Snapshot
Throughout the reporting period, Iraq has witnessed the continuation of long-standing armed conflicts, as well as the emergence of relatively short-lived new confrontations. Although the level of violence experienced since 2023 was lower compared to previous years, several situations (continue to) amount to armed conflicts under IHL. Iraq (supported by international partners) continues to carry out operations against the Islamic State (ISIL), which (despite a much-reduced territorial footprint compared to the mid-2010s) still represents a security threat capable of mounting coordinated violence. Despite the announcement in May 2025 that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) would dissolve, cross-border hostilities in northern Iraq between that armed group and Türkiye went on, notwithstanding the lack of Iraqi consent to the use of force in its territory by its neighbouring State. Between late 2023 and early 2024, violence also escalated between Iran-linked Shia militias in Iraq fighting under the banner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq – IRI (which attacked US forces and bases in the Middle East) and the US (which reacted by launching airstrikes without Iraq consent). Finally, in early 2024 two Iranian missiles, allegedly aimed at Israeli targets, landed in Erbil province of Iraq, amounting to a form of unconsented-to use of force on Iraqi territory.
Classification(s) and Parties to the Conflict(s)
- International armed conflict between Iraq and Iran
- International armed conflict between Iraq and Israel (ended September 2026)
- International armed conflict between Iraq and the United States (ended September 2026)
- International armed conflict between Iraq and Saudi Arabia (ended September 2026)
- International armed conflict between Iraq and Türkiye
- Non-international armed conflict between Iraq, supported by States contributing to the Combined Joint Task Force of “Operation Inherent Resolve” (CJTF-OIR), and ISIL
- Non-international armed conflict between the US and the IRI (ended April 2026)
- Non-international armed conflict between Israel and the IRI (ended April 2026)
Hundreds of civilian casualties were recorded during the reporting period. Indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks were reportedly carried out by ISIL, Iraqi armed forces and Türkiye. Turkish forces reportedly struck journalists based on alleged PKK links, including through drone attacks on media vehicles. Landmines and other explosive remnants of war continued to kill and injure civilians, restrict their movement and services, and impede livelihoods. Serious concerns also arose over conflict-related forced displacement of Kurdish communities as a result of Turkish military operations. Civilian infrastructure (including homes, villages, displacement camps, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, and cultural property) was regularly attacked, particularly by Turkish Armed Forces. The cumulative impact of air and ground operations on populated areas as well as agricultural and grazing lands caused extensive damage to civilian property and left large swaths of Iraqi territory uninhabitable. Unlawful killings persisted, with ISIL continuing to murder civilians and Iraq imposing death sentences following flawed procedures. Allegations of torture, arbitrary deprivation of liberty and inhuman treatment by Iraqi security forces persisted, while ISIL carried out abductions of civilians. Women and children continued to face limited protection for conflict-related sexual violence: whereas those perceived as tied to ISIL faced difficulties in reintegration, Yazidi women and girls with children born of rape remained particularly vulnerable. Disability is extremely high after decades of conflict, with widespread anti-personnel mines causing thousands of traumatic amputations. Mass graves containing up to 400,000 victims were also discovered during the reporting period.
Classification
Historical background
The territory that makes up contemporary Iraq was, at one time, part of the Ottoman Empire. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1920, the Kurdish people, who had lived in the region for centuries, had the opportunity to establish their own independent State for the first time in their history. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne signed by Türkiye and some Allied Powers, however, denied the coming into existence of an independent Kurdish State and instead divided Kurdish territory up, with it now spanning Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Türkiye. Iraq, as it exists today, gained independence from Britain in 1932, but was only allowed to join the League of Nations subject to the condition that the rights of Kurds in Iraq were protected.
Iraq has engaged in various international armed conflicts over the years including with Iran, Kuwait, and the United States. Much of the instability in Iraq today stems from its various conflicts with the US.
