Iraq

Multiple armed conflicts are taking place on the territory of Iraq.

Five international armed conflicts (IACs) occurred in Iraq in recent years, two of which were ongoing at the time of writing:

Iraq v Iran
Iraq v the United States [ended July 2026]
Iraq v Israel [ended April 2026]
Iraq v Saudi Arabia [ended July 2026]
Iraq v Türkiye [ongoing by occupation; hostilities ended April 2025]

In addition, four non-international armed conflicts (NIAC) occurred, two of which were ongoing at time of writing:

Iraq, supported by the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-OIR) v Islamic State
Islamic Resistance of Iran (IRI) v United States (March to April 2026)
IRI v Israel
Türkiye v PKK (ended in April 2025; please see the War WATCH report on Türkiye)

Iraq is a party to the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977 but not to Additional Protocol II.¹ The IACs taking place in Iraq are, therefore, governed by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary international humanitarian law (IHL). As Additional Protocol I only applies between States Parties, the IAC between Iraq and Saudi Arabia was the only one governed by the Protocol. The NIACs are governed only by Common Article 3 and customary IHL.

The territory that makes up contemporary Iraq was, at one time, part of the Ottoman Empire. In 1916, during the First World War, Britain and France divided the Middle East between themselves, delineating which State exercised influences over the parts of the Middle East.

² In 1920, two years after the end of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire was dissolved by the Treaty of Sevres signed between Allied Powers and Türkiye.³ At this dissolution, the Kurdish people, who had lived in the region for centuries and were part of the Ottoman Empire, had the opportunity to establish their own independent State for the first time in their history.⁴ This was, however, short-lived when in 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne signed by Türkiye and some Allied Powers, denied the coming into existence of an independent Kurdish State and instead divided Kurdish territory up, with it now spanning Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Türkiye.⁵ Iraq, as it exists today, gained independence from Britain in 1932, but was only allowed to join the League of Nations subject to the condition that the rights of Kurds in Iraq were protected.⁶

Iraq has known many armed conflicts. From 1980 to 1988, it was engaged in a major IAC with Iran.⁷ In August 1990, it invaded Kuwait, triggering a military response from the United States (US) in Operation Desert Storm, in a coalition with thirty-five other States that lasted until the end of February 1991.⁸ In March 2003, it again became involved in a major conflict with the United States. The US invasion was followed by years of internal armed conflict before the US’s ultimate withdrawal in December 2011.⁹ This last conflict is the root of much of the instability in Iraq today.¹⁰

An Autonomous Kurdistan

The Kurds were a nomadic people that were living in the region before the Arab conquest of Mesopotamia in the seventh century. Modern Kurds do not share a language across all the States where they live but have a number of dialects that have been influence by the languages in the States where they live. Additionally, Kurds do not have a single religion, but the majority are Sunni Muslims.¹¹ Kurds have long struggled for an independent State and have been subject to persecution in Iraq, Türkiye, Syria, and Iran.¹² In Iraq, the 1958 Constitution recognised that the Kurds had their own linguistic and cultural traditions, and in 1970, the March Manifesto (an attempt by the Ba’athists to consolidate its grip on power in Iraq) again recognised the language rights of Kurds, made provision for Kurds to be part of the Iraqi government, set aside funding for the development of Kurdistan, and sought to unify all Kurdish-majority areas under one self-governing unit.¹³ The Manifesto was never fully implemented, and in 1973, Iraqi Arabs and Iraqi Kurds were clashing.¹⁴ Then-leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein introduced the Law for Autonomy in the Area of Kurdistan in 1974 and gave Kurdish leader, Mustafa Barzani, two weeks to agree to it. Barzani refused on the basis that the law gave more control to Baghdad and covered significantly less territory than envisaged by the March Manifesto.¹⁵ This refusal led to further conflict between the Kurds and Saddam’s government.¹⁶ The Kurds were eventually defeated in 1975 after they stopped receiving support from the US and Iran.¹⁷ The Kurds were also subject to severe violence, including chemical weapons attacks, by Saddam Hussein’s government at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s.¹⁸

Kurdistan, as it autonomously exists today in Iraq, gained de facto autonomy in after the 1991 Gulf War, specifically in October 1991 when the Ba’athist central government started losing control over northern Iraq, although this autonomy did not extend to all the parts of Iraq in which Kurds were the majority.¹⁹ The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – an alliance of Kurdish political parties – held an election May 1992 to inject a formal governmental structure into the autonomous region.²⁰ Alhough desires for an independent Kurdish State were not new, the KRG opted to have Kurdistan autonomous but still a part of Iraq in order to avoid a repeat of the bloodshed that had occurred between Kurds and Hussein.²¹ When the United States invaded Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein in 2003, the Kurds supported them.²² It was eventually in 2005, with the adoption of the new Iraqi Constitution, that the full autonomy of Kurdistan was formally recognized.²³ The relationship between Baghdad and Erbil (the capital of Kurdistan) has not been perfect over the years and the two governments have disagreed over various issues.²⁴

The situation between Türkiye and the Kurds in Iraq

Iraq has seen long-standing tensions between Türkiye and the Kurds. The origins of these tensions trace back to when the idea of founding an independent Kurdish State was abandoned in 1923 due to the emergence of the Turkish Republic under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Although President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk initially promised limited autonomy to the Kurdish population, official recognition as a protected minority was ultimately reserved for Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. This exclusion contributed to a series of Kurdish uprisings during the 1920s and 1930s, as Kurdish insurgents sought to assert their political and cultural identity within the framework of the newly established Turkish Republic.²⁵

Following a 1980 coup in Türkiye,²⁶ tensions between the Turkish government and the Kurdish population in Türkiye escalated, culminating in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’s first armed attacks in 1984. This initiated a NIAC between Türkiye and the PKK on Turkish territory that, albeit with some interruptions, endured until April 2025 (See Armed Conflicts in Türkiye).

The conflict, initially confined to Turkish territory, expanded into the territory of Iraq when Türkiye commenced a series of cross-border airstrikes against PKK targets in Iraq,²⁷ followed by the deployment of ground forces beginning in December 2015. In subsequent years, Türkiye pursued regular military operations against the PKK, including coordinated air and ground campaigns, within Iraqi territory. These operations have been undertaken unilaterally, without the consent of the Iraqi government, which has repeatedly denounced them as breaches of its sovereignty and violations of international law.²⁸

It is important to distinguish the PKK from other Kurdish Peshmerga present in Iraq, as their origins, objectives, and relationships with regional governments differ significantly. The PKK, originating in Turkey, conducts attacks against the Turkish State, while maintaining a presence in parts of northern Iraq, where they use the mountainous border regions as a base for their operations. In contrast, the Kurdish Peshmerga serve as the official military forces of Kurdistan, primarily responsible for protecting Kurdish territories and maintaining security within the autonomous region. While the Kurdish Peshmerga were involved in an NIAC with the Iraqi government, this conflict ended with the ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities between the two parties by the end of 2017.²⁹

A Turkish presence in northern Iraq

Although Türkiye has had some kind of presence in northern Iraq since Saddam Hussein gave it permission to advance five kilometres into Iraqi territory in 1984,³⁰ Ankara has reportedly been establishing outposts in northern Iraq since 2018.³¹ In January 2023, Reuters reported that there were about eighty-seven Turkish bases in northern Iraq,³² although numbers floated have ranged from ‘more than a hundred’³³to thirty-seven.³⁴

Many of the villages in northern Iraq have been abandoned since hostilities between Türkiye and the PKK were revived in 2015. Türkiye reportedly have ‘drones and cameras operating 24/7’ in certain villages in northern Iraq as well as tanks, armoured vehicles, and helicopters.³⁵ In 2022, there were reportedly 4,000 Turkish troops in northern Iraq.³⁶ In 2025, the BBC reported that Türkiye had seized land from Kurds in Kurdistan and that the number of military bases constructed had swelled to 136. The BBC also found that Ankara now controlled more than 2,000 square kilometres of land in northern Iraq and that it had built over 600 kilometres of roads to connect its bases and outposts.³⁷

As a justification for its presence, Türkiye stated that the bases were in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter and that its ‘fight against terrorism’, referring to the PKK, ‘is carried out in coordination and close cooperation’ with Iraq.³⁸ Ankara has, however, not approached Baghdad for consent to construct the base,³⁹ and Iraqi authorities have ‘complained about Ankara’s incursions’.⁴⁰

The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq

The emergence in Syria of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – later rebranded as Islamic State – precipitated a significant spillover of the conflict into Iraq’s territory.⁴¹ By 2014, Iraq found itself involved in a NIAC with Islamic State, following the group’s rapid expansion and military operations across large parts of the country. After the group’s capture of Mosul on 10 June 2014, the Iraqi government sought assistance from the international community, leading to the formation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-OIR) as part of ‘Operation Inherent Resolve’ to counter Islamic State’s advances.⁴² Kurdish Peshmerga forces also fought alongside Iraq and the CJTF-OIR.⁴³

The conflict against Islamic State continued to intensify until late 2017, when the group suffered a decisive defeat, losing control of several key strongholds to Iraqi forces, supported by the CJTF-OIR. In December 2017, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared that Iraq had regained control over its border with Syria and announced the defeat of Islamic State.⁴⁴ In response, the CJTF-OIR announced the end of their forces’ combat mission.⁴⁵ These formal declarations of the end of the combat mission, however, did not end some States’ support to Iraqi forces’ military operations against Islamic State, including in-theatre tactical transport, air refuelling, transport and surveillance, staff and personnel, advice on the planning and directing of operations, guidance and training, and air and sea support. This includes support form States, such as the United States,⁴⁶ the United Kingdom,⁴⁷ Spain,⁴⁸ France,⁴⁹ Canada,⁵⁰ Australia (until December 2024),⁵¹ Germany,⁵² the Netherlands⁵³ Belgium,⁵⁴ and Italy.⁵⁵ Syria became a member of the CJTF-OIR in November 2025.⁵⁶ Another crucial actor in the fight against Islamic State in Iraq was the Shia militia forces constituting Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF or Hashd al-Shaabi). While Iraq formally recognized the PMF as a State-affiliated institution in 2016, many Shia factions within the PMF continued to operate outside government control.⁵⁷

Oil Relations Between Baghdad and Erbil

Almost one third of all the oil in Iraq is located in the Kurdistan region.⁵⁸ In the absence of legislation setting out how Iraq and Kurdistan are to share profits from oil and gas exports, Kurdistan started exporting oil on its own.⁵⁹ For years, Baghdad and Erbil have failed to come to an agreement on revenue-sharing from oil. An agreement was finally reached in June 2023 – the 2023–25 federal budget bill that the Iraqi parliament passed contained a revenue-sharing mechanism for oil exports. Kurdistan would receive 12.6% of oil exports and while Kurdistan can still market its own oil, all revenue must be deposited into a bank account that can be monitored by the central government.⁶⁰

In February 2025, the federal Iraqi parliament passed a bill amending the June 2023 budget, allowing Erbil to restart exporting oil through Türkiye and charge double the price per barrel than Iraq previously allowed.⁶¹ Exports from Kurdistan through Türkiye had been halted since March 2023 due to a ruling from the International Chamber of Commerce that the exports were illegal because they were taking place without Iraqi consent.⁶²

Relations, however, took a dip in May and June 2025. In May, the KRG signed two deals worth $110 billion with US oil companies.⁶³ The Iraqi government rejected the deals, calling them ‘null and void’ because only the Iraqi federal government could sign such deals,⁶⁴ and, in late May, the Iraqi government initiated legal proceedings against the KRG.⁶⁵ It is unclear if the lawsuit is still ongoing, but oil companies are reported to have started production in October 2025.⁶⁶ In June 2025, Baghdad accused Erbil of smuggling oil out of Iraq, saying that it was holding the KRG responsible for such smuggling and that it reserves its right to take legal measures if necessary.⁶⁷ In response, Baghdad also cut off public funding to KRG, depriving the latter of its ability to pay public salaries.⁶⁸

The latter half of 2025, however, saw improving relations between Erbil and Baghdad. In July, a preliminary deal on oil exports and the payment public sector salaries was reached.⁶⁹ In August, the two agreed to a new mechanism for oil exports as well as on the resumption of oil exported through Türkiye.⁷⁰ In September, after a US-brokered agreement was reached between the KRG, the Iraqi oil ministry, and oil companies operating in Kurdistan, exports from Kurdistan through Türkiye resumed after a two-and-a-half-year hiatus.⁷¹ Under this new deal, 50,000 barrels of oil per day are allocated to Kurdish refineries with the remaining 250,000 to 260,000 barrels exported through Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Company.⁷² The deal in September was valid until December 2025 and was subsequently renewed for a further three months until March 2026,⁷³ and again until June 2026.⁷⁴ In mid-August 2026, the deal was again extended until January 2027.⁷⁵

In March 2026, as a result of the conflict between Israel, the US, and Iran, and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Iraqi oil exports fell by seventy per cent. The Iraqi oil ministry asked the KRG if Iraqi could increase the number of barrels it pumped per day through the Ceyhan Kurdistan-Türkiye pipeline, with an agreement between Erbil and Baghdad reached on 17 March 2026.⁷⁶ Flows through the Ceyhan line had been suspended since the March 2023 International Chamber of Commerce ruling.⁷⁷ Türkiye had, in July 2025, initiated talks with Iraq to reopen the pipeline.⁷⁸ In May 2026, Iraq approached Türkiye to re-launch these talks with the aim of reaching a deal,⁷⁹ and in July, a one-year deal between to two States was reached.⁸⁰

Provincial, Regional, and Parliamentary Elections

A series of elections have been held in Iraq and Kurdistan in recent years. In December 2023, Iraq held its first provincial elections in ten years.⁸¹ The Shia Coalition Framework (CF), a ‘loose coalition’ of Shia Muslim groups won 101 of the 285 council seats.⁸² The groups that make up the CF are aligned with pro-Iranian military and political groups.⁸³

Elections for the Kurdistan Parliament, which were meant to be held in 2022, were eventually held in October 2024. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) won thirty-nine of the 100 seats, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) won twenty-three, and the New Generation – a Kurdish opposition party – won fifteen.⁸⁴ The KDP and PUK have been ruling together and were expected to continue to do so after the elections.⁸⁵ Despite having a long-standing working relationship, the KDP and PUK were only able to form a new government in May 2025.⁸⁶

On 11 November 2025, Iraq held parliamentary elections.⁸⁷ Voter turnout was expected to be low – a sign of the apathy of the electorate in Iraq⁸⁸ – but in fact it was fifty-six per cent, significantly higher than the forty-one per cent who had voted in 2021 polls.⁸⁹ There was violence both before and after the election. In October, one Sunni candidate was killed by an explosive device⁹⁰ while another’s office was shot at.⁹¹ The day before the elections, a brawl broke out between supporters of rival political parties and escalated into two police officers being killed.⁹² After the elections, the home of a Zeravani Peshmerga member in Kurdistan was stormed by armed men connected to a newly-elected MP. The men fired at the property, assaulted family members staying there, and attempted to abduct a family member.⁹³

No party won an outright majority. The Reconstruction and Development party – the then-Prime Minister Muhammad Shiy’a‘ al-Sudani’s party – won the most seats with 46 of the 329 seats. The State of Law party – headed by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki – won the second largest number of seats (twenty-eight). And the League of the Righteous party, which is also a militia, won twenty-seven seats.⁹⁴ The Sadrist Movement, a political bloc that had been previously disruptive to the Iraqi political status quo, boycotted the election. Muqtada al-Sadr called for a boycott after his party failed to form a government after winning the majority of seats in the 2021 parliamentary elections.⁹⁵ According to analysts, this boycott allowed the Shia vote to be redistributed to pro-Iranian parties in the CF.⁹⁶ The CF did declare itself the largest bloc and, as such, responsible for appointing a Prime Minister.⁹⁷

The Iraqi parliament struggled to immediately elect a new Prime Minister. There was agreement amongst Shia parties (besides the Reconstruction and Development party) that no Prime Minister should have two terms, essentially excluding al-Sudani from the race.⁹⁸ Al-Sudani had also lost support due to a gazetted Iraqi law which referred to Hezbollah and the Houthis as ‘terrorist’ organizations as well as due to political support from US President Donald Trump. These developments were unwelcomed by pro-Iranian parts of Iraqi society and government.⁹⁹ During discussions, however, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s name gained support.¹⁰⁰In January 2026, al-Sudani withdrew his name from contention,¹⁰¹ paving the way for al-Maliki who was eventually formally nominated by the CF in late January.¹⁰²

In response, US President Donald Trump criticized al-Maliki’s nomination, stating that under his previous leadership, Iraq ‘descended into poverty and total chaos’ and, as such, he should not be allowed to lead the country again.¹⁰³ This ‘sent shockwaves through the Iraqi political landscape’ and effectively ended al-Maliki’s bid for Prime Minister,¹⁰⁴ even though al-Maliki dismissed Trump’s statements as interference in Iraqi affairs.¹⁰⁵

Although most members of the CF were determined to maintain support for al-Maliki,¹⁰⁶ Iraq confirmed that it had received threats from the United States that it would impose sanctions on the country should he become Prime Minister.¹⁰⁷ The US’s actions reportedly put ‘unprecedented’ pressure on the CF, fracturing it between those who supported al-Maliki and those who sought better relations with the United States.¹⁰⁸ The deadlock that ensued was eventually broken in April 2026 when businessman Ali al-Zaidi was nominated to be Prime Minister by the Iraqi President.¹⁰⁹ al-Zaidi, who has no political background but degrees in law and business, was sworn in as prime minister in May 2026.¹¹⁰

Improved Relations with Türkiye

Turkish President Recep Erdoğan visited Iraq for the first time in thirteen years in April 2024. This meeting produced bilateral agreements energy, water, security, trade, and transportation, rekindling a relationship that had been strained since the 1950s.¹¹¹ Another meeting between the two States in Ankara in August 2024 produced a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation on counter-terrorism, military, and security matters.¹¹² More meetings between the two States have taken place since then, including in November 2024,¹¹³ indicating improved relations between the States after decades of disputes over security, including Turkish attacks on PKK fighters in Iraqi territory without Iraqi consent.¹¹⁴ Relations have also improved as a result of the PKK being banned and subsequently disarming and dissolving (see below).

