Non-International Armed Conflict between Cameroon and Ambazonian Separatists

14 April 2026

Background

The NIAC between Cameroon and Ambazonian separatists was triggered as early September and October 2017 in the north- and south-west of Cameroon.¹ There are multiple non-State actors in the region, ranging from organized armed groups fighting across the region under ideological commanders to smaller groups fighting at village level. Although fighting for a common cause – an independent Ambazonia – competition over resources and ideological differences has seen fragmentation between the groups.²

The most prominent of the Ambazonian separatist groups is said to be the Ambazonia Defence Force (ADF).³ The ADF is the armed wing of the Ambazonia Governing Council. The other dominant armed group is the Ambazonian Self Defence Council (ASDC), which is the armed wing of the Interim Government of Ambazonia.⁴ Other non-State armed groups identified as party to the conflict in Ambazonia include the Bui Warriors, the Southern Cameroons Defence Forces, and the Bui Unity Warriors.⁵ Despite evidence of coordination between the various groups, their splintering has resulted in clashes and in-fighting.⁶ The ADF and the ASDC are considered umbrella groups for other smaller militias.⁷

The multiplicity of the often fragmented groups impedes clear understanding of the organizational structure of each.⁸

Intensity

Although it is problematic to attribute indicators of violence to specific members of a coalition, it is possible to aggregate the violence generated between the enemies if multiple organized armed groups fight in a coalition that is sufficiently organized against a common enemy.⁹ This section thus assesses whether the violence generated by the fighting between Cameroon and the Ambazonian separatists equates to ‘protracted’ armed violence.

Intensity generated in the fighting between Cameroon and Ambazonian separatists increased in the latter half of 2023¹⁰ and continued throughout the reporting period. Violent events were thus reported during July,¹¹ August,¹² September,¹³ October,¹⁴ November,¹⁵ and December 2023.¹⁶

The parties also clashed throughout 2024, in January,¹⁷ February,¹⁸ March,¹⁹ April,²⁰ May,²¹ June,²² July,²³ August,²⁴ September,²⁵ October,²⁶ November,²⁷ and December.²⁸

Clashes during 2025 occurred in January,²⁹February,³⁰ March,³¹ April,³² May,³³ June,³⁴ July,³⁵ August,³⁶ October,³⁷ November,³⁸ and December.³⁹

Violence between the Cameroonian Armed Forces and the ADF occurred in September 2023,⁴⁰ October,⁴¹ and December 2023,⁴² and in January 2024,⁴³ August,⁴⁴ and November 2024.⁴⁵

Weapons employed by Ambazonian separatist groups include improvised explosive devices (IEDs)⁴⁶ often in the form of car bombs.⁴⁷ IEDs are also planted at checkpoints.⁴⁸

The use of IEDs by Ambazonian separatist groups significantly increased during 2025 with at least 131 such incidents reported.⁴⁹ The groups use rifles ⁵⁰ including hunting rifles in combat.⁵¹ Rifles are often taken from dead government soldiers.⁵²

To date, this NIAC has resulted in at least 6,500 casualties.⁵³ As deaths are often under-reported, the death toll is likely higher. The UN Refugee Agency estimated that by April 2025 at least 969,000 people were internally displaced in Cameroon, of which the Ambazonian conflict remains a major driver.⁵⁴ The violence generated from fighting between Cameroon and the Ambazonian separatist groups continued to meet the notion of intensity as demanded by IHL throughout the reporting period.

