Chad

In the Republic of Chad there was one non-international armed conflict (NIAC) during the period in review; it is between Chad (including Chadian forces that belong to the Multinational Joint Task Force, MNJTF) and Boko Haram. Chad is a party to the four Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols. Common Article 3 and customary international humanitarian law (IHL) also apply in this ongoing NIAC.

The Republic of Chad is a landlocked country that borders on Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger.¹ At the time of reporting, all the States bordering Chad as well as Chad itself were experiencing ongoing conflicts on their territory. Consequently, the geographic location of Chad is viewed as a threat multiplier. Boko Haram, which has been active in Nigeria since at least 2009, has, from at least 2014, expanded its operations beyond Nigeria.² Boko Haram has engaged in violence on Chadian territory after a first clash was reported during 2015,³ which followed an instance of the Chadian Armed Forces pursuing Boko Haram in neighbouring States.⁴ During 2015, a NIAC between Boko Haram and Chad was triggered.⁵

Boko Haram’s expanded geographical footprint led to the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council re-activating the MNJTF on 29 January 2025⁶ to counter Boko Haram activities.⁷ The MNJTF was composed of members of the armed forces of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria (though Niger withdrew in March 2025). Sector 2 of the MNJTF deployment area includes Baga Sola, a Chadian town in the Lake Chad region.⁸ It is the primary task of the Chadian forces who are part of the MNJTF to combat Boko Haram on Chadian territory.‘⁹

Additionally, the fragile security situation in Chad and around Lake Chad is compounded by the effects of climate change, extreme poverty, and cross-border violence.¹⁰ Chad ranks 190 of 193 nations on the Human Development Index, indicating the prevailing level of insecurity and vulnerability.¹¹

French Withdrawal from Chad

At the end of 2024, Chad was host to France’s last remaining security support mission in the Sahel. France and Chad maintained a security pact for more than sixty years.¹² In February 2023, France announced plans to reduce its presence in Africa.¹³ During November 2024 Chad stated it had ended its security cooperation agreement with France and aimed to revisit its strategic partnerships and enforce its sovereignty. It is suggested that Chad, as is the case in neighbouring States, prefers to rely on security support provided by Russia.¹⁴ During December 2024, as agreed with the Chadian government, France began the first phase of its withdrawal of soldiers from Chadian bases in Faya-Largeau.¹⁵ The last French soldiers evacuated the N’djamena base and left Chad before the 31 January 2025 deadline.¹⁶

Renewal of MNJTF

At the 1254^th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council on 12 January 2025, the African Union expressed its concerns regarding the continuing activity of Boko Haram, reaffirming that the regional collective security response needs to be well-coordinated, multipronged, and sustained. The African Union renewed the MNJTF mandate for an additional twelve months from 1 February 2025.¹⁷ In his remarks on 9 June 2025 at a United Nations (UN) Security Council briefing on the Central African Region, the Deputy Political Counsellor of the United States (US) raised concerns over the continuing level of violence generated by Boko Haram and encouraged African States and the MNJTF to remain engaged in this conflict.¹⁸ The European Union (EU) pledged €20 million to support the fight against Boko Haram for 2025.¹⁹

Chad’s Humanitarian Crisis

The ongoing NIACs combined with other manifestations of violence such as intercommunal violence and climatic events contributed to an estimated 12.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the West African, including Chad, region by December 2025. For this reporting period, owing to ongoing insecurity, climate shocks, and health emergencies such as an outbreak of cholera, Chad experienced one of the most severe and complex humanitarian crises in West Africa.²⁰ An area in Chad most in need of humanitarian assistance is the Hadjer Lamis province – where civilians fleeing the Lake Chad region because of Boko Haram tend to settle and to seek humanitarian assistance.²¹ Conflict in Sudan has further intensified the humanitarian crisis; by October 2025 western Chad was host to an estimated 890,847 Sudanese refugees.²² The number of refugees in Chad rose significantly after El Fasher fell to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in late October 2025.²³

Chad is rated as the third most affected State from climate change in the world.²⁴ The largest body of water in the Sahel, Lake Chad, is on Chadian territory and is a critical fresh water source that sustains life in the Sahel.²⁵ Climate change resulting in desertification, drought, and floods²⁶ has contributed to the surface area of Lake Chad shrinking by an estimated ninety per cent compared to 1960 water levels.²⁷ During 2025, the water level in Lake Chad rose by eleven per cent, which shrank pastoral land for cattle to graze on and resulted in rising violence among herders over access to grazing.²⁸ Climate change is viewed as a threat multiplier in the region as the variation in the supplies of food and water impacts population movement inside Chad and between bordering States.²⁹

Severe flooding affected Chad in 2016, 2020, 2022, and 2024.³⁰ It is estimated that in 2024 approximately 35,267 households were impacted by flooding in the Lac province of Chad. There was a further impact on agriculture and subsistence because the floods destroyed at least 22,213 hectares of fields and 1 678 heads of livestock. It is reported that Boko Haram exploits the increased vulnerability of the population that caused by the flooding by increasing illicit taxation on services, extorting people, and forcibly recruiting them.³¹

