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Back to International armed conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan

Ethiopia – Sudan

Reporting period: 2023-2025

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There is an ongoing international armed conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan over al-Fashaga territory, a disputed region located between the north-west of Ethiopia (Ahmara and Tigray regions) and the east of Sudan (Gedaref state),1EPO, ‘Al Fashaga Border Dispute’, ACLED, 5 August 2024. have been ongoing for decades. Although Sudan considers al-Fashaga an integral part of its territory based on an agreement reached in 1902 between the United Kingdom (which then ruled Sudan) and Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II, due to a lack of clear demarcation of the border, this territory has been disputed by both nations for decades.2International Crisis Group, ‘Containing the Volatile Sudan-Ethiopia Border Dispute’, Africa Briefing 173, 24 June 2021; E. Brachet, ‘Le triangle d’Al-Fashaga, une poudrière à la frontière entre le Soudan et l’Ethiopie’, Le Monde, 3 January 2023. The Anglo-Ethiopian agreement of 1902 resulted in the drawing of the Gwynn Line, an unofficial and unilateral demarcation line named after the British officer who led the effort. This placed al-Fashaga inside Sudan.3J. Horner and A. Soliman, ‘Coordinating international responses to Ethiopia-Sudan tensions’, Research Paper, Chatham House, April 2023, p 19; A. E. Engida, ‘Contesting issues between Ethiopia and Sudan over the Gwynn Line: Authorisation and irregularities in the demarcation of the boundary’, International Social Science Journal, Vol. 71, Nos 241–242 (17 July 2021), pp 301–18. Ethiopia, however, has consistently rejected this border delimitation, claiming that the al-Fashaga region stretches 40 to 50 km west of the line demarcating the border between Sudan and Ethiopia, and that the region belongs to it.4International Crisis Group, ‘Containing the Volatile Sudan-Ethiopia Border Dispute’, Africa Briefing 173, 24 June 2021; ‘In-depth analysis: Ethio-Sudan border dispute: Manageable or time bomb?’, Addis Standard, 20 May 2022; E. Brachet, ‘Le triangle d’Al-Fashaga, une poudrière à la frontière entre le Soudan et l’Ethiopie’, Le Monde, 3 January 2023. Significant discrepancies have been reported between the text of the 1902 treaty, the border as marked on the map, and the border which is rarely5A. de Waal, ‘Viewpoint: Why Ethiopia and Sudan have fallen out over al-Fashaga’, BBC, 3 January 2021; ‘Sudan denies occupying Ethiopian territory in contested region’, Al Jazeera, 21 January 2021. delineated on the ground.6International Crisis Group, ‘Containing the Volatile Sudan-Ethiopia Border Dispute’, AfricaBriefing 173, 24 June 2021. Concerns have also been raised over the pressure exerted over the Ethiopian emperor to reach the 1902 agreement as well as the lack of involvement of Ethiopia in the subsequent demarcation.7D. Watson, ‘Red Lines: Upheaval and Containment in the Horn of Africa’, ACLED 21 January 2021.

After decades of disagreement, the two states have made several attempts to resolve their dispute. However, changes in internal and regional configurations have undermined these efforts. For instance, the 1974 Ethiopian revolution put an end to the efforts for a negotiated border demarcation provided for in their 1972 exchange of letters.8‘In-depth analysis: Ethio-Sudan border dispute: Manageable or time bomb?’, Addis Standard, 20 May 2022; J. Horner and A. Soliman, ‘Coordinating international responses to Ethiopia-Sudan tensions’, Research Paper, Chatham House, April 2023, p 19.

In the mid-1990s, taking advantage of the fact that Sudan was embroiled in several civil wars, the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and Ethiopian farmers moved into the region. In 1995, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) withdrew from al-Fashaga and Halaybe (an area near the border with Egypt), apparently under pressure from Ethiopia and Egypt. This followed the alleged involvement of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.9M. Amin, ‘Sudan and Ethiopia’s dispute in fertile border area threatens regional stability’, Middle East Eye, 2 July 2021. From 1995 to 2020, Ethiopian farmers settled in the area, cultivating land and paying taxes to Ethiopia,10A. de Waal, ‘Viewpoint: Why Ethiopia and Sudan have fallen out over al-Fashaga’, BBC, 3 January 2021; ‘Sudan denies occupying Ethiopian territory in contested region’, Al Jazeera, 21 January 2021; J. Horner and A. Soliman, ‘Coordinating international responses to Ethiopia-Sudan tensions’, Research Paper, Chatham House, April 2023, p. 19. and al-Fashaga was administered by Amhara regional state authorities.11‘In-depth analysis: Ethio-Sudan border dispute: Manageable or time bomb?’, Addis Standard, 20 May 2022. See also: ‘Sudan denies occupying Ethiopian territory in contested region’, Al Jazeera, 21 January 2021.

