Türkiye

The non-international armed conflict (NIAC) in Türkiye between the Turkish armed and security forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) lasted, with some interruptions, from the 1980s until 2013 and resumed in July 2015. It had ended as of April 2025 upon a lasting cessation of hostilities and the announcement and implementation of the PKK’s dissolution.

Türkiye is a State Party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, but not to Additional Protocol II of 1977. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law (IHL) applied to the NIAC in Türkiye.

Origins and context

The Kurds are an ethnic group of more than 30 million people native to Kurdistan, a region that encompasses portions of the territory of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Türkiye. The origins of the Kurdish conflict can be dated back to the end of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. The idea of founding a Kurdish State was initially supported by the British, but was abandoned in 1923 due to the emergence of the Turkish Republic under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. As a consequence, the Kurdish settlement areas were divided among the four newly created States where Kurds predominantly live today. Although President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk initially guaranteed the Kurds limited autonomy, the status of a protected minority was ultimately granted only to Armenians, Greeks, and Jews, with Atatürk determined to assimilate Kurds into the Turkish nation. This led to the first Kurdish uprisings in the 1920s and 1930s, when Kurds sought to assert their voice in the newly founded Turkish Republic.¹

The PKK’s emergence and first rebellion

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) was established in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan as a Marxist-Leninist uprising aiming for Kurdish independence from Türkiye.² Following the 1980 coup d’état in Türkiye,³ tensions between the Turkish government and the Kurds continued to escalate. Just prior to the coup, Öcalan escaped to Syria and, with Syrian government support, set up a first PKK training camp in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, a reion then under Syrian control.⁴ In parallel, the PKK gained access to Iraqi territory through a deal with the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) that allowed PKK fighters to move to the Qandil Mountains.⁵

Driven by the suppression of Kurdish culture and human rights violations by Ankara, which accelerated under the Turkish junta, the PKK developed into a rural rebellion in south-eastern Türkiye in 1984.⁶ In August of that year, the PKK launched its first attacks against Turkish military posts in Şemdinli and Eruh, close to the borders with Iran and Iraq.⁷ This led to the outbreak of the first NIAC between the PKK and Türkiye, which lasted for fifteen years and cost the lives of an estimated 37,000 people.⁸ At that time, the PKK rebellion was fuelled by several million Kurdish refugees fleeing Saddam Hussein’s campaign of violence and repression in northern Iraq and who arrived in Türkiye in the late 1980s.

The first NIAC between Türkiye and the PKK ended in September 1999. Following the capture and conviction of Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan to life imprisonment after his expulsion from Syria due to Turkish pressure, the PKK declared a unilateral cease-fire that marked the end of the conflict.⁹ The PKK subsequently withdrew a considerable portion of its forces from Türkiye to Iraq. The organization persisted through this period largely because a substantial number of its leadership, personnel, and logistical infrastructure were in Iraqi Kurdistan.¹⁰

Emergence of the Semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq

The Kurdistan region’s origins trace back to the 1970s. In March 1970, following years of heavy fighting, an autonomy agreement was reached with Baghdad, granting the region autonomous status. The Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and the Anfal genocide campaign carried out by the Iraqi army caused widespread destruction and casualties among Iraqi Kurds.¹¹

In April 1991, following the Gulf War and the Kurdish uprising against Saddam Hussein, many Kurds were forced to flee Iraq to bordering regions of Iran and Türkiye. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States established a safe haven and no-fly zone in northern Iraq, facilitating the return of Kurdish refugees. In October 1991, the Iraqi army and central-government administration withdrew from most of the area, and Kurdish parties began administering it. In 1992, the Kurdistan Regional Government was formed.¹²

The second wave of violence

A second wave of violence began in 2004, when the PKK resumed attacks against Turkish forces, particularly in ambushes and bombings, prompting the Turkish Parliament to authorize the military to conduct cross-border operations against Kurdish rebel hideouts in northern Iraq in 2007. This led to the outbreak of a second NIAC that lasted until March 2013, when the jailed leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, announced another unilateral ceasefire.¹³ In parallel, the PKK shifted its objective in 2005 to seek greater cultural and political rights for Kurdish people within Türkiye instead of independence.¹⁴

Peace talks and subsequent interruption

Following the Oslo talks – specifically, confidential negotiations conducted from 2006 to 2008 – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan engaged in direct peace negotiations with the PKK between 2013 and 2015 to address the Kurdish issue through democratic processes. However, this so-called ‘Kurdish Opening’ strengthened pro-Kurdish political parties, and, consequently, the Turkish far right also gained influence. As a result, Erdoğan’s political party, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), lost its absolute majority in Parliament. This, coupled with regional events such as the Syrian civil war, prompted Erdoğan to terminate the negotiations.¹⁵

Renewed hostilities and regional expansion

In July 2015, renewed fighting broke out between the PKK and Turkish armed and security forces following a suicide attack in the Turkish-Syrian border town of Suruç that killed 32 Kurds and Turks. Although the government attributed the attack to Islamic State, numerous Kurds believed that the Turkish government was actively supporting IS fighters against the Kurdish opposition in Syria and Türkiye. Consequently, the PKK retaliated by attacking and killing two Turkish police officers. In response, Türkiye conducted airstrikes targeting PKK positions in northern Iraq (see ‘Armed conflicts in Iraq’) and within Türkiye.¹⁶

Intense fighting ensued between the PKK and Turkish Armed Forces, marking one of the deadliest periods in the forty-year-long conflict.¹⁷ Just between 21 July and 12 August 2015, the PKK are said to have mounted 90 attacks.¹⁸ In parallel, the government launched airstrikes against PKK targets in both Türkiye and northern Iraq, claiming to have killed 390 PKK fighters by the middle of August 2015.¹⁹ The government also arrested hundreds of people with suspected links to either the PKK or the IS group in July 2015.²⁰ In August 2015, Kurdish politicians and fighters announced local administrative autonomy for Sur, a decision that was met with a violent crackdown from the government, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of PKK fighters, security forces and civilians.²¹

Contrary to earlier phases of the armed conflict, armed clashes also took place in urban areas of south-east Türkiye,²² in particular from December 2015 until June 2016, when the PKK retreated from their last urban strongholds. This temporary shift for urban areas of the conflict translated into a peak in fatality rate linked to the PKK conflict in Türkiye.²³ However, since June 2016, fighting has taken place again predominantly in rural areas.²⁴ Starting in August 2015, curfews were imposed on towns and city districts in south-east Turkey, along with frequent water and electricity cuts.²⁵ Sur was under lockdown from 3 December 2015, as Turkish security forces attempted to remove PKK fighters from urban areas and the PKK dug trenches and set up checkpoints, leaving civilians trapped inside.²⁶ In December 2015, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated to the Turkish government 34 applications concerning the curfew measures taken in Türkiye since August of that year.²⁷

After the July 2016 attempted coup, President Erdoğan detained around 50,000 people, which included ten thousand military personnel and hundreds of generals. As the Turkish Armed Forces scaled back operational activities to restructure its command, the PKK took advantage of this weakness and persisted with its deadly, low-level attacks on security forces.²⁸ At the same time, the pro-Kurdish opposition, including the first pro-Kurdish party to enter parliament, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), was targeted as part of a wider and systematic assault against dissenting voices under the state of emergency declared after the attempted coup.²⁹

In December 2016, Amnesty International estimated that 2,360 people had died and thought it likely that ‘at least half a million people have been forcibly displaced by the violence, large-scale destruction of property and by ongoing curfews across the south-east’ by December 2016.³⁰ The use of heavy weaponry by the Turkish armed forces resulted in extensive destruction of some of the affected urban areas.³¹ For example, in a March 2017 report, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights estimated that 70 per cent of the buildings in the eastern part of the Sur District of Diyarbakir were destroyed as a result of heavy shelling.³²

On 20 January 2018, Türkiye initiated a new military campaign against the Kurdish insurgency by launching the ‘Olive Branch’ land and air operation targeting the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) positions in Afrin, north-western Syria (see below and ‘Armed Conflicts in Syria’), accusing them of fostering ties with the PKK and acting as a military wing. While Türkiye sees the YPG and the PKK as one and the same, they are in fact two distinct armed groups.Whereasthe PKK has operated in both south-eastern Türkiye and northern Iraq, the Kurdish insurgency in Syria was formally constituted through the establishment of the YPG, supported by the United States and the PKK, to combat Islamic State in Syria. Despite the existence of the Kurdistan Democratic Communities Union (KCK), which functions as an umbrella organization for Kurdish rebellions, the YPG and the PKK remain distinct entities. This distinction is notably evidenced by the fact that the YPG has, until recently, operated within the SDF, rejected the suggestion that Öcalan’s 2025 call for the PKK to demilitarize and dissolve applies to the YPG, and that the SDF, including the YPG, announced their dissolution and integration into the Syrian armed forces in late August 2026.

