to the Malian army and African Corps in Aguelhok during a drone attack’, Tanakra, 20 August 2025. ↩︎
57
‘Malian Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups seize control of key northern town’, Le Monde, 27 April 2026; ‘FLA Gains Ground in Mali After Peace Deal Falls Apart’, Africa Defense Forum, 2 June 2026; S. A. Salem, ‘Mali Attacks: Aggravating the Sahel Security Crisis’, Stimson, 7 May 2026. ↩︎
58
‘Malian Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups seize control of key northern town’, Le Monde, 27 April 2026; ‘Are Mali’s Tuareg-led FLA fighters terrorists or separatists?’, RFI, 4 May 2026; S. Lawal, ‘What is the Azawad Liberation Front, part of the Mali attacks?’, Al Jazeera, 28 April 2026; ‘FLA Gains Ground in Mali After Peace Deal Falls Apart’, Africa Defense Forum, 2 June 2026; L. Van Cauwenbergh, ‘Mali: Coordinated Tuareg rebel and jihadist assaults push regime to the brink of collapse’, Credendo, 11 May 2026; ‘Attacks in Mali Mark Long Trajectory of Worsening Security’, Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 27 April 2026. ↩︎
59
S. Lawal, ‘What is the Azawad Liberation Front, part of the Mali attacks?’, Al Jazeera, 28 April 2026; ‘FLA Gains Ground in Mali After Peace Deal Falls Apart’, Africa Defense Forum, 2 June 2026; L. Van Cauwenbergh, ‘Mali: Coordinated Tuareg rebel and jihadist assaults push regime to the brink of collapse’, Credendo, 11 May 2026. ↩︎
60
D. Cisse, ‘Mali : le régime peut-il résister à la pression insurrectionnelle?’, Fondation Pour la Recherche Stratégique, 4 May 2026. ↩︎
61
‘FLA Gains Ground in Mali After Peace Deal Falls Apart’, Africa Defense Forum, 2 June 2026. ↩︎
62
‘Are Mali’s Tuareg-led FLA fighters terrorists or separatists?’, RFI, 4 May 2026; S. Lawal, ‘What is the Azawad Liberation Front, part of the Mali attacks?’, Al Jazeera, 28 April 2026; L. Van Cauwenbergh, ‘Mali: Coordinated Tuareg rebel and jihadist assaults push regime to the brink of collapse’, Credendo, 11 May 2026; S. Muto, ‘Azawad Never Left: Reading Mali’s 2026 Crisis Through 2012’, African Arguments, 13 May 2026. ↩︎
63
‘Malian Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups seize control of key northern town’, Le Monde, 27 April 2026; ‘Are Mali’s Tuareg-led FLA fighters terrorists or separatists?’, RFI, 4 May 2026; S. Lawal, ‘What is the Azawad Liberation Front, part of the Mali attacks?’, Al Jazeera, 28 April 2026; L. Van Cauwenbergh, ‘Mali: Coordinated Tuareg rebel and jihadist assaults push regime to the brink of collapse’, Credendo, 11 May 2026; ‘Attacks in Mali Mark Long Trajectory of Worsening Security’, Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 27 April 2026. ↩︎
64
‘Malian Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups seize control of key northern town’, Le Monde, 27 April 2026; L. Van Cauwenbergh, ‘Mali: Coordinated Tuareg rebel and jihadist assaults push regime to the brink of collapse’, Credendo, 11 May 2026. ↩︎
65
S. Lawal, ‘What is the Azawad Liberation Front, part of the Mali attacks?’, Al Jazeera, 28 April 2026. ↩︎
66
‘What to know about the renewed coordinated attacks across Mali’, Al Jazeera, 5 July 2026; H. Nsaibia, ‘Battle for Anefis: What’s happening in northern Mali?’, ACLED, 6 July 2026. ↩︎
67
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 17; J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020. ↩︎
68
J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020. ↩︎
69
‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy, 137. ↩︎
70