Between 2007 and 2008, Ethiopia and Sudan entered into negotiations that led to an undisclosed agreement concerning the region. According to some reports, this agreement allowed both Ethiopian and Sudanese farmers to cultivate land in al-Fashaga, foreseeing formal demarcation at a later time.12International Crisis Group, ‘Containing the Volatile Sudan-Ethiopia Border Dispute’, Africa Briefing 173, 24 June 2021; M. Amin, ‘Sudan and Ethiopia’s dispute in fertile border area threatens regional stability’, Middle East Eye, 2 July 2021; ‘In-depth analysis: Ethio-Sudan border dispute: Manageable or time bomb?’, Addis Standard, 20 May 2022. Other reports indicate that, under this agreement, al-Fashaga was recognized as belonging to Sudan even while Ethiopian farmers were allowed to continue cultivating the land.13A. Younes, ‘Al-Fashqa Returns to Sudanese Sovereignty After Agreement With Ethiopia’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 12 April 2020; A. de Waal, ‘Viewpoint: Why Ethiopia and Sudan have fallen out over al-Fashaga’, BBC, 3 January 2021; EPO, ‘Al Fashaga Border Dispute’, ACLED, 5 August 2024. In any case, the agreement was never officially ratified and political instability in both nations resulted in renewal of tensions over the area.14‘In-depth analysis: Ethio-Sudan border dispute: Manageable or time bomb?’, Addis Standard, 20 May 2022. Notably, in 2014–19, clashes involving the SAF and Sudanese paramilitaries against Amhara militias resulted in a number of deaths and abductions.15D. Watson, ‘Red Lines: Upheaval and Containment in the Horn of Africa’, ACLED 21 January 2021.

In December 2020, capitalizing on Ethiopia’s focus on the Tigray conflict, 6,000 Sudanese soldiers advanced up to 40 km into Ethiopian-held territory in al-Fashaga.16‘Sudan denies occupying Ethiopian territory in contested region’, Al Jazeera, 21 January 2021; A. Soliman and E. Lannaud, ‘Securitizing the Ethiopia-Sudan border: How cross-border conflict is shaping trade and the control of land’, Chatham House, 4 April 2024. The violence saw thousands of Ethiopian farmers displaced from the fertile territory, with the SAF gradually gaining control of almost all of al-Fashaga between the Setit and Atbara rivers.17E. Brachet, ‘Le triangle d’Al-Fashaga, une poudrière à la frontière entre le Soudan et l’Ethiopie’, Le Monde, 3 January 2023; A. Soliman and E. Lannaud, ‘Securitizing the Ethiopia-Sudan border: How cross-border conflict is shaping trade and the control of land’, Chatham House, 4 April 2024; A. Soliman and A. A. Demissie, ‘The ‘conflict economy’ of sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan’, Chatham House, 4 April 2024; A. Soliman and A. A. Demissie, ‘The ‘conflict economy’ of sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan’, Chatham House, 4 April 2024; L. Karr and L. Yatim, ‘Africa File, July 18, 2024: Sudan Spillover Threatens Ethiopia’, Institute for the Study of War, 18 July 2024; A. Maulinardi, ‘The Ethiopian Refugees Stranded in Sudan’, The Republic, 6 October 2024; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Conflict in Ethiopia’, Council of Foreign Relations, 20 March 2025. As a result, relations between the two states deteriorated sharply, with increased tensions marked by the closure of borders between late 2020 and 2022, the installation of checkpoints, and the disruption of trade, as well as the construction of bridges and military outposts by the SAF.18A. Soliman and E. Lannaud, ‘Securitizing the Ethiopia-Sudan border: How cross-border conflict is shaping trade and the control of land’, Chatham House, 4 April 2024. Low-level confrontations pitting the Amhara militias and, albeit to a lesser extent, the ENDF against the SAF were also reported between 2020 and 2022, resulting in more than 20 deaths among both combatants and civilians.19International Crisis Group, ‘Containing the Volatile Sudan-Ethiopia Border Dispute’, Africa Briefing 173, 24 June 2021; M. Amin, ‘Sudan and Ethiopia’s dispute in fertile border area threatens regional stability’, Middle East Eye, 2 July 2021; J. Horner and A. Soliman, ‘Coordinating international responses to Ethiopia-Sudan tensions’, Research Paper, Chatham House, April 2023, p 20; EPO, ‘Al Fashaga Border Dispute’, ACLED, 5 August 2024; M. F. Mulugeta and L. Girma, ‘Unconventional Transactions and Alliances in the Horn of Africa: Statehood, Dams, Ports, and Peace Support Operations’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 15 April 2025.

