Iraq

Türkiye’s military operations against the PKK within the territory of Iraq are classified as an IAC, as these were mounted without Iraq’s consent. This remains unchanged despite the government’s recent lack of condemnation of these Turkish activities. The memorandum of understanding fostering broader military, security, and counterterrorism cooperation between the two parties does not explicitly refer to the operations Türkiye carries out against the PKK on Iraqi territory See ‘Major events and developments’. Moreover, the Iraqi government is said to have insisted on establishing a mechanism that places responsibility for security in its hands.¹L. Kenez, Turkey to provide Iraqi army with training in intelligence and drone operations, Nordic Monitor, 11 October 2024. Based on the foregoing, the absence of explicit protest does not suffice in itself to conclude that Iraq has implied consent to Türkiye’s military operations against the PKK on its territory.²ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 263. See also: ILC, Draft articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, p. 73, paras 3 and 8. Consequently, Türkiye’s continued military engagement against the PKK in Iraq remains viewed as a situation of IAC between Iraq and Türkiye

• 1
  L. Kenez, Turkey to provide Iraqi army with training in intelligence and drone operations, Nordic Monitor, 11 October 2024.
• 2
  ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 263. See also: ILC, Draft articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, p. 73, paras 3 and 8.

Since late 2019, the US armed forces have carried out regular airstrikes targeting factions of the IRI, including Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Harakat al-Nujaba, along with their facilities within Iraqi territory.

As noted,¹See ‘Historical background’. Iraq has explicitly sought support from the US as part of the CJTF-OIR to combat ISIL. However, the US strikes against targets not affiliated with ISIL – some of which have involved individuals formally part of the Iraqi armed forces – are likely to fall outside the permissible scope of that consent. This limitation is reinforced by the fact that the Iraqi government has consistently condemned such actions, further indicating a lack of consent for these operations.²L. Pelham, Iraq condemns ‘irresponsible’ US air strikes on Iran-backed groups, BBC, 24 January 2024. Taken together, this suggests that such attacks occur without the Iraqi government’s consent and thus amount to an IAC between the US and Iraq.

• 1
  See ‘Historical background’.
• 2
  L. Pelham, Iraq condemns ‘irresponsible’ US air strikes on Iran-backed groups, BBC, 24 January 2024.

In early 2024, two Iranian missiles, allegedly aimed at Israeli targets, landed in Erbil province. Iraq has continuously condemned these attacks on its territory.¹See ‘Key developments’. Hence, although there were no further incidents reported, these instances of use of force on Iraqi territory amounted to short-lived IACs between Iran and Iraq, as these attacks were conducted without the express consent of the Iraqi government on its territory.

• 1
  See ‘Key developments’.

ISIL, also known as the Islamic State group and Da’esh, emerged from the Islamic State of Iraq, an alliance of Sunni insurgent factions formed in 2006 and initially dominated by al-Qaeda in Iraq. Following its expansion into Syria in 2012 and the ending of relations with al-Qaeda and its affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra in 2013, ISIL solidified its position as a distinct entity. Despite its territorial defeat in 2019, ISIL remains active and retains an important organizational capability, continuing to engage in significant insurgent activities, recruiting fighters, and using a more decentralised structure for operational flexibility.

Operating primarily from two key regions in Syria – the Syrian Desert (Badiya Al-Sham) and the Jazira region – ISIL has capitalized on remote and poorly governed areas, where it continues to regroup, recruit, and train new combatants.¹UNSC, Twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, UN Doc S/2025/72, 31 January 2025, para 6; Masood Al Hakari, Without a Caliphate, But Far from Defeated: Why Da’esh/ISIS Remains a Threat in Syria in 2025, PRIF Blog, 7 April 2025.

Moreover, despite the loss of thousands of ISIL fighters, as of 2024, an estimated 2,500 remained active in Syria and Iraq.²T. Mehra, The Threat of ISIS in a Fragmentated Syria, ICCT, 16 May 2025. These continue to conduct coordinated and sustained attacks, such as the 2022 assault on Syrian prisons to free detained fighters, reflecting not only strategic planning to rebuild its forces but also the ability to execute complex operations over an extended period.³L. Loveluck and S. Cahlan, Prison break: ISIS fighters launched a brazen attack to free their comrades, 3 February 2022.