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq Comes to an End

In May 2024, the Iraqi government asked the United Nations (UN) to end its Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) mandate by the end of 2025. Iraq considered that UNAMI was no longer necessary since the political situation in the country had stabilised and that the Iraqi government had ‘been able to achieve a number of important steps’ which had fallen within the purview of UNAMI.¹¹⁵ The UN Security Council established UNAMI in 2003 to help Iraq deal with its years of internal conflict, occupation, and Islamic State, and in July 2024, it voted to end the mission.¹¹⁶ UNAMI’s mandate officially came to an end in December 2025, with the United Nations stating that it would continue to support Iraq with ‘technical expertise, advice and support’ but that Iraq was starting a ‘new chapter rooted in… leadership of its own future’.¹¹⁷

‘Transition Plan’ for the CJTF-OIR and Participating States

In September 2024, it was announced that the United States and Iraq had decided on a ‘two-phase transition plan for CJTF-OIR operations in Iraq’.¹¹⁸ The two States were ‘setting a timeline to transition the military mission to and enduring bilateral security relationship’ between Iraq and the individual States participating in the CJTF-OIR.¹¹⁹ The first phase of the plan was to start at the end of September 2024 and concerned the complete withdrawal of CJTF-OIR forces from certain parts of Iraq. This was to be completed by the end of September 2025.¹²⁰ The second phase was based on the agreed recognition that Islamic State still presented a threat in Syria and, as such, that the CJTF-OIR could ‘continue to support counter-terrorism operations in Syria from Iraq’,¹²¹ ostensibly from a base in Erbil. This phase was due to last until the end of September 2026.¹²² In a media briefing in September 2024, a senior US administration official repeated that this meant that the CJTF-OIR’s military mission in Iraq was to end by the end of September 2025, but that its operations in Syria would continue for at least one more year after that.¹²³

The transition to bilateral security discussion have reportedly taken place between Iraq and the United States,¹²⁴ the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany, with the latter three States including visits to Iraq’s Kurdistan region for security discussion as well.¹²⁵

By November 2025, the CJTF-OIR ‘certified that Iraq’s security forces can officially conduct full combat-strike operations self-sufficiently’.¹²⁶ It also appears that by this date, all CJTF-OIR forces had yet to leave Iraq, with one news source reporting that Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, Iraq’s then-Prime Minister, stated that certain demands on Iraqi non-State armed groups to disarm could not be met until the CJTF-OIR had fully withdrawn from Iraq.¹²⁷ By December 2025, 120 Dutch troops had left Erbil in Kurdistan, leaving only five advisors in the region.¹²⁸ Italian soldiers remained in Erbil and were training Kurdish forces.¹²⁹

In February 2026, Norway temporarily withdrew its thirty-person strong force in Iraq due to the US/Israeli/Iranian conflict but stated that its mission had ‘not been concluded’ but were watching developments to determine when it would be safe to re-deploy their soldiers.¹³⁰ Indeed, it appears as though the first phase was extended for a year, with coalition forces expected to withdraw finally and irreversibly at the ends of September 2026.¹³¹ In line with this, German forces in Kurdistan officially ended their mission in late August 2026.¹³²

Islamic State Detainees Moved into Iraq from Syria

In January 2026, the US started transferring thousands of IS detainees from prisons and camps in Syria to various facilities in Iraq.¹³³ The first 150 detainees were transferred on 21 January 2026,¹³⁴ and by the end of the mission in mid-February 2026, more than 5,000 Islamic State detainees had been transferred to Iraq.¹³⁵

In a report published in August 2026, the Syrian Investigate Reporting for Accountability Journalism found that many of those transferred from Syria to Iraq did not have criminal records linked to Islamic State.¹³⁶ Days later, Iraqi Minister of Justice, Khalid Shwani, announced that 3,000 detainees would be returned to Syria, with only those detainees who committed crimes in Iraq to remain in the country.¹³⁷

PKK Banned and Subsequently Disarms and Dissolves

In preparation for the first visit from Turkish President, Recep Erdoğan, in thirteen years (see above), the Iraqi government designated the PKK as a ‘banned’ organization in March 2024.¹³⁸ In July 2024, the Iraqi government officially gazetted that the PKK was to be described as the ‘banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party’ in all official correspondence.¹³⁹

In February 2025, imprisoned PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, called on the PKK to lay down arms, dissolve, and end its conflict with Türkiye.¹⁴⁰ A few days later, on 1 March 2025, the PKK announced a unilateral ceasefire in its NIAC with Türkiye¹⁴¹ and in May 2025, the group announced that it would disband and that ‘all activities’ carried out under the group’s name have come to an end.¹⁴²

The decision to ‘end the armed struggle’ was made because the PKK was of the opinion that the Kurdish issue could not ‘be resolved through democratic politics’¹⁴³ although the group was weakening in northern Iraq.¹⁴⁴ President Erdoğan welcomed the news and said that Türkiye would be monitoring the process closely.¹⁴⁵

In August 2026, it was revealed that between 7,000 and 8,000 PKK fighters in Iraq and Syria would be repatriated to Türkiye, with a further 8,000 citizens currently in Makhmour camp in Kurdistan also to be repatriated and that over 2,000 PKK fighters would join the Iraqi army. The repatriation of PKK members and civilians to Türkiye as well as the full and final disarmament of the PKK was expected to be completed by the end of November 2026, with all weapons also expected to be handed over to Kurdistan or Iraqi officials.¹⁴⁶

Disarmament of Some Iranian-backed Militias in Iraq

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) is an umbrella-group of armed groups backed by Iran that emerged after the renewed hostilities between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. From October 2023 to June 2024, these groups were conducting strikes on US bases and troops in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan as well as across locations in Israel.¹⁴⁷ Most recently, the group has attacked oil facilities in Saudi Arabia (see below).¹⁴⁸ The group is reportedly made up of ten ‘hardline Shi’ite armed factions’ with around 50,000 fighters.¹⁴⁹ Two of the most powerful groups that make up the IRI are Kataib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (the League of Righteous).¹⁵⁰

Both Kataib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq are also part of the PMF another umbrella group made up of different militias, although not all militias under this group are aligned with Iran.¹⁵¹ The PMF was born out of the collapse of the Iraqi government’s security system in 2014 in the country’s fight against Islamic State,¹⁵² and is thought to have more than 238,000 members.¹⁵³It is made up of three blocs of mostly Shia (but also some Sunni) Muslims, with the most dominant being Iranian-backed.¹⁵⁴

In addition to Kataib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, the other Iranian-backed groups in the PMF are the Badr Organization, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba.¹⁵⁵ The other Shia blocs are groups aligned with Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani and groups connected to Muqtada al-Sadr, an Iraqi cleric.¹⁵⁶ The PMF was legally incorporated into Iraq’s armed forces and placed under the direction of the Prime Minister’s supervision in 2016. PMF fighters draw government salaries and use State weapons and intelligence, and although not the Iraqi army, they are considered more powerful than the former.¹⁵⁷ Despite this government funding and attempts at control, the groups within the PMF exercise varying degrees of independence from the Iraqi State on the ground.¹⁵⁸

In December 2024, then US President Joe Biden reportedly asked Iraq to dissolve the PMF, but Iraq (and Iran) firmly rejected the idea.¹⁵⁹ In early January 2025, then-Iraqi Prime Minister al-Sudani called the PMF a ‘fundamental factor’ in Iraq’s fight against Islamic State that preserves Iraq’s peace and security.¹⁶⁰ Similar sentiments were expressed by al-Sudani in January 2026.¹⁶¹

In March 2025, the US continued to push for disarmament of ‘Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’, reportedly threatening to sanction leaders of the PMF,¹⁶² as well as to strike the groups if on Iraqi soil.¹⁶³ Recognising the threat the US posed, in April 2025 it was reported that ‘several’ Iranian-backed militias were ‘prepared to disarm’ in order to avoid a conflict with the United States.¹⁶⁴ Among the groups willing to disarm were Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada and Ansar Allah al-Awfiyaa.¹⁶⁵

Despite this step forward, the United States designated Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) in September 2025.¹⁶⁶ Muhandis General Company for Construction, Engineering, Mechanical, Agricultural, and Industrial Contracting, founded by Kataib Hezbollah, was also sanctioned by the United States in October 2025 for supporting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) and for allegedly being involved in the death of US personnel. Both Kataib Hezbollah and the IRGC are also sanctioned by the United States.¹⁶⁷

Progress seemed to be being made in December 2025 when Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council announced that some Iranian-backed groups were willing to surrender their weapons to the Iraqi State. Kataib Hezbollah, however, was not one of the groups. The groups released a separate statement declaring that ‘resistance is a right’ and that their weapons would ‘remain in the hands of its fighters’ at least until US and other foreign forces left Iraq.¹⁶⁸ The other groups designated as FTO’s by the US – Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali – signalled that they would be willing to surrender their weapons.¹⁶⁹ Some of these groups, however, seemingly reneged on this position in January 2026, when the Coordination Committee of the IRI released a statement in which the IRI’s general position that ‘the resistance’s weapons are sacred’ and opposed disarmament. The statement was signed by Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.¹⁷⁰ However, less than a day after the statement was released Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq distanced itself from it. The statement was reportedly issued by Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, the commander of Kataib Hezbollah, without coordination between the other groups with a commander of the Coordination Committee telling one news outlet that al-Hamidawi’s statements were ‘impulsive’ and ‘issued… unilaterally’. This reportedly caused a rift amongst the groups.¹⁷¹

The rift became a wider crack in June 2026 when Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Imam Ali Brigades announced that they had taken steps to start the process of surrendering their weapons to the Iraqi State.¹⁷² The crack transformed into a gulf in July 2026 when three of the seven groups in the Coordination Committee of the IRI withdrew from the organization and declared their willingness to hand over their weapons. These groups are Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib al-Imam Ali, and Ansar Allah al-Awfiya. Three of the remaining groups, Kataib Hezbollah, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and Harakat al-Nujaba, dissolved the Coordination Committee and established a new body made up of the three of them and defectors from other militias.¹⁷³

In June 2026, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi gave all Iranian-backed militias and other militias operating outside of Iraqi State control until 30 September 2026 to surrender their weapons – the same date that US and other foreign forces were to complete their withdrawal from Iraq (see above).¹⁷⁴ Beyond Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Imam Ali Brigades, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Saraya al-Salam has also agreed to disarm by the deadline.¹⁷⁵

The United States pressed for all weapons in Iraq to find their way into the government’s hands and refused to allow an extension beyond 30 September 2026.¹⁷⁶ A group of militias proposed that, instead of surrendering their weapons, they would place the weapons in designated private depots for two years as well as suspend armed activity in Iraq the same period, but Baghdad rejected the proposal.¹⁷⁷ At the date of reporting (early September 2026), Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kata’ib Sayyid ul-Shuhada remained steadfast in their demand to have foreign forces leave Iraq before they would be willing to surrender their weapons, while also adding further demands including the dismantling of the PKK (a process already underway (see above)), acquiring air defense systems for Iraqi airspace, and deploying the Iraqi army to Kurdistan.¹⁷⁸

IRI strikes on Jordan

In January 2024, the IRI launched an attack on a US base in Jordan, killing three US service members and injuring forty others.¹⁷⁹ Iran denied responsibility for the attack, according to Reuters, but the IRI claimed to have conducted it.¹⁸⁰ No further attacks were reported in 2024 or in 2025, meaning that the conflict was declassified.

In early March 2026, however, in response to the assassination the Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Saraya Awliya al-Dam, a member of the IRI, launched an attack on Jordanian territory.¹⁸¹ More attacks on US bases in Jordan were carried out in late March 2026, this time as a ‘coordinated… synchronized, large-scale operation’ by the IRI.¹⁸² At the date of reporting (3 September 2026), no further attacks have been reported.

Strikes on United Arab Emirates Nuclear Plant

On 17 May 2026, the UAE intercepted drones targeting its nuclear plant. The attack was unclaimed, but UAE officials blamed it on Iranian-backed militias operating in Iraq.¹⁸³ ACLED has noted that it is sometimes difficult to know whether attacks come from Iran or from Iranian-backed militias in Iraq.¹⁸⁴ At the date of reporting (early September 2026), no further attacks have been reported.

A Growing Houthi Presence in Iraq

Although Yemen’s Houthis (also called Ansar Allah) have had a presence in Iraq since at least 2011,¹⁸⁵ in September 2024, it was reported that the groups opened a political office in Baghdad.¹⁸⁶ Ahmed al-Sharafi (also known as Abu Idris) was put in charge of Houthi operations in Iraq and reportedly met with the PMF and Iranian-backed militias. al-Sharafi is, however, not the Houthis’ formal ambassador to Iraq – that role is filled by Mohammad al-Qabli.¹⁸⁷ One Iraqi official told The National News that the Houthis have offices and houses across southern Iraq. The Houthis also reportedly have ‘technical adviser teams’ in Iraq.¹⁸⁸ The Houthis reportedly gain ‘material provisions’, including funding, ‘political-military relations and a presence close to the Mediterranean see’ from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iraqi groups reportedly gain drone and missile capabilities from the partnership.¹⁸⁹

The Houthis have operated alongside Iraqi militias within Iraq before – a senior missile specialist from the Houthis was killed in a strike on US strike on a Kataib Hezbollah position near Baghdad in August 2024.¹⁹⁰In July 2026, Saudi Arabian intelligence suggested that the Houthis were involved in an attack on Saudi Arabia that was launched from Iraqi territory allegedly by Iranian-backed militias.¹⁹¹

Under IHL, an IAC occurs when one or more States resort to armed force against another State, regardless of the motives for the violence.¹⁹² The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentaries stress that the unilateral use of military force by one State against another is sufficient to trigger an IAC.¹⁹³

International Armed Conflict between Iraq and Iran

On 15 January 2024, a short-lived IAC between Iraq and Iran was triggered when the IRGC launched missiles into Erbil, Kurdistan. The IRGC justified the launch of at least ten missiles, stating that they targeted and hit an Israeli ‘spy headquarters’ as well as ‘bases of anti-Iran armed groups’. At least four people were killed and seventeen others injured.¹ It was later revealed that pro-Iranian groups within Iraq had spread misinformation and doctored images showing Israeli agents in Iran.² Iraq condemned the act as one of ‘aggression’ and a violation of its sovereignty.³ It filed a complaint with the UN Security Council on 16 January 2024.⁴ No further incidents were reported between the two States in 2024 and 2025.

After the start of the US and Israel conflict with Iran in late-February 2026, Iran again launched missiles into Iraqi territory. On 4 March 2026, the IRGC ‘launched a series of drone attacks’ on military bases in Erbil.⁵ By 19 March 2026, at least 112 attacks had been launched on Iraq by Iran and Iranian-backed militias. Most attacks targeted sites in Kurdistan.⁶ Despite the ceasefire between the US and Iran signed in April 2026, the IRGC continued to launch attacks on Kurdistan, killing at least four people and injuring nine more.⁷ Strikes were not limited to Kurdistan – a strike in early April hit a US facility in Baghdad.⁸

Accordingly, as of early September 2026, the IAC between Iran and Iraq remained ongoing.

1
‘Iran launches missile strikes in Iraq and Syria citing security threats’, Al Jazeera, 15 January 2024, Updated 16 January 2024; F. Hawramy, ‘Inside story: Iranian ballistic missiles rock Iraqi Kurdistan’, Amwaj.media, 16 January 2024; ‘Iraq to take legal measures against Iran following deadly Erbil attack’, Institut Kurde de Paris, 16 January 2024. ↩︎
2
‘FACT-CHECK: Iran’s failed attempt to spread disinformation on Kurdistan’, RUDAW, 22 January 2024. ↩︎
3
‘Iraq to take legal measures against Iran following deadly Erbil attack’, Institut Kurde de Paris, 16 January 2024. ↩︎
4
‘Iraq Files a Complaint Against Iran at UN Security Council and United Nations’, Iraq: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 January 2024. ↩︎
5
Al Jazeera English, X, 4 March 2026; ‘Hundreds of drones target Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE amid Iran war’, Al Jazeera, 4 March 2026. ↩︎
6
‘IRGC missile and drone attacks target civilian camps and Kurdish opposition bases in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region’, HENGAW Organization for Human Rights, 19 March 2026. ↩︎
7
‘Despite ceasefire, IRGC launches 18 attacks on Kurdistan parties’ camps, leaving 4 dead and 9 injured’, HENGAW Organization for Human Rights, 24 April 2026. ↩︎
8
E. Şanlı, ‘Drone attack targets US base near Baghdad airport’, Yeni Şafak, 6 April 2026. Attacks on Iraq continued in May,S. Perets, ‘IRGC targets Komala headquarters in Kurdistan Region with drone strike – report’, The Jerusalem Post, 6 May 2026; ‘Iran’s Revolutionary Guard attacks armed groups in northern Iraq’, Dawn, 31 May 2026 June,‘IRGC Attack Targets Kurdish Party Bases in Iraq’, Iranwire, 3 June 2026 July,‘Iran launches drone, missile attacks on dissident bases in Iraqi Kurdistan’, France 24, 13 July 2026 August,‘Iran-launched drones attack Iraqi Kurdish premier’s office, officials say’, Iran International, 17 August 2026 and September 2026.‘IRGC says it struck US bases in Iraqi Kurdistan with missiles, drones’, The Times of Israel, 2 September 2026. ↩︎

International armed conflict between Iraq and Israel Ended September 2026

An IAC between Israel and Iraq was triggered on 26 October 2024 when Israel launched Operation ‘Days of Repentance’ on Iran, but also targeted sites in Iraq and Syria.¹ Israel also used Iraqi airspace, without Iraqi consent, to target sites in Iran.² No further attacks from Israel on Iraq were reported in either 2024 or 2025.³

However, at the start of the IAC between Israel, the US, and Iran on 28 February 2026, Israel (and the US) launched attacks on the IRI in Iraqi territory without Iraqi consent, triggering another IAC with Iraq.⁴ Israeli attacks on Iraqi territory continued in March⁵ At the date of reporting (3 September 2026), no further Israeli strikes on Iraqi territory have been reported, meaning the Israel v Iraq IAC has been declassified.

According to the ICRC, an IAC ends when hostilities ‘end with a degree of stability and permanence’.⁶

1
P. Kingsley et al, ‘Israel Strikes Iran in Retaliatory Attack’, The New York Times, 25 October 2024, Updated 24 May 2025; M. Savill and B. Ozcelik, ‘Operation Days of Repentance: The Impact of Israel’s Strikes on Iran’, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 28 October 2024. ↩︎
2
D. Haynes, ‘‘Operation Days of Repentance’ – How Israel’s strike on Iran unfolded’, Sky News, 29 October 2024. ↩︎
3
G. Cafiero, ‘Iraqi militias kept quiet in the Israel-Iran war. Will it last?’, The New Arab, 3 July 2025, Updated 28 February 2026. ↩︎
4
A. Ganzeveld and N. Carl, ‘Iran Update Special Report: US and Israeli Strikes, February 28, 2026’, Institute for the Study of War, 28 February 2026. ↩︎
5
J. Burke, ‘Iran-backed militias intensify attacks against US, Israel and allies’, The Guardian, 6 March 2026 and April 2026.T. Chouiref, ‘US-Israeli strikes hit positions of Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq’s Anbar’, AA, 7 April 2026. ↩︎
6
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 10. ↩︎

International armed conflict between Iraq and the United States (US) Ended September 2026

Following the renewed outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Hamas on and following 7 October 2023, the IRI significantly increased its attacks against US military personnel and facilities.¹

An IAC between the United States and Iraq was triggered on 21 November 2023 when the US conducted airstrikes on IRI militias on Iraqi territory without Iraqi consent.² The US attack was a response to IRI groups targeting US forces at al-Assad Airbase in Iraq.³ The US launched further attacks, striking a Kataib Hezbollah operations center south of Baghdad.⁴ This attack, that killed eight members of Kataib Hezbollah, drew condemnation from Baghdad who called it ‘a clear violation of [its] sovereignty’.⁵

The US continued to carry out strikes on Iraqi territory without the latter’s consent. Such attacks occurred in December 2023,⁶ January,⁷ and February 2024.⁸ The attacks in December 2023⁹ and January 2024¹⁰ drew condemnation from Iraq, which denounced them as a violation of its sovereignty.

In late January 2024, Kataib Hezbollah announced that the IRI would suspend its attacks on US positions in the region in order to de-escalate tensions.¹¹ Although the United States continued to carry out strikes in February 2024, no strikes were reported in March 2024. There was an airstrike carried out on a PMF base in Babylon in April 2024. The PMF blamed the United States for the attack but both it and Israel denied responsibility.¹² The last confirmed US strikes on Iraqi territory in 2024 came in July with a strike on a PMF base south of Baghdad.¹³ A Yemeni drone specialist associated with the Houthis was killed in the strike.¹⁴

No further strikes were reported in 2024, 2025, and the first two months of 2026. It should be noted that while the United States did carry out strikes on Iraqi territory during late 2024 and 2025, they were against IS in the context of the CJTF-OIR’s NIAC with Islamic State (see below) and as such, with the consent of the Iraqi State. Those strikes are not considered part of the IAC with the United States and Iraq.