Although the two nations agreed in July 2022 to form a joint committee to resolve the border dispute and reopen the strategic Metema-Gallabat border crossing, in September, the SAF reinforced their positions following the resumption of fighting in Tigray.20J. Horner and A. Soliman, ‘Coordinating international responses to Ethiopia-Sudan tensions’, Research Paper, Chatham House, April 2023, p 20. Visits by the leaders of the two nations to each other’s capitals in October 2022 and then January 2023 raised hopes for an easing of tensions, but did not lead to meaningful change on the ground.21J. Horner and A. Soliman, ‘Coordinating international responses to Ethiopia-Sudan tensions’, Research Paper, Chatham House, April 2023, p 21. In the spring of 2023, according to Sudanese media, clashes reignited in al-Fashaga following an attack by Ethiopian forces seeking to exploit Sudan’s instability. The Ethiopian Prime Minister dismissed the claims.22‘News: PM Abiy Ahmed warns parties working to incite war between Ethiopia, Sudan, refutes reports of Ethiopian forces incursion into Sudanese border’, Addis Standard, 20 April 2023; S. Sahlu, ‘PM denies Ethiopian forces entered Sudanese border, warns against violence’, The Reporter (Ethiopia), 22 April 2023; EPO, ‘Al Fashaga Border Dispute’, ACLED, 5 August 2024.

As the non-international armed conflict in Sudan between the SAF and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has moved closer to the Ethiopian border, concerns have grown among Ethiopian officials about the risk of regional destabilization and the potential for cooperation between the RSF and Fano militias.23See ‘Non-International Armed Conflicts in Ethiopia’. In response, Ethiopia has reinitiated efforts to de-escalate tensions and manage the border disputes.24‘Sudan, Ethiopia agree to accelerate efforts to settle border dispute’, Sudan Tribune, 5 March 2023; A. Soliman and A. A. Demissie, ‘The ‘conflict economy’ of sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan’, Chatham House, 4 April 2024; L. Karr, ‘Africa File, July 18, 2024: Sudan spillover threatens Ethiopia’, Institute for the Study of War, 18 July 2024. However, although the most recent local armed confrontations between the ENDF and SAF date back to 2022 or even 2023,25M. F. Mulugeta and L. Girma, ‘Unconventional Transactions and Alliances in the Horn of Africa: Statehood, Dams, Ports, and Peace Support Operations’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 15 April 2025; EPO, ‘Al Fashaga Border Dispute’, ACLED, 5 August 2024. the dispute over al-Fashaga region persisted throughout the reporting period,26G. Gagliano, ‘Analyse – Guerre au Soudan : Carrefour des tensions géopolitiques régionales mais pas que…’, Le Diplomate.Media, 19 February 2025; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Conflict in Ethiopia’, Council of Foreign Relations, 20 March 2025. without any indication that the SAF have withdrawn or that any solution has been found. On the contrary, since the outbreak of the conflict between the SAF and the RSF in Sudan in April 2023, the SAF have deemed this area crucial to their military effort and have even sought to strengthen their presence in al-Fashaga.27A. Soliman and E. Lannaud, ‘Securitizing the Ethiopia-Sudan border: How cross-border conflict is shaping trade and the control of land’, Chatham House, 4 April 2024; A. Soliman and A. A. Demissie, ‘The ‘conflict economy’ of sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan’, Chatham House, 4 April 2024. Sudan has also accused Ethiopia of supporting the RSF.28A. Soliman and A. A. Demissie, ‘The ‘conflict economy’ of sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan’, Chatham House, 4 April 2024; A. Maulinardi, ‘The Ethiopian Refugees Stranded in Sudan’, The Republic, 6 October 2024. Moreover, according to Sudanese officials, in early July 2025, taking advantage of the power vacuum caused by the internal Sudanese conflict, Ethiopian militias backed by the ENDF conducted new incursions into the region and Ethiopian farmers expelled Sudanese counterparts under the protection of the ENDF.29‘Ethiopian militias making new incursions on Sudan border, official says’. Sudan Tribune, 4 July 2025.