The operation was conducted in conjunction with Türkiye-supported Sunni rebel groups. Concurrently, Turkish military operations against PKK fighters in rural areas of south-eastern Türkiye continued, albeit with relatively fewer casualties.³³ Following Erdoğan’s re-election in June 2018, the Turkish offensive in northern Iraq targeting PKK positions intensified while hostilities between Türkiye and the PKK persisted within Turkish territory. In September, Russia and Türkiye signed an agreement to establish a demilitarized buffer zone in the north-western Syrian governorate of Idlib to allow for ‘radical’ rebels and heavy weaponry to be ‘removed’ from the region.³⁴

Clashes between the Turkish government and the PKK in Türkiye, as well as cross-border operations in Iraq and Syria, continued and expanded in 2019, resulting in the deaths of Kurdish fighters, Turkish forces, and civilians, while the crackdown on pro-Kurdish opposition, notably the HDP and individuals allegedly linked to the PKK intensified.³⁵ In particular, since 2019, Türkiye has increasingly relied on drone strikes and airstrikes to counter the PKK and its affiliates in northern Iraq and northern Syria. Consequently, violence has intensified in these adjacent regions while decreasing within Türkiye.³⁶ Furthermore, on 27 May 2019, the Turkish military began ‘Operation Claw’, shifting from temporary cross-border operations in northern Iraq to maintaining positions, controlling territory, and constructing an interconnected network of military bases and other facilities. As a result, Türkiye progressively expanded its territorial scope and established a de facto security zone.³⁷

In parallel, in August 2019, Turkish security forces launched ‘Operation Kiran’, which targeted alleged PKK positions in the south-eastern and eastern provinces of Türkiye.³⁸ Türkiye’s Ministry of Interior announced in January 2020 that security forces had ‘neutralized’ 144 PKK fighters in the course of ‘Kiran’.³⁹

On 9 October 2019, Türkiye and Turkish-supported militias, including the Syrian National Army, initiated ‘Operation Peace Spring’ to capture territory from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF is a multi-ethnic coalition of Kurdish, Arabic, and Christian fighters dominated by the YPG, which was established with the support of the United States and the PKK in 2015, to counter the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Until its recent integration into the new Syrian government (see below), the SDF has controlled north-eastern Syria through the local Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria.⁴⁰ Its establishment of a ‘safe zone’ resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of Kurds from northern Syria to Türkiye. Amid the ongoing Turkish military offensive, the SDF reached a Russia-mediated agreement with the Bashar al-Assad regime, permitting Syrian government forces to deploy to strategic border regions as a safeguard against additional Turkish incursions. This precarious status quo persisted until the fall of the Assad regime in late 2024.⁴¹

In 2020, hostilities persisted between the PKK and the Turkish armed forces within Türkiye, alongside Turkish military operations in northern Iraq targeting the PKK and in north-eastern Syria against the YPG. Concurrently, the government’s repression of pro-Kurdish opposition intensified, encompassing continued efforts to criminalize it.⁴² In particular, on 11 January 2020, Türkiye launched Operation Kapan (kapan means trap), a multi-phase operation against the PKK in eastern Türkiye.⁴³ The same month, the PKK launched a large-scale military operation against the Turkish army in Serhat region. On 2 March, it attacked a Turkish military convoy in the province of Ağrı in eastern Türkiye, reportedly killing 79 Turkish soldiers without any fatalities among PKK forces.⁴⁴

Fighting remained intense throughout 2021 and 2022, as the Turkish military continued operations against Kurdish insurgencies in south-eastern Türkiye (PKK), northern Iraq (PKK), and northern Syria (YPG). Numerous casualties among the PKK were documented, with fewer reported among Turkish military personnel. In parallel, repression and efforts to criminalize pro-Kurdish opposition, notably the HDP, continued in Türkiye.⁴⁵ In September 2021, the Turkish Minister of Interior, Süleyman Soylu, stated that PKK fighters in the country totalled fewer than 200 for the first time.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, repression against the pro-Kurdish opposition and military operations targeting Kurdish groups continued throughout the latter half of 2021 and the first half of 2022.

Most confrontations occurred in northern Iraq (PKK) and involved targeting senior PKK figures, including through use of armed drones. Some clashes, though, took place in south-eastern Türkiye (PKK) and at the Türkiye-Syria border (YPG).⁴⁷ Operations in Iraq and Syria intensified from April 2022 with the launch of Operation Claw-Lock in northern Iraq, and the situation deteriorated further in August 2022, when the government stepped up attacks against the PKK and other Kurdish forces, both within Türkiye and across the border with Syria and Iraq. Operation Claw-Lock targeted caves and shelters used by the PKK and its allies, and involved commando units and special forces, backed by armed drones and attack helicopters.⁴⁸

In November 2022, a terror attack killed six civilians and injured more than eighty in Istanbul. Türkiye blamed the PKK and YPG, both of which denied any involvement. In resp0nse, Türkiye launched Operation Claw-Sword, initially striking 89 PKK/YPG-associated targets in Iraq (Qandil, Asos, Hakurk, and Sinjar) and northern Syria. Türkiye later claimed 184 fighters killed across Iraq and Syria, with Syrian Kurdish authorities reporting civilian casualties. Cross-border rockets also wounded Turkish personnel near Kilis in Türkiye.⁴⁹

Earthquake and subsequent PKK’s temporary ceasefire

Following the 6 February 2023 earthquake that struck south-eastern Türkiye and parts of Syria, killing 21,000, including more than 18,000 in Türkiye, the PKK announced a temporary suspension of operations in Türkiye to facilitate humanitarian and rescue efforts.⁵⁰ On 13 June 2023, however, the PKK terminated its temporary ceasefire, citing continuing Turkish attacks on its fighters in Iraq and Syria and Abdullah Öcalan’s imprisonment.⁵¹

Intensification of cross-border air and ground operations against PKK members and alleged affiliates, and continued repression of pro-Kurdish opposition

In August 2023, the Turkish military carried out several drone strikes in northern Iraq targeting PKK fighters and alleged affiliates, killing dozens of real or alleged members of the PKK.⁵² The PKK also clashed with the Turkish military and killed at least six Turkish soldiers in Zap (northern Iraq) in early August 2023, an area where Türkiye has been carrying out its ‘Claw-Lock’ operation since April 2022 (see above). Türkiye responded with airstrikes on PKK positions, killing four PKK fighters.⁵³

In retaliation for the suicide attack at the Ministry of Interior entrance in Ankara on 1 October 2023, claimed by the PKK, Türkiye launched multiple airstrikes targeting more than 50 PKK sites and targets in northern Iraq. The Turkish Ministry of Defence reported that several caves, shelters, and ammunution depots were destroyed, and numerous PKK fighters were ‘neutralized’. In parallel, Turkish authorities also detained suspects in Istanbul.⁵⁴

In late December 2023, combat between Turkish military forces and PKK fighters occurred in northern Iraq after the PKK attempted to overrun a Turkish base, resulting in the deaths of 12 Turkish service members and 13 PKK fighters.⁵⁵ In response to the deaths of its soldiers, Türkiye launched a series of airstrikes and operations in northern Iraq and Syria, ‘neutralizing’ more Kurdish fighters and detaining dozens of pro-Kurdish opposition activists, members of what was now called the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) (formerly HDP), in Türkiye. In total, fifty-six PKK fighters were killed.⁵⁶ The killing of the twelve Turkish soldiers prompted President Erdoğan to announce in late December that Türkiye would reinforce its newly established permanent bases in northern Iraq in the months ahead,⁵⁷ despite an earlier statement by Iraqi President Abdul-Latif Rashid that Iraq had rejected repeated Turkish airstrikes and the presence of Turkish bases in northern Iraq.⁵⁸