The US claimed at least one strike on the IRI in Iraqi territory in March 2026.¹⁵ There were at least three other attacks in the same month which the United States was accused of mounting but which it did not claim responsibility for. The first was a strike on Karrada in Baghdad – allegedly an attempt to kill Kataib Hezbollah’s leader Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi.¹⁶ The second, on 24 March, killed between seven and fifteen PMF members and wounded thirteen others.¹⁷ The last strike happened on 28 March. Three PMF members and two Iraqi police members were killed by airstrikes targeting PMF headquarters near Kirkuk Airport in Iraq. Both the US and Israel were blamed for the strikes.¹⁸

The next confirmed US strike on Iraqi territory was two airstrikes on PMF bases in April 2026. One PMF commander was killed, and three other members were injured.¹⁹

The final confirmed US strike carried out on Iraqi territory was conducted on 28 July 2026 in coordination with Saudi Arabia.²⁰ The strikes targeted a PMF headquarters in Basra,²¹ and according to the PMF, at least twenty members killed with a further thirty-two wounded.²² As of early September 2026, this was the last confirmed US strike on Iraq, meaning the IAC has ended.

According to the ICRC, an IAC ends when hostilities ‘end with a degree of stability and permanence’.²³

1
C. Schaer, US troops in the Middle East: Soldiers in the line of fire, Deutsche Welle, 30 January 2024. ↩︎
2
I. Ali et al, ‘U.S. forces carry out series of strikes against Iran-backed militia in Iraq’, Reuters, 22 November 2023; M. Seyler, ‘US retaliates against Iran-backed militants after ballistic missile strike, officials say’, ABC News, 22 November 2023; H. Cooper, ‘U.S. Conducts Airstrikes Against Iranian Proxies in Iraq’, The New York Times, 21 November 2023. ↩︎
3
M. Seyler, ‘US retaliates against Iran-backed militants after ballistic missile strike, officials say’, ABC News, 22 November 2023. ↩︎
4
H. Cooper, ‘U.S. Conducts Airstrikes Against Iranian Proxies in Iraq’, The New York Times, 21 November 2023; A. Rasheed and T. Azhari, ‘Iraq condemns US strikes that killed Iran-aligned fighters’, Reuters, 22 November 2023. ↩︎
5
A. Rasheed and T. Azhari, ‘Iraq condemns US strikes that killed Iran-aligned fighters’, Reuters, 22 November 2023. ↩︎
6
‘US launches strikes on Iraq over drone attack blamed on Iran-aligned forces’, Al Jazeera, 26 December 2023; Biden orders airstrikes against Iran-backed militias after US troops wounded in Iraq’, The Guardian, 27 December 2023 ↩︎
7
L. Pelham, ‘Iraq condemns ‘irresponsible’ US air strikes on Iran-backed groups’, BBC, 24 January 2024; E. Watson, ‘U.S. strikes Iranian-backed militias in Iraq over wave of attacks on American forces’, CBS News, 23 January 2024; E. Schmitt, ‘U.S. Strikes 3 Iran-Linked Militia Sites in Iraq’, The New York Times, 23 January 2024 ↩︎
8
J. Clark, ‘U.S. Strikes Targets in Iraq and Syria in Response to Deadly Drone Attack’, U.S. Department of War, 2 February 2024; P. Stewart et al, ‘U.S. launches strikes in Iraq, Syria, nearly 40 reported killed’, Reuters,4 February 2024; T. Copp et al, ‘US hits hard at militias in Iraq and Syria, retaliating for fatal drone attack’, Associated Press, 6 February 2024; O. Guerin and H. Bachega, ‘US drone strike kills Iran-backed militia leader in Baghdad’, BBC, 8 February 2024. ↩︎
9
‘US launches strikes on Iraq over drone attack blamed on Iran-aligned forces’, Al Jazeera, 26 December 2023; ‘Biden orders airstrikes against Iran-backed militias after US troops wounded in Iraq’, The Guardian, 27 December 2023 ↩︎
10
L. Pelham, ‘Iraq condemns ‘irresponsible’ US air strikes on Iran-backed groups’, BBC, 24 January 2024 ↩︎
11
‘Kataib Hezbollah announces halt of attacks on US forces’, Al Jazeera, 31 January 2024; T. Azhari, ‘Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah says it suspends attacks on US forces’, Reuters, 31 January 2024; A. Rasheed, ‘Iraq’s PMF force says base was attacked, army investigates’, Reuters, 20 April 2024. ↩︎
12
‘Airstrike Against Iraqi Group Aims To Stop Iran’s Proxies’, Iran International, 20 April 2024; ‘One killed, eight wounded in blast at Iran-aligned group’s base in Iraq’, Al Jazeera, 20 April 2024; ‘Iran-allied militia coalition claims its base in Iraq was hit by an airstrike’, PBS, 19 April 2024. ↩︎
13
‘US carries out ‘defensive’ strike in Iraq as regional tensions worsen’, France 24, 31 July 2024; ‘US carries out strike in Iraq as regional tensions worsen’, Voice of America, 30 July 2024. ↩︎
14
A. Horton and M. Salim, ‘Houthi drone expert among those killed in U.S. strike in Iraq’, The Washington Post, 5 August 2024. ↩︎
15
‘Iraq pulled into Iran war as US targets Iran-aligned groups’, Al Jazeera, 23 March 2026. ↩︎
16
V. J. Taylor, ‘Iran-backed militias are destroying Iraq. Baghdad must take them on.’, Atlantic Council, 2 April 2026. ↩︎
17
A. Fulton et al, ‘Strike in Iraq reportedly kills seven fighters – as it happened’, The Guardian, 24 March 2026; ‘Deadly strikes in Iraq blamed on US and Iran’, Courthouse News Service, 24 March 2026; ‘‘A heinous crime’: Air strikes kill seven fighters in Iraq’s Anbar’, Al Jazeera, 25 March 2026. ↩︎
18
‘Air strikes in Iraq kill three PMF fighters, two police’, Al Jazeera, 28 March 2026. ↩︎
19
R. Reddy et al, ‘Iran Update Evening Special Report, April 1, 2026’, Critical Threats, 1 April 2026. ↩︎
20
‘Iraqi armed groups condemn ‘dangerous escalation’ after US-Saudi strikes’, Al Jazeera, 29 July 2026; A. Tolba and M. Al Gebaly, ‘Saudi Arabia says it struck Iran-backed groups in Iraq with U.S. coordination’, Reuters, 28 July 2026, Updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
21
A. Tolba and M. Al Gebaly, ‘Saudi Arabia says it struck Iran-backed groups in Iraq with U.S. coordination’, Reuters, 28 July 2026, Updated 29 July 2026 ↩︎
22
‘Iraqi armed groups condemn ‘dangerous escalation’ after US-Saudi strikes’, Al Jazeera, 29 July 2026. ↩︎
23
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 10. ↩︎

International Armed Conflict between Iraq and Saudi Arabia Ended September 2026

On 27 July 2026, Iranian-backed militias launched drones from Iraqi territory into Saudi Arabian airspace. Saudi Arabia intercepted the drones and stated that it ‘reserve[d] the right to respond’.¹ Saudi Arabia triggered an IAC when it launched joint airstrikes with the United States on Iranian-backed militias in Iraq on 28 July 2026.² The Saudi/US strikes targeted a PMF headquarters in Basra,³ and according to the PMF, at least twenty members killed with a further thirty-two wounded.⁴ Although the PMF does consist of some Iranian-backed militias, it is an official part of the Iraqi security apparatus (see above).⁵ In addition, in March 2026 the Iraqi Ministerial Council for National Security authorized all military units of the PMF to respond to attacks launched against them, explaining that these actions would fall under ‘the right to respond and self-defence’.⁶

Under IHL, an IAC occurs when one or more States resort to armed force against another State, regardless of the motives for the violence.⁷ The ICRC commentaries stress that the unilateral use of military force by one State against another is sufficient to trigger an IAC, even if the other State does not engage in a retaliatory military operation.⁸ Given that the PMF is part of the Iraqi State security apparatus, the strikes by Saudi Arabia on the PMF constitute an IAC between it and Iraq which was triggered on 28 July 2026.

Alhough Saudi Arabia braced for attacks from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in August 2026,⁹ no attacks were reported, and as of early September 2026, no further attacks between the PMF and Saudia Arabia have been reported, meaning the conflict has been declassified.

According to the ICRC, an IAC ends when hostilities ‘end with a degree of stability and permanence’.¹⁰

1
‘Saudi Arabia defends against drone strikes from ‘Iran-backed’ groups’, Al Jazeera, 27 July 2026; ‘Saudi Arabia says it intercepted drones from Iraq as Houthis target oil sites’, France 24, 27 July 2026. ↩︎
2
‘Iraqi armed groups condemn ‘dangerous escalation’ after US-Saudi strikes’, Al Jazeera, 29 July 2026; A. Tolba and M. Al Gebaly, ‘Saudi Arabia says it struck Iran-backed groups in Iraq with U.S. coordination’, Reuters, 28 July 2026, Updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
3
A. Tolba and M. Al Gebaly, ‘Saudi Arabia says it struck Iran-backed groups in Iraq with U.S. coordination’, Reuters, 28 July 2026, Updated 29 July 2026 ↩︎
4
‘Iraqi armed groups condemn ‘dangerous escalation’ after US-Saudi strikes’, Al Jazeera, 29 July 2026. ↩︎
5
A. Tolba and M. Al Gebaly, ‘Saudi Arabia says it struck Iran-backed groups in Iraq with U.S. coordination’, Reuters, 28 July 2026, Updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
6
G. Taqi and M. Saadoon, ‘Iraqi Official Tells Alhurra Why Iraq Authorized PMF to Respond to Attacks’, Al Hurra, 25 March 2026; W. C. Biggerstaff, ‘Is the United States at War with Iraq?’, Just Security, 14 May 2026. ↩︎
7
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule”’, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para 70; ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 9–10. ↩︎
8
‘Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Commentary of 2025: Article 2 – Application of the Convention’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases, para 293; ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 9. ↩︎
9
N. Roberston and H. Humayun, ‘Saudi Arabia braces for attacks on ports and airports by Iraqi militias working with Iran-backed Houthis’, CNN, 7 August 2026; A. Qadi, ‘Saudi Arabia Warns of Possible Attacks by Iraqi Armed Groups’, Kurdistan 24, 29 August 2026 ↩︎
10
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 10. ↩︎

International armed conflict between Iraq and Türkiye

In the broader context of the spill-over nature of the non-international armed conflict between Türkiye and the PKK, Türkiye has conducted frequent airstrikes and ground operations targeting PKK positions in northern Iraq. Türkiye has been conducting these operations without the consent of the Iraqi government, which has long condemned Turkish attacks in northern Iraq as a violation of its sovereignty.¹ The Turkish attacks on Iraqi territory without Iraqi consent means that there is an IAC between the two States that has existed at least since 2015, if not since 1984.² Under IHL, an IAC occurs when one or more States resort to armed force against another State, regardless of the motives for the violence.³

The conflict between Türkiye and the PKK involving attacks on Iraqi territory by Türkiye continued in 2023,⁴ and in January,⁵ February,⁶ March,⁷ and April 2025.⁸

In February 2025, imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, called on the group to lay down arms, dissolve, and end its conflict with Türkiye.⁹ On 1 March 2025, the PKK announced a unilateral ceasefire in its NIAC with Türkiye¹⁰ and in May 2025, the group announced that it would disband and that ‘all activities’ carried out under the group’s name have come to an end.¹¹ President Erdoğan welcomed the news and said that Türkiye would be monitoring the process closely (see above).¹²

No further attacks from Türkiye on the PKK in Iraqi territory were reported after April 2025. The final disarmament of the PKK was to be completed by the end of November 2026, with all weapons also expected to be handed over to Kurdistan or Iraqi officials.¹³

According to the ICRC, an IAC ends when hostilities ‘end with a degree of stability and permanence’.¹⁴ In light of the fact that no reported Turkish attacks have been carried out on Iraqi territory since April 2025 and the PKK is in the process of permanently dissolving, meaning that Türkiye’s conflict with the PKK in Iraq will come to a permanent end, the NIAC between Türkiye and the PKK ended in April 2025. But the presence of Turkish forces without Iraqi consent means that a continued IAC through military occupation persists.

1
‘Iraq Condemns Turkish Strikes on Sinjar’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 18 August 2018; ‘Iraq strongly condemns Turkish military operation in Kurdistan Region’, Kurd Press, 19 April 2022; ‘Iraq demands Turkey apologise over attack on Sulaimaniyah airport’, Al Jazeera, 9 April 2023; ‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Council on Foreign Relations, Updated 29 July 2026; M. Gurbuz, ‘Turkey’s Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Iraq’, Arab Center Washington DC, 28 September 2022. ↩︎
2
‘Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’, Council on Foreign Relations, Updated 29 July 2026. ↩︎
3
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule”’, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para 70; ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 9–10. ↩︎
4
‘Turkey attacked Kurdistan Region, Iraq over 1,500 times in 2023: Monitor’, RUDAW, 21 February 2024; ‘Eleven killed, 13 injured in Turkish attacks on Kurdistan Region in 2023’, 946 Media, 2 January 2024 2024,N. Ezzeddine, ‘Q&A | Disbanding the PKK: A turning point in Turkey’s longest war?’, ACLED, 22 May 2025 ↩︎
5
Shia Waves English, ‘Turkey neutralizes 36 PKK members in Iraq and Syria, ministry says’, YouTube, 7 January 2025; ‘Türkiye: Two PKK female militants “neutralized” in operation in Kurdistan region’, Shafaq, 6 January 2025 ↩︎
6
‘Middle East & North Africa: Iraq’, International Crisis Group, February 2025; ‘Turkish military attacks since Abdullah Öcalan’s call for peace’, Community Peacemaker Teams, 6 March 2025; B. Hubbard and S. Timur, ‘Kurdish Fighters Called a Truce, but Turkey Kept Up Lethal Strikes’, The New York Times, 12 March 2025 ↩︎
7
‘Turkish military attacks since Abdullah Öcalan’s call for peace’, Community Peacemaker Teams, 6 March 2025; B. Hubbard and S. Timur, ‘Kurdish Fighters Called a Truce, but Turkey Kept Up Lethal Strikes’, The New York Times, 12 March 2025 ↩︎
8
‘Middle East & North Africa: Iraq’, International Crisis Group, April 2025. ↩︎
9
‘Jailed PKK leader tells group to lay down arms, end conflict with Turkiye’, Al Jazeera, 27 February 2025; P. Kirby, ‘Jailed Kurdish leader issues call to lay down arms’, BBC, 27 February 2025. ↩︎
10
A. Wilks, ‘Kurdish PKK militants declare a ceasefire in 40-year insurgency in Turkey’, Associated Press, 1 March 2025 ↩︎
11
J. Yeung, ‘Kurdish PKK militants announce decision to dissolve after decades of conflict with Turkey’, CNN, 12 May 2025; D. Butler and E. Toksabay, ‘Kurdish PKK ends 40-year Turkey insurgency, bringing hope of regional stability’, Reuters, 12 May 2025; S. Fraser, ‘The PKK Kurdish militant group will disarm and disband as part of a peace initiative with Turkey’, Associate Press, 12 May 2025. ↩︎
12
D. Butler and E. Toksabay, ‘Kurdish PKK ends 40-year Turkey insurgency, bringing hope of regional stability’, Reuters, 12 May 2025; S. Fraser, ‘The PKK Kurdish militant group will disarm and disband as part of a peace initiative with Turkey’, Associate Press, 12 May 2025. ↩︎
13
S. Akrayi, ‘Thousands of PKK Fighters to Join Iraqi Army as Disarmament Process Takes Shape Under Turkish Intelligence Oversight’, Kurdistan24, 31 August 2026; ‘Türkiye prepares next phase of PKK disarmament: report’, Xinhua, 31 August 2026. ↩︎
14
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 10. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between Iraq, supported by the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-OIR), and the Islamic State (IS)

Background

The US-led international coalition (the Global Coalition against Islamic State) was established in 2015 under the banner of ‘Operation Inherent Resolve’, initially comprising more than seventy States.¹ The Combined Joint Task Force of the Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) is a multinational military formation established by the Global Coalition against Islamic State that intervened with the declared objective of containing and ultimately defeating the group’s influence in the region. Between 2013 and 2019, a significant portion of the territory formerly occupied by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria was reclaimed, predominantly through military operations undertaken by the CJTF-OIR but also with significant support from the groups with Syrian and Iraq.²

Iraq declared victory over Islamic State in 2017, but the group has continued to operate within Iraq.³ Islamic State’s presence has diminished, mainly due to sustained counter-terrorism operations by both Iraqi forces and the CJTF-OIR,⁴ with Islamic State attacks in Iraq ropping by sixty-eight per cent between January and April 2023.⁵ Despite the drop in frequency, clashes between Islamic State and Iraq, supported by the CJTF-OIR, continue to be reported.

Intensity

In the first quarter of 2023, ninety-two attacks in Iraq were attributed to Islamic State.⁶ In May 2023, the US and ‘partner forces’ carried out twenty-one attacks against IS in Iraq.⁷ Attacks were also reported in June,⁸ August,⁹ and November 2023.¹⁰ Islamic State also carried out a ‘bomb and gun attack’ at the end of November 2023, killing eleven civilians and injuring at least a dozen more. The attack was reportedly targeted relatives of a local politician. Two bombs destroyed a vehicle and people who rushed to help were shot by snipers¹¹

Armed clashes and remote detonation attacks continued into 2024. Clashes were reported in January,¹² March,¹³ May,¹⁴ July,¹⁵ August,¹⁶ October,¹⁷ November,¹⁸ November 2024 and December 2024.¹⁹ A notable clash occurred in August 2024. During a joint military operation involving Iraqi and CJTF-OIR forces approximately fifteen Islamic State fighters were killed and seven US personnel were injured.²⁰ The Islamic State fighters were reportedly equipped with firearms, grenades, and explosive suicide belts, highlighting a degree of tactical organization and lethality. By January 2025, 137 joint Iraqi-CJTF-OIR operations were documented, resulting in thirty IS operatives killed and seventy-four detained.²¹

Significantly fewer clashes were reported in 2025, with violence reported only in January²² and March (during which the Islamic State chief of global operations and ‘driving force behind Iraqi operations’ was killed).²³

Reports of attacks in 2026 are scant, but clashes were reported in June,²⁴ and August.²⁵ In one August 2026 attack, Islamic State militants launched an attack on PMF military positions in Salah al-Din province. The PMF fended off the attack which IS had launched from a mountain. It was reportedly an ‘intense battle’ with ‘gunfire and explosions’. No casualties were reported.²⁶

Accordingly, as of September 2026, the violence between Iraq, supported by CJTF-OIR, and Islamic State remains protracted in nature, satisfying the intensity criterion for the existence of a NIAC.

