Senegal

As of June 2026, the non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between the Senegalese government and the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) has ended. Common Article 3 and customary international humanitarian law (IHL) apply to this conflict. Senegal is also a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977, which requires an organized non-State armed group to hold sustained territorial control.

Origins and Context

Since 1982, the MFDC has been engaged in a low-intensity conflict with the central government over Casamance’s independence in Senegal’s southern region. This has been considered the oldest armed conflict in West Africa.¹V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018; ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) stands in solidarity with efforts to combat COVID-19 pandemic’, Centre pour le dialogue humanitaire, 17 April 2020; A. Y. Embalo, ‘Quelle est la portée de l’accord de paix signé à Bissau entre Dakar et le Front Sud du MFDC?’, RFI, 5 August 2022; A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; ‘Senegalese soldier missing, another injured in ambush near Mongone’, The Point, 22 April 2025. The region is differentiated from the rest of Senegal by having an abundance of mineral and other resources. It is a major contributor to the national economy, serving as the country’s primary food basket through the production of rice, and generates exportable commodities such as cotton.²M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; ‘The Casamance uprising in Senegal: one of the longest conflicts in Africa’, The European Institute for International Relations, 25 July 2023. The Casamance is characterized by a high degree of ethnic diversity, but the predominant ethnic group are the Diola people.³M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. Politically, the region is highly decentralized, unlike in the north of the country where political systems are centralized.⁴N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014.

The conflict in Casamance has a complex origin and multiple motivations.⁵M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. The history of colonization, the creation of colonial borders, the policies of successive Senegalese governments, and the marginalization of the Casamance people are among the internal contributing factors.⁶M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014.

According to Casamance separatists, the first president of Senegal, Leopold Senghor, had pledged that the region would gain independence from Senegal twenty years after the nation’s own independence from France.⁷C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; ‘Kein Frieden in der Casamance’, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, September 2021. Casamance’s geographical position, separated from mainland Senegal by The Gambia and enclosed by the Guinea-Bissau border to the south, presents complicated external geostrategic challenges.⁸M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014; ‘Kein Frieden in der Casamance’, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, September 2021.

Deterioration of the situation

In 1985, the MFDC established an armed wing known as ‘Atika’ that started carrying out military manoeuvres in late 1986.⁹C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. Atika was fully operational in 1990 under the command of Sidhi Badji (or Sidy Badji).¹⁰M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007. An initial attack was carried out on 20 April 1990.¹¹C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 281 ; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014.

The 1990s saw guerrilla warfare reach its peak.¹²‘The Casamance uprising in Senegal: one of the longest conflicts in Africa’, The European Institute for International Relations, 25 July 2023. As the MFDC’s military wing underwent a process of radicalization, the Senegalese government reorganized and divided the Casamance province into Kolda and Ziguinchor regions, effectively eliminating the term ‘Casamance’ from general usage.¹³M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. The Senegalese government used torture of detainees to try and weaken the organization but later reverted to peaceful engagement in order to stem the rebellion.¹⁴M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014.

During the 1990s, President Abdou Diouf followed a three-pronged approach of military, political, and diplomatic efforts, but these failed to resolve the conflict.¹⁵M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. Sporadic and occasionally severe violence persisted despite several ceasefires signed in 1991, 1993 and 1999 , displacing large numbers of civilians along the Guinea-Bissau and Gambian borders.¹⁶N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds) Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, pp 281–82; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024.

First wave of splintering within the MFDC

The 1991 ceasefire led to the first split within the MFDC, with its senior military leader, Sidy Badji, and his followers forming ‘Front Nord’, which operated along the Gambian border and abided by the ceasefire, while the ‘Front Sud’, led by Léopold Sagna, resumed operations along the Guinea-Bissau border.¹⁷C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 281. Following the second ceasefire on 8 July 1993, internal divisions within ‘Front Sud’ opposed the radicals led by Salif Sadio to the moderates led by Sagna who were loyal to the MFDC’s leader, Abbé Diamacoune Senghor.¹⁸ C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 281. From 1995 to 1998, the ‘Front Sud’ intensified its operations, causing significant losses to the Senegalese army, and attempts at ceasefire and dialogue failed. In parallel, internal tensions within the ‘Front Sud’ pitting the moderates  against Sadio’s hardliners grew further.¹⁹C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 282.