On 12 January 2024, a PKK attempt to infiltrate a Turkish base in northern Iraq killed nine Turkish soldiers and wounded eight. Türkiye said subsequent airstrikes killed 36 Kurdish fighters in Iraq and nine in Syria. Several caves, bunkers, shelters, tunnels, ammunition storage areas, and supply facilities were also reportedly destroyed. Meanwhile, 165 people were detained within the framework of anti-terrorist operations targeting the PKK across 28 Turkish provinces.⁵⁹

On 8 March 2024, further Turkish airstrikes hit northern Iraq and Syria. According to Iraqi security sources, a Turkish strike killed two civilians, whereas Türkiye reported that overnight operations in Iraq and Syria had killed thirteen Kurdish fighters. However, it remains uncertain whether both accounts pertain to the same incident.⁶⁰ On 19 March, the PKK launched another attack against a Turkish position in northern Iraq, killing one Turkish soldier and injuring four others. Türkiye responded by sending warplanes to strike twenty-seven suspected PKK targets in northern Iraq, including caves, bunkers, and shelters.⁶¹ Six PKK fighters were killed during other engagements that occurred within the area of the ‘Claw-Lock’ operation in northern Iraq (see above).⁶²

On 2 April 2024, another drone strike killed a senior PKK military commander and seriously injured two PKK fighters. Iraqi Kurdish authorities attributed the strike to Türkiye, but Türkiye did not publicly acknowledge it.⁶³ Conversely, on 6 May 2024, Türkiye said airstrikes killed 16 PKK members in northern Iraq, although the figure was not independently verified.⁶⁴

Later, on 10 May 2024, Türkiye claimed that operations killed 10 PKK fighters across the ‘Claw-Lock’ operation’s area in northern Iraq and seven YPG fighters in northern Syria.⁶⁵ Further clashes occurred between the Turkish military and the PKK during a search-and-sweep operation in the ‘Claw-Lock’ operational area on 21 June 2024, resulting in the death of one Turkish soldier and three PKK members.⁶⁶

On 13 July 2024, President Erdoğan said the latest ground phase in northern Iraq was approaching completion and that Türkiye would ‘close the lock very soon in the Claw Operation Zone in northern Iraq.’ Nevertheless, no timeline was given, and Turkish bases and cross-border operations remained in place.⁶⁷ Further clashes were reported, including in September 2024 (see below).

In July and August 2024, additional Turkish airstrikes resulted in the deaths of dozens of Kurdish fighters in northern Iraq.⁶⁸ A Turkish drone strike in late August killed three people in northern Iraq. According to Iraqi Kurdistan’s counterterrorism service, a vehicle belonging to the PKK was hit, and a senior PKK member, his driver, and a guard were killed. However, Iraqi Kurdistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani later claimed that two of the victims were journalists without any link to an armed group.⁶⁹ A few days later, Iraqi air defences intercepted an armed drone which officials suspect to be of Turkish origin. There were no casualties reported, and the specific mission remains unclear, including whether it was targeting the PKK.⁷⁰

In a statement on 2 September 2024, the Turkish Ministry of Defence said that Türkiye conducted airstrikes in northern Iraq, destroying 20 PKK targets and ‘neutralizing’ many fighters.⁷¹ Two days later, a Turkish drone strike hit a vehicle in Sulaimaniya (northern Iraq), killing its three passengers. Their identities and PKK status were not immediately established.⁷² On 9 September 2024, during a confrontation with the PKK in northern Iraq, a Turkish soldier was killed. Türkiye responded with airstrikes, targeting PKK bases in Gara, Hakurk, Metina, and Qandil, resulting in the deaths of numerous PKK fighters.⁷³ Further clashes in Dohuk (northern Iraq) later in September killed several PKK fighters.⁷⁴ On 16 September, a Turkish drone strike resulted in the death of one PKK member and injuries to two others during a meeting at a refugee camp in northern Iraq.⁷⁵ On 10 November, a Turkish drone attack in Duhok (northern Iraq) killed three PKK fighters, including a senior leader. Another drone strike in Sinjar (northern Iraq) killed two members of the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), a militia associated with the PKK.⁷⁶

As detailed below, despite the peace efforts commenced in late 2024, air and ground cross-border operations across Iraq and Syria persisted until April 2025, undermining the renewed peace process.

Security talks between Iraq and Türkiye, and subsequent cooperation

In parallel, in mid-March 2024, Iraq and Türkiye held high-level security talks in Baghdad to discuss security issues including potential measures against the PKK. On this occasion, Iraq formally designated the PKK a ‘banned organization’, but did not use Türkiye’s ‘terrorist organization’ designation. Nevertheless, Türkiye welcomed the decision.⁷⁷ Türkiye designated the PKK as a terrorist organization in 1984, followed by the United States in 1997, and the European Union in 2014.⁷⁸ A joint statement by Iraq and Türkiye declared that ‘the PKK organization represents a security threat to both Türkiye and Iraq’ and that its presence in Iraq ‘represents a violation of the Iraqi constitution.’⁷⁹ Iraq also responded positively to Türkiye’s proposal to set up a joint operations centre against the PKK.⁸⁰

On 22 April 2024, during the first visit to Iraq by a Turkish leader since 2011, President Erdoğan and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani agreed to enhance their cooperation against the PKK, in addition to establishing a new trade corridor and increasing Iraq’s access to water resources from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. More than 20 Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) were signed, including one between Iraq, Qatar, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates to collaborate on a road and rail development project to connect Asia to Europe and turn Iraq into a transit hub.⁸¹

On 15 August 2024, following two days of high-level security discussions in Türkiye, the two nations signed an agreement covering military, security, and counterterrorism cooperation. This includes establishing a joint security coordination centre in Baghdad and strengthening training at the Turkish military base near Bashiqa. Türkiye’s Defence Minister Yasar Guler also stated that Ankara desired Baghdad to expedite the process of officially designating the PKK as a terrorist organization.⁸²

Initiation of a new peace process between Türkiye and the PKK, and its endangerment

In October 2024, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and an ally of Erdoğan, usually known for strong anti-PKK rhetoric, initiated an unexpected political opening, eventually proposing on 22 October that imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan address parliament and order the PKK’s disbandment, in exchange for the possibility of being released. The pro-Kurdish DEM opposition responded by stating that they were ready to do their part for ‘honourable peace’.⁸³

However, this initiative towards peace was jeopardized the following day when two assailants launched an attack on the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ) complex using firearms and explosives, resulting in the deaths of five individuals and injuries to 22 others. Both assailants perished during the incident. The PKK claimed responsibility on 25 October, indicating that the operation had been planned prior to the recent political opening.⁸⁴ In response to the attack on TUSAŞ, Türkiye conducted extensive airstrikes across Iraq and Syria targeting over 100 sites, and killing 59 fighters, among them two believed to be high-ranking commanders.⁸⁵ The SDF reported the deaths of twelve civilians, a claim that Türkiye has disputed.⁸⁶ Meanwhile, Turkish security forces detained 176 suspected PKK members during operations across Türkiye.⁸⁷

A further step towards peace was undertaken in late December 2024, when Türkiye authorized the pro-Kurdish DEM party to meet with Öcalan for the first time in nearly a decade. During the meeting with two senior DEM members, Pervin Buldan and Sirri Sureyya Onder, Öcalan expressed his willingness to contribute to peace between Turks and Kurds.⁸⁸

In early January 2025, despite the new peace process initiated in late 2024, Türkiye, leveraging the change of government in Syria following the fall of Bashar Al-Assad to Türkiye-backed rebels, intensified efforts against the Kurdish insurgency in Syria (see ‘Armed conflicts in Syria’). In particular, on 5 January 2025, Türkiye asserted that it had killed four PKK members in northern Iraq and 32 PKK ‘affiliates’ in northern Syria.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, according to some analysts, the growing regional instability also prompted Ankara’s shift in posture towards Öcalan and the PKK.⁹⁰