‘Malian Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups seize control of key northern town’, Le Monde, 27 April 2026; ‘Are Mali’s Tuareg-led FLA fighters terrorists or separatists?’, RFI, 4 May 2026; S. Lawal, ‘What is the Azawad Liberation Front, part of the Mali attacks?’, Al Jazeera, 28 April 2026; ‘FLA Gains Ground in Mali After Peace Deal Falls Apart’, Africa Defense Forum, 2 June 2026; L. Van Cauwenbergh, ‘Mali: Coordinated Tuareg rebel and jihadist assaults push regime to the brink of collapse’, Credendo, 11 May 2026; ‘Attacks in Mali Mark Long Trajectory of Worsening Security’, Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 27 April 2026. ↩︎
71
Africa News, ‘Mali: More than 30 killed in twin central attacks’, Daily Motion, May 2026; ‘Armed fighters kill at least 30 people in attacks in central Mali’, Al Jazeera, 7 May 2026. ↩︎
72
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 17; J. Nikolic, et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020. ↩︎
73
‘Are Mali’s Tuareg-led FLA fighters terrorists or separatists?’, RFI, 4 May 2026; Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, Facebook, 2 May 2026; ‘FLA Gains Ground in Mali After Peace Deal Falls Apart’, Africa Defense Forum, 2 June 2026. ↩︎
74
‘Are Mali’s Tuareg-led FLA fighters terrorists or separatists?’, RFI, 4 May 2026; Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, Facebook, 2 May 2026. ↩︎
75
S. Muto, ‘Azawad Never Left: Reading Mali’s 2026 Crisis Through 2012’, African Arguments, 13 May 2026. ↩︎
76
W. Nasr, ‘Mali: What Were the Reasons and the Consequences of the 25 April Attacks?’, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 28 May 2026. ↩︎
77
‘The Limits of Russia’s Africa Corps: Mali and the JNIM-FLA Offensive’, The Soufan Center, 12 May 2026. ↩︎
78
S. Lawal, ‘What is the Azawad Liberation Front, part of the Mali attacks?’, Al Jazeera, 28 April 2026; S. A. Salem, ‘Mali Attacks: Aggravating the Sahel Security Crisis’, Stimson, 7 May 2026. ↩︎
79
‘Are Mali’s Tuareg-led FLA fighters terrorists or separatists?’, RFI, 4 May 2026; Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, Facebook, 2 May 2026; S. Lawal, ‘What is the Azawad Liberation Front, part of the Mali attacks?’, Al Jazeera, 28 April 2026; P. Shankar, ‘What’s happening in Mali one week after attack by armed groups? All we know’, Al Jazeera, 5 May 2026. ↩︎
80
W. Nasr, ‘Mali: What Were the Reasons and the Consequences of the 25 April Attacks?’, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 28 May 2026; S. A. Salem, ‘Mali Attacks: Aggravating the Sahel Security Crisis’, Stimson, 7 May 2026. ↩︎
81
S. Lawal, ‘What is the Azawad Liberation Front, part of the Mali attacks?’, Al Jazeera, 28 April 2026; ‘FLA Gains Ground in Mali After Peace Deal Falls Apart’, Africa Defense Forum, 2 June 2026; ‘What to know about the renewed coordinated attacks across Mali’, Al Jazeera, 5 July 2026; S. A. Salem, ‘Mali Attacks: Aggravating the Sahel Security Crisis’, Stimson, 7 May 2026. ↩︎
82
‘Attacks in Mali Mark Long Trajectory of Worsening Security’, Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 27 April 2026. ↩︎
83
‘Malian Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups seize control of key northern town’, Le Monde, 27 April 2026; ‘Are Mali’s Tuareg-led FLA fighters terrorists or separatists?’, RFI, 4 May 2026; S. Lawal, ‘What is the Azawad Liberation Front, part of the Mali attacks?’, Al Jazeera, 28 April 2026; L. Van Cauwenbergh, ‘Mali: Coordinated Tuareg rebel and jihadist assaults push regime to the brink of collapse’, Credendo, 11 May 2026; L. Van Cauwenbergh, ‘Mali: Coordinated Tuareg rebel and jihadist assaults push regime to the brink of collapse’, Credendo, 11 May 2026; ‘Attacks in Mali Mark Long Trajectory of Worsening Security’, Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 27 April 2026. ↩︎
84