Organization

Although multiple non-State actors and splinter factions are operating in the Anglophone zones of Cameroon, these groups fight for the same purpose – an independent Ambazonia.⁵⁵ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) set out factual considerations that are necessary for a collective of non-State armed groups who are sufficiently organized to meet in order to qualify as an alliance.⁵⁶ These factors are used to determine, on a case-by-case basis, if there is sufficient coordination in a coalition or alliance to become a party to a NIAC and to allow for the aggregation of intensity.⁵⁷

A shared ideology or common enemy does not automatically suggest that the necessary level of coordination for a coalition has been met. Relevant factual indicators include the establishment of a coordination structure for the alliance as a whole, the sharing of operational tasks between organized armed groups who are members of the alliance, common rules of engagement, the coordination of simultaneous attacks against the opposing party, and the launching of joint military operations.⁵⁸ Information on coordination is under-reported. Coordination is suggested but specifics on the nature of coordination escapes public record.⁵⁹ What is known is that there is not necessarily an overarching command structure but that organized armed groups fighting a common enemy, the Cameroonian Defence Force, form loose alliances.⁶⁰

The ADF

The ADF, which emerged in late 2017 as the armed wing of the ‘Ambazonia Governing Council’, is the largest of several insurgency groups fighting for an independent Ambazonia.⁶¹ The ADF started its opposition to the Cameroonian government and subsequent fight against the Cameroonian Armed Forces on 9 September 2017 when the Ambazonia Governing Council declared its war of independence for Southern Cameroon.⁶²

The ADF has a tiered command structure. This is evident from key leadership figures in distinct hierarchical roles.⁶³ These leadership positions include the ranks of a Commander in Chief⁶⁴ and his deputy,⁶⁵ a US-based spokesperson⁶⁶ and commanders in charge of their own ‘batallions’.⁶⁷

At the time of reporting, the two highest ranking officials in the ADF were Lucas Cho Ayaba and Benedict Kuah. Ayaba served as the Commander in Chief of the ADF while Kuah served as the Chairman of the Ambazonia War Council.⁶⁸ Kuah’s deputy was Capo Daniel until he left the ADF (see above).⁶⁹ Ayaba is also the leader of the Ambazonia Governing Council and, until 2024, he was in exile in Norway.⁷⁰ As the Commander in Chief is geographically remote, he often disseminates battlefield instructions to ‘battalion’ commanders who execute orders at the ‘village’ level.⁷¹

The ability of the ADF to implement IHL is further illustrated by its War Crime Catalog⁷² and Eyewitness Reporting portal for suspected war crimes,⁷³ which forms part of the official website of the Ambazonia Governing Council website. The Ambazonia Governing Council has also, on occasion, accused the Cameroonian government of specific violations of IHL, including of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.⁷⁴ It has also addressed a letter listing violations of IHL committed by the Cameroonian Armed Forces to the ICRC.⁷⁵ The ADF ‘domesticates’ IHL and expands on IHL in instruments such as The Charter of Ambazonia on the Protection of Women, Children and People with Disabilities During Wartime or Armed Conflict (April 2022).⁷⁶

ADF fighters must follow a code of conduct.⁷⁷ Discipline is imposed by commanders through corporal punishments such as whippings.⁷⁸ Commanders often invoke fear among fighters to achieve discipline and compliance. For example a journalist reported that a commander told his fighters that if they fell asleep while on watch duty, he would shoot them in the leg.⁷⁹

The ADF itself describes its military tactics as rapid guerilla warfare, which includes urban warfare capabilities.⁸⁰ The group often ambushes the Cameroonian Armed Forces to minimize its own losses.⁸¹

The Ambazonia Governing Council has implemented the ‘Liberation Tax Law’ which introduced what is essentially a levy for civilians over the age of twenty-one living in the English-speaking regions of southern Cameroon where the ADF is active. Funds are used to sustain the fighting.⁸² Chapter 8 of the Liberation Tax Law exempts fighters and their spouses, widows of fallen fighters, educators, and the disabled from paying tax.⁸³ Liberation tax exemption is thus a recruitment tool for the ADF. Funds are also raised through illicit activities such as kidnappings for ransom.⁸⁴

Bui Warriors

Samual Ikome Sako serves as the leader of the Bui Warriors.⁸⁵ This group has a tiered structured built around the group’s leader, General Sako. This is the case for the majority of the Ambazonian separatists.⁸⁶ The existence of a tiered leadership structure enables discipline and the ability to implement IHL.⁸⁷

Insufficient information is available on this group to draw a conclusion on whether it independently satisfies the organizational threshold demanded by IHL.