Outbreaks of cholera and measles in 2025 placed further stress on limited humanitarian resources. Cholera broke out in three provinces (Ouaddaï, Sila, Guera, and Hadjer Lamis) during July 2025. Measles spread significantly in the regions of N’Djamena and Sila. Hepatitis E cases are increasingly being reported in high-density refugee camps due to the quality of the drinking water.³²

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) says that Chad is experiencing one of the most underfunded ongoing emergencies.³³ By December 2025, approximately four million people in Chad had been identified as being ‘in need’ and 1.5 million people were ‘urgently prioritized’.³⁴

Intercommunal or Herder/Farmer Violence

Pastoral (herder/farmer) and inter-communal violence continued throughout the reporting period. Violence of this nature is often rooted in increased competition over climate change-induced limits on natural resources such as grazing land and drinking wells.³⁵ Intercommunal violence in Chad is particularly violent and results in death, the burning of fields, and damage to cattle.³⁶

Intercommunal violence was specifically reported during July 2023,³⁷ October,³⁸ and December 2023,³⁹ January 2024,⁴⁰ March,⁴¹ May,⁴² July,⁴³ August,⁴⁴ September,⁴⁵ November,⁴⁶ and December 2024,⁴⁷ as well as January 2025,⁴⁸ May,⁴⁹ June,⁵⁰ July,⁵¹ August,⁵² September,⁵³ October,⁵⁴ November,⁵⁵ and December 2025.⁵⁶

According to the UN Secretary-General’s report on Central Africa, by 15 November 2024 at least 1 000 people had been killed in farmer-herder clashes with an additional 2,000 people injured.⁵⁷ Particularly violent competition over natural resources include the events in the Ouaddaï- and Hadjer-Lamis provinces in June and November 2025, respectively. In June, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights specifically called for peaceful resolution of the pastoral violence between indigenous farmers and Zaghawa herders in Chad’s Ouaddaï province which killed at least twenty.⁵⁸ Another notable clash occurred in November 2025 in which two communities fought over access to a well in Hadjer-Lamis province. Thirty-three people were killed.⁵⁹

In November 2025, the UN Secretary-General expressed grave concern over the frequency and ferocity of intercommunal violence in Chad:

‘I am concerned by the rising levels of intercommunal violence in Chad and the additional risks that it poses to a country already confronting the activities of armed groups, the long-term effects of natural disasters and the challenges of hosting one of the largest number of refugees in the world….’ ⁶⁰

Disarmament of Union of Democratic Forces for Democracy

A Chadian armed group, the Union of Democratic Forces for Democracy (UFDD), was founded in 2006 by Mahamat Nouri, an ex-government minister, with the aim of overthrowing the government of President Idriss Deby. Although the UFDD operates in Chad, its headquarters are in Darfur, Sudan.⁶¹ On 2 January 2024, the UFDD began disarming 900 fighters⁶² in accordance with the 2022 Doha agreement.⁶³ Progress on the UFDD’s disarmament process is unclear, but during the reporting period there was a concern that the UFDD has again taken up arms.

Possible New Armed Group Alliance

On 19 October 2025, two organized armed groups, the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR) and Movement for Peace, Reconstruction and Development (MPRD) announced the formation of a coalition. On 26 October, the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) held meetings in France with CCMSR, the MPRD, and some twenty other Chadian non-State actors seeking to form a broader alliance against the Chadian government.⁶⁴ The lack of available information makes it difficult to determine whether the envisioned coalition constitutes an alliance under IHL, in which case it will equate to a single party to a conflict should the intensity threshold be met in the future. However, at this point, the members of the coalition are not involved in the existing NIAC in Chad.

Growing Tensions between Chad and Sudan

The allegation that Chad provides support, including weapons transfers, logistical support and mercenaries, to the RSF in the ongoing NIAC between Sudan and the RSF has been a point of friction between the Chadian and Sudanese governments throughout the reporting period.⁶⁵ Sudan also alleged that the RSF launched armed drone attacks from Chadian territory as a part of the RSF’s siege of El Fasher.⁶⁶

In November 2024, Sudan lodged a complaint against Chad for aiding the RSF at the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Sudan alleges that in supporting the RSF, Chad is complicit in the commission of war crimes and is in violation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other international law.⁶⁷ Chad denies involvement with the RSF.⁶⁸

Other allegations of Chadian involvement in the Sudanese NIAC include that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) uses Chadian airports and trade routes to arm the RSF in its fight against the Sudanese armed forces.⁶⁹ On 5 March 2025, Sudan filed an application at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to institute proceedings against the UAE.⁷⁰ Sudan alleged that the UAE violated its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In its filing, Sudan specifically alleged that the UAE is ‘complicit in the genocide on the Masalit through its direction of and provision of extensive financial, political, and military support for the rebel RSF militia’. On 5 May 2025, the ICJ delivered its decision and declared it ‘manifestly lacks jurisdiction’ in the matter due to a reservation made by the UAE in article IX to the jurisdictional clause of the Genocide Convention. The Court removed the case from its General List.⁷¹