Furthermore, ISIL’s capacity to maintain an armed presence is bolstered by its control over key resources. Since the fall of the Assad regime, the group reportedly resupplied itself with weapons captured from the former government’s armed forces and the Russian military.⁴A. Braverman et al., Iran Update, 24 December 2024. It also continues to be capable of benefiting from critical financial resources to sustain its operational capabilities, maintain logistical support, and project authority in areas under its influence.⁵A. Y. Zelin, Devorah Margolin, The Islamic State’s Shadow Governance in Eastern Syria Since the Fall of Baghuz, Vol 16, Issue 9 (September 2023).

Despite ISIL’s progressive decentralization of its power structures, leaving a degree of autonomy for its provinces across the globe, these remain under the strategic direction of a central leadership reportedly based in Syria. This leadership reportedly retains significant control, issuing directives on military strategy, economic governance, and resource management, which highlights the enduring institutional cohesion of the group.⁶T. Hamming, The General Directorate of Provinces: Managing the Islamic State’s Global Network, Vol 16, Issue 7 (July 2023).

In light of these factors, including its continued military capability, operational resilience, organizational coherence, and resource control, it can be concluded that ISIL retains a level of organisation that fulfils the criterion under IHL for classification as a non-State armed group.

The Iraqi armed forces, in conjunction with CJTF-OIR support, have continued targeted operations aimed at degrading ISIL’s operational capabilities, including efforts to destroy its military assets and infrastructure, such as tunnel networks and hideouts. These operations have significantly weakened ISIL’s ability to carry out large-scale attacks. Nonetheless, the group retains a demonstrated capacity for coordinated violence.⁷See ‘Major events and developments’.

Although some States forming part of the CJTF-OIR ceased to conduct actual airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, their support continues to meet the criterion of the ICRC’s support-based approach and thus be considered parties to the NIAC between Iraq and ISIL within Iraq.⁸ICRC, How is the term “Armed Conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?, 16 April 2024, p. 16. These States all intervened in this pre-existing armed conflict, and there is a sufficiently close link between their actions and the harm caused to ISIL by the joint actions by Iraq and other States part of the CJTF-OIR.⁹See Armed Conflict(s) Overview. This includes States, such as the US OIR-CJTF, United States of America, 2 March 2016, the UK GOV.UK, Update: air strikes against Daesh, 27 April 2024, Spain Gobierno de Espana, Operation Support to Iraq, 14 July 2025, France Ministère des Armée, Dossier de Press Chammal, December 2023, Canada OIR-CJTF, Canade, 10 March 2016, Australia (until December 2024) OIR-CJTF, Australia, 2 March 2016, Germany Die Bundesregierung, Bundeswehr setzt Einsatz im Irak fort, 13 Septmeber 2023, the Netherlands Ministerue van Defensie, Nederland levert helikopters en troepencommandant voor NAVO-missie Irak, 29 Septmeber 2023, Belgium The Brussels Times, Tenth anniversary of Belgium’s involvement in the fight against ISIS, 24 September 2024, and Italy Italian Institute for International Political Studies, In Iraq, Italy and France Are Looking for a Primary Role to Play, 12 October 2021.

Overall, the frequency and sophistication of incidents between ISIL and Iraq, supported by the CJTF-OIR, remain sufficient to satisfy the intensity threshold under IHL. Taken together, the level of protracted violence and the sustained operational capability of those parties point to the continued existence of an NIAC. Customary IHL remains applicable alongside Common Article 3.

• 1
  UNSC, Twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, UN Doc S/2025/72, 31 January 2025, para 6; Masood Al Hakari, Without a Caliphate, But Far from Defeated: Why Da’esh/ISIS Remains a Threat in Syria in 2025, PRIF Blog, 7 April 2025.
• 2
  T. Mehra, The Threat of ISIS in a Fragmentated Syria, ICCT, 16 May 2025.
• 3
  L. Loveluck and S. Cahlan, Prison break: ISIS fighters launched a brazen attack to free their comrades, 3 February 2022.
• 4
  A. Braverman et al., Iran Update, 24 December 2024.
• 5
  A. Y. Zelin, Devorah Margolin, The Islamic State’s Shadow Governance in Eastern Syria Since the Fall of Baghuz, Vol 16, Issue 9 (September 2023).
• 6
  T. Hamming, The General Directorate of Provinces: Managing the Islamic State’s Global Network, Vol 16, Issue 7 (July 2023).
• 7
  See ‘Major events and developments’.
• 8
  ICRC, How is the term “Armed Conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?, 16 April 2024, p. 16.
• 9
  See Armed Conflict(s) Overview. This includes States, such as the US OIR-CJTF, United States of America, 2 March 2016, the UK GOV.UK, Update: air strikes against Daesh, 27 April 2024, Spain Gobierno de Espana, Operation Support to Iraq, 14 July 2025, France Ministère des Armée, Dossier de Press Chammal, December 2023, Canada OIR-CJTF, Canade, 10 March 2016, Australia (until December 2024) OIR-CJTF, Australia, 2 March 2016, Germany Die Bundesregierung, Bundeswehr setzt Einsatz im Irak fort, 13 Septmeber 2023, the Netherlands Ministerue van Defensie, Nederland levert helikopters en troepencommandant voor NAVO-missie Irak, 29 Septmeber 2023, Belgium The Brussels Times, Tenth anniversary of Belgium’s involvement in the fight against ISIS, 24 September 2024, and Italy Italian Institute for International Political Studies, In Iraq, Italy and France Are Looking for a Primary Role to Play, 12 October 2021.