On 22 January 2025, one week after nationalist Devlet Bahçeli urged Öcalan to declare the disbandment of the PKK, a delegation from the DEM party met Öcalan again, with discussions about the potential resolution of the conflict intensified.⁹¹

The PKK’s declared disbandment and its subsequent implementation

On 27 February 2025, Öcalan made a breakthrough statement from jail, calling on the PKK to disarm and disband, a move that could end the PKK’s 40-year conflict with Ankara, which had killed more than 40,000. Öcalan was quoted as wanting the PKK to convene a congress and to formally dissolve itself. While there was no immediate response from the PKK headquarters in northern Iraq, the Kurdish-led forces in Syria, the SDF, which are dominated by the YPG, welcomed Öcalan’s call for disbandment positively but stated that Öcalan’s call did not apply to them.⁹²

Nevertheless, on 1 March 2025, the PKK leadership based in Iraq announced an immediate unilateral ceasefire and declared it would abstain from engaging in armed operations unless provoked. It also endorsed Öcalan’s appeal while seeking political and legal assurances from Turkish authorities.⁹³ However, despite the PKK’s ceasefire declaration, in early March 2025, Türkiye said its forces killed 26 PKK or PKK-affiliated fighters during the following week in northern Iraq and Syria. Ankara stated that operations would continue until dissolution and disarmament occurred in practice.⁹⁴

Between 5 and 12 May 2025, the PKK convened its 12^th congress and ultimately declared its dissolution, marking the end of armed struggle and the cessation of military activities conducted under the PKK designation, thereby fostering hope for regional stability. However, while recalling that its mission shifted over the years from seeking an independent Kurdish State to seeking greater Kurdish rights and limited autonomy in south-eastern Türkiye, the PKK conditioned the surrender of weapons on Ankara’s response and approach towards Kurdish rights, as well as the fate of its fighters and leadership.⁹⁵

Since then, few further hostilities between Türkiye and the PKK have been reported. A fatal incident involved twelve Turkish soldiers who were found dead after exposure to methane in a former PKK cave complex in northern Iraq in early July 2025. They were conducting a search for the remains of an officer killed by the PKK in May 2022.⁹⁶ Between March and the end of October 2025, a total of 35 casualties, including those soldiers, were reported. Since the end of October 2025, no fatalities have been recorded.⁹⁷

On 9 July 2025, in a rare video statement, Öcalan announced the end of the armed struggle against Türkiye and emphasized the need for a comprehensive democratic transition. He also appealed to the Turkish parliament to establish a commission responsible for overseeing disarmament and facilitating the broader peace process.⁹⁸ Two days later, in northern Iraq, 30 PKK fighters, male and female, burned weapons in a symbolic ceremony attended by Kurdish, Iraqi and Turkish officials, marking the first publicly verified step in the disarmament process.⁹⁹ On 5 August 2025, the Turkish Parliament formed a 51-member National Solidarity, Brotherhood, and Democracy Commission to supervise disarmament of the PKK and to create associated legal reforms.¹⁰⁰

On 26 October 2025, the PKK announced it was withdrawing all remaining fighters from Türkiye to northern Iraq as part of the disarmament process, and urged Ankara to advance political participation and the social reintegration of the PKK within Türkiye.¹⁰¹ On 7 November 2025, the Turkish government began preparing legislation to permit the return and conditional reintegration of thousands of PKK elements from northern Iraq. Under the proposed law, PKK members would be protected though they would not be granted a general amnesty for past crimes. The return would take place in separate waves for civilians and fighters, and some PKK commanders could be sent to third countries. The possibility of PKK fighters and affiliates returning to Türkiye was deemed by analysts to be one of the final steps in completing the peace process launched a year ago.¹⁰² In parallel, on 2 November 2025, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein called on remaining PKK elements in northern Iraq to disarm.¹⁰³

In early 2026, the parliamentary commission approved a strategic roadmap recommending the enactment of a provisional legal framework that provides for verified PKK disarmament, reintegration, narrowed definitions of terrorism, and adherence to constitutional and European human rights judgments.¹⁰⁴ In late April, however, the pro-Kurdish opposition DEM party strongly criticized how the government has been handling the peace process, labelling the government as ‘acting in a hesitant, timid and stalling manner’. In response, Erdoğan stated that the peace process was progressing in a ‘positive atmosphere’ and reached a critical stage with the recent adoption of the commission’s strategic roadmap (see above).¹⁰⁵ This echoed a growing disagreement between Türkiye and the PKK as the PKK sought guarantees before completing disarmament, while Ankara continued to insist on full verified disarmament before broader democratic reforms.¹⁰⁶

The peace process was brought to a near standstill due to the Iran conflict, which precipitated a new phase of instability and uncertainty in the Middle East, and entailed the risks of a resurgence of Kurdish insurgency in Iran and Iraq (see ‘Armed conflicts involving Iran’).¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, on 24 June 2026, President Erdoğan announced that the legal framework intended to accelerate PKK dissolution and reintegration was being prepared.¹⁰⁸ Following his statement, the governing coalition submitted a reintegration bill to the parliament in early August. According to the bill, the implementation of the PKK’s disarmament and disbandment would be verified and overseen by the National Security Council and a committee comprising the vice president, several ministers, and the head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT). Furthermore, sentences related to membership or assistance offences would be suspended, and PKK fighters who were not involved in killings and who returned to Türkiye within six months of the law’s enactment would be granted protection. Nevertheless, PKK officials convicted of serious crimes – including leading a terrorist organization and serving aggravated life sentences prior to 2005 – would not be eligible for these legal protections or suspended sentences. Consequently, Öcalan, who has been incarcerated since 1999, would remain imprisoned.¹⁰⁹

On 10 August, the Turkish Parliament enacted legislation with 468 votes in favour out of 600, offering legal protection to PKK fighters who have not been charged with specific offenses and enabling the suspension of sentences for certain individuals convicted of PKK affiliation, thereby fostering their reintegration into society. However, this legislation did not address broader issues concerning Kurdish rights, reforms to counterterrorism laws, or the status of Öcalan.¹¹⁰ On 18 August, President Erdoğan promulgated the legislation, which establishes a conditional pardon for thousands of PKK members, with exclusions for Öcalan, senior leaders, and individuals responsible for serious crimes. The legislation also delays ongoing investigations and legal proceedings against PKK members for a period of five or ten years, depending on the severity of the offenses, and authorities would dismiss cases against these individuals should they refrain from reoffending during these intervals. Nevertheless, its entry into force is contingent upon the Turkish National Security Council’s confirmation that the PKK has entirely disbanded and disarmed.¹¹¹

On 24 August 2026, the implementation of the legal framework adopted on August 18 commenced, marked by the inaugural meeting of the Government’s Monitoring, Coordination, and Implementation Board, presided over by Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz. The Board established four working groups focused on legal issues, monitoring and verification, social reintegration, and disarmament. Öcalan later characterized the process as having reached a pivotal stage. Regarding the verification process of the PKK disbandment and disarmament, it has been scheduled for completion within two months, with the National Security Council expected to present its findings in October.¹¹²

Meanwhile, following the agreement signed with Syria’s new government in March 2025, which stipulates the SDF’s integration into Syria’s new State institutions and the withdrawal of foreign PKK cadres,¹¹³ the Kurdish-led SDF (see above; see also ‘Armed Conflicts in Syria‘) announced in late August 2026 their dissolution and integration into the Syrian armed forces. The move was warmly welcomed by Ankara, which had repeatedly demanded the SDF’s dissolution as part of its broader ‘terror-free region’ policy because, as mentioned, it regards the SDF as being closely linked to the PKK.¹¹⁴