‘What to know about the renewed coordinated attacks across Mali’, Al Jazeera, 5 July 2026; H. Nsaibia, ‘Battle for Anefis: What’s happening in northern Mali?’, ACLED, 6 July 2026. ↩︎
85
N. Milnes and R. Lyammouri, ‘AI-Enabled Ourole Teaming for Sahel Convoy Security: Case of Fuel Blockade by JNIM’, Policy Center for the New South, December 2025; S. Vandermeersch, ‘Mali Under Siege: Tracking the Fuel Blockade Crippling Bamako’, Bellingcat, 3 December 2025; 15000 nigerien sur facebook, Facebook, 12 December 2025. ↩︎
86
S. Vandermeersch, ‘Mali Under Siege: Tracking the Fuel Blockade Crippling Bamako’, Bellingcat, 3 December 2025. ↩︎
87
S. Vandermeersch, ‘Mali Under Siege: Tracking the Fuel Blockade Crippling Bamako’, Bellingcat, 3 December 2025; ‘AI-Enabled Ourole Teaming for Sahel Convoy Security: Case of Fuel Blockade by JNIM’, Policy Center for the New South, December 2025. ↩︎
88
D. Baché, ‘Mali: le Jnim poursuit son offensive, le Premier ministre dénonce «une tentative de déstabilisation»’, RFI, 22 October 2025. ↩︎
89
‘Strategic Interdiction of Fuel Supply Lines and Hostage Leverage by JNIM’, African Security Analysis, 31 January 2026. ↩︎
90
‘Au Mali, le Jnim reprend ses attaques : un convoi de camions-citernes incendié’, Jeune Afrique, 30 January 2026. ↩︎
91
‘Al Qaeda-linked group killed at least 12 truck drivers in Mali: HRW’, SABC News, 10 March 2026. ↩︎
92
‘Au Mali, le Jnim reprend ses attaques : un convoi de camions-citernes incendié’, Jeune Afrique, 30 January 2026. ↩︎
93
A. Bespalova, ‘More than 700 fuel tankers arrive in Mali’s capital under escort of FAMa and Africa Corps’, African Initiative, 18 May 2026. ↩︎
94
‘In Mali, General Appointed to Win Bamako’s ‘Fuel War’’, African Defense Forum, 13 January 2026. ↩︎
95
A. Bespalova, ‘More than 700 fuel tankers arrive in Mali’s capital under escort of FAMa and Africa Corps’, African Initiative, 18 May 2026; Africa View Facts, Facebook, 1 May 2026; A. Bespalova, ‘The Malian Armed Forces and the Africa Corps continue combat operations in the north of the country’, African Initiative, 4 May 2026; ‘Russia’s African Corps, Malian Army Escort Over 800 Fuel Tankers Into Bamako’, Sputnik Africa, 1 May 2026. ↩︎
96
R. Taha, ‘Mali rebels attack convoy of soldiers, Russian mercenaries’, Deutsche Welle, 9 July 2026. ↩︎
97
‘Malian army denies releasing jihadists to end fuel convoy attacks’, Africa News, 31 March 2026. ↩︎
98
P. Crowe, ‘Suspected jihadists attack Mali’s Morila mine’, Reuters, 5 January 2026. ↩︎
99
P. Crowe, ‘Suspected jihadists attack Mali’s Morila mine’, Reuters, 5 January 2026; SABC News, Facebook, 5 January 2026. ↩︎
100
‘JNIM Takes Aim at Illegal Chinese Miners in Mali’, African Defense Forum, 16 June 2026; P. Adeleye, ‘Mali: How JNIM is extorting illegal Chinese miners to fund terror’, The Africa Report, 28 May 2026. ↩︎

Mali

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (January 2025 – June 2026)

Russia’s Africa Corps now as a party to several NIACs in Mali

Russia as a party to the conflict through Africa Corps: Mali (supported by Russia) v JNIM

Russia as a party to the conflict through Africa Corps: Mali (supported by Russia) v ISSP

Russia as a party to the conflict through Africa Corps: Mali (supported by Russia) v FLA

Coordinated attacks launched by the FLA and JNIM in Kidal in April 2026

A common enemy-specific alliance, but two separate NIACs prevail

Coordination structure for the alliance as a whole

Differences in rules of engagement

Coordination of simultaneous attacks and joint military operations

JNIMs new ‘economic conflict strategy’: Targeting oil convoys and goldmines

Non International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State parties

Non-State parties

Foreign involvement

Other actors