Classification
Historical Background
Origins and context
The Kurdish conflict originated after the First World War, when Kurdish settlement areas were divided among Türkiye, Syria, Iraq and Iran. In Türkiye, assimilation policies and denial of protected minority status contributed to early Kurdish uprisings.
The PKK’s emergence and first insurgency
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was established in 1978 under Abdullah Öcalan, initially seeking Kurdish independence. After the 1980 coup, repression, Syrian support and access to Iraqi territory facilitated its development into an insurgency. The first NIAC began in 1984 after PKK attacks against Turkish military posts and ended in 1999 following Öcalan’s capture and a unilateral ceasefire.
Emergence of the Semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq developed from earlier autonomy arrangements, the Kurdish uprising after the Gulf War, the creation of a safe haven and no-fly zone, and the formation of the Kurdistan Regional Government in 1992.
The second wave of violence
A second NIAC began in 2004 when the PKK resumed attacks, and Türkiye later authorized cross-border operations in northern Iraq. It ended with Öcalan’s 2013 unilateral ceasefire.
Peace talks and subsequent interruption
Peace negotiations between Türkiye and the PKK took place between 2013 and 2015 but collapsed amid domestic political shifts and regional developments.
Renewed hostilities and regional expansion
Fighting resumed in July 2015 and became particularly intense, including urban fighting in south-eastern Türkiye before returning mainly to rural areas. Türkiye expanded operations against the PKK and affiliated Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria, increasingly relying on air and drone strikes, cross-border operations, military bases and security zones.
Key Developments (2023–2026)
Between 2023 and 2026, several major developments occurred:
- Earthquake and subsequent PKK’s temporary ceasefire: After the February 2023 earthquake in southeastern Türkiye and Syria, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) temporarily suspended operations in Türkiye to facilitate humanitarian efforts. The ceasefire ended in June 2023, with the PKK citing continued Turkish operations and Abdullah Öcalan’s imprisonment.
- Intensification of cross-border air and ground operations against PKK members and alleged affiliates, and continued repression of pro-Kurdish opposition: From 2023 to early 2025, Türkiye intensified air, drone and ground operations against the PKK and alleged affiliates in northern Iraq and Syria, while direct clashes continued in the Claw Lock area. PKK attacks against Turkish positions and facilities prompted further Turkish strikes, arrests and reinforcement of military bases in northern Iraq. Iraq rejected Turkish bases but later deepened security cooperation with Türkiye.
- Security talks between Iraq and Türkiye, and subsequent cooperation: In 2024, Iraq and Türkiye expanded security cooperation, with Iraq designating the PKK as a banned organization, supporting coordination against it and signing military, security and counterterrorism arrangements with Türkiye.
- Initiation of a new peace process between Türkiye and the PKK, and its endangerment: A new peace process began in late 2024 through political openings toward Öcalan, but it was strained by a PKK-claimed attack and renewed Turkish operations.
- The PKK’s declared disbandment and its subsequent implementation: In 2025, Öcalan called for the PKK to disarm and dissolve, followed by a PKK ceasefire, declared dissolution and initial disarmament steps. Türkiye created legal and institutional mechanisms for reintegration, but implementation remained conditional on verified disarmament, while unresolved questions concerning Kurdish rights, Öcalan and senior PKK leaders persisted.
Non-International Armed Conflict
NIAC between Türkiye and the PKK
The armed conflict between Türkiye and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) resumed in July 2015 after the collapse of peace talks, with frequent attacks, high casualties, mass displacement, urban fighting, heavy weaponry, and later sustained rural and cross border operations. Although hostilities increasingly shifted from Türkiye to northern Iraq and, to a lesser extent, northern Syria, the conflict retained its non-international character insofar as it continued to oppose Türkiye and the PKK. The situation in northern Syria must be distinguished from the spillover into Iraq, since the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), although supported by the PKK and operating within the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), remained a distinct entity, rejected Öcalan’s 2025 call as applicable to it, and later announced integration into SDF. The PKK satisfied the organization requirement through its hierarchical political and military structure, leadership, Qandil-based command, capacity to conduct sustained operations, recruitment, weapons access, and ability to speak with one voice. However, following Öcalan’s 2025 call, the PKK’s ceasefire, declared dissolution, disarmament steps and absence of reported hostilities since March 2025 indicate that the conflict ended by then.
Parties to the Conflict(s)
State Parties
- Türkiye
Non-State Parties
- Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
Other Main Actors
- Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)
- Kurdistan Democratic Communities Union (KCK)