Bui Unity Warriors

The Bui Unity Warriors splintered from the Bui Warriors in January 2022. The Bui Unity Warriors were led by General ‘Mad Dog’ until his death on 24 April 2024.⁸⁸ This group appears to have a tiered command structure because in a video published by them, reference was made to a General Newsman and a Vice-General Viper.⁸⁹ Similar to other Ambazonian separatist groups, the hierarchy of this group revolves around one prominent general.⁹⁰ The existence of a leadership structure enables the non-State actor to discipline its fighters and implement IHL.⁹¹

The Bui Unity Warriors successfully carried out several attacks against the Cameroonian Armed Forces, suggesting that the group has the ability to engage in military operations.⁹² These attacks also confirm that the Bui Unity Warriors are sufficiently organized under IHL. In the Katanga case, the International Criminal Court (ICC) found that, at a minimum, a group needs to be able to organize itself to the extent that it can execute a military attack.⁹³

Weapons and ammunition are partly obtained by raiding military bases of the Cameroonian Armed Forces,⁹⁴ and by ambushing soldiers.⁹⁵ The Bui Unity Warriors also speak with one voice, often using videos to reach their audience.⁹⁶

The Bui Unity Warriors are sufficiently organized as demanded by IHL.

Restoration Forces

Public information concerning the internal leadership structure of the Restoration Forces (often referred to as the Amba Boys), the military wing of the Ambazonian Self-Defense Council,⁹⁷ is scarce. What is known is that the Restoration Forces’ leadership mimics a basic hierarchical structure.⁹⁸ Ideological leaders give orders to Generals based in the Ambazonia region.⁹⁹ Generals then disseminate information to deputy Generals who then inform mission commanders who, in turn, give orders to unit or camp commanders. Experienced Generals control various units (composed of unit commanders and fighters) and mission commanders.¹⁰⁰ Camps are often geographically dispersed. Owing to fragmentation, there are instances where control over camps is decentralized and some fighters act rather autonomously.¹⁰¹ Separate units tend to be compiled of less than thirty fighters each.¹⁰² Regional units tend to choose their own names, for example the Mountain Fako Lions or the Lebialem Red Dragons.¹⁰³

This group also employs motorcyclists to move arms and avoid checkpoints.¹⁰⁴ Funding is raised through donations (often from international sympathizers) predominantly garnered by the ideological leader who then transfers money to Generals via Western Union, Money Gram, or cell phone wallets (such as MTN Mobile Money). Kidnappings and other illicit activities are also used to raise funds.¹⁰⁵ Fighters are recruited through social media platforms including WhatsApp, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, blogs and video blogs.¹⁰⁶ Fighters are also recruited through forced recruitment; children are also forcibly recruited.¹⁰⁷

The Restoration Forces are sufficiently organized as required by IHL.

Southern Cameroons Defence Forces

The Southern Cameroons Defence Forces (SOCADEF) are the military wing of the African People’s Liberation Movement.¹⁰⁸ The Commander in Chief of the SOCADEF is Ebenezer Akwanga,¹⁰⁹ a remote commander living in exile in the United States.¹¹⁰ Units are divided into twenty-five to thirty fighters each.¹¹¹

The SOCADEF have guidelines within their code of conduct that reflect IHL principles, for example, the duty to treat the wounded and to not target schools and hospitals. These guidelines also impose sanctions for non-compliance, the purpose of which is to promote discipline. The guidelines are promoted through training exercises.¹¹²

In the Katanga case, the ICC found that, at a minimum, a group needs to be able to organize itself to the extent that it can execute a military attack.¹¹³ Successful attacks against soldiers lasting several hours confirm that SOCADEF is able to engage in military operations and that it is, as a result, sufficiently organized under IHL.¹¹⁴

SOCADEF speaks with one voice, for examples the group’s political wing issued a press statement to the Secretary General of the UN,¹¹⁵ and took responsibility for ‘Operation No Rest for You’, a military attack executed against the Cameroonian Defence Force.¹¹⁶

The Southern Cameroons Defence Forces are sufficiently organized as demanded by IHL.