Organization

Islamic State

An offshoot of Al-Qaida, Islamic State is a transnational non-State armed group with a radical Sunni neo-Salafist approach to Islam.²⁷ First emerging and operating in Iraq as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), carrying out attacks against US and Iraqi armed forces, in April 2013, during the Syrian civil war, it became the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIL) and in June 2014, it simply took on the name Islamic State and in the process officially broke from Al-Qaida.²⁸ The founder of the group was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (also known as Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarrai) and the group had a ‘pyramid-like structure’ with unified leadership.²⁹

Between 2014 and 2017, Islamic State was able to seize control of large parts of Iraq and Syria, connecting the two on their shared border as well as seize weapons the United States had provided to Iraq.M³⁰ By April 2015, it controlled around 138,000 square kilometres of territory across Syria and Iraq, with approximately eight million people living under the group’s control.³¹ It also had 35,000 members from around eighty States by this time,³² and was able to launch ‘sophisticated attacks’ around the world.³³

It was a sophisticated group during this period, carrying out activities typically done by the government of a State,³⁴ such as fixing roads and telephone lines, collecting refuse, paying salaries, offering banking services, maintaining law and order, and creating various government-like departments including water, electricity, communication, education, agriculture, and transportation, and even exporting oil on the black market from its seized territory in Iraq.M³⁵ It did this in several regions in Iraq and Syria but also in North Africa, although the sectors operating in Iraq and Syria were ‘centers of immediate importance’.³⁶ Within Syria, Islamic State’s religious police had headquarters that receive and store reports from local religious police on any violations of its interpretation of Sharia law.³⁷ It also had a court system that enforces its religious laws.³⁸ In addition, due to its State-like structure, Islamic State was able to generate its own funds, through taxing those within its territories and through selling oil on the black market.³⁹

Islamic State was able to produce its own weapons on an industrial scale during its height⁴⁰ as well as speak with one voice. In 2014, the group’s media branch, al-Hayat Media Center, released professionally produced videos in nineteen languages on social media platforms, allowing them to spread across the globe.⁴¹ The al-Hayat Media Center, a ‘centralized and coordinated media structure’ for Islamic State was also used to recruit fighters from across the globe.⁴² In addition, the group published five magazines in seven different languages, operated an online radio, released an application for phones called ‘The Dawn’, and released a manual for its fighters and supporters to evade geolocation.⁴³

In December 2017, Iraq declared that had regained control of its border with Syria and that its conflict with Islamic State was over.⁴⁴ Indeed, by early 2018, Islamic State had lost control of large parts of its territory in Iraq and Syria and though its control greatly diminished, it continued to have significant influence.⁴⁵ After the group’s military defeat in Syria in 2019⁴⁶ a spokesperson for the Syrian Democratic Forces declared that while IS’s ‘standing army’ was ‘finished on the ground’, the group continued to be a threat globally.⁴⁷

While there were fewer attacks in Syria and Iraq after this event, they were not altogether diminished.⁴⁸ and the group has continued to carry out attacks in both Syria and Iraq, largely using guerrilla tactics.⁴⁹ The planning capacity of group, however, appears to have weakened.⁵⁰ That being so, the group underwent something of a resurgence in Syria for a while, largely due to new leadership (See Armed Conflicts in Syria). After its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (also Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarrai) was killed by a US airstrike in Syria in October 2019,⁵¹ Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (also Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-Salbi) became the leader of IS overseeing new attacks in Iraq and Syria in 2020.⁵² New leadership was, according to the US Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘committed to enabling international operations’.⁵³

Despite the group still being able to carry out attacks, the organization has diminished since 2019. In 2025, the group’s attacks declined by fifty percent, reportedly falling by a further seventy-two per cent in January 2026.⁵⁴ The group has, as yet, been unable to recover from this decline.⁵⁵ Further, according to Syrian intelligence, Islamic State as an organization has greatly diminished, with the group consisting of ‘scattered individuals’ who share an ‘ideological bond, but without any organizational structure that would enable them to pose a serious threat to the security of Syria or the region’.⁵⁶ The organization of the group has indeed changed.

The group is now largely decentralized, with smaller branches operating autonomously after the death of Abu-al Hussein al-Husseini al Hashimi in August 2023.⁵⁷ These cells recruit and act without waiting for orders.⁵⁸ The types of attacks have also changed, with the group engaging more in guerilla tactics with smaller, more mobile units.⁵⁹ The planning capacity of the group also appears to have weakened, with recent attacks from some cells being defensive rather than offensive in nature.⁶⁰

Islamic State has also lost successive key leadership figures. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the founder of IS, was killed by a US airstrike in Syria in October 2019.⁶¹ Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (also Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-Salbi) was then appointed in October 2019⁶² and killed in by a US raid in Syria in February 2022.⁶³ Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi became the third Caliph of the group in March 2022,⁶⁴ until he was killed in November 2022, with Islamic State announcing Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi as the new leader.⁶⁵ He was killed by Türkiye in August 2023.⁶⁶ Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was named as his successor⁶⁷ and he remains the leader today. Other leadership figures were also killed or detained during the reporting period.⁶⁸

Despite the decentralization, the change in tactics, and the deaths of successive leaders, Islamic State continues to speak with one voice, although its way of doing so has changed. One source stated that IS’s al-Hayat Media Center ‘has vanished from the digital space’ and that tech companies have frequently banned and removed accounts associated with IS from their platforms.⁶⁹ In addition, the agency it once used to claim responsibility for attacks, Amaq News Agency, has also been absent.⁷⁰ However, the weekly newsletter still appears to be operating, and it has a spokesman, Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari, who made a public statement in February 2026.⁷¹ It also claimed responsibility for a June 2026 attack.⁷²

The group also still appears to be able to financially sustain itself and recruit new members.⁷³ At the end of 2024, it was estimated by the US Treasury that Islamic State still had access to about US$10 million and was continuing to engage in fundraising activities for its operations.⁷⁴ However, some cells appear to be financially struggling, with some fighters seeking out settlements with the Syrian government because of this.⁷⁵ Recruitment campaigns are targeting young boys and men who are facing economic hardship or who grew up in displacement camps.⁷⁶ In December 2025, Islamic State was said to still have around 3,000 fighters in Syria and Iraq.⁷⁷

While the group has become dormant, it cannot be ruled out that it is potentially reorganizing for a resurgence.⁷⁸

On the basis of the foregoing, therefore, Islamic State continues to possess the level of organization required under IHL to be considered a non-State armed group party to a NIAC. Accordingly, Iraq, supported by the CJTF-OIR remains in an ongoing NIAC against Islamic State.

1
‘Our Mission’, The Global Coalition. ↩︎
2
‘Islamic State defeated in final Syria victory: SDF, Al Jazeera,23 March 2019. ↩︎
3
‘Iraq declares war with Islamic State is over’, BBC, 9 December 2017; S. Demir, ‘German forces end military mission in Iraq’s Kurdish region’, AA, 26 August 2026. ↩︎
4
A. Mehvar et al,‘Regional Overview Middle East, ACLED, 14 January 2025 ↩︎
5
‘US troops launched 38 missions against ISIS in Iraq, Syria in May’, Kurd Press, 10 June 2023. ↩︎
6
‘Iraq: Briefing and Consultations’, Security Council Report, 17 May 2023. ↩︎
7
J. Schogal, ‘US troops launched 38 missions against ISIS in Iraq and Syria in May’, Task & Purpose, 7 June 2023; ‘US troops launched 38 missions against ISIS in Iraq, Syria in May’, Kurd Press, 10 June 2023. ↩︎
8
S. Kittleson, ‘Iraq tries to root out IS remnants in farms north of the capital’, Al Majalla, 28 June 2023; ‘Suspected ISIS attack kills two Iraqi soldiers, wounds three others in Kirkuk’, Kurdistan 24, 11 June 2023 ↩︎
9
‘French Soldier Killed in Iraq in Battle with ISIS Militants’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 29 August 2023; ‘Deadly ISIS Attack Targets PMF in Eastern Saladin, Iraq’, Shafaq, 8 August 2023 ↩︎
10
B. Aydogan, ‘Fire breaks out after drone attack at US base in Iraq’, AA, 9 November 2023. ↩︎
11
.‘Gunmen kill 11 in roadside attack in eastern Iraq’, Al Jazeera, 1 December 2023; Q. Abdul-Zahra, ‘11 civilians are killed in an attack by gunmen in Iraq’s eastern Diyala province’, Associated Press, 1 December 2023. ↩︎
12
‘ISIS kills three soldiers in attack in western Iraq, shows it is still active’, The Arab Weekly, 15 January 2024 ↩︎
13
‘ISIS Attack Kills One Iraqi Soldier North of Baghdad’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 1 March 2024; A. Lucente, ‘Iraq says it killed prominent ISIS leader as group resurfaces’, Al-Monitor, 28 March 2024 ↩︎
14
‘Five Iraqi soldiers killed in ISIS attack, sources say’, Reuters, 14 May 2024; A. Lucente, ‘ISIS resurgence in Iraq sees fresh attacks, clashes after commander killed’, Al-Monitor, 14 May 2024; ‘ISIS attack in Saladin province resulted in fatalities among Iraqi security forces’, Kurdistan 24, 13 May 2024 ↩︎
15
‘Islamic State kills four police in clashes in eastern Iraq’, Reuters, 13 July 2024 ↩︎
16
‘US military says 15 ISIL fighters killed in joint raid with Iraqi forces’, Al Jazeera, 31 August 2024; ‘CENTCOM confirms ISIS leaders killed in raid partnered with Iraqi Security Forces in Western Iraq’, CENTCOM, 13 September 2024 ↩︎
17
L. Martinez and M. Seyler, ‘2 US service members injured in Iraqi raid targeting ISIS leaders’, Eyewitness News, 23 October 2024; ‘Iraqi-led Attacks Kill Seven ISIS Operatives, US Centcom Says’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 23 October 2024; L. Mylroie, ‘3rd Major Raid Against ISIS in Iraq in 10 Days’, Kurdistan 24, 25 October 2024; ‘Nine ISIS commanders killed by Iraqi army with US ‘technical support’, The Arab Weekly, 23 October 2024 ↩︎
18
‘ISIS kills three security personnel in Iraq blast’, The New Arab, 17 November 2024; ‘Middle East & North Africa: Iraq’, International Crisis Group, ↩︎
19
‘Middle East & North Africa: Iraq’, International Crisis Group, December 2024. ↩︎
20
‘US military says 15 ISIL fighters killed in joint raid with Iraqi forces’, Al Jazeera, 31 August 2024; ‘CENTCOM confirms ISIS leaders killed in raid partnered with Iraqi Security Forces in Western Iraq’, CENTCOM, 13 September 2024. ↩︎
21
‘CENTCOM and Partner Forces Conduct Operations in Iraq and Syria to Defeat ISIS’, CENTCOM, 6 January 2025. ↩︎
22
C. Gordon, ‘F-16s, F-15s, and A-10s Conduct Airstrikes Against ISIS in Iraq’, Air and Space Forces, 6 January 2025 ↩︎
23
M. K. Mallonee and E. Szekeres, ‘US and Iraqi forces kill ISIS chief of global operations, officials say’, CNN, 15 2025; D. Anwar, ‘VOA Kurdish: Senior ISIS leader killed in Iraqi intelligence operation’, Voice of America, 15 March 2025 ↩︎
24
‘PMF says three ISIS militants killed in western Nineveh operation’, Shafaq, 2 June 2026 July,‘Airborne Iraqi operation hits ISIS hideouts in remote Kirkuk valley’, 21 July 2026 ↩︎
25
K. Aziz, ‘Iraq Says Airstrikes Destroy Eight ISIS Hideouts in Kirkuk’, Kurdistan 24, 26 August 2026; A. Salem, ‘Iraq’s PMF repels ISIS attack in Salah al-Din province’, Iraqi News, 23 August 2026. ↩︎
26
A. Salem, ‘Iraq’s PMF repels ISIS attack in Salah al-Din province’, Iraqi News, 23 August 2026. ↩︎
27
MM. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 1. ↩︎
28
MM. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 2; J. Jefferis, ‘ISIS Administrative and Territorial Organization’, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2021. ↩︎
29
M. Qasem, ‘ISIS’s dream of establishing ‘caliphate’ recedes further into the distance’, Salaam Times, 30 January 2025. ↩︎
30
M. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 2; R. Callimachi, ‘ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls’, The New York Times, 23 March 2019. ↩︎
31
J. Jefferis, ‘ISIS Administrative and Territorial Organization’, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2021. ↩︎
32
MM. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 2; J. Jefferis, ‘ISIS Administrative and Territorial Organization’, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2021; C. P. Clarke and C. J. O’Leary, ‘The Islamic State Five Years After the Collapse of the Caliphate’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 29 March 2024 ↩︎
33
‘Not Resurgence, but Recalibration: ISIS in Syria’, Soufan Center, 23 June 2026. ↩︎
34
J. Jefferis, ‘ISIS Administrative and Territorial Organization’, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2021 ↩︎
35
M. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 2; J. Jefferis, ‘ISIS Administrative and Territorial Organization’, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2021; R. Callimachi, ‘ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls’, The New York Times, 23 March 2019; M. Qasem, ‘ISIS’s dream of establishing ‘caliphate’ recedes further into the distance’, Salaam Times, 30 January 2025. ↩︎
36
MM. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 2. ↩︎
37
J. Jefferis, ‘ISIS Administrative and Territorial Organization’, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2021. ↩︎
38
J. Jefferis, ‘ISIS Administrative and Territorial Organization’, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2021. ↩︎
39
R. Callimachi, ‘ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls’, The New York Times, 23 March 2019; J. Jefferis, ‘ISIS Administrative and Territorial Organization’, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2021; MM. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 2. ↩︎
40
R. Callimachi, ‘ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls’, The New York Times, 23 March 2019; ‘Standardisation and Quality Control in Islamic State’s Military Production: Weapon Manufacturing in the East Mosul Sector’, Conflict Armament Research, December 2016; E. Schmitt, ‘Papers Offer a Peek at ISIS’ Drones, Lethal and Largely Off-the-Shelf’, The New York Times, 31 January 2017 ↩︎
41
MM. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 3; B. Aragó, ‘Media Jihad’, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2017. ↩︎
42
Emran, ‘ISIS’s media decline mirrors its battlefield and leadership losses’, Salaam Times, 23 May 2025; B. Aragó, ‘Media Jihad’, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2017. ↩︎
43
MM. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 3. ↩︎
44
‘Iraq declares war with Islamic State is over’, BBC, 9 December 2017. ↩︎
45
MM. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 3; R. Callimachi, ‘ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls’, The New York Times, 23 March 2019. ↩︎
46
C. P. Clarke and C. J. O’Leary, ‘The Islamic State Five Years After the Collapse of the Caliphate’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 29 March 2024; R. Callimachi, ‘ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls’, The New York Times, 23 March 2019 ↩︎
47
R. Callimachi, ‘ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls’, The New York Times, 23 March 2019. ↩︎
48
R. Callimachi, ‘ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls’, The New York Times, 23 March 2019 ↩︎
49
S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
50
S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
51
P. Barker et al, ‘ISIS Leader al-Baghdadi Is Dead, Trump Says’, The New York Times, 27 October 2019 ↩︎
52
MM. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 1 and 3. ↩︎
53
‘Operation Inherent Resolve and other U.S. Government Activities related to Iraq & Syria (1 October – 31 December 2024)’, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, February 2025, 11. ↩︎
54
C. Lister, ‘The Collapse of ISIS in Syria’, Middle East Institute, 8 June 2026; S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
55
C. Lister, ‘The Collapse of ISIS in Syria’, Middle East Institute, 8 June 2026. ↩︎
56
C. Lister, ‘The Collapse of ISIS in Syria’, Middle East Institute, 8 June 2026. ↩︎
57
S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026; ‘ISIL confirms death of leader Abu Hussein al-Qurashi, names successor’, Al Jazeera, 3 August 2023. ↩︎
58
S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
59
R. Callimachi, ‘Described as Defeated, Islamic State Punches Back With Guerrilla Tactics’, The New York Times, 21 January 2021; C. P. Clarke and C. J. O’Leary, ‘The Islamic State Five Years After the Collapse of the Caliphate’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 29 March 2024; C. Lister, ‘The Collapse of ISIS in Syria’, Middle East Institute, 8 June 2026; S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
60
S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
61
P. Barker et al, ‘ISIS Leader al-Baghdadi Is Dead, Trump Says’, The New York Times, 27 October 2019; J. Garamore, ‘U.S. Forces Kill ISIS Founder, Leader Baghdadi in Syria’, U.S. Department of War, 27 October 2019; ‘Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: US releases first images of raid on compound’, BBC, 31 October 2019. ↩︎
62
MM. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 3; ‘Islamic State group names its new leader as Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi’, BBC, 31 October 2019 ↩︎
63
D. Vergun, ‘Leader of ISIS Dead Following U.S. Raid in Syria’, U.S. Department of War, 3 February 2022; ‘US officials share details of raid that killed ISIL leader’, Al Jazeera, 3 February 2022. ↩︎
64
J. Seldin, ‘Islamic State Names New Leader, Shares Only His Nom-de-Guerre’, Voice of America, 10 March 2022; ‘Islamic state confirms death of its leader, names new chief’, Reuters, 10 March 2022 ↩︎
65
‘ISIL announces death of its leader’, Al Jazeera, 30 November 2022; ‘ISIS has officially announced the death of the organization’s leader and the appointment of a new leader’, The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute, 4 December 2022. ↩︎
66
‘ISIL confirms death of leader Abu Hussein al-Qurashi, names successor’, Al Jazeera, 3 August 2023; ‘ISIS has declared the death of its leader and the appointment of a new leader’, The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute, 8 August 2023. ↩︎
67
‘ISIL confirms death of leader Abu Hussein al-Qurashi, names successor’, Al Jazeera, 3 August 2023; ‘ISIS has declared the death of its leader and the appointment of a new leader’, The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute, 8 August 2023 ↩︎
68
‘Syria says key ISIL leader Taha al-Zoubi captured near Damascus’, Al Jazeera, 24 December 2025; G. Al Sayed and B. Finley, ‘Senior Islamic State leader killed by US airstrike in northwest Syria’, ABC News, 24 June 2026; ‘U.S. forces killed ISIS leader in Syria airstrike, Central Command says’, NBC News, 24 June 2026. ↩︎
69
Emran, ‘ISIS’s media decline mirrors its battlefield and leadership losses’, Salaam Times, 23 May 2025. ↩︎
70
Emran, ‘ISIS’s media decline mirrors its battlefield and leadership losses’, Salaam Times, 23 May 2025. ↩︎
71
S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
72
‘Not Resurgence, but Recalibration: ISIS in Syria’, Soufan Center, 23 June 2026; S. J. Frantzman, ‘ISIS claims responsibility for new attack in Syria targeting official near Damascus’, The Jerusalem Post, 17 June 2026. ↩︎
73
S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
74
‘Operation Inherent Resolve and other U.S. Government Activities related to Iraq & Syria (1 October – 31 December 2024)’, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, February 2025, 12. ↩︎
75
S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
76
S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
77
‘Counter-Terrorism: Briefing on the Secretary-General’s Strategic-Level Report on ISIL/Da’esh’, Security Council Report, 3 February 2026. ↩︎
78
S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026; ‘Not Resurgence, but Recalibration: ISIS in Syria’, Soufan Center, 23 June 2026. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between the United States (US) and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) (Iraq) Ended April 2026

On 17 October 2023, following a long pause in hostilities between the IRI and the US, the former started carrying out attacks on US positions across the Middle East, including in Iraq. The attacks were the IRI’s response to the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Hamas on and following 7 October 2023.¹

Intensity

As it is problematic to bilaterally attribute indicators of violence to any specific members of a coalition, it is possible to aggregate the violence generated between the enemies, if multiple states and or organized armed groups who are sufficiently organized fight in a coalition against an enemy.² This section thus assesses whether the violence generated between groups considered to be part of the IRI and the US satisfy the intensity requirement under IHL.