The allegations of UAE and Chadian support of the RSF in fighting the Sudanese government have continued even after the ICJ rejected Sudan’s application. The non-governmental organization Priority Peace Sudan filed a complaint with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in December 2025 against the Chadian president. The complaint concerns an allegation that Chad facilitates the transfer of weapons from the UAE into Sudan to equip the RSF.⁷²

Other incidents which caused friction between Chad and Sudan during the reporting period include a fatal cross-border drone attack from Sudan into Chadian territory as well as a cyber-attack launched against the Chadian internet infrastructure. In December 2025, Chad claimed the RSF had targeted Chadian territory from Sudan with a drone attack that killed two Chadian soldiers.⁷³ In January 2024, Autonomous Sudan, a pro-Sudanese hacking group, launched a cyber-attack against Chad’s internet infrastructure that caused an hours-long internet blackout.⁷⁴

Non-International Armed Conflict between Chad (supported by the MNJTF) and Boko Haram

Background

The NIAC between Chad (supported by the MNJTF) and Boko Haram ignited during 2015 as elements of Boko Haram sought tactical refuge on islands in the Lake Chad Basin after they crossed the border from Nigeria.¹ The Chadian government imposed the first state of emergency in 2015 in response to Boko Haram’s presence and activities on its territory.² This NIAC is ongoing.

Intensity

In his report on the situation in Central Africa, the UN Secretary-General found a slight decrease of Boko Haram activity between 1 June and 15 November 2024 as fifty-six Boko Haram related incidents caused ninety-nine civilian deaths compared to the same period in 2023 when sixty-seven incidents resulted in 117 casualties.³ The continuous reporting by the Secretary-General on this situation also serves as an indicator that the conflict between Chad and Boko Haram remains intense.

Specific clashes between the Chadian Armed Forces and Boko Haram on the territory of Chad during the reporting period occurred during October 2024,⁴ March 2024,⁵ July 2024,⁶ September 2024,⁷ October 2024, ⁸ November 2024,⁹ December 2024, ¹⁰ March 2025,¹¹ and October 2025.¹²

The MNJTF, of which Chad is a troop contributing State combating Boko Haram (see above), reported on the lethality of Operation Lake Sanity Phase II which commenced on 23 April 2023 and 4 June 2024. According to the MNJTF, within approximately a month, at least 176 fighters surrendered and two air campaigns proved effective in disrupting logistics, causing at least 140 Boko Haram casualties.¹³ The African Union also celebrated the successes of Operation Lake Sanity Phase II following the Joint Steering Committee meeting on 6 and 7 August 2024 where Members stated that the operation ‘further degraded Boko Haram’.¹⁴

Some of the deadliest military operations between Chad and Boko Haram include those which took place in July 2024 and November 2024. Chadian Armed Forces reported that it attacked five Boko Haram bases in Chad’s Lak province during July 2024, killing at least seventy fighters. ¹⁵ A major incident recorded during the reporting period occurred on 28 October 2024 when hundreds of Boko Haram fighters launched a coordinated attack against Chadian soldiers stationed in Ngouboua, western Lake Chad on the island of Bakaram; forty Chadian soldiers were killed.¹⁶ In retaliation, the Chadian Armed Forces employed airstrikes on 8 November 2024 against Boko Haram fighters on the Chadian side of Lake Chad as it initiated its ‘Haskanite’ counter-offensive.¹⁷ By 18 February 2025, the Chadian Armed Forces announced the end of this military counteroffensive in which 297 Boko Haram fighters, twenty-four Chadian soldiers, and three civilians were reportedly killed. A further twenty-seven Chadian soldiers and four civilians were wounded. It was not reported how many Boko Haram fighters were wounded.¹⁸

The weapons Boko Haram use include assault rifles and heavy machine guns¹⁹ including AK47s and PKM machine guns.²⁰ Boko Haram often employs improvised explosive devices (IEDs).²¹ Reports also suggest that Boko Haram has acquired drone technology, which the group uses to drop locally-made grenades.²² The Chadian Armed Forces too relied on aerial strikes to counter Boko Haram in its territory, resulting in an increase in casualties and injuries.²³

The violence generated in the pre-existing NIAC between Chad and Boko Haram remained sufficiently intense to equate to protracted armed violence as demanded by IHL throughout the reporting period.