Turkish and Kurdish media reported the establishment of a weapons-handover and verification mechanism involving Ankara, Baghdad, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah between 31 August and 4 September 2026. Reported measures include designated surrender locations, inspection of evacuated PKK camps, and deployment of Iraqi border guards or Peshmerga to vacated positions. They also provide for the return and reintegration of thousands of PKK members to Türkiye or their integration into the Iraqi army. In its first public disclosure of the total casualties suffered by the PKK, approximately 27,000 PKK fighters were reported to have been killed in Iraq, Syria, and Türkiye during the PKK’s armed campaign against Türkiye.¹¹⁵ However, such reports have not yet been independently verified, and there is not yet public evidence available establishing that weapons had actually been surrendered. Furthermore, senior PKK figure Cemil Bayık warned that the process may come to a halt unless Türkiye clarifies the future status of Öcalan and other senior PKK leaders, and ensures that disarmament is complemented by wider democratic and legal reforms.¹¹⁶

Two criteria need to be assessed in order to determine whether a situation of armed violence amounts to a NIAC:

First, the level of armed violence must reach a certain degree of intensity that goes beyond internal disturbances and tensions.
Second, in every NIAC, at least one side in the conflict must be a non-State armed group that exhibits a certain level of organization in order to qualify as a party to the NIAC. Government forces are presumed to satisfy the criteria of organization.¹¹⁷

Various indicative factors are used to assess whether a given situation has met the required intensity threshold, such as the number, duration, and intensity of individual confrontations; the types of weapons and military equipment used; the number of persons and types of forces participating in the fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; the number of civilians fleeing; and the involvement of the UN Security Council.¹¹⁸

A series of indicative factors are also used to assess whether armed groups exhibit the required degree of organization, such as ‘the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the group; the existence of a headquarters; the fact that the group controls a certain territory; the ability of the group to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and military training; its ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations, including troop movements and logistics; its ability to define a unified military strategy and use military tactics; and its ability to speak with one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as ceasefire or peace accords.’¹¹⁹

Conversely, for an NIAC to end, one of the following two conditions must be met: (1) one of the parties ceases to exist; (2) hostilities are no longer intense and regular, including (but not only) where there is a durable cessation of combat. A party ceases to exist when it is militarily defeated or its forces are party is demobilized, even if isolated or sporadic acts of violence by remnants continue. A durable cessation of armed confrontations excludes a temporary lull in hostilities but is not contingent upon whether a ceasefire has been formally concluded or declared unilaterally.

Non-international armed conflict between Türkiye and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

Background

In light of the frequency of attacks by the PKK and Turkish armed and security forces, the number of casualties and the number of people forced to leave the areas affected by violence, the required degree of intensity was arguably reached again in July 2015, and it continued to be so until March 2025.

As detailed above, after two years of direct peace negotiations – the so-called ‘Kurdish Opening’ – in July 2015, fighting broke out again between the PKK and Turkish armed and security forces, and marked one of the deadliest periods in the decades-long conflict and resulted in around 7,000 people (PKK fighters, Turkish forces and civilians) being killed in the last decade.¹

Between December 2015 and June 2016, in addition to airstrikes inside Türkiye and northern Iraq, intense and continuous armed clashes also took place in urban areas of south-eastern Türkiye. This resulted in a significant increase in casualties, with more than 2,300 individuals killed and half a million displaced between July 2015 and December 2016. The Turkish military’s use of heavy weaponry also caused extensive destruction of urban areas. Since then, hostilities were primarily in the countryside, and the rate of fatalities gradually decreased in Türkiye. In parallel, violence progressively increased across northern Iraq.² Furthermore, commencing in 2019, the Turkish military has increasingly relied on airstrikes to combat the PKK in Iraq, respectively, with cross-border operations becoming more frequent. Notably, in late May 2019, with the initiation of ‘Operation Claw’, Türkiye shifted from sporadic cross-border incursions to establishing a permanent territorial presence in northern Iraq, thereby creating a de facto security zone.³

As described, fighting remained intense between 2020 and 2022, as Turkish armed forces continued operations against PKK rebellions in south-eastern Türkiye and northern Iraq. Beginning in April 2022, operations in Iraq intensified with the launch of Operation Claw-Lock in the north, which involved both ground and air forces. The situation further deteriorated in August 2022, when the government intensified military actions against the PKK, both within Türkiye and in Iraq. Irrespective of the temporary unilateral ceasefire announced by the PKK in February 2023 in the aftermath of the earthquake that hit south-eastern Türkiye and northern Syria, from 2023, armed confrontations shifted from rural areas in south-eastern Türkiye to the mountains of northern Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region. Fighting involved direct clashes, attacks on Turkish military bases, suicide attacks, car bombs, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mortars, destruction of bunkers and ammunition warehouses, increased use of armed drones, and air strikes,⁴ with deaths reported on both sides.

Despite the peace process between Türkiye and the PKK launched in late 2024, hostilities between Türkiye and the PKK persisted until March 2025 and were largely confined to Iraq, a pattern corroborated by the security dialogue initiated between Iraq and Türkiye in March 2024 (see above).

A NIAC ‘may spill over from the territory of the State in which it began into the territory of a neighbouring State not party to the conflict’, and ‘the crossing of an international border does not change the non-international character of the armed conflict’⁵ in itself, provided that the conflict continues to oppose the same parties.

Organization

The origins of the PKK can be dated back to the foundation of the Ankara Democratic Higher Education Association (Ankara Demokratik Yüksek Öğrenim Derneği, ADYÖD), which was founded in 1974 in Ankara under the authority of Öcalan. From 1984, the PKK entered into armed insurgency and has been eager to both mobilise and recruit new fighters. In 1986, a PKK training camp was set up in the valley of Bekaa in Lebanon. This served as a model for further strategic measures ranging from additional training to the surveillance and control of the fighters.⁶ Initially aiming for complete independence, since 2005, the PKK has moderated its position and now advocates for Kurdish autonomy and rights (see above).⁷

There is relatively little hard information available about the organization of the PKK,⁸ but it is said to follow a hierarchical structure divided between its military and political wings. Accordingly, the command of the group is based in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq, and Abdullah Öcalan is still considered the political leader of the group despite serving a life sentence in Türkiye since his arrest in 1999. Cemil Bayik, a PKK founding member, is believed to be the number two in the PKK and has repeatedly spoken on behalf of the PKK from its base in the Qandil region in Iraq.⁹ Bayik also co-chairs with Besê Hozat the Executive Council of the KCK, an umbrella organization for the PKK and allied groups.¹⁰Murat Karayilan acts as the Commander of the PKK’s military wing and the leader of the PKK in northern Iraq. He is also a member of the Executive Council of the KCK.¹¹

The PKK is able to sustain military operations not only in Türkiye but also in Iraq (see above), and has employed a mix of guerrilla and terrorist tactics, including car bombs, grenades, IEDs, kidnappings, mortars, drones, small arms and suicide bombings.¹² As of April 2025, the PKK had at least 4,000 fighters, most in northern Iraq, while affiliated groups were active in northern Iraq, northern Syria, and western Iran. The PKK is known for primarily targeting Turkish and Turkish-supported forces within its main areas of operation, as well as security and governmental personnel and infrastructure in Türkiye,¹³ resulting in recurrent casualties (see above). This underscores its capacity to plan, coordinate, and execute military operations.

Taken together, these elements illustrate that the group fulfils the requisite degree of organization.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the PKK leadership is reportedly still based in northern Iraq, Öcalan’s call for disarmament and dissolution made in February 2025 translated into the following concrete steps as detailed above: the PKK’s unilateral ceasefire declaration, the formal dissolution of the PKK, the announcement of the end of the PKK’s armed struggle, the symbolic ceremony of burning weapons, the withdrawal of PKK fighters from Türkiye to northern Iraq, and the establishment of a commission overseeing PKK disarmament and the adoption of a legal framework by Türkiye providing for the PKK’s dissolution and reintegration.

Therefore, although the issue of the future status of Öcalan and other senior PKK leaders has been described as potentially endangering the peace process, and reports of the establishment of weapons-handover and verification mechanisms have not been substantiated by independent sources, the formal dissolution of the PKK, coupled with its concrete progressive implementation, indicates that the PKK, as a party to NIAC opposing Türkiye, has ceased to exist.