An Autonomous Kurdistan
The Kurds were a nomadic people that were living in the region before the Arab conquest of Mesopotamia in the seventh century. Kurds have long struggled for an independent State and have been subject to persecution in Iraq, Türkiye, Syria, and Iran. In 1974, then-leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein introduced the Law for Autonomy in the Area of Kurdistan and gave Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani two weeks to agree to it. Barzani refused on the basis that the law gave more control to Baghdad and covered significantly less territory than envisaged by earlier promises. Kurdistan, as it autonomously exists today in Iraq, gained de facto autonomy after the 1991 Gulf War. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – an alliance of Kurdish political parties – held an election May 1992 to inject a formal governmental structure into the autonomous region. It was eventually in 2005, with the adoption of the new Iraqi Constitution, that the full autonomy of Kurdistan was formally recognized.
The situation between Türkiye and the Kurds in Iraq
Iraq has seen long-standing tensions between Türkiye and the Kurds. Following a 1980 coup in Türkiye, tensions between the Turkish government and the Kurdish population in Türkiye escalated, culminating in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’s first armed attacks in 1984. This initiated a non-international armed conflict between Türkiye and the PKK on Turkish territory that, albeit with some interruptions, endured until April 2025.
A Turkish presence in northern Iraq
Although Türkiye has had some kind of presence in northern Iraq since Saddam Hussein gave it permission to advance five kilometres into Iraqi territory in 1984, Ankara has reportedly been establishing outposts in northern Iraq since 2018. In January 2023, Reuters reported that there were about eighty-seven Turkish bases in northern Iraq, although numbers floated have ranged from ‘more than a hundred’ to thirty-seven. The BBC reported that Ankara now controls more than 2,000 square kilometres of land in northern Iraq and that it had built over 600 kilometres of roads to connect its bases and outposts. As a justification for its presence, Türkiye stated that the bases were in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter and that its ‘fight against terrorism’, referring to the PKK, ‘is carried out in coordination and close cooperation’ with Iraq. Ankara has, however, not approached Baghdad for consent to construct the bases and Iraqi authorities have ‘complained about Ankara’s incursions’.
The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Islamic State) in Iraq
By 2014, Iraq was engaged in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) with Islamic State. Following the fall of Mosul in June 2014, the Iraqi government requested international assistance, leading to the formation of an international Combined Joint Task Force as part of “Operation Inherent Resolve” (CJTF-OIR) and to the provision of support by Kurdish Peshmerga. The campaign against the Islamic State intensified until late 2017, when the Islamic State lost key strongholds and Iraq declared the border secured and the group defeated. States involved in CJTF-OIR ended combat missions but continued to support Iraq, including through transport, refuelling, surveillance, advising and training. Shia militias organized in Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU) also fought Islamic State; though affiliated with the Iraqi State since 2016, many of their factions operated largely outside government control.
Key developments (2023-2026)
- Oil Relations Between Baghdad and Erbil
Almost one third of all the oil in Iraq is located in the Kurdistan region. In the absence of legislation setting out how Iraq and Kurdistan are to share profits from oil and gas exports, Kurdistan started exporting oil on its own. For years, Baghdad and Erbil have failed to come to an agreement on revenue-sharing from oil. In the latter half of 2025, relations improved and the KRG, the Iraqi oil ministry, and oil companies operating in Kurdistan, agreed to resume exports from Kurdistan through Türkiye after a two-and-a-half-year hiatus.
- Provincial, Regional, and Parliamentary Elections
A series of elections have been held in Iraq and Kurdistan in recent years. In the December 2023, provincial elections, the Shia Coalition Framework, a ‘loose coalition’ of Shia Muslim groups won the most seats. Kurdistan’s parliamentary elections were held in October 2024 with the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan taking the top two spots respectively. On 11 November 2025, Iraq held parliamentary elections. No party won an outright majority – the Reconstruction and Development party won the most seats, the State of Law party was second, and the League of the Righteous party was third. A new Prime Minister, businessman Ali al-Zaidi, was only sworn in in Mya 2026.
- Improved Relations with Türkiye
Turkish President Recep Erdoğan visited Iraq for the first time in thirteen years in April 2024. More meetings between the two States have taken place since then, indicating improved relations between the States after decades of disputes over security.
- United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq Comes to an End
The UN Security Council established UNAMI in 2003 to help Iraq deal with its years of internal conflict, occupation, and Islamic State. In July 2024, the Security Council voted to end the mission with it officially coming to an end in December 2025.