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International armed conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan

An international armed conflict (IAC) occurs when one or more States resort to armed force against another State, regardless of the motives for or the intensity of the violence.1ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), Case No IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para 70 ; ICRC, 2016 Commentary, paras 218–19; ICRC, How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?, Opinion Paper, 2024, pp 9–10. To establish that a territory is occupied, three cumulative conditions must be fulfilled, namely:

  • ‘the armed forces of a State are physically present in a foreign territory without the consent of the effective local government in place at the time of the invasion;
  • the effective local government in place at the time of the invasion has been or can be rendered substantially or completely incapable of exerting its powers by virtue of the foreign forces’ unconsented-to presence;
  • the foreign forces are in a position to exercise authority over the territory concerned (or parts thereof) in lieu of the local government.’2ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 304.

A territory is considered occupied ‘as soon as it is under the effective control of a State that is not the recognized sovereign of the territory.’3ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 324. See also: Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Central Front, Ethiopia’s Claim 2, Partial Award, 2004, para 29.

Colonial treaties delimitating territories are generally considered as basis of the territorial title. As stated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), ‘[b]y becoming independent, a new State acquires sovereignty with the territorial base and boundaries left to it by the colonial power’.4ICJ, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p 568, para 30; ICJ, Land and Maritime Delimitations and Sovereignty over Island (Gabon/Equatorial Guinea), Judgment, 19 May 2025, para 128. Moreover, the disputed nature of the al-Fashaga territory does not in itself prevent the situation from being classified as a military occupation. According to the ICJ, ‘the Fourth Geneva Convention […] applies, in particular, in any territory occupied in the course of the conflict by one of the contracting parties. […] [T]here being no need for any inquiry into the precise prior status of those territories.’5ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p 136, paras 95 and 101. However, besides the voices raised against the recourse of colonial law as basis of territorial title6See for instance ICJ, Land and Maritime Delimitations and Sovereignty over Island (Gabon v Equatorial Guinea), Judgment, 19 May 2025, Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf, para 3 et seq. and allegations of coercion upon Ethiopia, the exact demarcation of the border has never been approved by both nations either formally or by means of conduct, and significant discrepancies between the 1902 treaty and the demarcation line have been reported. In addition, both Ethiopia and Sudan have exercised control over al-Fashaga.7See above ‘Historical background’. Therefore, in the absence of evidence establishing with sufficient certainty that the territory belongs to Ethiopia or Sudan, the possibility of occupation cannot be determined. The fact that Ethiopia claimed that Sudan was occupying its territory and that Sudan rejected these allegations, arguing that the Sudanese Armed Forces had been redeployed within Sudanese territory on the border with Ethiopia,8‘Sudan denies occupying Ethiopian territory in contested region’, Al Jazeera, 21 January 2021. merely reinforces this assessment.

For an IAC to exist, ‘there is no requirement that the use of armed force between the Parties reach a certain level of intensity’.9ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 236. Moreover, an IAC is deemed to have ended with the general close of military operations, which includes not only the cessation of active hostilities, but also the end of ‘military movements of a bellicose nature, including those that reform, reorganize or reconstitute, so that the likelihood of the resumption of hostilities can reasonably be discarded’.10ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 278; ICRC, How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?, Opinion Paper, 2024, p 10. In particular, according to ICRC updated Commentary, ‘the fact of redeploying troops along the border to build up military capacity or mobilizing or deploying troops for defensive or offensive purposes should be regarded as military measures with a view to combat. Even in the absence of active hostilities, such military operations having a continuing nexus with the international armed conflict will justify maintaining the classification of the situation as an international armed conflict.’11ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 279.

The deployment of 6,000 Sudanese troops in the area was met by armed resistance from the ENDF and resulted in local confrontations between the ENDF and the SAF.12A. Maulinardi, ‘The Ethiopian Refugees Stranded in Sudan’, The Republic, 6 October 2024. Since the latest armed confrontations between the ENDF and SAF, the latter remained deployed in the region and are reportedly seeking to strengthen their presence. Sudanese officials have also accused the ENDF and local militias backed by the ENDF of conducting incursions into al-Fashaga.13See ‘Historical background’ and ‘Key developments’. Although such allegations have been denied by Ethiopia, the continued deployment of Sudanese troops in the region not only reflects the objective of strengthening Sudan’s military capabilities, but also serves defensive purposes and is linked, at least to some degree, to the conflict with Ethiopia. Therefore, as things stand, the IAC between Ethiopia and Sudan is considered to be ongoing. Conversely, the sporadic clashes reported between the SAF and Amhara militias do not reach the threshold of intensity required for the situation to be classified as a non-international armed conflict.

State Parties

  • Ethiopia
  • Sudan

Other Non-State Actors

  • Amhara militias