In any event, given that no further hostilities have been reported since April 2025, the conflict in Türkiye is deemed to have ended as of that date.

1
International Crisis Group, ‘Türkiye’s PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer’; Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
2
See above. See also: International Crisis Group, ‘Türkiye’s PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer’. ↩︎
3
See above. See also: International Crisis Group, ‘Türkiye’s PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer’. ↩︎
4
See also: Counter Terrorism Guide, ‘Terrorist Groups: Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)’, April 2025. ↩︎
5
ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 474 ↩︎
6
O. Grojean ‘Turquie: Le mouvement kurde à l’heure du « processus de paix »’, Politique étrangère, 2014, Vol. 2, pp 27–37. ↩︎
7
See also: Counter Terrorism Guide, ‘Terrorist Groups: Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)’, April 2025. ↩︎
8
See ‘Who are Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) rebels’, BBC, 4 November 2016. ↩︎
9
I. Pannell, ‘Kurdish PKK Warns Turkey of Long Fight for Freedom’, BBC, 25 April 2016; Counter Terrorism Guide, ‘Terrorist Groups: Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)’, April 2025. ↩︎
10
‘Senior PKK figure says Turkey must clarify status of Öcalan for peace’, Turkish Minute, 4 September 2026; KCK – Kurdistan Democratic Communities Union. ↩︎
11
Counter Terrorism Guide, ‘Terrorist Groups: Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)’, April 2025. ↩︎
12
Counter Terrorism Guide, ‘Terrorist Groups: Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)’, April 2025. ↩︎
13
Counter Terrorism Guide, ‘Terrorist Groups: Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)’, April 2025. ↩︎

State Party

Türkiye

Non-state parties

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)
Kurdistan Democratic Communities Union (KCK)