Regional spill-over and subsequent improvement of the security situation after Abdoulaye Wade’s election,

In the late 1990s, the conflict spread to Guinea-Bissau, where the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Ansumana Mané, launched a coup in June 1998 against the president, Nino Veira, after being accused of supplying arms to ‘Front Sud’. Senegal’s army sided with Veira while the ‘Front Sud’ sent fighters to support Mané.²⁰C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 282. The conflict in Guinea-Bissau eventually ended with the victory of the government’s troops in 1999 and the killing of Mané in November 2000 after a failed second coup attempt in which some elements of the ‘Front Sud’ took part.²¹C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007

After Diouf lost the presidential elections in March 2000, the newly elected President Abdoulaye Wade intensified his peace efforts, leading to the signing of a peace agreement in Ziguinchor on 30 December 2004.²² C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 282; A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024.

Overall, security conditions improved under President Wade, but he too failed to achieve lasting peace.²³M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. Overall, fighting decreased, but clashes between the Senegalese army and the MFDC continued, with attacks by the rebels against civilians also reported.²⁴C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007

Second wave of splintering of the MFDC

At the same time, the MFDC became increasingly fractured, particularly after the death of its leader Abbé Diamacoune Senghor in January 2007.²⁵V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 283; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; ‘The Casamance uprising in Senegal: one of the longest conflicts in Africa’, The European Institute for International Relations, 25 July 2023. The MFDC split into three main factions: the Diakaye’s faction, under the leadership of Fatoma Coly; the faction under the leadership of César Atoute Badiate (who succeeded Sagna after his death in the early 2000s); and the faction led by Salif Sadio.²⁶V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 282; A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; ‘Casamance Peace Process: Diakaye Lays Down its Arms’, Le Quotidien, 15 May 2023.

Macky Sall’s election and amelioration of the situation in Casamance

The situation in Casamance was a major issue in the March 2012 presidential elections, in which Macky Sall defeated Wade, and has significantly progressed since then.²⁷N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 283; A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024. Once elected, Sall adopted a development policy focused on Casamance and enhanced access to essential infrastructure and social services for rural communities.²⁸A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024.  He also attempted to improve relations with Yahya Jammeh, the erstwhile President of The Gambia, pledging to engage in ‘genuine’ negotiations and accepting the Italian Catholic organization Sant’Egidio as a mediator in the dispute.²⁹ V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014; ‘Kein Frieden in der Casamance’, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, September 2021.

In October 2013, Sadio’s faction held preliminary peace talks with the MFDC for the first time although no agreement was reached.³⁰ V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014; ‘Kein Frieden in der Casamance’, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, September 2021. Amid a widening rift among the factions in the MFDC, Macky Sall called for the existing factions, including the armed wing of the MFDC, the northern front led by Salif Sadio and the southern front comprising the César Atoute Badiate and Ousmane Gnantang Diatta factions, to unite under one secretary-general to facilitate peaceful negotiations.³¹V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. The attempt was, however, unsuccessful.‘Kein Frieden in der Casamance’, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, September 2021.

A major achievement on 10 March 2023 was the signing of a peace agreement that was the result of talks which began in 2020 between the government and Diakaye’s faction.³² A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Le Sénégal va-t-il enfin boucler le processus de paix en Casamance?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024. Consequently, in Mongone, Diakaye’s faction fighters laid down their arms in May 2023, and in December, weapons were handed in for destruction by 255 former fighters.³³A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Le Sénégal va-t-il enfin boucler le processus de paix en Casamance?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; M. Drame, ‘Plus de 250 Combattants de Diakaye et de Irapa Déposent les Armes’, Seneplus, 15 May 2023.

Humanitarian impact of the conflict

In comparison with other West African civil wars, the Casamance conflict has been of a low-level intensity.³⁴ V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007. Since the beginning of the conflict, an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 people have been killed, with hundreds of deaths reported from landmines.³⁵A. Y. Embalo, ‘Quelle est la portée de l’accord de paix signé à Bissau entre Dakar et le Front Sud du MFDC?’, RFI, 5 August 2022; M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; ‘The Casamance uprising in Senegal: one of the longest conflicts in Africa’, The European Institute for International Relations, 25 July 2023; M. Gerth-Niculescu, ‘Senegal’s restless Casamance region sees deadly protests’, Deutsche Welle, 14 February 2024; D. Lemmi and M. Simoncelli, ‘Rebel conflict in Senegal’s Casamance region far from over’, Deutsche Welle, 9 January 2023. At least 60,000 people have been displaced due to the ongoing conflict and another 10,000 to 18,000 have fled to Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia.³⁶A. Y. Embalo, ‘Quelle est la portée de l’accord de paix signé à Bissau entre Dakar et le Front Sud du MFDC?’, RFI, 5 August 2022; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; M. Gerth-Niculescu, ‘Senegal’s restless Casamance region sees deadly protests’, Deutsche Welle, 14 February 2024; D. Lemmi and M. Simoncelli, ‘Rebel conflict in Senegal’s Casamance region far from over’, Deutsche Welle, 9 January 2023; ‘UNHCR: Senegalese refugees in the Gambia and Guinea Bissau’, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 27 September 2018.