In sum, the Ambazonian separatists remain sufficiently organized under IHL and the existing NIAC with the Cameroonian authorities continued throughout the reporting period.

1
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2
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3
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4
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5
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6
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7
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8
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9
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10
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12
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13
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14
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18
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20
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21
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22
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23
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24
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25
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26
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27
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28
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29
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30
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31
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32
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33
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34
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35
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36
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37
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38
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39
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40
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41
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42
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43
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44
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45
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46
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47
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48
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49
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50
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52
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53
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54
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55
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56
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57
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58
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60
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61
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62
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63
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64
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65
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66
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67
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68
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69
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70
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71
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72
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74
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75
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76
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77
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78
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79
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80
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81
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82
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83
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84
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85
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86
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87
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88
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 14.
89
D. Atangana, ‘Soldier Killed, Gun Seized by Separatists in Bui After Epaulette Award’, Mimi Mefo Info, 3 July 2024.
90
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91
M. M. Bradley, ‘Revisiting the Notion of ‘Organised Armed Group’ in Accordance with Common Article 3: Exploring the Inherent Minimum Threshold Requirements’, African Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law, 2018, 72; T. Rodenhäuser, ‘Organizing Rebellion Symposium: Four Points to Conceptualize Armed Groups under International Law’, Opinio Juris, 16 September 2019.
92
S. Buba, ‘Cameroon Soldiers Free 11 Captives From Separatists in Bui’, Mimi Mefo Info, 4 October 2023.
93
ICC, ‘The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga’, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber II,7 March 2014, para 681.
94
E. Ndi, ‘Separatist Unity Warriors Claim Responisbility for Deadly Attack on Military Post in Mbonso’, Mimi Mefo Info, 18 June 2025.
95
D. Atangana, ‘Soldier Killed, Gun Seized by Separatists in Bui After Epaulette Award’, Mimi Mefo Info, 3 July 2024.
96
E. Ndi, ‘Separatist Unity Warriors Claim Responisbility for Deadly Attack on Military Post in Mbonso’, Mimi Mefo Info, 18 June 2025.
97
A. Purcell, ‘Amba Boys: Transforming Pacifists into Warmongers?’, Grey Dynamics, 28 November 2023
98
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16.
99
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16.
100
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16.
101
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16.
102
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 17.
103
A. Purcell, ‘Amba Boys: Transforming Pacifists into Warmongers?’, Grey Dynamics, 28 November 2023.
104
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 17.
105
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 20.
106
A. Purcell, ‘Amba Boys: Transforming Pacifists into Warmongers?’, Grey Dynamics, 28 November 2023.
107
A. Purcell, ‘Amba Boys: Transforming Pacifists into Warmongers?’, Grey Dynamics, 28 November 2023.
108
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 14.
109
‘Country Policy and Information Note: Cameroon: North-West/South-West Crisis’, United Kingdom Home Office, December 2020, 23
110
‘About the CEO’, Ebenezer Akwanga Human Rights and Humanitarian Institute.
111
‘SOCADEF Claims Responsibility for Ikiliwindi Attack on Military’, Mimi Mefo Info, 22 October 2021.
112
Cameroon News Agency, Facebook, 19 June 2022.
113
ICC, ‘The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga’, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber II,7 March 2014, para 681.
114
‘SOCADEF Claims Responsibility for Ikiliwindi Attack on Military’, Mimi Mefo Info, 22 October 2021.
115
‘SOCADEF Hees to UN”s Call, Agrees to Stand Down for 14 Days’, Mimi Mefo Info, 26 March 2020
116
‘SOCADEF Claims Responsibility for Ikiliwindi Attack on Military’, Mimi Mefo Info, 22 October 2021.