Organization

The leader of Boko Haram, at the time of reporting, was Imam Ibrahim Bakura Doro (aka Bakura Buduma).²⁴ His deputy Imam is Abu Issa.²⁵ Other key leadership positions include the Chief of Police (Hisbah), held by Kannay; Chief Cleric, a position held by Mallam Mamman; and Chief Judge, a position held by Mallam Abdurahmane.²⁶ Ibrahim Bakura Doro often acts as the group’s spokesperson in an unofficial capacity via social media.²⁷ Boko Haram has a military and a civilian wing.²⁸ There is uncertainty around exactly how many fighters belong to Boko Haram, but a common estimate is several thousand.²⁹

As its leader, Imam Bakura Doro serves as the overall commander of the military wing and has direct command over the territory held by Boko Haram on the islands of Lake Chad.³⁰ Commander Aliyu Ngulde, in turn, commands a Boko Haram-controlled enclave, Gwoza Hills, located along the Nigeria-Cameroon border.³¹ A smaller territory held by Boko Haram is commanded by Commander Alhai Kale.³² The hills in the vicinity of the Shiroro reservoir in Kaduna state are commanded by Commander Sadiku.³³ Owing to its deployment of regional commanders and large militia style units with, on average, 100 to 200 fighters,³⁴ Boko Haram has the capability to respect and implement IHL.

The leadership style of the military commanders is described as akin to patronage as the fighters are permitted a modicum of independence under regional command.³⁵ Boko Haram has a de facto Shura Council to offer religious guidance when required.³⁶

Boko Haram’s ideology informs its actions in that it considers as a legitimate target Muslims or Christians who do not support them or are perceived to support the government.³⁷ Boko Haram employs extreme violence, plunder, and sectarianism in its tactics and sanctions suicide attacks against civilians it views as ‘infidels’ or ‘apostates’.³⁸ Suicide bombing is a further tactic of Boko Haram; because the traditional burqa conceals the presence of a bomb and Islamic custom forbids men searching women, the female fighters wear the suicide vests.³⁹

Imam Bakura Doro has experience in procuring and distributing weapons and ammunition, strengthening the logistical capacity of Boko Haram.⁴⁰ Commander Shekau has expanded Boko Haram’s operational capabilities by accelerating the training in building and using IEDs, including vehicle-borne IEDs, as well as suicide vests.⁴¹ Boko Haram fighters are armed at all times and, when needed, additional weaponry may be requested or exchanged within its structures.⁴²

Boko Haram often plunders or kidnaps for ransom to obtain resources.⁴³ In particular, the kidnapping of foreigners and wealthy Nigerian nationals has been lucrative.‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project. To fund its activities, it also taxes fishermen and herders in areas under its control.⁴⁴ Boko Haram often engages in cattle theft and has ventured into selling scrap iron.⁴⁵ Local religious sympathizers donate to Boko Haram, but it is not reliant on external funding streams as generally its operations are low cost and are not dependent on the purchase of sophisticated weaponry.⁴⁶ Each regional leader controls a treasury and the administrative capacity of the group is limited.⁴⁷

A high unemployment rate enables the recruitment of fighters.⁴⁸ It has been claimed, at times, Boko Haram forcibly conscripts members or, at other times, offers financial incentives.⁴⁹ Historically, training has been in camps located on Nigerian territory under the control of Boko Haram, including Borno,⁵⁰ as well as in Cameroon,⁵¹ and Somalia.⁵²

Boko Haram continues to meet the minimum requirements of organization as demanded by IHL.

The pre-existing NIAC between Chad (supported by the MNJTF) and Boko Haram continued throughout the reporting period.