As noted,¹See ‘Major events and developments’. a growing number of violent confrontations between the US and IRI were reported following the situation in Gaza in October 2023.²See ‘Armed Conflicts in Israel’. In the period between October 2023 and late January 2024, Iran-linked militias had reportedly launched more than 150 rocket and drone attacks on US military personnel and facilities located in Iraq and Syria, causing significant destruction and injury.³See ‘Armed Conflicts in Syria’. Notably, the Al-Asad airbase in western Iraq, a key installation housing US troops and equipment, was regularly subjected to attack since October 2023. The US conducted, allegedly in response, regular airstrikes targeting facilities used by these groups, including training areas, weapon and ammunition storage, and safe houses.⁴J. Clark, U.S. Strikes Targets in Iraq and Syria in Response to Deadly Drone Attack, 2 February 2023. These incidents led to substantial physical damage and multiple casualties on both sides.

In terms of organization, the IRI constitutes a network of Shia militias that emerged with a common ideological and operational objective. The IRI is characterized by a decentralized and fragmented structure, with a wide range of loosely aligned armed groups, such as Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HHN), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS). Formally, these factions are part of the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU), which is an umbrella term for multiple factions of militias formally part of the Iraqi security forces. The PMU initially emerged as a crucial actor in combating and defeating ISIL after the defeat of the Iraqi security forces in Mosul in June 2014. While factions within the PMU continue their anti-ISIL operations, the IRI factions have gradually expanded their influence over Iraqi and Syrian territory, with the aim of reducing the US presence in Iraq and Syria.⁵A. Majidyar, ‘Iran-Backed Iraqi Militia Leader Intensifies Propaganda against U.S. and Its Allies’, Middle East Institute, 1 August 2017.

Although formally part of the Iraqi armed forces, like many other factions within the PMU, they operate independently from the Iraqi State.⁶See European Union Agency for Asylum, Country Guidance: Iraq, p. 16. Various sources affirm that each of the IRI factions relies on its own chain of command.⁷I. Rudolf, All the Mahdi’s Men: Contextualising Nuances Within Iraq’s Islamic Resistance, Routledge, 18 May 2024. Although the IRI is not a singular entity with a unified command, each constituent militia independently meets the organizational criteria set out in IHL.⁸See ICRC, How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?, Opinion Paper, 2024, p. 16.

All IRI factions have clearly established hierarchical and compartmentalized military leadership and administrative structures. The KH, for instance, is led by a secretary general, working alongside an advisory council, to formulate strategy and actions. Under these two entities are offices divided into different branches, including a Police Bureau and a Military Bureau. Militarily, the factions organize their forces into distinct operational units.⁹M. Knights, Back into the Shadows? The Future of Kata’ib Hezbollah and Iran’s Other Proxies in Iraq, Washington Institute, October 2020.