1
G. Seufert, ‘Kurdenkonflikt’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 22 October 2024. ↩︎
2
A. Palmer and M. Holtz, ‘Examining Extremism: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 13 July 2023; Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
3
Turkey’s 1980 military coup leaders stand trial’, BBC News, 4 April 2012. ↩︎
4
H. Akın Ünver, ‘Turkey’s ‘Kurdish initiative’: What went wrong? (Or did it?)’, Foreign Policy Association. ↩︎
5
W. Van Wilgenburg, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan and the Turkey-PKK Conflict’, Kurdish Peace Institute, 26 April 2023. ↩︎
6
H. Akın Ünver, ‘Turkey’s ‘Kurdish initiative’: What went wrong? (Or did it?)’, Foreign Policy Association; A. Palmer and M. Holtz, ‘Examining Extremism: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’, CSIS, 13 July 2023; Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
7
H. Akın Ünver, ‘Turkey’s ‘Kurdish initiative’: What went wrong? (Or did it?)’, Foreign Policy Association. ↩︎
8
H. Akın Ünver, ‘Turkey’s ‘Kurdish initiative’: What went wrong? (Or did it?)’, Foreign Policy Association; A. Palmer and M. Holtz, ‘Examining Extremism: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’, CSIS, 13 July 2023. ↩︎
9
H. Akın Ünver, ‘Turkey’s ‘Kurdish initiative’: What went wrong? (Or did it?)’, Foreign Policy Association; A. Palmer and M. Holtz, ‘Examining Extremism: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’, CSIS, 13 July 2023. ↩︎
10
International Crisis Group, ‘Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation?’, Middle East Report No. 81, 13 November 2008, p 2. ↩︎
11
Kurdistan Regional Government, ‘Facts & Figures’; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, ‘Iraq under Baath Rule, 1968-1976: Introductory Note’, Research Study Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976, November 1976. P 864; United Nations, Yearbook on Human Rights for 1973-1974, 1979, p 119. ↩︎
12
Kurdistan Regional Government, ‘Facts & Figures’; Kurdistan Regional Government, Department of Foreign Relations, ‘Kurdistan Regional Government’, 6 September 2020; Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
13
‘Timeline: PKK conflict with Turkey’, Al Jazeera, 21 March 2013; C. Letsch, ‘Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan declares ceasefire with Turkey’, The Guardian, 21 March 2013; International Crisis Group, ‘Turkey and the PKK: Saving the Peace Process’, Europe Report No. 234, 6 November 2014, p 5. ↩︎
14
Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
15
W. Van Wilgenburg, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan and the Turkey-PKK Conflict’, Kurdish Peace Institute, 26 April 2023; G. Seufert, ‘Kurdenkonflikt’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 22 October 2024; W. M. Rodgers, ‘PKK leader Ocalan’s historic call to disarm could go to waste without external guarantors’, Chatham House, Expert Comment, Last updated 16 April 2025; Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
16
C. Letsch, ‘The Turkish Kurds Who Want Peace – But Not at Any Price’, The Guardian, 11 August 2015; Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
17
International Crisis Group, ‘Türkiye’s PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer’. ↩︎
18
A. Aydin and C. Emrence, ‘ A New Episode in the Turkish Civil War?’, The Washington Post, 21 August 2015; see also Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
19
‘Turkey: Jets Strike Kurdish Rebels’, The New York Times, 4 August 2015; C. Yeginsu, ‘Turkey Attacks Kurdish Militant Camps in Northern Iraq’, The New York Times, 25 July 2015; D. Kenner, ‘Turkey’s War Within’, Foreign Policy, 17 August 2015; L. Bohn, ‘”All Our Young People Have Gone to the Mountain”. Inside Turkey’s Revived War Against the Kurds’, The Atlantic, 18 August 2015; T. Arango, ‘As Turkey Targets Fighters, War Grips Kurdish Lands Once Again’, The New York Times, 24 August 2015. ↩︎
20
S. Capeluouto and G. Tuysuz, ‘Turkey Arrests Hundreds of Suspected Terrorists, Prime Minister Says’, CNN, 25 July 2015. ↩︎
21
C. Letsch, ‘Sur, Turkey: Residents Pay Price of Violence as Curfew Enters Fourth Month’, The Guardian, 3 March 2016. ↩︎
22
G. Murat Tezcür and C. Beslaw, ‘Violence in Turkey is Increasingly Resembling Violence in Syria – Here’s Data to Show Why’, Political Violence at a Glance Blog, 23 September 2016; A. Stein, ‘Kurdish Fighters and Turkey’s New Urban Insurgency’, War on the Rocks Blog, 23 March 2016. See also: International Crisis Group, ‘Türkiye’s PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer’. ↩︎
23
International Crisis Group, ‘Türkiye’s PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer’. ↩︎
24
Amnesty International, ‘Turkey: Displaced and dispossessed: Sur residents’ right to return home’, 6 December 2016, p 5; M. Konaev and B. Kadercan, ‘Old Dogs, New Tricks: Urban Warfare in Turkey’s War with the PKK’, War on the Rocks Blog, 3 January 2018. ↩︎
25
C. Letsch, ‘Sur, Turkey: Residents Pay Price of Violence as Curfew Enters Fourth Month’, The Guardian, 3 March 2016; Amnesty International, ‘Turkey: Displaced and dispossessed: Sur residents’ right to return home’, 6 December 2016, pp 5, 7 and 14. ↩︎
26
C. Letsch, ‘Sur, Turkey: Residents Pay Price of Violence as Curfew Enters Fourth Month’, The Guardian, 3 March 2016. ↩︎
27
ECtHR, ‘European Court of Human Rights Looks into Complaints About Curfew Measures in Turkey, Press Release, Doc ECHR 420 (2016), 15 December 2016. ↩︎
28
N. Danforth and D. Runde, ‘Turkey and the PKK After the Failed Coup’, War on the Rocks, 18 August 2016; A. Jamieson, ‘Turkey’s Erdogan to build more prisons as post-coup purge persists’, NBC News, 16 September 2018;Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
29
Amnesty International, ‘Turkey: Displaced and dispossessed: Sur residents’ right to return home’, 6 December 2016, p 5; Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
30
Amnesty International, ‘Turkey: Displaced and dispossessed: Sur residents’ right to return home’, 6 December 2016, pp 5 and 7. ↩︎
31
Amnesty International, ‘Turkey: Displaced and dispossessed: Sur residents’ right to return home’, 6 December 2016, pp 5 and 8. ↩︎
32
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights Situation in South-East Turkey, July 2015 to December 2016, February 2017, p 11. ↩︎
33
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Türkiye: January and February 2018. ↩︎
34
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Türkiye: June 2018 – December 2018; Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
35
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Türkiye: January 2019 – December 2019. ↩︎
36
International Crisis Group, ‘Türkiye’s PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer’; Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
37
N. Özçelik, ‘Operation Claw: Strategy, Scope and Goals’, Politics Today, 24 July 2019; Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
38
E. Avundukluoğlu, ‘Turkey’s Operation Kiran neutralizes 121 PKK terrorists’, Anadolu Agency, 20 November 2019. ↩︎
39
A. Karadag, ‘Turkey’s Operation Kiran completed “successfully” ’, Anadolu Agency, 11 January 2020. ↩︎
40
W. van Wilgenburg, ‘Syrian Democratic Forces (Syria)’, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR); Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. See also: ‘Armed conflicts in Syria’. ↩︎
41
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR); B. McKernan, ‘Turkey-Syria offensive: Kurds reach deal with Damascus to stave off assault’, The Guardian, 14 October 2019; United Nations, ‘Turkey’s Military Operation Has Displaced Thousands of Civilians, Worsened Syria’s Dire Humanitarian Crisis, Top Official Warns Security Council’, Press release, 24 October 2019; Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. See also: ‘Armed conflicts in Syria’. ↩︎
42
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Türkiye: January 2020 – December 2020. ↩︎
43
‘Turkey launches fresh operation against PKK in eastern provinces’, Rudaw, 13 March 2020. According to the Ministry of Interior, in March 2020 the government’s security forces launched the eighth phase of the operation.‘Kapan-8 operasyonu başlatıldı’, CNN Türk, 13 March 2020. ↩︎
44
‘HPG: 79 soldiers killed in revolutionary operation in Ağrı’, ANF News, 9 March 2020. ↩︎
45
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Türkiye: January 2021 – December 2022. ↩︎
46
‘Number of terrorists in Turkey drops below 200: Minister Soylu’, Daily Sabah, 19 September 2021. ↩︎
47
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Türkiye: July 2021 – July 2022. ↩︎
48
‘Turkey launches new offensive against Kurdish rebels in Iraq’, Al Jazeera, 18 April 2022; International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Türkiye: April–December 2022; A. Ismail and L. Masri, ‘A Reuters special report: As Turkey intensifies war on Kurdish fighters in Iraq, civilians are suffering’, Reuters, 10 October 2023. ↩︎
49
J. Spicer, A. Kucukgocmen and E. Toksabay, ‘Turkey blames deadly bomb on Kurdish fighters; PKK denies involvement’, Reuters, 14 November; A. Kucukgocmen and S. Al-Khalidi, ‘Turkish air strikes target Kurdish fighters in Syria, Iraq after bomb attack’, Reuters, 20 November 2022; H. Hayatsever and D. Butler, ‘Erdogan says Turkey to attack Kurdish fighters with tanks, soldiers’, 23 November 2022. ↩︎
50
‘Kurdish fighters suspend ‘operations’ after Turkey quake’, Al-Monitor, 10 February 2023. ↩︎
51
A. Zaman, ‘Did Kurdish PKK call off truce with Turkey to make peace or war?’, Al-Monitor, 14 June 2023. ↩︎
52
‘Turkish drone strikes hit PKK targets in northern Iraq, kill two’, Reuters, 6 August 2026; ‘Two killed in Turkish drone attacks against PKK members in Iraq’, Reuters, 9 August 2023; ‘Three killed in Turkish drone attack on PKK members in northern Iraq – Statement’, Reuters, 11 August 2023; A. Ismail and L. Masri, ‘A Reuters special report: As Turkey intensifies war on Kurdish fighters in Iraq, civilians are suffering’, Reuters, 10 October 2023; ‘Seven killed in Turkish drone strikes on PKK members in northern Iraq’, Reuters, 24 August 2023. ↩︎
53
‘Six Turkish soldiers killed in anti-PKK military operation in Iraq’, Al Jazeera, 10 August 2023. ↩︎
54