The first attack carried out by the IRI on US positions in Iraq reportedly came on 17 October 2023.³ On this date, the IRI claimed responsibility for an attack on US forces at Ain al Assad airbase. The two drones were intercepted by US forces, destroying one and damaging the other.⁴ Further IRI attacks on bases in northern Iraq that hosted US forces were targeted on 18 and 19 October 2023.⁵ The first US airstrike on IRI positions in Iraq came on 21 November 2023 and targeted a Kataib Hezbollah operations centre south of Baghdad.⁶ The US’s action was a response to another IRI attack with a ballistic missile on US forces at the Ain al Assad airbase, injuring eight US personnel.⁷

The two parties continued to attack each positions in December 2023,⁸ January,⁹ and February 2024.¹⁰ A notable attack carried out by the IRI against the US during this period was an attack in late January 2024 on the Tower 22 US military outpost in Jordan that killed three US service members and injured forty others.¹¹ The US responded by targeting IRI positions in Iraq and Syria.¹² The US attacks killed almost forty people.¹³

By the end of January 2024, the IRI as well as Iranian-backed militias in Syria had carried out more than 170 attacks on US positions in the Middle East.¹⁴ In late January 2024, Kataib Hezbollah, the most prominent member of the IRI, announced that the IRI would suspend its attacks on US positions in the region in order to de-escalate tensions.¹⁵ Although the US continued to carry out strikes in February 2024, no strikes were reported in March, April, May, and June 2024. The next confirmed US strike on Iraq came in July 2024, when the US launched an attack on PMF bases in Musaybi, Babylon province. Four PMF members were killed and four others injured.¹⁶

The violence between the IRI and the US declined after July 2024 and the conflict was declassified. No exchanges of fire were reported in the latter half of 2024, the entirety of 2025, and the first two months of 2026.

Violence, however, flared again after the outbreak of the US/Israel/Iran IAC on 28 February 2026. A new NIAC came into existence in March to April 2026. Almost immediately following the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the IRI started targeting US positions in Iraq and Jordan, and the attacks continued throughout March 2026.¹⁷ By mid-March, the IRI had launched ‘more than 300 missiles and drones’ at various US positions and interests in Iraq.¹⁸ No US attacks on the IRI in March 2026 were confirmed but one attack – a strike on in Karrada in Baghdad that was allegedly an attempt to kill Kataib Hezbollah’s leader Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi – has been ascribed to the United States.¹⁹ The last reported IRI attack on US positions in Iraq was in April 2026.²⁰

In April, the IRI announced that it would suspend its attacks, mirroring the ceasefire that was announced between the US and Iran.²¹ According to US figures released in May 2026, the IRI had targeted Israel and US positions in Iraq ‘more than 600 times’ since then end of February 2026.²²

Accordingly, the NIAC between the United States and the IRI in Iraq ended in April 2026.

Organization

The IRI is an umbrella-group of armed groups backed by Iran that emerged after the renewed hostilities between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.²³ The group reportedly has around 50,000 fighters²⁴ and often communicates through coordinated public statements.²⁵

It is unclear which militias exactly make up the IRI. Until recently, some of the militias confirmed to be part of it were Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Saraya Awliya al-Dam, and smaller groups linked to Kataib Hezbollah.²⁶ However, in the currently underway process to disarm all militias in Iraq and put all weapons in the country under government control (see above), a rift between Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the most powerful militias in the IRI,²⁷ seems to have developed with Asaib Ahl al-Haq indicating that it is going disarm²⁸ while Kataib Hezbollah maintains that it will not. As a result, Asaib Ahl al-Haq has distanced itself from Kataib Hezbollah and potentially left the IRI.²⁹

According to one analyst, the IRI is a ‘front group’ that is controlled and staffed mainly Kataib Hezbollah.³⁰ This group has, indeed, made statements seemingly on behalf of the IRI.³¹ Kataib Hezbollah is considered the most powerful member of the IRI, especially since Asaib Ahl al-Haq seems to have left the group.³² Kataib Hezbollah, along with Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, are the most closely aligned with aligned with Iran and are likely to respond to Iranian direction.³³

Though sometimes considered Iranian proxies that act on instruction from Tehran,³⁴ for the 2026 conflicts at least, Iran allowed IRI militias to carry out attacks without its prior approval.³⁵ In 2023, Tehran also denied being involved in the decision-making of IRI militias.³⁶ In addition, after the outbreak of the US/Israel/Iranian conflict, Tehran informed Baghdad that they had ‘devolved authority to regional Iranian commanders’ in Iraq and would not be able to intervene should the militias carry out attacks on US interests in northern Iraq.³⁷ This does not mean that there is no coordination between the IRI and Iran. Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba spokesperson, Mahdi al-Kaabi, was quoted in the Associated Press as saying that ‘[s]ince we are allies of the Islamic Republic, we have coordination with our brothers in the Islamic Republic’ but did not give further details on what the coordination looks like.³⁸ One analyst described the loyalty shown to Iran not as political but religious and ideological.³⁹

In addition, several groups in the IRI are also part of the PMF⁴⁰ and, as such, funded by the Iraqi State in some way.⁴¹ The founder of Kataib Hezbollah, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, was the deputy head of the PMF until he was killed by a US strike in 2020.⁴² Militias within the IRI, however, maintain that they are ‘not affiliated’ with the Iraqi government but that they ‘respect the law and the constitution’ of Iraq and act in tandem with the government when ‘they serve national interests’.⁴³ Though loosely connected to the State, it is believed that the Iraqi government has little power to influence or control the actions and decisions of IRI militias.⁴⁴

According to the ICRC, for an alliance to become party to a NIAC, and to aggregate violence generated by such an alliance under IHL, all non-State actors that are members of the alliance must meet the organizational criteria under IHL.⁴⁵ Therefore, the threshold of organization of all known members of the IRI must individually be examined to meet the minimum requirements demanded by IHL. At the outset, it is important to note that the exact organization and leadership of the IRI and its militias is difficult to determine. Analysts suggest that this is deliberate because the vagueness allows each militia to plausibly deny involvement in attacks.⁴⁶There may be others, including non-State actors referred to as militias who might be part of the IRI that are sufficiently organized but information on this is either scarce or not available in the public domain. Accordingly, this section details what is publicly known about the organization of militias known to be part of the IRI.

Kataib Hezbollah

Kataib Hezbollah (KH) (also known as the Hezbollah Brigades) was founded by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (who was killed in the same 2020 US strike that killed Qassem Soleimani) in 2003 and took on its current form of organization in 2007. It has close ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon and the IRGC in Iran, with analysts believing that Tehran was directly involved in its creation. al-Muhandis also founded the PMF and KH is intimately intertwined with the PMF, meaning that it also receives funding from the Iraqi State.⁴⁷

KH is reportedly run by a thirty-three-member Shura Council that has a secretary-general (Ahmad al-Hamidawi (aka Abu Hussein or Ahmad Mohsen Faraj al-Hamidawi)) with five deputies. The IRGC and Lebanon’s Hezbollah reportedly act as ‘overseers’ of the Council.⁴⁸ Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi was targeted by a US attack in March 2026 but reportedly was not killed.⁴⁹ Instead, Abu Ali al-Askari, Kataib Hezbollah’s senior security commander was killed in the attack.⁵⁰ Little is known about Abu Hussein; he rarely appears in public and only communicates directly with trusted aides.⁵¹ KH also has an executive council, designated bureaus and fighters – a structure that closely mimics Lebanon’s Hezbollah.⁵²

In 2019, the group was estimated to have 10,000 fighters in total, 7,500 of whom were in Iraq and the remainder in Syria.⁵³ Types of weapons used include rockets, improvised rocket assisted munition explosive devices, and drones.⁵⁴

The group reportedly has multiple communications outlets.⁵⁵ It runs Sabereen News, a ‘social media conglomerate’ that publishes propaganda for all IRI militias in Iraq,⁵⁶ and Al-Etejah TV, a satellite station that broadcasts ‘counter U.S. operations’ and ‘counter-Saudi operations’.⁵⁷

Asaib Ahl al-Haq

Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) was founded between 2004 and 2006 as a breakaway from another militia – Jaish al-Mahdi – with the support of Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah.⁵⁸ It was actively involved in the second Gulf War and was, as a result, designated as an FTO by the United States.⁵⁹ Since its founding, Qais al-Khazali has been its leader.⁶⁰ al-Khazali is reportedly led by a ‘Board of Trustees’ that oversees all AAH activities. The organization also has both a political and military wing.⁶¹ Other key leadership figures include Laith al-Khazali, al-Khazali’s brother, Mohammed al-Tabatabai, Hassan Salem, and Shiekh Baqr al-Saeedi.⁶² It is also a member of the PMF and, as such, is partially funded by the Iraqi State.⁶³

In 2021, AAH was believed to have 10,000 members⁶⁴ with that number potentially swelling to 15,000 by April 2024.⁶⁵ AAH is known to use rockets,⁶⁶ improvised rocket-assisted mortars, explosively formed penetrators,⁶⁷ and drones.⁶⁸

It has been known to communicate through Sabereen News.⁶⁹

In June 2026, it was reported that the AAH had decided to disarm and surrender all its weapons to the Iraqi State.⁷⁰ It also had a public disagreement with KH, distancing itself from the KH’s statement that IRI members would not disarm.⁷¹. As such, it is unclear, whether at the time of reporting, the AAH is still a member of the IRI.

Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba

Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HHN) was reportedly founded by Akram al-Kaabi as a front for KH and AAH in 2013 and operates in both Iraq and Syria.⁷² al-Kaabi reportedly had disagreements with the AAH and now the group is now considered to operate distinctly from both it and KH.⁷³ It is backed by the IRGC and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, receiving both funding and resources from them.⁷⁴ In 2015, al-Kaabi also stated in an interview that he would ‘answer any order’ from Iran’s Supreme Leader, even going to far as to state that the HHN would be willing to fight the Iraq State.⁷⁵ HHN is also a member of the PMF, which means it is partly funded by the Iraqi State.⁷⁶

al-Kaabi remains the leader of the HHN.⁷⁷ The group is purely military in nature and has three brigades – Liwa Ammar Ibne Yasir, Liwa Al-Hasan Al-Mujtaba and Liwa Al-Hamd – with a fourth one (the Golan Liberation Brigade) reportedly developed to carry out operations against Israel.⁷⁸ Other known members and positions in the HHN are its spokesperson, Nasr al-Shammari,⁷⁹ and a deputy secretary general, Hussein al-Moussawi.⁸⁰

The group was estimated to have around 10,000 fighters in 2016.⁸¹ And one of the weapons that the HHN is known to use drones.⁸² Information on current membership figures and other types of weapons used is scarce.

Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada

Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) was founded and is reportedly ‘built around’ Mustafa Abdul Hamid Hussein al-Utabi (also known as Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani or Hamid Thajil Warij al-Utabi).⁸³ Utabi is a founding member of Kataib Hezbollah, providing a connection between the two groups.⁸⁴ The current leader of KSS is Hashim Binyan al-Sarraf (also known as Abu Alaa al-Walaei).⁸⁵ Another leader is thought to be Falih Khazali (aka Mustafa Khazali) who was also a member of Kataib Hezbollah and has acted as a spokesperson for KSS.⁸⁶ The group did have a head of security, Haider al-Musawi, but he was killed in an Israeli strike in June 2025.⁸⁷ KSS reportedly receives assistance from Iran and Hezbollah, including financial, military and intelligence assistance. It also reportedly receives commands from Iran.⁸⁸

In 2017, the number of KSS members was estimated at 2,723. The group is believed to have been involved in attacks which use rockets,⁸⁹ drones, and heavy machine guns.⁹⁰

KSS reportedly runs iNEWS TV and has its own Telegram channel. Until March 2022, it also communicated through Sabereen News.⁹¹ It also publishes communications under an IRI banner.⁹²

Saraya Awliya al-Dam

Saraya Awliya al-Dam is believed to be a front for more established Iranian-aligned militias.⁹³ although the group denies this.⁹⁴ It is linked to KSS and KHC⁹⁵ and emerged after the US assassination of Qassem Soleimani and then PMF and KH leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in January 2020. The group is knowns to have tunnels across various provinces in Iraq. Although ‘less clearly defined’ than other Iraqi militias, it is known that Saraya Awliya al-Dam is ‘composed of elite fighters’ with Iranian support (including funding, weapons, and training) whose purpose is to ‘carry out specialised operations’ on US interests and positions across Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, and the wider Gulf region.⁹⁶

The group is believed to have been involved in attacks on Israel as well as US positions across Iraq and neighbouring States. The groups reportedly uses rockets and rocket launchers, roadside bombs, drones, and portable air-defence systems.⁹⁷

The group has a spokesperson, Abu Mahd Al-Jaafari,⁹⁸ and reportedly communicates both through a Telegram account and through Sabereen News.⁹⁹

Based on the foregoing, the militias within the IRI are sufficiently organized to constitute a coalition party to armed conflict under IHL. Given the lack of intensity since April 2026, the short-lived NIAC with the United States has ended.