The estimated numbers of fighters within each faction diverge markedly. For the two largest factions, KH and AAH, estimates range from 5,000 up to 30,000 fighters. In terms of logistics and training capabilities, evidence suggests that their fighters all receive training from the Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and Hezbollah. As part of the PMU, they receive funding and training from the Iraqi government. Additionally, the IRGC-QF provides them with significant financial and material support, including drones, rifles, rockets, and systems for launching anti-missiles, as well as training in using these weapons.¹⁰I. Rudolf, All the Mahdi’s Men: Contextualising Nuances Within Iraq’s Islamic Resistance, Routledge, 18 May 2024; Crispin Smith and Michael Knights, Remaking Iraq: How Iranian-Backed Militias Captured the Country, Just Security, 20 March 2023. The sophistication of the attacks using drones and heavy weaponry attests to these factions’ capacities to organize themselves and execute military strategies effectively¹¹.See also M. Knights, A. al-Kaabi, H. Malik, Tracking Anti-U.S. and Anti-Israel Strikes From Iraq and Syria During the Gaza Crisis, Policy Analysis, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 December 2024. As to their outreach and communication capabilities, the militias have their respective dedicated media wings that provide morale-boosting battlefield updates, propaganda videos, and serve as recruitment tools for new fighters. Their media network includes websites, social media accounts, and satellite channels¹².See https://www.kataibhezbollah.me/; https://www.aletejahtv.iq/.

Despite maintaining operational autonomy and distinct chains of command, these factions demonstrate a certain level of coordination within their alliance beyond their shared operational objectives. Their fighters reportedly fought regularly in support of the Assad regime.¹³W. Posch, Schiitische Milizen im Irak und in Syrien Volksmobilisierungseinheiten und andere. The establishment of a shared communication network also contributed to their ability to promote a unified narrative.¹⁴See IRI Telegram channel established on 18 October 2023. Operationally, the groups have demonstrated their capacity to carry out coordinated attacks across borders. On 18 October 2023, the IRI executed simultaneous strikes on the Ain Asad airbase and the Harir US base in Iraq.¹⁵N. Şaban, Analyzing Iranian-Orchestrated Attacks on U.S. Bases in Syria and Iraq Post Gaza War, OMRAN, 7 March 2024. Taken together, these elements underscore a level of coordination between the militias that are part of the IRI’s network, making it sufficient to consider them as a decentralized armed group party to a NIAC.¹⁶ICRC, The Roots of Restraint in war, 2018, pp. 45–47.

Although supported materially and financially by Iran, there is insufficient conclusive factual evidence to determine that these factions operated under its direct control and command. While the evidence clearly demonstrates that Iran significantly contributes to the group’s equipment, financing, and training, and shares strategic and ideological aims with these groups, there is a lack of factual evidence that demonstrates it is involved in the general planning of their military activities.¹⁷I. Rudolf, All the Mahdi’s Men: Contextualising Nuances Within Iraq’s Islamic Resistance, Routledge, 18 May 2024.

In conclusion, the factual patterns between October 2023 and February 2024 meet the intensity threshold, and the parties to the conflict are sufficiently organized for the situation to be classified as an NIAC. Iraq is not a party to AP II, but customary IHL remains applicable.

The decline in violent confrontations from February 2024 onwards, along with the absence of any reported incidents since December 2024, may be indicative of a cessation of hostilities. According to the ICRC, a NIAC comes to an end when a ‘peaceful settlement is reached’, namely when ‘one of the parties ceases to exist’ or ‘there is a lasting cessation of armed confrontations without real risk of resumption’.¹⁸ICRC, How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?, Opinion Paper, 2024, pp. 18–19. Persistent warnings from IRI factions about the potential for renewed attacks against the US indicate that the situation remains unstable, and a significant risk of resumption persists, meaning that the NIAC has not ended.

• 1
  See ‘Major events and developments’.
• 2
  See ‘Armed Conflicts in Israel’.
• 3
  See ‘Armed Conflicts in Syria’.
• 4
  J. Clark, U.S. Strikes Targets in Iraq and Syria in Response to Deadly Drone Attack, 2 February 2023.
• 5
  A. Majidyar, ‘Iran-Backed Iraqi Militia Leader Intensifies Propaganda against U.S. and Its Allies’, Middle East Institute, 1 August 2017.
• 6
  See European Union Agency for Asylum, Country Guidance: Iraq, p. 16.
• 7
  I. Rudolf, All the Mahdi’s Men: Contextualising Nuances Within Iraq’s Islamic Resistance, Routledge, 18 May 2024.
• 8
  See ICRC, How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?, Opinion Paper, 2024, p. 16.
• 9
  M. Knights, Back into the Shadows? The Future of Kata’ib Hezbollah and Iran’s Other Proxies in Iraq, Washington Institute, October 2020.
• 10
  I. Rudolf, All the Mahdi’s Men: Contextualising Nuances Within Iraq’s Islamic Resistance, Routledge, 18 May 2024; Crispin Smith and Michael Knights, Remaking Iraq: How Iranian-Backed Militias Captured the Country, Just Security, 20 March 2023.
• 11
  .See also M. Knights, A. al-Kaabi, H. Malik, Tracking Anti-U.S. and Anti-Israel Strikes From Iraq and Syria During the Gaza Crisis, Policy Analysis, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 December 2024.
• 12
  .See https://www.kataibhezbollah.me/; https://www.aletejahtv.iq/.
• 13
  W. Posch, Schiitische Milizen im Irak und in Syrien Volksmobilisierungseinheiten und andere.
• 14
  See IRI Telegram channel established on 18 October 2023.
• 15
  N. Şaban, Analyzing Iranian-Orchestrated Attacks on U.S. Bases in Syria and Iraq Post Gaza War, OMRAN, 7 March 2024.
• 16
  ICRC, The Roots of Restraint in war, 2018, pp. 45–47.
• 17
  I. Rudolf, All the Mahdi’s Men: Contextualising Nuances Within Iraq’s Islamic Resistance, Routledge, 18 May 2024.
• 18
  ICRC, How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?, Opinion Paper, 2024, pp. 18–19.