S. Fraser, ‘Turkey strikes suspected Kurdish militant targets in northern Iraq after suicide attack in Ankara’, AP News, 1 October 2023; D. Butler, ‘After Ankara bombing, Turkey hits back in Iraq and at home’, Reuters, 2 October 2023; ‘Turkey carries out new air strikes in northern Iraq after Ankara bombing’, Reuters, 4 October 2023. ↩︎
55
‘12 Turkish soldiers have been killed over 2 days in clashes with Kurdish fighters, authorities say’, AP News, 23 December 2023; ‘Turkey retaliates at home, abroad after troops killed in Iraq’, Reuters, 25 December 2023. ↩︎
56
‘Turkey retaliates at home, abroad after troops killed in Iraq’, Reuters, 25 December 2023. ↩︎
57
‘Turkey to reinforce military bases in N.Iraq after 12 soldiers killed’, Reuters, 28 December 2023. ↩︎
58
‘Iraq rejects Turkish strikes in Kurdistan region, seeks resolution’, Reuters, 2 October 2023. ↩︎
59
A. Wilks, ‘Turkey launches airstrikes against Kurdish fighters in Iraq and Syria after 9 soldiers were killed’, AP News, 13 January 2024; ‘Turkey says it ‘neutralises’ 45 Kurdish fighters in northern Iraq, Syria’, Reuters, 13 January 2024; D. Butler and H. Hayatsever, ‘Turkey strikes Kurdish fighters in Iraq and Syria’, Reuters, 16 January 2024. ↩︎
60
‘Two civilians killed in Turkish air strike in northern Iraq, security sources say’, Reuters, 8 March 2024. ↩︎
61
‘Turkish warplanes strike Kurdish militant positions in Iraq after attack kills soldier, wounds 4’, AP News, 20 March 2024. ↩︎
62
‘Turkish soldier killed in clash in Iraq, defence ministry says’, Reuters, 19 March 2024. ↩︎
63
‘PKK Commander Killed In Iraq Strike Blamed On Turkey’, Barron’s, 02 April 2024. ↩︎
64
‘Turkey strikes northern Iraq from air, says it kills PKK members’, Reuters, 6 May 2024. ↩︎
65
‘Turkey says it killed 17 Kurdish fighters in northern Iraq, Syria’, Reuters, 10 May 2024. ↩︎
66
Y. Gungor, ‘Turkish soldier killed in anti-terror operation zone in northern Iraq’, Anadolu Ajansi, 21 June 2024. ↩︎
67
‘Turkey to soon wind down latest operation in northern Iraq, Erdogan says’, Al Jazeera, 13 July 2024; Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
68
‘Turkey says it killed 13 Kurdish fighters in northern Iraq’, Reuters, 30 July 2024; ‘Turkish airstrikes kill 17 Kurdish fighters in northern Iraq, ministry says’, Voice of America News, 12 August 2024. ↩︎
69
‘Turkish drone strike kills three people in northern Iraq’, Reuters, 23 August 2024. ↩︎
70
‘Turkish drone shot down over Iraq’s Kirkuk, sources say’, Reuters, 29 August 2024. ↩︎
71
‘Turkish military destroys 20 targets of Kurdish militant group PKK, ministry says’, Reuters, 2 September 2024. ↩︎
72
‘Three killed in Turkish drone strike in northern Iraq, sources say’, Reuters, 4 September 2024. ↩︎
73
‘Turkish soldier killed in clash in northern Iraq, defence ministry says’, Reuters, 9 September 2024. ↩︎
74
‘Turkish drone and clashes kill three PKK members in Iraq, sources say’, Reuters, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
75
‘Turkish drone and clashes kill three PKK members in Iraq, sources say’, Reuters, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
76
‘Five killed in Turkish drone strikes on PKK members in northern Iraq’, Reuters, 10 November 2024. ↩︎
77
Q. Abdul-Zahra, ‘Turkey’s top diplomat visits Iraq and seeks support against Kurdish militant group’, AP News, 14 March 2024; ‘Turkey, Iraq hold security talks in Baghdad, Iraqi government says’, Reuters, 15 March 2024. ↩︎
78
See: Counter Extremism Project, ‘Extremist Groups: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’, 5 August 2025. ↩︎
79
Q. Abdul-Zahra, ‘Turkey’s top diplomat visits Iraq and seeks support against Kurdish militant group’, AP News, 14 March 2024. ↩︎
80
‘Iraq warm to Turkey’s proposed anti-PKK joint ops centre, says Turkish official’, Reuters, 21 March 2024. ↩︎
81
T. Azhari, E. Toksabay, and A. Rasheed, ‘Iraq, Turkey to elevate security, economic ties after Erdogan visit’, Reuters, 22 April 2024. ↩︎
82
‘Turkey, Iraq sign accord on military, security, counter-terrorism cooperation’, Reuters, 15 August 2024. ↩︎
83
H. Hayatsever, ‘Erdogan ally makes offer to jailed PKK leader Ocalan to end conflict’, Reuters, 22 October 2024. ↩︎
84
E. Toksabay and M. Ozkan, ‘Attack on aerospace firm in Turkey’s Ankara kills 5, injures 22’, Reuters, 24 October 2024; ‘Kurdish militant group PKK says it carried out Ankara attack ’, Reuters, 25 October 2024. ↩︎
85
T. Gumrukcu and D. Butler, ‘Turkey steps up strikes on PKK in Iraq, Syria after Ankara attack’, Reuters, 24 October 2024; ‘Turkish air strikes hit PKK targets in Iraq again after Ankara attack’, Reuters, 25 October 2024. ↩︎
86
T. Gumrukcu and D. Butler, ‘Turkey steps up strikes on PKK in Iraq, Syria after Ankara attack’, Reuters, 24 October 2024. ↩︎
87
‘Turkish air strikes hit PKK targets in Iraq again after Ankara attack’, Reuters, 25 October 2024. ↩︎
88
‘Turkey to allow pro-Kurdish party to visit jailed militant leader’, Reuters, 27 December 2024; ‘Turkey’s imprisoned Kurdish rebel leader says he is willing to work with authorities for peace’, AP News, 29 December 2024. ↩︎
89
‘Erdogan expects support from Syria in Turkey’s battle with PKK’, Reuters, 5 January 2025. ↩︎
90
D. Butler, ‘Jailed Kurdish militant leader calls for end to conflict with Turkey’, Reuters, 27 February 2025. ↩︎
91
‘Erdogan ally urges jailed militant leader to announce PKK’s disbandment’, Reuters, 14 January 2025; ‘Turkey’s pro-Kurdish party to meet jailed PKK leader again Wednesday’, Reuters, 22 January 2025. ↩︎
92
D. Butler, ‘Jailed Kurdish militant leader calls for end to conflict with Turkey’, Reuters, 27 February 2025; ‘SDF chief says PKK disarmament call ‘not related to us in Syria‘, Reuters, 27 February 2025; ‘Erdogan says new phase started in efforts for ‘terror-free’ Turkey after Ocalan call’, Reuters, 28 February 2025. ↩︎
93
A. Wilks, ‘Kurdish PKK fighters declare a ceasefire in 40-year insurgency in Turkey’, AP News, 2 March 2025. ↩︎
94
‘Turkey continues operations on PKK in Iraq, Syria despite Ocalan call’, Reuters, 6 March 2025. ↩︎
95
D. Butler and E. Toksabay, ‘Kurdish PKK ends 40-year Turkey insurgency, bringing hope of regional stability’, Reuters, 12 May 2025. ↩︎
96
‘7 more Turkish soldiers die from methane gas in Iraqi cave, raising deaths to 12’, AP News, 7 July 2025. ↩︎
97
International Crisis Group, ‘Türkiye’s PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer’ ↩︎
98
‘Jailed PKK leader Ocalan says armed struggle with Turkey is over’, Reuters, 9 July 2025. ↩︎
99
A. Rasheed, ‘Kurdish PKK fighters burn weapons in Iraq to launch disarmament’, Reuters, 11 July 2025. ↩︎
100
H. Hayatsever, ‘Turkey sets up parliamentary commission to oversee PKK disarmament’, Reuters, 5 August 2025. ↩︎
101
‘Kurdish PKK fighters announce withdrawal from Turkey as part of disarmament’, Reuters, 26 October 2025; ‘Kurdish PKK announces it is withdrawing fighters from Turkiye to Iraq’, Al Jazeera, 26 October 2025. ↩︎
102
T. Azhari, ‘Turkey preparing law to let PKK fighters return under peace plan’, Reuters, 7 November 2025. ↩︎
103
Q. Abdul-Zahra, ‘Iraq’s foreign minister calls for disarmament of ‘PKK elements’ in the north’, AP News, 2 November 2025. ↩︎
104
E. Toksabay, ‘Turkish lawmakers back plan advancing PKK peace process’, Reuters, 18 February 2026. ↩︎
105
‘Pro-Kurdish party criticises Turkey’s “hesitant” steps toward PKK peace’, Reuters, 28 April 2026, ‘Erdogan rejects criticism of Turkey’s peace efforts with Kurdish fighters’, Reuters, 29 April 2026. ↩︎
106
‘Erdogan rejects criticism of Turkey’s peace efforts with Kurdish fighters’, Reuters, 29 April 2026; J. Spicer and A. Rasheed, ‘Iran war brings Turkey-PKK peace process to near standstill’, Reuters, 13 May 2026. ↩︎
107
J. Spicer and A. Rasheed, ‘Iran war brings Turkey-PKK peace process to near standstill’, Reuters, 13 May 2026. ↩︎
108
‘Turkey working on legislation to speed up militant PKK’s disbandment, Erdogan says’, Reuters, 24 June 2026. ↩︎
109
N. Devranoglu and H. Hayatsever, ‘Turkey unveils draft law to reintegrate PKK fighters, achieve peace’, Reuters, 5 August 2026. ↩︎
110
‘Turkish parliament passes landmark law to advance PKK peace process’, Reuters, 10 August 2026; ‘Turkiye approves pardon-like bill for thousands of PKK fighters’, Al Jazeera, 10 August 2026; E. Topcu, ‘Can Turkey’s new PKK law bring peace?’, Deutsche Welle, 11 August 2026. ↩︎
111
‘Turkey’s Erdogan signs law offering conditional pardon for thousands of PKK fighters’, AP News, 18 August 2026. ↩︎
112
‘Gov’t board holds first meeting on PKK disarmament’, Hürriyet Daily News, 24 August 2026; E. Akin, ‘Turkey’s Kurdish peace process moves to implementation: What to know and what’s next’, Al-Monitor, 25 August 2026. ↩︎
113
‘Turkey’s Erdogan welcomes Syrian deal with Kurdish forces’, Reuters, 11 March 2025; Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Global Conflict Tracker, Last updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
114
‘Turkey says SDF dissolution will help with Syrian unity’, Reuters, 26 August 2026. ↩︎
115
S. Abdulrazek, ‘Türkiye Unveils Mechanism for PKK Weapons Handover Ahead of Reintegration’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 1 September 2026; Institute for the Study of War (ISW), ‘Iran Update, September 4, 2026’, 4 September 2026. ↩︎
116
‘Senior PKK figure says Turkey must clarify status of Öcalan for peace’, Turkish Minute, 4 September 2026. ↩︎
117
ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber) (Case No IT-94-1-AR72), 2 October 1995, para 70; ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Judgment (Trial Chamber) (Case No IT-94-1-T), 7 May 1997, para 562; International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2016 Commentary, paras 422–29. ↩︎
118
For a summary, see ICTY, Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Judgment (Trial Chamber) (Case No IT-04-82-T), 10 July 2008, para 177; ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 431-2; ICRC, ‘How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international law’, Opinion Paper, 2024, pp 14-15. ↩︎
119
ICTY, Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj et al., Judgment (Trial Chamber) (Case No. IT–04–84), 3 April 2008, para 60; ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 430; ICRC, ‘How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international law’, Opinion Paper, 2024, pp 13–14. ↩︎