1
C. Schaer, ‘US troops in the Middle East: Soldiers in the line of fire,’ Deutsche Welle, 30 January 2024; ‘Iraq and the United States: Return to the Status Quo or Calm Before the Storm?’, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, 17 June 2024. ↩︎
2
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 17; J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020; S. D’Cunha, et al, ‘Defining armed conflict: some clarity in the fog of war’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Law and Policy, 2 May 2024. ↩︎
3
‘Iraq and the United States: Return to the Status Quo or Calm Before the Storm?’, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, 17 June 2024. ↩︎
4
A. Jhaveri et al, ‘Iran Update, October 18, 2023’, Critical Threats, 18 October 2023. ↩︎
5
A. Sewell et al, ‘Troops hurt after three drones attack US bases in Iraq as tensions flare after Gaza hospital blast’, Associated Press, 19 October 2023. ↩︎
6
I. Ali et al, ‘U.S. forces carry out series of strikes against Iran-backed militia in Iraq’, Reuters, 22 November 2023; M. Seyler, ‘US retaliates against Iran-backed militants after ballistic missile strike, officials say’, ABC News, 22 November 2023; H. Cooper, ‘U.S. Conducts Airstrikes Against Iranian Proxies in Iraq’, The New York Times, 21 November 2023. ↩︎
7
C. Babb, ‘US Force Attacked at Iraq Air Base, Responds by Hitting Iranian-Backed Proxies’, Voice of America, 21 November 2023. ↩︎
8
‘US launches strikes on Iraq over drone attack blamed on Iran-aligned forces’, Al Jazeera, 26 December 2023; Biden orders airstrikes against Iran-backed militias after US troops wounded in Iraq’, The Guardian, 27 December 2023 ↩︎
9
L. Pelham, ‘Iraq condemns ‘irresponsible’ US air strikes on Iran-backed groups’, BBC, 24 January 2024; E. Watson, ‘U.S. strikes Iranian-backed militias in Iraq over wave of attacks on American forces’, CBS News, 23 January 2024; E. Schmitt, ‘U.S. Strikes 3 Iran-Linked Militia Sites in Iraq’, The New York Times, 23 January 2024 ↩︎
10
J. Clark, ‘U.S. Strikes Targets in Iraq and Syria in Response to Deadly Drone Attack’, U.S. Department of War, 2 February 2024; P. Stewart et al, ‘U.S. launches strikes in Iraq, Syria, nearly 40 reported killed’, Reuters,4 February 2024; T. Copp et al, ‘US hits hard at militias in Iraq and Syria, retaliating for fatal drone attack’, Associated Press, 6 February 2024; O. Guerin and H. Bachega, ‘US drone strike kills Iran-backed militia leader in Baghdad’, BBC, 8 February 2024; N. Schifrin and E. Barnhart, ‘U.S. strikes Iran-backed militias in retaliation for deadly attack on American troops’, PBS, 2 February 2024. ↩︎
11
T. Lopez, ‘3 U.S. Service Members Killed, Others Injured in Jordan Following Drone Attack’, 29 January 2024; M. Cengiz, ‘Who Are Iran-backed Militia Groups Targeting U.S. Bases in the Middle East?’, Homeland Security Today, 1 February 2024. ↩︎
12
N. Schifrin and E. Barnhart, ‘U.S. strikes Iran-backed militias in retaliation for deadly attack on American troops’, PBS, 2 February 2024; J. Clark, ‘U.S. Strikes Targets in Iraq and Syria in Response to Deadly Drone Attack’, U.S. Department of War, 2 February 2024. ↩︎
13
P. Stewart et al, ‘U.S. launches strikes in Iraq, Syria, nearly 40 reported killed’, Reuters,4 February 2024. ↩︎
14
N. Carl et al, ‘Iran Update, January 28, 2024’, Institute for the Study of War, 28 January 2024. ↩︎
15
‘Kataib Hezbollah announces halt of attacks on US forces’, Al Jazeera, 31 January 2024; T. Azhari, ‘Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah says it suspends attacks on US forces’, Reuters, 31 January 2024; A. Rasheed, ‘Iraq’s PMF force says base was attacked, army investigates’, Reuters, 20 April 2024. ↩︎
16
US carries out ‘defensive’ strike in Iraq as regional tensions worsen’, France 24, 31 July 2024; ‘US carries out strike in Iraq as regional tensions worsen’, Voice of America, 30 July 2024. ↩︎
17
S. J. Frantzman, ‘With Iraqi militia attacks on US forces, Iraq edges toward Iran war frontline’, 1 March 2026; J. Burke, ‘Iran-backed militias intensify attacks against US, Israel and allies’, The Guardian, 6 March 2026; ‘Iraq Unable to Avoid the U.S.-Iran Crossfire’, The Soufan Center, 16 March 2026; B. Toomey and A. Sharawi, ‘Iran’s Iraqi Militias Are Coming for US Troops’, Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, 24 March 2026. ↩︎
18
‘Iraq Unable to Avoid the U.S.-Iran Crossfire’, The Soufan Center, 16 March 2026. ↩︎
19
V. J. Taylor, ‘Iran-backed militias are destroying Iraq. Baghdad must take them on.’, Atlantic Council, 2 April 2026. ↩︎
20
R. Gramer, ‘Iran-Backed Militias Target U.S. Diplomatic Posts in Iraq’, The Wall Street Journal, 5 April 2026. ↩︎
21
‘Iran-backed militias in Iraq announce suspension of military operations for 2 weeks’, The Times of Israel, 8 April 2026. ↩︎
22
A. Williams, ‘Iran-backed groups targeted U.S. facilities in Iraq 600 times, U.S. official says’, 7 May 2026. ↩︎
23
J. Salhani, ‘Who are the Islamic Resistance in Iraq?’, Al Jazeera, 10 February 2024; H. Malik and M. Knights, ‘Profile: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 October 2023, Updated 20 June 2024; M. Gregory, ‘Explainer: Who are Iraq’s Iranian-backed armed groups?’, Reuters, 29 July 2026. ↩︎
24
M. Gregory, ‘Explainer: Who are Iraq’s Iranian-backed armed groups?’, Reuters, 29 July 2026 ↩︎
25
See for example a statement released on the death of Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada’s head of security, M. Knights and H. Malik, ‘Israeli Strike Kills Head of Security for Iraqi Militia KSS’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 9 July 2025. ↩︎
26
W. van Wilgenburg, ‘Iran-aligned Iraqi ‘Islamic Resistance’ groups resurface from the shadows’, The New Region, 3 March 2026; M. Gregory, ‘Explainer: Who are Iraq’s Iranian-backed armed groups?’, Reuters, 29 July 2026; Z. Salim, ‘What is ‘Saraya Awliya al-Dam’ in Iraq, and how are they linked to Iran?’, The New Arab, 26 March 2026; ‘Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada sets conditions for weapons regulation’, Shafaq, 29 August 2026. ↩︎
27
M. Gregory, ‘Explainer: Who are Iraq’s Iranian-backed armed groups?’, Reuters, 29 July 2026 ↩︎
28
S. Martany, ‘Powerful Iran-backed militias in Iraq say they will start handing in weapons to authorities’, Associated Press, 2 June 2026 ↩︎
29
S. al-Salhy, ‘Dissolution of Iraqi ‘resistance’ committee amid weapons control drive’, The New Region, 23 July 2026. ↩︎
30
W. van Wilgenburg, ‘Iran-aligned Iraqi ‘Islamic Resistance’ groups resurface from the shadows’, The New Region, 3 March 2026. ↩︎
31
R. Zimmit, ‘Spotlight on Iran’, The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute, 31 December 2025 – 7 January 2026; S. al-Salhy, ‘Dissolution of Iraqi ‘resistance’ committee amid weapons control drive’, The New Region, 23 July 2026. ↩︎
32
F. al-Nashmi, ‘Al-Hamidawi: Iran’s Elusive Man in Iraq’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 15 March 2026; M. Gregory, ‘Explainer: Who are Iraq’s Iranian-backed armed groups?’, Reuters, 29 July 2026. ↩︎
33
W. van Wilgenburg, ‘Iran-aligned Iraqi ‘Islamic Resistance’ groups resurface from the shadows’, The New Region, 3 March 2026; F. al-Nashmi, ‘Al-Hamidawi: Iran’s Elusive Man in Iraq’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 15 March 2026. ↩︎
34
‘Iran Convinced Proxies In Iraq To Stop Attacks, Report Claims’, Iran International, 18 February 2024 ↩︎
35
Q. A. Zahra and S. Kullab, ‘Driven by the pressures of war, Iran gives its field commanders more power over militias in Iraq’, Associated Press, 21 April 2026; Z. Abdi, ‘Shia Militias in Iraq: A Backgrounder’, Arab Center Washington DC, 14 May 2026. ↩︎
36
‘US forces targeted in broadest Iraq attacks since start of Israel-Hamas war’, The Guardian, 9 November 2023. ↩︎
37
Q. A. Zahra and S. Kullab, ‘Driven by the pressures of war, Iran gives its field commanders more power over militias in Iraq’, Associated Press, 21 April 2026; ↩︎
38
Q. A. Zahra and S. Kullab, ‘Driven by the pressures of war, Iran gives its field commanders more power over militias in Iraq’, Associated Press, 21 April 2026. ↩︎
39
M. Naser, ‘Will Iraq become a battleground in a prolonged war on Iran?’, The New Arab, 4 March 2026. ↩︎
40
‘Who Holds the Keys to Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces?’, Al Hurra, 3 September 2026; Z. Abdi, ‘Shia Militias in Iraq: A Backgrounder’, Arab Center Washington DC, 14 May 2026 ↩︎
41
Q. A. Zahra and S. Kullab, ‘Driven by the pressures of war, Iran gives its field commanders more power over militias in Iraq’, Associated Press, 21 April 2026. ↩︎
42
F. al-Nashmi, ‘Al-Hamidawi: Iran’s Elusive Man in Iraq’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 15 March 2026. ↩︎
43
Q. A. Zahra and S. Kullab, ‘Driven by the pressures of war, Iran gives its field commanders more power over militias in Iraq’, Associated Press, 21 April 2026. ↩︎
44
M. Naser, ‘Will Iraq become a battleground in a prolonged war on Iran?’, The New Arab, 4 March 2026. ↩︎
45
‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Recommitting to Protection in Armed Conflict on the 70^th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions’, International Committee of the Red Cross, October 2019, 40 – 41. ↩︎
46
L. Porter, ‘Islamic Resistance in Iraq appears to be responsible for attacks in the country and there’s no end in sight’, Atlantic Council, November 2023; S. Zaidan, ‘Iraq’s armed factions are still three steps ahead of Baghdad’, Al Majalla, 3 August 2026. ↩︎
47
M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Kata’ib Hezbollah’, Mapping Militants Projects, 21 September 2024; M. Knights, ‘Profile: Kataib Hezbollah’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 April 2021, Updated 21 October 2023. ↩︎
48
M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Kata’ib Hezbollah’, Mapping Militants Projects, 21 September 2024; M. Knights, ‘Profile: Kataib Hezbollah’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 April 2021, Updated 21 October 2023; F. al-Nashmi, ‘Al-Hamidawi: Iran’s Elusive Man in Iraq’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 15 March 2026. ↩︎
49
F. al-Nashmi, ‘Al-Hamidawi: Iran’s Elusive Man in Iraq’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 15 March 2026. ↩︎
50
‘Iraqi Hezbollah’s commander killed in Baghdad strike’, Dawn, 17 March 2026; ‘Security commander of Iraq’s Kataeb Hezbollah said killed in airstrike’, The Times of Israel, 16 March 2026. ↩︎
51
F. al-Nashmi, ‘Al-Hamidawi: Iran’s Elusive Man in Iraq’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 15 March 2026. ↩︎
52
‘Kata’ib Hezbollah: A Dominant Iraqi Pro-Iranian Militia’, The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 21 December 2021. ↩︎
53
M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Kata’ib Hezbollah’, Mapping Militants Projects, 21 September 2024. ↩︎
54
M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Kata’ib Hezbollah’, Mapping Militants Projects, 21 September 2024; ‘P. Baskar and N. MacFarquhar, ‘Kataib Hezbollah: What to Know’, The New York Times, 15 May 2026. ↩︎
55
M. Knights, ‘Profile: Kataib Hezbollah’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 April 2021, Updated 21 October 2023. ↩︎
56
H. Malik et al, ‘Profile: Sabereen News’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 9 April 2021, Updated 18 October 2024 ↩︎
57
H. Malik and C. Smith, ‘Profile: Al-Etejah Satellite Television’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 August 2021. ↩︎
58
M. Knights, ‘Profile: Asaib Ahl al-Haq’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 April 2021, Updated 21 October 2023; S. Wyer, ‘The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’, Institute for the Study of War, Middle East Security Report, December 2012, 9. ↩︎
59
S. Wyer, ‘The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’, Institute for the Study of War, Middle East Security Report, December 2012, 9 ↩︎
60
S. Wyer, ‘The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’, Institute for the Study of War, Middle East Security Report, December 2012, 9; M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’. Mapping Militants Project, 1 June 2025. ↩︎
61
S. Wyer, ‘The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’, Institute for the Study of War, Middle East Security Report, December 2012, 12-13. ↩︎
62
M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’. Mapping Militants Project, 1 June 2025. ↩︎
63
R. Jaboori, ‘Qais al-Khazali—The PMU Militia Leader Challenging the U.S. in Iraq’, Jamestown Foundation, 2 April 2020; M. Knights, ‘Profile: Asaib Ahl al-Haq’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 April 2021, Updated 21 October 2023. ↩︎
64
US Department of State, ‘Country Report on Terrorism 2021 – Chapter 5 – Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)’, Ecoi.net, 22 March 2023 ↩︎
65
M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’. Mapping Militants Project, 1 June 2025. ↩︎
66
US Department of State, ‘Country Report on Terrorism 2021 – Chapter 5 – Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)’, Ecoi.net, 22 March 2023 M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’. Mapping Militants Project, 1 June 2025 ↩︎
67
S. Wyer, ‘The Resurgenc of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’, Institute for the Study of War, Middle East Security Report, December 2012, 9 ↩︎
68
M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’. Mapping Militants Project, 1 June 2025. ↩︎
69
H. Malik et al, ‘Profile: Sabereen News’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 9 April 2021, Updated 18 October 2024; M. Knights, ‘Profile: Asaib Ahl al-Haq’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 April 2021, Updated 21 October 2023. ↩︎
70
L. al-Jnaidi, ‘Iraq’s Asaib Ahl al-Haq to disengage from Popular Mobilization Forces, place weapons under state control’, AA, 2 June 2026; S. Martany, ‘Powerful Iran-backed militias in Iraq say they will start handing in weapons to authorities’, Associated Press, 2 June 2026. ↩︎
71
S. al-Salhy, ‘Dissolution of Iraqi ‘resistance’ committee amid weapons control drive’, The New Region, 23 July 2026 ↩︎
72
M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Harakat al-Nujaba’, Mapping Militants Project, 2025; M. Knights et al, ‘Profile: Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 April 2021, Updated 2 January 2025. ↩︎
73
M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Harakat al-Nujaba’, Mapping Militants Project, 2025; M. Knights et al, ‘Profile: Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 April 2021, Updated 2 January 2025; S. F. H. Naqvi, ‘Harakat Hezbollah Al-Najuba: Iran’s Next Top Proxy Group?’, Manara Magazine, 9 July 2024. ↩︎
74
M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Harakat al-Nujaba’, Mapping Militants Project, 2025; M. Knights et al, ‘Profile: Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 April 2021, Updated 2 January 2025. ↩︎
75
M. Knights et al, ‘Profile: Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 April 2021, Updated 2 January 2025; S. F. H. Naqvi, ‘Harakat Hezbollah Al-Najuba: Iran’s Next Top Proxy Group?’, Manara Magazine, 9 July 2024. ↩︎
76
M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Harakat al-Nujaba’, Mapping Militants Project, 2025; M. Knights et al, ‘Profile: Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 April 2021, Updated 2 January 2025. ↩︎
77
‘Nujaba Leader Warns of ‘Decisive War’ if Coalition Troops Remain in Iraq After Sept. 30’, Kurdistan24, 2 September 2026. ↩︎
78
S. F. H. Naqvi, ‘Harakat Hezbollah Al-Najuba: Iran’s Next Top Proxy Group?’, Manara Magazine, 9 July 2024. ↩︎
79
M. Knights et al, ‘Profile: Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 April 2021, Updated 2 January 2025. ↩︎
80
‘Iran-backed Iraqi armed group claims Israeli attack on its forces imminent’, RUDAW, 20 August 2025. ↩︎
81
M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Harakat al-Nujaba’, Mapping Militants Project, 2025. ↩︎
82
M. Knights et al, ‘Profile: Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 April 2021, Updated 2 January 2025. ↩︎
83
M. Knights, ‘Profile: Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 May 2021, Updated 17 November 2023. ↩︎
84
M. Knights, ‘Profile: Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 May 2021, Updated 17 November 2023. ↩︎
85
M. Knights, ‘Profile: Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 May 2021, Updated 17 November 2023; Z. Salim, ‘What is ‘Saraya Awliya al-Dam’ in Iraq, and how are they linked to Iran?’, The New Arab, 26 March 2026. ↩︎
86
M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’, Mapping Militants Project, 1 March 2021. ↩︎
87
M. Knights and H. Malik, ‘Israeli Strike Kills Head of Security for Iraqi Militia KSS’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 9 July 2025. ↩︎
88
M. Knights, ‘Profile: Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 May 2021, Updated 17 November 2023; ‘Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’, Iran Watch 31 March 2020. ↩︎
89
M. Crenshaw and K. Robinson, ‘Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’, Mapping Militants Project, 1 March 2021 ↩︎
90
‘Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada’, Counter Extremism Project. ↩︎
91
M. Knights, ‘Profile: Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 May 2021, Updated 17 November 2023; H. Malik et al, ‘Profile: Sabereen News’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 9 April 2021, Updated 18 October 2024. ↩︎
92
M. Knights and H. Malik, ‘Israeli Strike Kills Head of Security for Iraqi Militia KSS’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 9 July 2025. ↩︎
93
C. Smith et al, ‘Profile: Saraya Awliya al-Dam’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 March 2021, Updated 27 June 2024; M. Ersan, ‘Who Are “Saraya Awliya al-Dam”: Iran’s Arm of Influence in Iraq?’, OmanNet, 14 April 2026 ↩︎
94
S. Zaidan, ‘Iraq’s armed factions are still three steps ahead of Baghdad’, Al Majalla, 3 August 2026. ↩︎
95
Smith et al, ‘Profile: Saraya Awliya al-Dam’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 March 2021, Updated 27 June 2024; M. Ersan, ‘Who Are “Saraya Awliya al-Dam”: Iran’s Arm of Influence in Iraq?’, OmanNet, 14 April 2026 ↩︎
96
Z. Salim, ‘What is ‘Saraya Awliya al-Dam’ in Iraq, and how are they linked to Iran?’, The New Arab, 26 March 2026; M. Ersan, ‘Who Are “Saraya Awliya al-Dam”: Iran’s Arm of Influence in Iraq?’, OmanNet, 14 April 2026. ↩︎
97
Z. Salim, ‘What is ‘Saraya Awliya al-Dam’ in Iraq, and how are they linked to Iran?’, The New Arab, 26 March 2026; C. Smith et al, ‘Profile: Saraya Awliya al-Dam’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 March 2021, Updated 27 June 2024; M. Knights, ‘Saraya Awliya al-Dam Finds New Mission in Israel Attacks’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 June 2024. ↩︎
98
‘IRI’s Saraya Awliya Al-Dam denies role in Erbil, Kuwait attacks’, Shafaq, 25 July 2026 S. Zaidan, ‘Iraq’s armed factions are still three steps ahead of Baghdad’, Al Majalla, 3 August 2026 ↩︎
99
C. Smith et al, ‘Profile: Saraya Awliya al-Dam’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 March 2021, Updated 27 June 2024; H. Malik et al, ‘Profile: Sabereen News’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 9 April 2021, Updated 18 October 2024. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between Israel and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) Ended April 2026

Background

The IRI started attacking Israel shortly after the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Hamas in Gaza in October 2023. The first IRI attack occurred on 3 November 2023 when the IRI launched a missile on Eilat in Israel.¹ Since then, the IRI has continued to launch attacks into Israel, with Israel responding sporadically.

Intensity

This section assesses whether the violence generated between groups considered to be part of the IRI and Israel satisfy the intensity requirement under IHL.

The first reported strike on Israeli territory by the IRI was a missile strike on Eilat that occurred in November 2023 – the first strike on Israel from Iraqi territory since 1991.² Thereafter, the IRI attacked Israel for an entire year.

From November 2023 to September 2024, the IRI claimed responsibility for 167 attacks on Israel and Israeli targets.³ These attacks happened in December 2023,⁴ January,⁵ February,⁶ March,⁷ April⁸ May,⁹ June,¹⁰ August,¹¹ and September 2024,¹² with more attacks also taking place in October,¹³ and November 2024.¹⁴

Israel carried out strikes on the IRI in at least October 2024 when it launched Operation ‘Days of Repentance’ on Iran, but also targeted sites in Iraq and Syria.¹⁵

Attacks between the two parties dropped after November 2024 and did not flare in 2025.¹⁶ This is likely the result of the IRI agreeing to an Iraqi government request to cease attacks on Israel to ensure stability in Iraq in December 2024.¹⁷ The conflict thus ended in November 2024.

Violence again flared at the start of the IAC between Israel and the United States against Iran on 28 February 2026, when the two States launched attacks on the IRI in Iraqi territory,¹⁸ with attacks on the IRI emanating from Israel also occurring in March,¹⁹ and April 2026.²⁰. The IRI too launched attacks on Israeli targets throughout March 2026²¹ but most of its efforts were focused on US interests in Iraq (see above). According to US figures released in May 2026, the IRI had targeted Israel and US positions in Iraq ‘more than 600 times’ since then end of February 2026.²² In April, the IRI announced that it would suspend its attacks, mirroring the ceasefire that was announced between the US and Iran.²³ Though the ceasefire was only to last for two weeks, as of 3 September 2026, no attacks between the IRI and Israel have been reported since April 2026, the date the NIAC has been declassified.

Organization

The IRI is sufficiently organized under IHL (see above).

A NIAC between the IRI and Israel was triggered in March 2026 and ended in late April 2026.

1
D. Muwaffaq, ‘Iraqi militant group claims responsibility for missile attack on Israel’, Kurdistan 24, 3 November 2023. ↩︎
2
D. Muwaffaq, ‘Iraqi militant group claims responsibility for missile attack on Israel’, Kurdistan 24, 3 November 2023. ↩︎
3
D. Polak, ‘The Islamic Resistance in Iraq – September 2024’, Alma Research and Education Center, 26 September 2024. ↩︎
4
‘Islamic Resistance in Iraq Claims Attack on Israeli ‘Vital Target’ in the Mediterranean Sea’, Shafaq, 22 December 2023 ↩︎
5
‘Islamic Resistance in Iraq: We struck Israel’s Eilat with drones’, Middle East Monitor, 6 February 2024 ↩︎
6
‘Middle East & North Africa: Iraq’, International Crisis Group, February 2024 ↩︎
7
‘Israel: Kiryat Shmona Airport bombed by Iraqi Islamic Resistance’, Middle East Monitor, 7 March 2024 ↩︎
8
M. Knights and H. Malik, ‘New Options for Iraq’s Axis of Resistance Players (Part 1): Attacks on Israel’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 April 2024; ‘Airstrike Against Iraqi Group Aims To Stop Iran’s Proxies’, Iran International, 20 April 2024 ↩︎
9
‘Iraqi militant group launches missiles on targets in Israel’, Al Arabiya, 3 May 2024; ‘Iraqi militant group claims missile attack on Tel Aviv targets, source says’, Reuters, 3 May 2024 ↩︎
10
H. Malik and M. Knights, ‘Iraqi Groups and Yemen’s Houthis Claim More Joint Attacks on Israel’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 17 June 2024; T. Azhari and L. Bassam, ‘Iran’s allies in Iraq ramp up attacks on Israel amid fears of drawing blood’, The Arab Weekly, 4 June 2024 ↩︎
11
‘Middle East & North Africa: Iraq’, International Crisis Group, August 2024 ↩︎
12
M. Knights et al, ‘Tripling of Iraqi Militia Claimed Attacks on Israel in October’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 15 October 2024 ↩︎
13
M. Knights et al, ‘Tripling of Iraqi Militia Claimed Attacks on Israel in October’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 15 October 2024; J. Burke, ‘Iraq militias step up Israel attacks as Iran looks to junior proxies’, The Guardian, 17 October 2024 ↩︎
14
‘Militias Draw Iraq into the Regional Storm’, The Soufan Center, 26 November 2024; D. Polak, ‘The Islamic Resistance in Iraq – Attacks Against Israel (November 2, 2023, to November 20, 2024)’, Alma Research and Education Center, 20 November 2024. ↩︎
15
P. Kingsley et al, ‘Israel Strikes Iran in Retaliatory Attack’, The New York Times, 25 October 2024, Updated 24 May 2025; M. Savill and B. Ozcelik, ‘Operation Days of Repentance: The Impact of Israel’s Strikes on Iran’, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 28 October 2024. ↩︎
16
G. Cafiero, ‘Iraqi militias kept quiet in the Israel-Iran war. Will it last?’, The New Arab, 3 July 2025, Updated 28 February 2026. ↩︎
17
‘Iran-backed Iraqi militias halt Israel attacks, Lebanese daily reports’, Iran International, 23 December 2024. ↩︎
18
A. Ganzeveld and N. Carl, ‘Iran Update Special Report: US and Israeli Strikes, February 28, 2026’, Institute for the Study of War, 28 February 2026 ↩︎
19
J. Burke, ‘Iran-backed militias intensify attacks against US, Israel and allies’, The Guardian, 6 March 2026 ↩︎
20
T. Chouiref, ‘US-Israeli strikes hit positions of Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq’s Anbar’, AA, 7 April 2026 ↩︎
21
J. Burke, ‘Iran-backed militias intensify attacks against US, Israel and allies’, The Guardian, 6 March 2026; ↩︎
22
A. Williams, ‘Iran-backed groups targeted U.S. facilities in Iraq 600 times, U.S. official says’, 7 May 2026. ↩︎
23
‘Iran-backed militias in Iraq announce suspension of military operations for 2 weeks’, The Times of Israel, 8 April 2026. ↩︎

State Parties

Iraq
Iran
Israel
Saudi Arabia
United States
Türkiye
States contributing to the Combined Joint Task Force of Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), including the United Kingdom, Spain, Canada, Australia (at least until December 2024), Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Syria (since November 2025)