1
‘Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures’, International Crisis Group, 8 March 2017.
2
‘Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures’, International Crisis Group, 8 March 2017.
3
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/865, 29 November 2024, para 23.
4
M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Chad president launches operation to fight Boko Haram after attack kills over 40 troops’, Voice of America, 29 October 2024; B. Noubarassem and S. Lawal, ‘Chad’s presidency attacked: Coup attempt, Boko Haram or ‘drunk’ fighters?’, Al Jazeera, 9 January 2025; M. Banchereau, ‘Attack on a Chad military base kills 40 soldiers, presidency says’, Associated Press News, 29 October 2024
5
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, March 2024
6
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, July 2024; ‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/865, 29 November 2024, para 24
7
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, September 2024; ‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/865, 29 November 2024, para 24
8
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/865, 29 November 2024, para 23; ‘Attaque terroriste de Boko Haram: Une mise en scène inappropriée de la communication présidentielle’, Tchad One, 30 October 2024
9
M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Chad says airstrikes kill scores of Boko Haram fighters’, Voice of America, 8 November 2024; E. Takadji, ‘17 Chadian soldiers and 96 rebels killed in a Boko Haram attack, army says’, Associated Press News, 11 November 2024; ‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, November 2024; ‘L’armée tchadienne confirme des affrontements avec des éléments qualifiés de « terroristes » dans la région du Lac’, Tchad One, 10 November 2024
10
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/865, 29 November 2024, para 23
11
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, March 2025
12
‘Tchad: Plusieurs éléments de Boko Haram neutralisés lors du premier accrochage terrestre de l’opération Haskanite’, Tribune Echos, 9 November 2025.
13
‘MNJTF Force Commander’s Text Speech: International Press Conference For Progress Of Operation Lake Sanity II by Major General Ibrahim Sallau Ali Gss psc(++) fdc Naphm Ftam Gom Fcmh Naim MSc Force Commander Multinational Joint Task Force Held 4 June 2024 At Maiduguri’, Multinational Joint Task Force, 4 June 2025; R. Hoinathy and C. Delanga, ‘Capitalising on Operation Lake Sanity’s success against Boko Haram’, Institute for Security Studies, 16 September 2024.
14
‘Boko Haram and other terrorist groups activities in Lake Chad Basin region suppressed in a joint forces operation’, African Union, 8 August 2024.
15
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/865, 29 November 2024, para 24.
16
M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Chad president launches operation to fight Boko Haram after attack kills over 40 troops’, Voice of America, 29 October 2024; B. Noubarassem and S. Lawal, ‘Chad’s presidency attacked: Coup attempt, Boko Haram or ‘drunk’ fighters?’, Al Jazeera, 9 January 2025.
17
M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Chad says airstrikes kill scores of Boko Haram fighters’, Voice of America, 8 November 2024; ‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, November 2024.
18
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/865, 29 November 2024, para 23.
19
,‘Troops Eliminate Boko Haram Commander Abba Alai, Crush Terrorists in Gwoza and Garin Fallujah’, Zagazola, 3 March 2025
20
‘MNJTF Force Commander’s Text Speech: International Press Conference For Progress Of Operation Lake Sanity II by Major General Ibrahim Sallau Ali Gss psc(++) fdc Naphm Ftam Gom Fcmh Naim MSc Force Commander Multinational Joint Task Force Held 4 June 2024 At Maiduguri’, Multinational Joint Task Force, 4 June 2025.
21
I. Ojo, ‘Troops kill B’Haram chief bomb maker, eight others in Sambisa’, Punch, 6 March 2025; ‘Communiqué of the 1254th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held on 13 January 2025 on the Consideration Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram Terrorist Group and Renewal of its Mandate’, African Union, 3 February 2025, para 6; R. Hoinathy and C. Delanga, ‘Capitalising on Operation Lake Sanity’s success against Boko Haram’, Institute for Security Studies, 16 September 2024.
22
‘Boko Haram Militants Attack Two Nigerian Army Bases with Grenade-strapped Drones’, Defense Mirror, 26 December 2024; N. Roll et al, ‘Nigeria, Sahel Militants Embrace DIY Drone’, eNCA, 27 March 2025; and ‘Nigerian Army Confirms Boko Haram’s Use Of Armed Drones In Borno, Similar To Israeli, Ukrainian Types’, Sahara Reporters, 14 May 2025.
23
M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Chad says airstrikes kill scores of Boko Haram fighters’, Voice of America, 8 November 2024.
24
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024; ‘Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On’, International Crisis Group, 30 May 2023.
25
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
26
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
27
‘Boko Haram – Video Reaffirming Loyalty to Abu Umaima and Rejecting ISWAP, translation by Sufyan Musah’, Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring Global Jihad in Nigeria, 12 May 2022.
28
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
29
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
30
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
31
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
32
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
33
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
34
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024
35
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
36
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
37
‘Boko Haram, including JAS and ISIS-WA’, European Union Agency for Asylum, February 2019.
38
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024; ‘Boko Haram’, Counter Terrorism Guide.
39
‘Boko Haram’, Counter Terrorism Guide; ‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project.
40
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
41
‘Boko Haram’, Counter Terrorism Guide.
42
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
43
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
44
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
45
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025.
46
‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project.
47
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
48
D. Mbachu, ‘Nigeria’s revamp of economic indicators sparks debate’, African Business, 13 February 2025.
49
‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project.
50
‘Cameroon, Nigeria Face ‘Advanced Weaponry’ from Terrorists’, African Defense Forum, 13 May 2025
51
‘Cameroon army says dismantles Boko Haram training camp’, Reuters, 22 December 2014; ‘Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram’, International Crisis Group, 16 November 2016; M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Former Boko Haram Fighters Wait for Rehabilitation Facility’, Voice of America, 17 December 2017
52
‘Nigerian Boko Haram fighters trained in Somalia: president’, Reuters, 15 February 2016; S. Busari, ‘Boko Haram sought terror training in Somalia, security chief says’, CNN, 25 February 2016; ‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project.