Türkiye and the PKK have been involved in an NIAC on Turkish territory since the 1980s, albeit with some interruptions.¹See ‘Armed Conflicts in Türkiye’. The NIAC, initially confined to Turkish territory, expanded into the territory of Iraq when Türkiye initiated a cross-border airstrikes against PKK targets in Iraq, followed by the deployment of ground forces beginning in December 2015.²See Armed Conflicts Overview. In subsequent years, and through to the present day, Türkiye has regularly conducted military operations against the PKK within Iraqi territory, including coordinated air and ground campaigns. These incidents cause destruction and significant loss, including substantial civilian harm.³S. Foltyn, Life inside Iraq’s ‘Forbidden Zone’ controlled by Turkey, BBC, 30 April 2025. Despite PKK’s announcement to disband, the facts on the ground attest to a significant level of violence between the two parties.

The PKK is reportedly a hierarchical organization with a formal division between its political and military arms. Its origins date back to the foundation in 1974 in Ankara under the presidency of Abdullah Öcalan of the Ankara Democratic Higher Education Association (Ankara Demokratik Yüksek Öğrenim Derneği, ADYÖD). Since 1984, the PKK has been eager to both mobilize and recruit new militants. In 1986, a PKK training camp was set up in the Bekaa valley in Lebanon. This served as a model for further strategic measures ranging from organisation and additional formation to the surveillance and control of the militants.⁴O. Grojean, ‘Turquie: Le mouvement kurde à l’heure du « processus de paix »’, Politique étrangère, vol 2 (2014), pp. 27–37.

The command of the group is reportedly based in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq, and Ӧcalan is still thought to be the leader of the group despite his imprisonment in Türkiye since his arrest in 1999. The group has an internal policy in place and has signed some of Geneva Call’s Deeds of Commitment.⁵Geneva Call, Turkey: The PKK movement signs Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment prohibiting sexual violence and against gender discrimination, 15 March 2016. The PKK also retains a strong capacity to sustain itself financially and in terms of human forces. It is said to recruit most of its members through personal acquaintance from the Kurdish areas of south-eastern Türkiye. Moreover, the group recruits and obtains important funding through the Kurdish diaspora in Europe.⁶See UK Government, Country policy and information note: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey, October 2023; A. Palmer and M. Holtz, Examining Extremism: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), 13 July 2023. Despite having been significantly weakened by Türkiye’s operations against the group, the PKK continues to be able to sustain military operations in Iraq.

Hence, all the elements support the conclusion that the PKK is sufficiently organized to be considered an organised armed group under IHL, and the intensity level of the situation is still such as to conclude that there is an ongoing NIAC between the PKK and Türkiye in Iraq.

• 1
  See ‘Armed Conflicts in Türkiye’.
• 2
  See Armed Conflicts Overview.
• 3
  S. Foltyn, Life inside Iraq’s ‘Forbidden Zone’ controlled by Turkey, BBC, 30 April 2025.
• 4
  O. Grojean, ‘Turquie: Le mouvement kurde à l’heure du « processus de paix »’, Politique étrangère, vol 2 (2014), pp. 27–37.
• 5
  Geneva Call, Turkey: The PKK movement signs Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment prohibiting sexual violence and against gender discrimination, 15 March 2016.
• 6
  See UK Government, Country policy and information note: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey, October 2023; A. Palmer and M. Holtz, Examining Extremism: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), 13 July 2023.