- ‘Transition Plan’ for the CJTF-OIR and Participating States
In September 2024, the US and Iraq decided on a ‘two-phase transition plan for CJTF-OIR operations in Iraq’ to end. The first phase of plan was to start at the end of September 2024 and concerned the complete withdrawal of CJTF-OIR forces from certain parts of Iraq. This was to be completed by the end of September 2025. This phase was extended for one year. The second phase concerns an agreement that the CJTF-OIR will still be able to operate out of Erbil against IS in Syria.
- Islamic State Detainees Moved into Iraq from Syria
In January and February 2026, the US transferred more than 5,000 IS detainees from prisons and camps in Syria to various facilities in Iraq.
- PKK Banned and Subsequently Disarms and Dissolves
In March 2024, the Iraqi government designated the PKK as a ‘banned’ organization. In February 2025, imprisoned PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, called on the PKK to lay down arms, dissolve, and end its conflict with Türkiye. In May 2025, the group announced that it would disband and that ‘all activities’ carried out under the group’s name have come to an end. The repatriation of PKK members and civilians to Türkiye as well as the full and final disarmament of the PKK is expected to be completed by the end of November 2026.
- Disarmament of Some Iranian-backed Militias in Iraq
In April 2025, several Iranian-backed militias were prepared to disarm in order to avoid a conflict with the United States. In June 2026, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi gave all Iranian-backed militias and other militias operating outside of Iraqi State control until 30 September 2026 to surrender their weapons. Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Imam Ali Brigades, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Saraya al-Salam has also agreed to disarm by the deadline.
- Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) Strikes on Jordan
In January 2024, the IRI launched an attack on a US base in Jordan, killing three US service members and injuring forty others. In early March 2026, the Saraya Awliya al-Dam, a member of the IRI, launched an attack on US positions on Jordanian territory with more attacks carried out throughout March 2026.
- Strikes on United Arab Emirates Nuclear Plant
On 17 May 2026, the UAE intercepted drones targeting its nuclear plant. The attack was unclaimed, but UAE officials blamed it on Iranian-backed militias operating in Iraq.
- A Growing Houthi Presence in Iraq
Although Yemen’s Houthis (also called Ansar Allah) have had a presence in Iraq since at least 2011, in September 2024 it was reported that the groups opened a political office in Baghdad. The Houthis also reportedly have ‘technical adviser teams’ in Iraq. The Houthis have operated alongside Iraqi militias within Iraq before and in July 2026, Saudi Arabian intelligence suggested that the Houthis were involved in an attack on Saudi Arabia that was launched from Iraqi territory allegedly by Iranian-backed militias.
International Armed Conflicts
Iraq vs Iran
On 15 January 2024, a short-lived IAC between Iraq and Iran was triggered when the IRGC launched missiles into Erbil, Kurdistan. Iraq condemned the act as one of ‘aggression’ and a violation of its sovereignty. No further incidents were reported between the two States in 2024 and 2025. A second IAC broke out on 4 March 2026 when the IRGC launched a series of drone attacks on military bases in Erbil. Strikes continued and were not limited to Kurdistan – a strike in early April hit a US facility in Baghdad. Attacks on Iraq continued in May, June, July, August, and September 2026. The IAC is, as of early September 2026, ongoing.
Iraq vs Israel
A short-lived IAC between Israel and Iraq was triggered on 26 October 2024 when Israel launched Operation ‘Days of Repentance’ on Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Israel also used Iraqi airspace, without Iraqi consent, to target sites in Iran. No further attacks from Israel on Iraq were reported in either 2024 or 2025. Another short-lived IAC between Israel and Iraq started on 28 February 2026 when Israel (and the US) launched attacks on the IRI in Iraqi territory without Iraqi consent. Israeli attacks on Iraqi territory continued in March and April 2026. At the date of reporting (3 September 2026), no further Israeli strikes on Iraqi territory have been reported, meaning the Israel v Iraq IAC has been declassified.