Below the threshold situation between Chad and FACT

Background

FACT was established in 2016 to oust Chadian President Idriss Déby.⁷⁵ The creation of FACT was a result of the split in the former UFDD into three separate groups: the UFDD, led by Mahamat Nouri, FACT, headed by Mahamat Mahadi and the Council of Military Command for the Salvation of the Republic under Mahamat Hassani Bulmay.⁷⁶

FACT is a Chadian rebel group which operates mainly from Libyan territory and crosses into Chad to conduct attacks and then retreats to Libya.⁷⁷ FACT was initially based in Jufra, Libya,⁷⁸ until LAAF took this territory during 2017.⁷⁹

Since August 2023, FACT has suffered multiple setbacks. In early October, its Chief of Staff, Tahir Wodji was arrested in Libya and in mid-October the transitional authorities in southern Libya accused the group of conducted deadly airstrikes and ordered them to leave the State, forcing them to withdraw to the remote El Salvador Pass which lies on the Libyan, Chad, Algerian and Nigeran borders. This significantly weakened the group. Adding to these woes, on 11 November FACT’s Deputy Secretary-General, Mahamat Bahr Bechir Kindji defected (with what he claimed were 1,000 fighters, but which FACT claimed numbered only fifty).⁸⁰

Intensity

In August 2023, a two-year long unilateral ceasefire declared by FACT concerning clashes between Chad and FACT⁸¹ ended following the Chadian military targeting FACT in the northern Tibesti region.⁸² The consequence of Chad’s military action was FACT calling off this ‘informal’ ceasefire around 19 August 2023.⁸³ This was followed by a joint military response by the Chadian Armed Forces and Libya against FACT, taking place from August 2023. The success of this joint military operation led to prominent leader Mahamat Barh Béchir Kendji together with an estimated 130 to 1000 FACT fighters surrendering themselves to the Chadian Armed Forces.⁸⁴

It is clear that the above incidents are merely sporadic and isolated clashes between Chadian Armed Forces and FACT and that the severity of fighting does not equate to protracted armed violence. The severity of violence between the two, therefore, does not satisfy the intensity requirement demanded by IHL.

Organization

Very little information is available about the command structure of FACT; it is known that its overall commander is Mahamat Mahadi Ali who is also the group’s founder.⁸⁵ Ali serves as the spokesperson for FACT and communicates by issuing public statements.⁸⁶ Prior to 2021, FACT fighters received training from LAAF and LAAF supporters such as Russia and the UAE.⁸⁷ The standard of training enables FACT to enforce military discipline, plan military tactics, and be able to comply with IHL.

The regular modus operandi of FACT is cross-border guerrilla-style attacks⁸⁸ launched from military bases in the mountainous border region of southern Libya.⁸⁹ On 30 October 2023, FACT’s military wing deployed approximately 2,000 fighters, evidence of its recruitment capability, and 400 armoured vehicles, which signals its logistical capacity.⁹⁰ FACT generates funding to support the conflict through illicit cross-border trading in Libyan resources such as oil⁹¹ and by mercenary employment.⁹²

FACT is sufficiently organized as is demanded under IHL.

The clashes between Chad and FACT do not meet the threshold for regular and intense violence with the authorities, meaning that IHL does not apply.

State Parties

Chad (supported by MNJTF)
France (until 31 January 2025)