Non-State parties

Islamic State (IS)
Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI)
Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK)

1
‘States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties’, International Humanitarian Law Databases: International Committee of the Red Cross, 16 July 2026. ↩︎
2
H. Ariav and M. Ferragamo, ‘The Kurds’ Long Struggle With Statelessness’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 December 2022; ‘The Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916’, The Avalon Project: Yale Law School. ↩︎
3
H. Ariav and M. Ferragamo, ‘The Kurds’ Long Struggle With Statelessness’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 December 2022; ‘The Treaty of Sèvres, 1920 (The Treaty Of Peace Between The Allied And Associated Powers And Turkey Signed At Sèvres August 10, 1920)’, Dipublico, 22 October 2010. ↩︎
4
K. Yildiz, ‘The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future’, Pluto Press, 2007, 10; H. Ariav and M. Ferragamo, ‘The Kurds’ Long Struggle With Statelessness’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 December 2022. ↩︎
5
H. Ariav and M. Ferragamo, ‘The Kurds’ Long Struggle With Statelessness’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 December 2022; ‘Lausanne Peace Treaty’, Republic of Türkiye: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; K. Yildiz, ‘The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future’, Pluto Press, 2007, 12. ↩︎
6
K. Yildiz, ‘The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future’, Pluto Press, 2007, 14. ↩︎
7
K. Burch, ‘Iran-Iraq War’, EBSCO, 2021 ↩︎
8
S. L. Danver, ‘Warfare in Iraq’, EBSCO, 2019; ‘The Gulf War 1990–1991’, Naval History and Heritage Command ↩︎
9
J. Pritchard, ‘Iraq War’, EBSCO, 2019. ↩︎
10
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability in Iraq’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 July 2026. ↩︎
11
K. Yildiz, ‘The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future’, Pluto Press, 2007, 7-8. ↩︎
12
H. Ariav and M. Ferragamo, ‘The Kurds’ Long Struggle With Statelessness’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 December 2022. ↩︎
13
K. Yildiz, ‘The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future’, Pluto Press, 2007, 17-18. ↩︎
14
K. Yildiz, ‘The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future’, Pluto Press, 2007, 19. ↩︎
15
K. Yildiz, ‘The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future’, Pluto Press, 2007, 20-22. ↩︎
16
K. Yildiz, ‘The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future’, Pluto Press, 2007, 23. ↩︎
17
K. Yildiz, ‘The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future’, Pluto Press, 2007, 23; ‘Kurds in Iraq’, Minority Rights Group, May 2026. ↩︎
18
K. Yildiz, ‘The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future’, Pluto Press, 2007, 25-33; ‘Iraq’s Kurdistan region, autonomous since 1991’, Institut Kurde de Paris, 27 September 2018. ↩︎
19
‘Iraq’s Kurdistan region, autonomous since 1991’, Institut Kurde de Paris, 27 September 2018; H. Ariav and M. Ferragamo, ‘The Kurds’ Long Struggle With Statelessness’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 December 2022; K. Yildiz, ‘The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future’, Pluto Press, 2007, 44. ↩︎
20
K. Yildiz, ‘The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future’, Pluto Press, 2007, 44. ↩︎
21
K. Yildiz, ‘The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future’, Pluto Press, 2007, 45. ↩︎
22
‘Iraq’s Kurdistan region, autonomous since 1991’, Institut Kurde de Paris, 27 September 2018; H. Ariav and M. Ferragamo, ‘The Kurds’ Long Struggle With Statelessness’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 December 2022. ↩︎
23
‘Iraq’s Kurdistan region, autonomous since 1991’, Institut Kurde de Paris, 27 September 2018; ‘Iraq 2005’, Constitute Project. ↩︎
24
K. Palani, ‘Erbil-Baghdad relations: Twenty years since the regime change’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 17 March 2023. ↩︎
25
M. A. Mihatsch, ‘Kurdenkonflikt’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 24 January 2018. ↩︎
26
‘Turkey’s 1980 military coup leaders stand trial’, BBC News, 4 April 2012 ↩︎
27
‘Turkey: Jets Strike Kurdish Rebels’, Associated Press, 4 August 2015; C. Yeginsu, ‘Turkey Atttacks Kurdish Militant Camps in Northern Iraq’, The New York Times, 25 July 2015; D. Kenner, ‘Turkey’s War Within’, Foreign Policy, 17 August 2015; L. Bohn, ‘”All Our Young People Have Gone to the Mountain”. Inside Turkey’s Revived War Against the Kurds’, The Atlantic, 18 August 2015; T. Arango, ‘As Turkey Targets Militants, War Grips Kurdish Lands Once Again’, The New York Times, 24 August 2015 ↩︎
28
‘Statement to the Security Council (A.O.B) SRSG Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert’, United Nations: Iraq, 26 July 2022. ↩︎
29
M. Chmaytelli, ‘Iraqi forces, Kurdish Peshmerga agree on ceasefire, Kurdistan says’, Reuters, 27 October 2017; R. Alaaldin, ‘The U.S. and Kurdistan: Revise and rebuild after Kirkuk’, Brookings, 3 November 2017. ↩︎
30
M. Gurbuz, ‘Turkey’s Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Iraq’, Arab Center Washington DC, 28 September 2022 ↩︎
31
S. Foltyn, ‘Life inside Iraq’s ‘Forbidden Zone’ controlled by Turkey’, 29 April 2025; ‘Turkey establishing military bases in northern Iraq’, Kurd Press, 29 June 2020; and A. Ismail, ‘Insight: Turkey’s push into Iraq risks deeper conflict’, Reuters, 31 January 2023. ↩︎
32
A. Ismail, ‘Insight: Turkey’s push into Iraq risks deeper conflict’, Reuters, 31 January 2023 ↩︎
33
M. Gurbuz, ‘Turkey’s Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Iraq’, Arab Center Washington DC, 28 September 2022 ↩︎
34
‘Ankara has built nearly 40 ‘military points’ in Kurdistan Region: Turkish presidency’, RUDAW, 6 July 2026. ↩︎
35
A. Ismail, ‘Insight: Turkey’s push into Iraq risks deeper conflict’, Reuters, 31 January 2023; M. Gurbuz, ‘Turkey’s Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Iraq’, Arab Center Washington DC, 28 September 2022; S. Foltyn, ‘Life inside Iraq’s ‘Forbidden Zone’ controlled by Turkey’, 29 April 2025. ↩︎
36
M. Gurbuz, ‘Turkey’s Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Iraq’, Arab Center Washington DC, 28 September 2022. ↩︎
37
S. Foltyn, ‘Life inside Iraq’s ‘Forbidden Zone’ controlled by Turkey’, 29 April 2025. ↩︎
38
A. Ismail, ‘Insight: Turkey’s push into Iraq risks deeper conflict’, Reuters, 31 January 2023; M. Gurbuz, ‘Turkey’s Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Iraq’, Arab Center Washington DC, 28 September 2022. ↩︎
39
M. Gurbuz, ‘Turkey’s Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Iraq’, Arab Center Washington DC, 28 September 2022; J. Kosiński, ‘Turkish Military Presence in Northern Iraq and its Implications’, Gorstra Research Group ↩︎
40
A. Ismail, ‘Insight: Turkey’s push into Iraq risks deeper conflict’, Reuters, 31 January 2023; M. Gurbuz, ‘Turkey’s Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Iraq’, Arab Center Washington DC, 28 September 2022. ↩︎
41
‘Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria’, International Crisis Group, 11 October 2019. ↩︎
42
UNSC, ‘Letter dated 20 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2014/691, 22 September 2014. ↩︎
43
J. Garamone, Kurdish Peshmerga Continue Partnership to Fight ISIS, DOD News, 27 September 2022. ↩︎
44
‘Iraq declares war with Islamic State is over’, BBC, 9 December 2017. ↩︎
45
‘Canada renews two international military missions supporting international security and stability’, Government of Canada, 31 March 2022; C. Chalak, ‘Germany extends its military mission in Kurdistan Region, Iraq’, Rudaw, 21 October 2022; ‘Germany extends Bundeswehr mission in Iraq’, Deutsche Welle, 1 December 2022; ‘Iraq – OIR and NMI’, Danish Defence; ‘Militaire bijdrage Nederland in Irak’, Ministerie van Defensie; ‘Nederlandse bijdrage Irak verlengd’, Ministerie van Defensie, 5 November 2021; ‘Opération CHAMMAL’, Ministère des Armées; H. Fayet, ‘What Strategic Posture Should France Adopt in the Middle East?’, Focus stratégique, Ifri, November 2022; ‘UK action to combat Daesh’, Gov.UK. ↩︎
46
‘United States of America’, OIR-CJTF, 2 March 2016 ↩︎
47
‘Update: air strikes against Daesh, GOV.UK, 27 April 2024 ↩︎
48
‘Operation Support to Iraq’, Gobierno de Espana, 14 July 2025 ↩︎
49
‘Dossier de Press Chammal’, Ministère des Armée, December 2023 ↩︎
50
‘Canade’, OIR-CJTF, 10 March 2016 ↩︎
51
‘Australia’, OIR-CJTF, 2 March 2016 ↩︎
52
‘Bundeswehr setzt Einsatz im Irak fort’, Die Bundesregierung, 13 September 2023 ↩︎
53
‘Nederland levert helikopters en troepencommandant voor NAVO-missie Irak’, Ministerue van Defensie, 29 September 2023 ↩︎
54
‘Tenth anniversary of Belgium’s involvement in the fight against ISIS’, The Brussels Times, 24 September 2024 ↩︎
55
‘In Iraq, Italy and France Are Looking for a Primary Role to Play’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 12 October 2021. ↩︎
56
M. Khurma and G. Cafiero, ‘Syria joining the anti-ISIS coalition is a westward pivot—with opportunities and risks’, Atlantic Council, 21 November 2025; ‘Syria signs up to US-led coalition against ISIL’, Al Jazeera, 11 November 2025. ↩︎
57
‘Country Guidance: Iraq’, European Union Agency for Asylum, November 2024, 16. ↩︎
58
‘Kurdistan Oil: The Past, Present and Future’, The Kurdish Project. ↩︎
59
Q. Abdul-Zahara and A. Zeyad, ‘Iraq’s parliament approves budget, ending dispute over oil revenue sharing with Kurdish region’, Associated Press, 12 June 2023; S. Karda, ‘The Kurdistan Regional Government Launches Oil Exports through Turkey’, Jamestown Foundation, 2 June 2009. ↩︎
60
Q. Abdul-Zahara and A. Zeyad, ‘Iraq’s parliament approves budget, ending dispute over oil revenue sharing with Kurdish region’, Associated Press, 12 June 2023. ↩︎
61
‘Iraq OKs budget change aimed at resuming KRG oil flows’, Argus Media, 3 February 2025; ‘Iraq parliament approves compensation plan to resolve Kurdistan oil dispute, say lawmakers’, Reuters, 2 February 2025. ↩︎
62
A. Rasheed and R. Edwards, ‘Iraq halts northern crude exports after winning arbitration case against Turkey’, Reuters, 25 March 2023; ‘Baghdad sues Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan regional government over $110 billion US energy deal’, Times of India, 27 May 2025. ↩︎
63
‘Iraqi Kurdish leader to oversee signing of energy agreements with US companies’, Reuters, 19 May 2025; I. Asaolu, ‘Iraq Rejects $110bn Kurdish Energy Deals with U.S. Firms’, The Electricity Hub, 23 May 2025. ↩︎
64
I. Asaolu, ‘Iraq Rejects $110bn Kurdish Energy Deals with U.S. Firms’, The Electricity Hub, 23 May 2025 ↩︎
65
‘Baghdad sues Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan regional government over $110 billion US energy deal’, Times of India, 27 May 2025; ‘Iraqi Oil Ministry Sues Kurdish Region’s Govt. over US Contracts’, Asharq Al-Aswat, 26 May 2025; C. Kennedy, ‘Iraq Files Lawsuit Against U.S. Over Kurdistan Oil Contracts’, Oil Price, 26 May 2025. ↩︎
66
‘KRG’s $110 billion energy deal to enter implementation soon’, The New Region, 16 October 2025. ↩︎
67
‘Iraq holds Kurdish government legally responsible for continued oil smuggling’, The New Arab, 5 June 2025; ‘Iraq holds Kurdish government legally responsible for continued oil smuggling’, Reuters, 5 June 2022; T. Paraskova, ‘Iraq Says Kurdistan Is Legally Responsible for Oil Smuggling’, Oil Price, 5 June 2025. ↩︎
68
‘Public employees in Iraq’s Kurdish region caught in the middle of Baghdad-Erbil oil dispute’, The New Arab, 9 June 2025. ↩︎
69
K. Aziz, ‘KRG Announces Breakthrough Salary Deal with Baghdad’, Kurdistan24, 17 July 2025; ‘‘Preliminary agreement’ reached between Erbil, Baghdad over salary issue: KRG spokesperson’, The New Region, 16 July 2025. ↩︎
70
‘Kurdistan Region and Iraq Agree on Oil Export Mechanism’, Kurdistan Regional Government, 13 August 2025; G. Akram, ‘Erbil and Baghdad agree on oil export resumption terms’, The New Region, 13 August 2025; K. Aziz, ‘Erbil, Baghdad Sign Oil Export Mechanism Agreement’, Kurdistan24, 13 August 2025. ↩︎
71
‘Iraq resumes Kurdish oil exports to Turkiye after two-and-a-half-year halt’, Al Jazeera, 27 September 2025; V. J. Taylor and Y. Saeed, ‘Is the Baghdad-Erbil oil deal a blueprint for settlement—or a stopgap?’, The Atlantic Council, 30 September 2025; ‘Eight oil companies reach agreement with Iraq, KRG to resume oil exports’, Reuters, 25 September 2025. ↩︎
72
‘Iraq Ships 2.5 Million Barrels of KRG Oil Following Export Restart’, Oil Price, 14 October 2025. ↩︎
73
‘Iraq, Kurdistan renew three-month agreement for oil exports through March 31, Kurdish Rudaw reports’, Reuters, 25 December 2025 ↩︎
74
Y. al-Maleki, ‘Iraq’s oil export vulnerability exposes the cost of unresolved disputes’, The Atlantic Council, 7 April 2026. ↩︎
75
R. Tahir, ‘Tripartite northern export deal renewed, spurring Kurdistan field restarts’, Iraq Oil Report, 20 August 2026. ↩︎
76
A. Rasheed et al, ‘Iraq resumes Kirkuk crude exports via Ceyhan after Baghdad-KRG deal’, Reuters, 17 March 2026; M. Sio and T. Chouiref, ‘Iraq’s KRG, Baghdad reach deal to resume oil exports via Türkiye’s Ceyhan port’, AA, 18 March 2026; U. Shokri, ‘Iraq’s Northern Exports Return, but Supply Risks Persist’, Middle East Forum, 19 March 2026. ↩︎
77
U. Shokri, ‘Iraq’s Northern Exports Return, but Supply Risks Persist’, Middle East Forum, 19 March 2026. ↩︎
78
A. Zavarace, ‘Iraq requests extension of Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline agreement’, Inspenet, 15 June 2026. ↩︎
79
‘Iraq seeks talks with Turkey on new oil transit deal’, Turkish Minute, 26 May 2026 ↩︎
80
S. Watkins, ‘Iraq’s Oil Lifeline Has Been Saved, But For How Long?’, Oil Price, 13 July 2026. ↩︎
81
Y. Saeed, ‘Iraqi Provincial Elections Could Come With Major Political and Security Ramifications’, Arab Gulf States Institute, 23 January 2024; A. Rasheed and T. Azhari, ‘Iraq holds first local elections in a decade, 41% turnout’, Reuters, 18 December 2023. ↩︎
82
‘Iraq’s governing Shia alliance strengthened in provincial elections’, Al Jazeera, 20 December 2023. ↩︎
83
Y. Saeed, ‘Iraqi Provincial Elections Could Come With Major Political and Security Ramifications’, Arab Gulf States Institute, 23 January 2024; ‘Iraq’s governing Shia alliance strengthened in provincial elections’, Al Jazeera, 20 December 2023. ↩︎
84
‘Ruling KDP in Kurdish region of northern Iraq wins delayed elections’, Al Jazeera, 30 October 2024; ‘The Results of the Kurdistan Parliamentary Elections’, Institut Kurde de Paris, 23 October 2024; M. A. Salih, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan’s Parliamentary Elections: Resilience, Challenges, and US Policy Stakes’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 30 October 2024. ↩︎
85
‘Ruling KDP in Kurdish region of northern Iraq wins delayed elections’, Al Jazeera, 30 October 2024; M. A. Salih, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan’s Parliamentary Elections: Resilience, Challenges, and US Policy Stakes’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 30 Octoober 2024. ↩︎
86
‘Middle East & North Africa: Iraq’, International Crisis Group, May 2025; ‘KDP, PUK negotiations in ‘final stages’: PUK official’, The New Region, 28 May 2025. ↩︎
87
‘Iraqis vote in general election amid scepticism about change’, The Arab Weekly, 11 November 2025; O. al-Jaffal and M. Saadoun, ‘Post-2025 Elections in Iraq: Reproduction of Power or Entrenchment of Institutional Fragility?’, Arab Reform Initiative, 26 February 2026; R. Zeidel, ‘The 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary Election: Results, Dynamics and Implications’, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 21 December 2025. ↩︎
88
M. Everett, ‘Special vote under way for forces and displaced in Iraq parliamentary polls’, Al Jazeera, 9 November 2025; ‘Iraqis vote in general election amid scepticism about change’, The Arab Weekly, 11 November 2025 ↩︎
89
R. Zeidel, ‘The 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary Election: Results, Dynamics and Implications’, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 21 December 2025. ↩︎
90
‘Killing of Sunni candidate casts shadow over Iraqi elections’, Amwaj.Media, 21 October 2025; ‘Iraq launches investigation after election candidate killed in Baghdad bombing’, Arab News Japan,15 October 2025 ↩︎
91
‘Two Wounded in Attack on Office of Iraqi Parliamentary Candidate’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 18 October 2025. ↩︎
92
‘Two police killed in Kirkuk ahead of Iraq elections’, RUDAW, 11 November 2025. ↩︎
93
‘Violence flares after Iraq vote as MP’s guards storm Peshmerga home’, The Arab Weekly, 16 November 2025; ‘Zeravani condemns attack on Peshmerga home in Kirkuk by Sunni MP’, The New Region, 16 November 2025. ↩︎
94
R. Zeidel, ‘The 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary Election: Results, Dynamics and Implications’, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 21 December 2025. ↩︎
95
R. Zeidel, ‘The 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary Election: Results, Dynamics and Implications’, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 21 December 2025; O. al-Jaffal and M. Saadoun, ‘Post-2025 Elections in Iraq: Reproduction of Power or Entrenchment of Institutional Fragility?’, Arab Reform Initiative, 26 February 2026. ↩︎
96
O. al-Jaffal and M. Saadoun, ‘Post-2025 Elections in Iraq: Reproduction of Power or Entrenchment of Institutional Fragility?’, Arab Reform Initiative, 26 February 2026; W. van Wilgenburg, ‘Toward a New Compromise in Iraq?’, Carnegie Middle East Center, 9 December 2025. ↩︎
97
‘Middle East & North Africa: Iraq’, International Crisis Group, November 2025. ↩︎
98
V. J. Taylor, ‘Dispatch from Iraq: The biggest challenge awaiting the country’s next prime minister’, Atlantic Council, 10 December 2025. ↩︎
99
W. van Wilgenburg, ‘Toward a New Compromise in Iraq?’, Carnegie Middle East Center, 9 December 2025. ↩︎
100