Iraq vs the United States
An IAC between the United States and Iraq was triggered on 21 November 2023 when the US conducted airstrikes on IRI militias on Iraqi territory without Iraqi consent. While Iraq expressly invited US support under the CJTF-OIR framework to counter the Islamic State, that consent is limited to operations against that armed group. Strikes directed at actors unconnected to the Islamic State – including individuals formally within Iraqi armed forces – likely fall outside the scope of that invitation. This assessment is reinforced by the consistent condemnation of the US airstrikes by the Iraqi government. Such strikes continued until January 2024 after which there were no further strikes until March 2026 when the US again started launching attacks on IRI groups in Iraq without Iraqi consent. The last reported US strike was in July 2026. As such, as of September 2026, this IAC has ended.
Iraq vs Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia triggered an IAC with Iraq when it launched joint airstrikes with the US on Iranian-backed militias in Iraq on 28 July 2026 without Iraqi consent. As of September 2026, no further strikes have been reported, meaning that the IAC has ended.
Iraq vs Türkiye
In the absence of valid consent by Iraq, Türkiye’s continuing cross-border operations in Iraqi territory against the PKK continue to amount to as an international armed conflict (IAC). In May 2025, however, the PKK permanently laid down their arms with final disarmament to be completed by November 2026. No further attacks from Türkiye on the PKK in Iraqi territory were reported after April 2025. This means that Türkiye’s conflict with the PKK in Iraq has come to a permanent end, but the presence of Turkish forces without Iraqi consent means that a continued IAC through military occupation persists.
Non-International Armed Conflicts
Iraq, supported by the CJTF-OIR vs IS
IS (which emerged from the Islamic State of Iraq, expanded into Syria and became a distinct entity after breaking with al-Qaeda) has remained active despite its 2019 territorial defeat. It operates from remote Syrian areas, using decentralised cells for flexibility while retaining direction from a central leadership issuing guidance on military, economic and resource management. Islamic State continues to conduct coordinated and sustained attacks, recruit and train fighters, resupply from captured materiel, and maintain financing while projecting authority in the areas under its influence, evidencing sufficient organization under IHL. Although Iraqi armed forces, with CJTF-OIR support, conduct operations against the Islamic State’s infrastructure, degrading its capacity for large-scale attacks, the group retains an ability to coordinated violence. Even though some States forming part of the CJTF-OIR no longer carry out airstrikes in Iraq, their ongoing operational support satisfies the support-based approach and renders them parties to the pre-existing NIAC. The frequency and intensity of hostilities meet the intensity threshold, and the NIAC between Iraq, supported by the CJTF-OIR, and the Islamic State continues.
United States vs IRI
Following an escalation in clashes in October 2023, Iran-linked Shia militias in Iraq fighting under the banner of IRI conducted rocket and drone attacks on US forces and facilities in Iraq and Syria, met by repeated US airstrikes on IRI sites. The resulting casualties and damage indicate that violence met the intensity threshold required for a NIAC. The IRI is a network of PMF-affiliated Shia factions that, though formally integrated within Iraq’s security architecture, operate independently with their own hierarchies, units, logistics, media outlets and training. Despite their autonomy, IRI factions demonstrate a certain level of coordination and shared communication networks, suggesting that they be regarded as a decentralized organized armed group party to a NIAC. While Iran’s backing for the IRI is significant, evidence that the former also participates in the planning and supervision of military operations of the latter is insufficient, thereby excluding that the armed conflict be seen as an international one. Taken together, these elements suggest that the intensity and organization thresholds required for a NIAC to exist were met. The violence between the IRI and the US declined after July 2024 and the conflict was declassified. No exchanges of fire were reported in the latter half of 2024, the entirety of 2025, and the first two months of 2026. Violence, however, flared again after the outbreak of the US/Israel/Iran IAC on 28 February 2026. A new NIAC came into existence in March to April 2026. Almost immediately following the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the IRI started targeting US positions in Iraq and Jordan, and the attacks continued throughout March 2026. However, confrontations again declined from April 2026 and the NIAC is assessed to have ended by April 2026.