Non-State parties

Boko Haram

Other Non-State Actors

FACT

1
K. Yeboua and B. Chipanda, ‘Chad’, African Futures: International Institute for Security Studies, 14 August 2025.
2
R. Hoinathy, ‘Boko Haram’s resurgence in Chad’, Institute for Security Studies, 6 May 2019; ‘Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures’, International Crisis Group, 8 March 2017.
3
R. Hoinathy, ‘Boko Haram’s resurgence in Chad’, Institute for Security Studies, 6 May 2019
4
‘Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures’, International Crisis Group, 8 March 2017.
5
‘Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures’, International Crisis Group, 8 March 2017.
6
‘MNJTF Mandate’, Multinational Joint Task Force
7
‘About the Force’, Multinational Joint Task Force.
8
‘Sector 2’, Multinational Joint Task Force.
9
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10
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11
‘Human Developments Report: Chad’, United Nations Development Programme, 6 May 2025.
12
E. E. Olumba and B. Nwosu, ‘Chad’s break with France: why it happened and what it means for power dynamics in the Sahel region’, The Conversation, 11 December 2024.
13
‘France to reduce troops in West and Central Africa to 600, say sources’, France 24, 17 June 2024.
14
‘Chad ends military cooperation with France’, Al Jazeera, 29 November 2024; ‘Chad to end security cooperation with France’, Deutsche Welle, 29 November 2024; E. E. Olumba and B. Nwosu, ‘Chad’s break with France: why it happened and what it means for power dynamics in the Sahel region’, The Conversation, 11 December 2024.
15
‘France hands over first military base amid withdrawal from Chad’, France 24, 26 December 2024.
16
‘French troops complete withdrawal from Chad after 70 years’, SABC News, 1 February 2025; B. Roger and E. Vincent, ‘Departure of last French soldiers from Chad brings an end to a ‘special relationship’’, Le Monde, 2 February 2025.
17
‘Communiqué of the 1254th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held on 13 January 2025 on the Consideration Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram Terrorist Group and Renewal of its Mandate’, African Union, 3 February 2025, para 15.
18
‘Central African Region – Security Council, 9931^st meeting’, United Nations Audiovisual Library, 9 June 2025.
19
O. Oshoko, ‘European Union Pledges 300 Million Euros to Support Fight Against Terrorism, Violent Extremism in North East, North West in 2025’, Security King, 7 April 2025.
20
‘Global Humanitarian Overview 2026: West and Central Africa’, Humanitarian Action, 8 December 2025; ‘Chad: Overview of the 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (abridged version)’, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 13 February 2025.
21
A. Zusanne, ‘Lake Chad’s displaced families appeal for a life with dignity’, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 12 December 2025.
22
‘Global Humanitarian Overview 2026: West and Central Africa’, Humanitarian Action, 8 December 2025.
23
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, November 2025.
24
‘Humanitarian Action for Children: Chad’, UNICEF, August 2023.
25
K. Yeboua and B. Chipanda, ‘Chad’, African Futures: International Institute for Security Studies, 14 August 2025.
26
S. Ekanem, ‘10 African countries with the lowest quality of life in 2025’, Business Insider Africa, 23 September 2025
27
‘Conflict, climate, hunger and resilience in the spotlight at Lake Chad Basin conference’, World Food Programme, 25 October 2024.
28
C. Valade, ‘Lake Chad residents caught between Boko Haram and rising waters’, Le Monde, 6 August 2025; ‘Chad: Authorities Failing to Address Deadly Clashes Between Herders and Farmers Amid Climate Crisis’, Amnesty International, 20 November 2025.
29
‘Conflict, poverty and water management issues exposing vulnerable communities in Africa to extreme floods that are now common events because of climate change’, World Weather Attribution, 23 October 2024; ‘Conflict, climate, hunger and resilience in the spotlight at Lake Chad Basin conference’, World Food Programme, 25 October 2024.
30
C. Delanga, ‘Lake Chad Basin: repeated flooding weakens an already stricken region’, Institute for Security Studies, 4 November 2025.
31
‘Lake Chad Basin: repeated flooding weakens an already stricken region’, Polity, 5 November 2025.
32
‘Global Humanitarian Overview 2026: West and Central Africa’, Humanitarian Action, 8 December 2025.
33
A. Zusanne, ‘Lake Chad’s displaced families appeal for a life with dignity’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 12 December 2025.
34
‘Global Humanitarian Overview 2026: West and Central Africa’, Humanitarian Action, 8 December 2025.
35
‘Chad: Authorities Failing to Address Deadly Clashes Between Herders and Farmers Amid Climate Crisis’, Amnesty International, 20 November 2025.
36
‘Chad: Overview of inter/intracommunity conflicts (July 2025)’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 21 July 2025.
37
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, July 2023 August,‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, August 2023
38
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, October 2023
39
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, December 2023
40
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, January 2024
41
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, March 2024
42
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, May 2024; P. Kum, ‘Tchad: Tensions intercommunautaires persistantes à Magar suite à un conflit foncier’, Al Wihda, 26 May 2024
43
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, July 2024
44
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, August 2024
45
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, September 2024
46
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/342, 30 May 2025, para 20
47
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, December 2024; ‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/342, 30 May 2025, para 20
48
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, January 2025; ‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/342, 30 May 2025, para 20
49
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, May 2025; ‘Tchad: l’appareil sécuritaire est-il déréglé?’, Tchad Infos, 20 June 2025
50
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, June 2025; M. Mahamat, ‘Tchad: déclaration de Paul Mbaïnodoum Ngartelbaye sur les conflits intercommunautaires’, Al Wihda, 10 July 2025; ‘Tchad: le PLD exprime son indignation face aux tragédies de Mandakaou et Molou et appelle à une réponse ferme’, Al Wihda, 17 June 2025; ‘Tchad: le CADH dénonce les massacres d’Arronga et appelle à une action urgente des autorités’,Al Wihda, 17 June 2025
51