W. van Wilgenburg, ‘Toward a New Compromise in Iraq?’, Carnegie Middle East Center, 9 December 2025. ↩︎
101
‘Al-Sudani Says He’s Dropping Out of Iraq’s PM Race. Is It a Trap for Al-Maliki?’, The National Context, 11 January 2026 ↩︎
102
‘Iraq Shia alliance nominates former PM Nouri al-Maliki as its candidate’, Al Jazeera, 24 January 2026; ‘Iraq’s Shi’ite alliance nominates Nouri al-Maliki for prime minister’, Reuters, 24 January 2026. ↩︎
103
M. Tawfeeq and N. Ebrahim, ‘Trump warns against Nouri al-Maliki’s return as prime minister of Iraq’, CNN, 28 January 2026; Donald J. Trump, Truth Social, 27 January 2026. ↩︎
104
R. al-Rahim and V. Taylor, ‘Why the Trump administration is refusing to accept a third term for Iraq’s Nouri al-Maliki’, Atlantic Council, 3 February 2026 ↩︎
105
M. Tawfeeq and N. Ebrahim, ‘Trump warns against Nouri al-Maliki’s return as prime minister of Iraq’, CNN, 28 January 2026. ↩︎
106
A. Ahmad, ‘Iraq’s Shia bloc divided over tactics after US rejects al-Maliki for PM’, Al Jazeera, 6 February 2026 ↩︎
107
S. al-Kubaisi, ‘Iraq confirms US threat of sanctions if Maliki returns as PM’, The New Arab, 19 February 2026. ↩︎
108
‘Under US pressure, Iraq’s ruling Shiite alliance edges towards break with Maliki’, Amwaj.media, 24 February 2026. ↩︎
109
‘Iraq president nominates Ali al-Zaidi as PM-designate’, Le Monde, 28 April 2026. ↩︎
110
‘Iraq’s parliament approves new Ali al-Zaidi government’, Al Jazeera, 14 May 2026. ↩︎
111
S. Cagaptay et al, ‘The Iraq-Turkey Reset’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 May 2024. ↩︎
112
‘Briefing: Turkey, Iraq sign security and military cooperation deal’, BBC Monitoring, 16 August 2024; ‘Turkey, Iraq sign agreement on military, security, counter-terrorism cooperation’, The Arab Weekly, 16 August 2024. ↩︎
113
‘Turkey, Iraq To Deepen Security Cooperation in High-Level Talks’, The Media Line, 22 November 2024 April 2025,‘Joint Statement on the Fifth Meeting of High-Level Security Mechanism Between the Republic of Türkiye and the Republic of Iraq’, Republic of Türkiye: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 April 2025 May 2025,G. Akram, ‘Sudani visits Ankara, discusses security with Erdogan’, The New Region, 8 May 2025 and July 2026,W. Ibrahim, ‘Iraqi PM visits Turkiye to boost ties despite complex challenges’, Al Jazeera, 28 July 2026 ↩︎
114
S. Çevik, ‘Turkey and Iraq’s Emerging Partnership in a Changing Regional Order’, Arab Center Washington DC, 26 August 2026. ↩︎
115
‘Iraq requests end of UN assistance mission by end-2025’, Reuters, 10 May 2024; A. R. Zeyad, ‘Iraqi government asks the United Nations to wind down its political mission in the country’, Associated Press, 10 May 2024. ↩︎
116
E. M. Lederer, ‘UN votes to end Iraq political mission established after 2003 US-led invasion toppled Saddam Hussein’, Associated Press, 1 June 2024. ↩︎
117
‘Iraq: UN mission ends, with pledge of continued support’, United Nations News, 2 December 2025; Q. Abdul-Zahra, ‘UN chief visits Iraq to mark end of assistance mission set up after 2003 invasion’, Associated Press, 13 December 2025. ↩︎
118
‘Senior Administration Official and Senior Defense Official on a Transition Plan for Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq’, U.S. Department of State, 27 September 2024. ↩︎
119
‘Senior Administration Official and Senior Defense Official on a Transition Plan for Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq’, U.S. Department of State, 27 September 2024. ↩︎
120
‘Senior Administration Official and Senior Defense Official on a Transition Plan for Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq’, U.S. Department of State, 27 September 2024; ‘Anti-Jihadist Coalition Mission in Iraq Ending in 2025’, The Defense Post, 30 September 2024. ↩︎
121
‘Senior Administration Official and Senior Defense Official on a Transition Plan for Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq’, U.S. Department of State, 27 September 2024 ↩︎
122
‘Iraq, Germany discuss security ties as US-led coalition withdrawal nears’, News.AZ, 24 August 2026. ↩︎
123
‘Senior Administration Official and Senior Defense Official on a Transition Plan for Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq’, U.S. Department of State, 27 September 2024. ↩︎
124
‘Senior Administration Official and Senior Defense Official on a Transition Plan for Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq’, U.S. Department of State, 27 September 2024 ↩︎
125
W. van Wilgenburg and M. B. Caggins III, ‘After the Coalition: Evaluating the Next Steps for Foreign Forces in Iraq and Syria’, New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 18 March 2025; W. van Wilgenburg, ‘German Defense Minister Underlines Continued Support to Kurdistan’, Kurdistan Chronicles, 12 December 2024; ‘Iraq, Germany discuss security ties as US-led coalition withdrawal nears’, News.AZ, 24 August 2026; W. van Wilgenburg, ‘Italy’s Defense Minister Praises Peshmerga’, Kurdistan Chronicles, 22 December 2024; W. van Wilgenburg, ‘Dutch Military Advisors Should Stay in Kurdistan: Defense Minister’, Kurdistan Chronicles, 24 December 2024. ↩︎
126
‘U.S.-led coalition certifies Iraq’s combat strike readiness’, Iraqi News, 6 November 2025. ↩︎
127
‘U.S.-led coalition certifies Iraq’s combat strike readiness’, Iraqi News, 6 November 2025. ↩︎
128
W. van Wilgenburg, ‘Dutch Military Advisors Should Stay in Kurdistan: Defense Minister’, Kurdistan Chronicles, 24 December 2024. ↩︎
129
W. van Wilgenburg, ‘Italy’s Defense Minister Praises Peshmerga’, Kurdistan Chronicles, 22 December 2024. ↩︎
130
‘Iraq/Jordan/Kuwait’, Forsvaret, 25 March 2026. ↩︎
131
‘Iraq, Germany discuss security ties as US-led coalition withdrawal nears’, News.AZ, 24 August 2026; ‘Iraq rejects plan to keep US-led coalition forces beyond September 30’, TRT World, 31 August 2026; ‘Iraqi PM Reaffirms Final Deadline for Coalition Withdrawal’, Bas News, 12 August 2026. ↩︎
132
S. Demir, ‘German forces end military mission in Iraq’s Kurdish region’, AA, 26 August 2026; S, Mahmoud, ‘German military ends Iraq mission as US-led anti-ISIS coalition prepares to leave’, The National, 26 August 2026. ↩︎
133
‘US begins transfer of up to 7,000 IS group detainees from Syria to Iraq’, France 24, 22 January 2026. ↩︎
134
G. Alsayed, ‘U.S. military transfers first 150 Islamic State group detainees from Syria to Iraq’, PBS News, 21 January 2026 ↩︎
135
‘Iraq: Alleged ISIS Detainees Transferred from Syria at Risk of Abuse’, Human Rights Watch, 17 February 2026; ‘More than 5,000 ISIL detainees transferred from Syria, says Iraqi ministry’, Al Jazeera, 13 February 2026. ↩︎
136
A. Al Ibrahim and M. Bassiki, ‘“The Final Charge”: From U.S.-Funded Prisons to Iraqi Terrorism Courts, Syrians Face Possible Death Sentences’, Syrian Investigate Reporting for Accountability Journalism, 25 August 2026. ↩︎
137
‘Iraq Announces Return of 3,000 Syrian Detainees Following SIRAJ Investigation’, Syrian Investigate Reporting for Accountability Journalism, 28 August 2026. ↩︎
138
E. Akin, ‘Iraq bans PKK as security ties with Turkey gain momentum’, Al Monitor, 14 March 2024; S. Cagaptay et al, ‘The Iraq-Turkey Reset’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 May 2024. ↩︎
139
S. Salim, ‘Iraq bans a Kurdish separatist group and strengthens its cooperation with Turkey’, Associated Press, 23 July 2024. ↩︎
140
‘Jailed PKK leader tells group to lay down arms, end conflict with Turkiye’, Al Jazeera, 27 February 2025; P. Kirby, ‘Jailed Kurdish leader issues call to lay down arms’, BBC, 27 February 2025. ↩︎
141
A. Wilks, ‘Kurdish PKK militants declare a ceasefire in 40-year insurgency in Turkey’, Associated Press, 1 March 2025 ↩︎
142
J. Yeung, ‘Kurdish PKK militants announce decision to dissolve after decades of conflict with Turkey’, CNN, 12 May 2025; D. Butler and E. Toksabay, ‘Kurdish PKK ends 40-year Turkey insurgency, bringing hope of regional stability’, Reuters, 12 May 2025; S. Fraser, ‘The PKK Kurdish militant group will disarm and disband as part of a peace initiative with Turkey’, Associate Press, 12 May 2025. ↩︎
143
J. Yeung, ‘Kurdish PKK militants announce decision to dissolve after decades of conflict with Turkey’, CNN, 12 May 2025; S. Fraser, ‘The PKK Kurdish militant group will disarm and disband as part of a peace initiative with Turkey’, Associate Press, 12 May 2025 ↩︎
144
D. Butler and E. Toksabay, ‘Kurdish PKK ends 40-year Turkey insurgency, bringing hope of regional stability’, Reuters, 12 May 2025. ↩︎
145
D. Butler and E. Toksabay, ‘Kurdish PKK ends 40-year Turkey insurgency, bringing hope of regional stability’, Reuters, 12 May 2025; S. Fraser, ‘The PKK Kurdish militant group will disarm and disband as part of a peace initiative with Turkey’, Associate Press, 12 May 2025. ↩︎
146
S. Akrayi, ‘Thousands of PKK Fighters to Join Iraqi Army as Disarmament Process Takes Shape Under Turkish Intelligence Oversight’, Kurdistan24, 31 August 2026; ‘Türkiye prepares next phase of PKK disarmament: report’, Xinhua, 31 August 2026. ↩︎
147
J. Salhani, ‘Who are the Islamic Resistance in Iraq?’, Al Jazeera, 10 February 2024; H. Malik and M. Knights, ‘Profile: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 October 2023, Updated 20 June 2024; M. Gregory, ‘Explainer: Who are Iraq’s Iranian-backed armed groups?’, Reuters, 29 July 2026. ↩︎
148
A. Qadi, ‘Saudi Arabia Warns of Possible Attacks by Iraqi Armed Groups’, Kurdistan24, 29 August 2026. ↩︎
149
M. Gregory, ‘Explainer: Who are Iraq’s Iranian-backed armed groups?’, Reuters, 29 July 2026. ↩︎
150
M. Gregory, ‘Explainer: Who are Iraq’s Iranian-backed armed groups?’, Reuters, 29 July 2026. ↩︎
151
H. Al-Khafaji, ‘Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces: The Possibilities for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration’, London School of Economics and Political Science: Middle East Centre, Conflict Research Programme, November 2019; ‘Who Holds the Keys to Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces?’, Al Hurra, 3 September 2026. ↩︎
152
H. Al-Khafaji, ‘Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces: The Possibilities for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration’, London School of Economics and Political Science: Middle East Centre, Conflict Research Programme, November 2019; B. Duman, ‘Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi: The structure ‘which disturbs Iraq’s balance’’, Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkezi Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 26 October 2026 ↩︎
153
‘2.2 Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)’, European Union Agency for Asylum, Country Guidance Iraq, November 2024. ↩︎
154
‘Who Holds the Keys to Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces?’, Al Hurra, 3 September 2026; Z. Abdi, ‘Shia Militias in Iraq: A Backgrounder’, Arab Center Washington DC, 14 May 2026. ↩︎
155
‘Who Holds the Keys to Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces?’, Al Hurra, 3 September 2026. ↩︎
156
Z. Abdi, ‘Shia Militias in Iraq: A Backgrounder’, Arab Center Washington DC, 14 May 2026. ↩︎
157
Q. A. Zahra and S. Kullab, ‘Driven by the pressures of war, Iran gives its field commanders more power over militias in Iraq’, Associated Press, 21 April 2026; ‘Who Holds the Keys to Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces?’, Al Hurra, 3 September 2026. ↩︎
158
‘Who Holds the Keys to Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces?’, Al Hurra, 3 September 2026. ↩︎
159
A. Mohammed, ‘Iran Rejects U.S. Call for Hashd al-Shaabi Dissolution, Says Iraq Decides Its Own Affairs’, Channel 8, 28 March 2025; ‘Middle East & North Africa: Iraq’, International Crisis Group, January 2025. ↩︎
160
‘PM Sudani hails PMF as ‘fundamental factor’ of Iraq’s peace, security’, The New Region, 5 January 2025. ↩︎
161
R. Zimmit, ‘Spotlight on Iran’, The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute, 31 December 2025 – 7 January 2026. ↩︎
162
‘Iran Update, March 17, 2025’, Critical Threats, 17 March 2025 ↩︎
163
A. Rasheed, ‘Exclusive: Iran-backed militias in Iraq ready to disarm to avert Trump wrath’, Reuters, 8 April 2025. ↩︎
164
‘Iran-backed militias in Iraq ready to disarm to avert Trump wrath’, The Jerusalem Post, 7 April 2025; A. Rasheed, ‘Exclusive: Iran-backed militias in Iraq ready to disarm to avert Trump wrath’, Reuters, 8 April 2025. ↩︎
165
A. Rasheed, ‘Exclusive: Iran-backed militias in Iraq ready to disarm to avert Trump wrath’, Reuters, 8 April 2025. ↩︎
166
‘Terrorist Designations of Iran-Aligned Militia Groups’, U.S. Department of State, 17 September 2025. ↩︎
167
‘Treasury Takes Aim at Iran-Backed Militia Groups Threatening the Safety of Americans’, U.S. Department of Treasury, 9 October 2025. ↩︎
168
D. Mohammed, ‘Iraq’s Armed Factions Agree to Coordinate on Restricting Weapons to State Control, Supreme Judicial Council Chief Says’, Kurdistan24, 20 December 2025; D. Moudalla, ‘Weapons under state control in Iraq: Iran-aligned militias under pressure’, L’Orient Today, 22 December 2025. ↩︎
169
D. Mohammed, ‘Iraq’s Armed Factions Agree to Coordinate on Restricting Weapons to State Control, Supreme Judicial Council Chief Says’, Kurdistan24, 20 December 2025. ↩︎
170
R. Zimmit, ‘Spotlight on Iran’, The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute, 31 December 2025 – 7 January 2026. ↩︎
171
S. al-Salhy, ‘Dissolution of Iraqi ‘resistance’ committee amid weapons control drive’, The New Region, 23 July 2026. ↩︎
172
S. Martany, ‘Powerful Iran-backed militias in Iraq say they will start handing in weapons to authorities’, Associated Press, 2 June 2026. ↩︎
173
S. al-Salhy, ‘Dissolution of Iraqi ‘resistance’ committee amid weapons control drive’, The New Region, 23 July 2026. ↩︎
174
‘Iraq Orders Iran-Backed Militias to Disarm Within Three Months’, Iranwire, 29 June 2026; Y. Schneider, ‘The Plan to Disarm Iraq’s Militias: Internal Division and Iran’s Efforts to Block It’, The Institute for National Security Studies, 2 September 2026; S. J. Frantzman, ‘Iraqi militias raise new conditions for disarmament, Iraq takes ‘wait-and-see’ approach – analysis’, The Jerusalem Post, 2 September 2026. ↩︎
175
Y. Schneider, ‘The Plan to Disarm Iraq’s Militias: Internal Division and Iran’s Efforts to Block It’, The Institute for National Security Studies, 2 September 2026. ↩︎
176
M. Al-Bassem, ‘US hardens stance on disarming military factions in Iraq’, The New Arab, 14 July 2026. ↩︎
177
M. Ali, ‘Exclusive: Iraqi factions propose weapons ‘freeze’ instead of disarmament’, The New Arab, 29 August 2026. ↩︎
178
A. Oseran, ‘Iran-backed Iraqi militias escalate demands ahead of disarmament deadline’, i24 News, 30 August 2026. ↩︎
179
T. Lopez, ‘3 U.S. Service Members Killed, Others Injured in Jordan Following Drone Attack’, 29 January 2024. ↩︎
180
P. Stewart et al, ‘Three US troops killed in Jordan drone strike linked to Iran’, Reuters, 29 January 2024. ↩︎
181
‘Iraqi militia claims drone attack on Jordan in support of Iran’, The New Arab, 4 March 2026. ↩︎
182
J. Al-Samarraie, ‘Islamic Resistance in Iraq escalates: Coordinated strikes on multiple Jordanian airbases’, Iraqi News, 28 March 2026. ↩︎
183
‘UAE Says Drones Targeting Nuclear Plant Came from Iraq’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 19 May 2026; ‘Launch of strikes on UAE nuclear plant from Iraq puts more pressure on Zaidi’, The Arab Weekly, 20 May 2026; ‘Attack on UAE Nuclear Plant From Iraq ‘Warning Shot’ By Iran | Bloomberg’, ACLED, 22 May 2026. ↩︎
184
‘Attack on UAE Nuclear Plant From Iraq ‘Warning Shot’ By Iran | Bloomberg’, ACLED, 22 May 2026. ↩︎
185
S. Mumayiz et al, ‘Update on Houthi Involvement in Iraq’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 26 February 2025 ↩︎
186
A. J. Rubin, ‘Once Considered Foes, Iranian-Backed Groups Get a Warm Welcome From Iraq’, The New York Times, 15 September 2024. ↩︎
187
S. Mumayiz et al, ‘Update on Houthi Involvement in Iraq’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 26 February 2025. ↩︎
188
M. Aldroubi, ‘Houthis’ growing presence in Iraq linked to attack on Saudi Arabia’, The National News, 31 July 2026. ↩︎
189
E. Ardemagni, ‘Houthi-Islamic Resistance in Iraq: A Partnership with Constraints. Until Now?’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 10 March 2026. ↩︎
190
M. Knights and A. al-Kaabi, ‘Houthi Missile Forces Colonel Killed at Iraqi Government Base in Jurf al-Sakhar’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 6 August 2024. ↩︎
191
T. Azhari and M. Ghobari, ‘Yemen’s Houthis are attacking Saudi Arabia from Iraq, sources say’, Reuters, 30 July 2026; M. Aldroubi, ‘Houthis’ growing presence in Iraq linked to attack on Saudi Arabia’, The National News, 31 July 2026. ↩︎
192
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule”’, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para 70; ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 9–10. ↩︎
193
‘Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Commentary of 2025: Article 2 – Application of the Convention’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases, para 293; ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 9. ↩︎

Overview

Historical background

An Autonomous Kurdistan

The situation between Türkiye and the Kurds in Iraq

A Turkish presence in northern Iraq

The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq

Key developments (between June 2023 and September 2026)

Oil Relations Between Baghdad and Erbil

Provincial, Regional, and Parliamentary Elections

Improved Relations with Türkiye

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq Comes to an End

‘Transition Plan’ for the CJTF-OIR and Participating States

Islamic State Detainees Moved into Iraq from Syria

PKK Banned and Subsequently Disarms and Dissolves

Disarmament of Some Iranian-backed Militias in Iraq

IRI strikes on Jordan

Strikes on United Arab Emirates Nuclear Plant

A Growing Houthi Presence in Iraq

International Armed Conflict

Non-International Armed Conflict

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-State parties