Israel vs IRI
The IRI started attacking Israel in November 2023. The IRI is a network of PMF-affiliated Shia factions that, though formally integrated within Iraq’s security architecture, operate independently with their own hierarchies, units, logistics, media outlets and training. Despite their autonomy, IRI factions demonstrate a certain level of coordination and shared communication networks, suggesting that they be regarded as a decentralized organized armed group party to a NIAC. While Iran’s backing for the IRI is significant, evidence that the former also participates in the planning and supervision of military operations of the latter is insufficient, thereby excluding that the armed conflict be seen as an international one. Taken together, these elements suggest that the intensity and organization thresholds required for a NIAC to exist were met. Attacks between the two parties dropped after November 2024 and did not flare in 2025. The conflict thus ended in November 2024. Violence again flared on 28 February 2026, when Israel launched attacks on the IRI in Iraqi territory. However, no attacks have been reported since April 2026, the date from which the NIAC has been declassified.
Key parties to the conflict
State Parties
- Iraq
- United States
- Türkiye
- Israel
- Saudi Arabia
- Iran
- States contributing to the Combined Joint Task Force of “Operation Inherent Resolve” (CJTF-OIR), including the United Kingdom, Spain, Canada, Australia (at least until December 2024), Syria, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy.
Non-state parties
- Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
- Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) (from October 2023 to February 2024)
- Islamic State (IS)
Civilian Harm
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
Hundreds of civilian casualties were recorded during the period. Reports alleged indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks by Islamic State, Iraqi armed forces and Türkiye. Turkish forces reportedly struck journalists based on alleged PKK links, including drone attacks on media vehicles, amid rising intimidation and violence. Landmines and other explosive remnants continued to kill and injure civilians, restrict their movement and services, and impede livelihoods. There were also reports of forcible displacement of civilians by the Turkish Armed Forces without lawful justification, with Iraqi authorities failing to take appropriate measures to halt and investigate such violations.
Attacks against Journalists
During the period, several attacks by Turkish Armed Forces against journalists were reported, apparently based on alleged PKK affiliation. Drone strikes on media vehicles caused deaths and injuries. Journalists reported rising violence and intimidation, and a regional court in Iraqi Kurdistan sentenced a media editor to three years for espionage and alleged ties to a Kurdish party close to the PKK. Absent clear evidence of direct participation in hostilities at the time, these attacks raise serious concerns about compliance with the principles of distinction and precautions in attack, and may breach the duty to respect and protect journalists.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
During the period, civilian objects were regularly attacked, particularly in areas under the control of the Turkish Armed Forces, including homes, villages, displacement camps, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population and cultural property. These attacks were often justified by allegations of targeting the PKK.
During the reporting period, Turkish Armed Forces carried out large scale air and artillery operations using fighter jets, drones and artillery. The cumulative impact caused extensive damage to civilian property and rendered large areas uninhabitable. Reports that strikes hit areas known to be populated or previously inhabited raise serious concerns of indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks under IHL. Even where military objectives may have been present, a failure to take all feasible precautions to verify targets, minimize civilian harm and avoid damage to civilian objects would breach IHL.
Attacks on Villages
Evidence indicates deliberate targeting of civilian property by Turkish Armed Forces in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq during the period. Reports include the bombing of a residential home. Authorities claimed the area was used as a logistical or supply point for PKK fighters, yet no evidence was presented that the house itself served a military purpose. In the absence of verified proof that the homes targeted were military objectives, such strikes breach the IHL principle of distinction.
Attacks on Displacement Camps
Reports indicate that refugee and IDP camps were struck by Turkish drones in 2024 and 2025. Türkiye justified these operations by alleging the presence of PKK operatives or training sites inside the camps. A camp sheltering large numbers of Yazidi civilians was also struck. No public evidence has been provided to show that the camps or targeted locations qualified as military objectives under IHL.
VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY
A range of protection concerns persist for those in the power of the various parties to armed conflict, including instances of murder, torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, collective punishments, sexual violence, unfair trials and arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Women, children and person with disabilities, while afforded special protection, faced heightened risks related to the armed conflicts. As mass graves continue to be discovered, seemingly in connection with previous armed conflicts and IHL violations, Iraqi authorities are obliged to investigate and prosecute conducts that may amount to war crimes.
Murder of Civilians
Unlawful killings persisted during the reporting period. Islamic State continued to murder civilians, albeit at a lower level than before. At the same time, Iraq imposed death sentences following flawed judicial procedures and potentially coerced confessions. These conducts are serious violations of international humanitarian law and may constitute war crimes.