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; G. Ali, ‘Tchad: l’EDS appelle à l’unité et à l’action pour soutenir les victimes des violences au sud’, Al Wihda, 1 July 2025
52
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, August 2025; H. O. Evarist, ‘Tchad: Le CESCE ouvre sa 2ᵉ session 2025, en croisade contre les tensions intercommunautaires’, Al Wihda, 5 August 2025; ‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/772, 28 November 2025, para 26
53
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/772, 28 November 2025, para 26
54
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, October 2025
55
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, November 2025; P. Kum, ‘Tchad: 26 blessés dans un conflit autour d’un puits pastoral à Goskoro’, Al Wihda, 17 November 2025; ‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/772, 28 November 2025, para 26
56
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, November 2025.
57
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN doc S/2024/865, 29 November 2024, para 29.
58
‘Communiqué de presse sur les violences intercommunautaires en République du Tchad’, La Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peoples, 24 June 2025; ‘Chad: The ACHPR condemns inter-community violence in the country and calls for dialogue and restraint’, Committee for Justice, 8 July 2025.
59
‘Seventeen dead in Chad resource clashes’, APA News, 5 November 2025; M. Ozkan, ‘At least 33 killed in intercommunal violence in Chad: Report’, AA, 5 November 2025.
60
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/772, 28 November 2025, para 71.
61
‘Union of Forces for Democracy and Development’, EBSCO, 2023.
62
‘Chadian rebel group UFDD returns to Chad from southern Libya’, Libya Security Monitor, 2 January 2024
63
‘Chad military gov’t, opposition groups sign peace deal in Qatar’, Al Jazeera, 8 August 2022.
64
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, October 2025.
65
‘Sudan accuses Chad of supporting Rapid Response Forces’, Nova News, 6 November 2024.
66
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, December 2024.
67
‘Sudan files AU complaint against Chad over arm supplies, demands compensation’, The Arab Weekly, 6 November 2024; ‘Sudan War Destabilizes Eastern Chad’, African Defense Forum, 17 December 2024; ‘Sudan accuses Chad of aiding RSF in complaint to African Rights Commission’, Sudan Tribune, 6 November 2024.
68
‘Sudan rejects Chad’s denial of support to RSF’, Sudan Tribune, 9 November 2024.
69
D. Walsh, et al, ‘Talking Peace in Sudan, the U.A.E. Secretly Fuels the Fight’, The New York Times, 29 September 2023; O. Mizzi, ‘Why is there talk of Sudan and Chad going to war?’, The New Arab, 27 March 2025; R. Hoinathy and M. Mahdi, ‘Urgent AU action could defuse rising Chad–Sudan tensions’, Institute for Security Studies, 3 April 2025.
70
International Court of Justice, ‘Application: Instituting Proceedings filed in the Registry of the Court on 5 March 2025 – Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in Sudan (Sudan v. United Arab Emirates’, Application, 5 March 2025.
71
‘World court says lacks jurisdiction to rule on Sudan’s genocide case against UAE’, Reuters, 6 May 2025; International Court of Justice, ‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in Sudan (Sudan v. United Arab Emirates)’, Order, 5 May 2025.
72
M. Olivier, ‘War in Sudan: five questions to understand the accusations against Chad’, The Africa Report, 30 December 2025; A. Zondi, ‘ICC complaint targets Chad’s President over alleged support for Sudan’s RSF’, Channel Africa, 19 December 2025.
73
‘Sudan, Chad accuse RSF of cross-border drone attack’, Sudan Tribune, 27 December 2025; ‘Sudanese army accuses RSF of targeting military site in Chad’, Xinhua, 28 December 2025.
74
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, January 2024.
75
AM. Bissada.‘Chad: Six things to know about the rebel group FACT’, The Africa Report, 22 April 2021; F. E. Şefkatli, ‘The Problem of Foreign Mercenaries in Libya: the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)’, ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 27 April 2021.
76
‘Who are Chad’s FACT rebels and what are their goals?’, Al Jazeera, 21 April 2021.
77
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19.
78
F. E. Şefkatli, ‘The Problem of Foreign Mercenaries in Libya: the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)’, ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 27 April 2021
79
‘Who are Chad’s FACT rebels and what are their goals?’, Al Jazeera, 21 April 2021.
80
C. Adjim, ‘Multiplication des coups durs pour les rebelles du FACT’, Tchad Infos, 20 November 2023; ‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, November 2023.
81
‘Chad rebels ready to observe cease-fire, chief says’, Daily Sabah, 25 April 2021; ‘Tchad: les quatre “exigences préalables” du FACT en vue de futurs pourparlers’, Al Wihda, 31 October 2021
82
M. Ramadane, ‘Chad’s FACT rebel group ends ceasefire over alleged attack by junta’, The Star, 20 August 2023; ‘Tchad-Libye: Le FACT annonce des bombardements contre sa base et rompt son cessez-le-feu’, Al Wihda, 18 August 2023.
83
‘Africa: Chad’, International Crisis Group, August 2023; M. Ramadane, ‘Chad’s FACT rebel group ends ceasefire over alleged attack by junta’, Reuters, 19 August 2023.
84
‘COI Focus: TCHAD – Situation Sécuritaire’, Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, 12 July 2024.
85
‘Who are Chad’s FACT rebels and what are their goals?’, Al Jazeera, 21 April 2021.
86
S. Alharathy, ‘Rebel group FACT ends ceasefire with Chadian army after attack on bases in Libya’, The Libya Observer, 20 August 2023; A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021.
87
A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021.
88
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19
89
‘Chad’, The World Factbook, 15 December 2025; D. Ekonde, ‘Chad’s latest marshal’, Africa is a Country, 20 February 2020; ‘Union of Forces for Democracy and Development’, EBSCO, 2023; A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021.
90
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19.
91
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19
92
A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021.

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between 2023 and 2025)

French Withdrawal from Chad

Renewal of MNJTF

Chad’s Humanitarian Crisis

Intercommunal or Herder/Farmer Violence

Disarmament of Union of Democratic Forces for Democracy

Possible New Armed Group Alliance

Growing Tensions between Chad and Sudan

Non-international armed conflicts

Background

Intensity

Organization

Below the threshold situation between Chad and FACT

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-State parties

Other Main actors

Other Non-State Actors