Both the Senegalese army and the MFDC have committed atrocities against their enemies as well as against civilians in the conflict.³⁷C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007. Even in 2025, areas of forest, fields, and rural tracks are uninhabitable because of landmines and explosive ordnance from the conflict.³⁸ A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Le Sénégal va-t-il enfin boucler le processus de paix en Casamance?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; ‘Senegal: releasing land, rebuilding life’, Reliefweb, 19 May 2025. The international community has, however, paid little attention to the conflict in Casamance.³⁹C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; ‘Kein Frieden in der Casamance’, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, September 2021.

Presidential elections in March 2024

Despite former President Sall’s numerous attempts to limit opposition and postpone the elections initially scheduled for February 2024,⁴⁰‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group. which led to widespread protests that were violently suppressed.⁴¹‘Premiers heurts au Sénégal après un report à hauts risques de la présidentielle’, France 24, 04 February 2024; Human Rights Watch, ‘Senegal: Delayed Elections Spark Violence, Repression’, News release, 12 February 2024. The presidential poll was held peacefully on 24 March 2024 with candidates from the ruling party and the opposition competing.⁴²‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; M. Soumaré and M. H. Boko, ‘Senegal: Who’s in Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko’s inner circle?’, The Africa Report, 14 August 2024. On 25 March 2024, the Electoral Commission announced that Diomaye Faye, the candidate for the opposition Patriotes Africains du Sénégal pour le Travail, l’Éthique et la Fraternité, had won the poll. The decision was confirmed by the Constitutional Court on 29 March 2024. ⁴³‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group. Faye won with 54.3 per cent of the vote, beating eighteen other candidates including that of the ruling coalition, Amadou Ba, who won 35.8 per cent.⁴⁴‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; M. Chemam, ‘Bassirou Diomaye Faye becomes Senegal’s youngest president ever’, RFI, 2 April 2024.

On 2 April 2024, Faye, a leftwing pan-Africanist with family roots in the troubled region of Casamance, was sworn in as Senegal’s youngest president and promised systemic change, greater sovereignty, and peace after years of deadly unrest.⁴⁵‘Bassirou Diomaye Faye sworn in as Senegal’s youngest president’, The Guardian, 2 April 2024; ‘Senegal President Faye names opposition leader Ousmane Sonko as prime minister’, France 24, 3 April 2024; ‘Could the Diomaye Faye-Sonko government win a historic peace in Casamance?’, Africa Confidential, 3 March 2025. Faye is one of a group of political opponents who, ten days before the presidential ballot on 24 March, had been released from prison under an amnesty announced by President Macky Sall.⁴⁶ ‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; ‘Bassirou Diomaye Faye sworn in as Senegal’s youngest president’, The Guardian, 2 April 2024. In his inaugural act as the leader of Senegal, Faye designated his primary supporter, Ousmane Sonko, as prime minister, who had been released from prison alongside him.⁴⁷‘Senegal President Faye names opposition leader Ousmane Sonko as prime minister’, France 24, 3 April 2024; ‘Senegal’s Faye appoints ally Ousmane Sonko as prime minister’, Al Jazeera, 3 April 2024; M. Chemam, ‘Senegal’s President Faye appoints Ousmane Sonko as prime minister’, RFI, 3 April 2024. Sonko had previously been disqualified from running as a presidential candidate due to his conviction for defamation and ‘corruption of youth’ in May and June 2023.⁴⁸ ‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; ‘Au Sénégal, l’opposant Ousmane Sonko a été condamné à deux ans de prison ferme pour « corruption de la jeunesse »’, Le Monde Afrique, 01 June 2023; ‘Senegal President Faye names opposition leader Ousmane Sonko as prime minister’, France 24, 3 April 2024; M. Chemam, ‘Senegal’s President Faye appoints Ousmane Sonko as prime minister’, RFI, 3 April 2024.

Peace agreement signed between Senegal and the MFDC Badiate’s faction

On 23 February 2025, the Senegalese government reached a peace agreement with the MFDC faction under the leadership of Cesar Atoute Badiate.⁴⁹ ‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; ‘Senegal signs historic peace deal with Casamance separatists’, Africa News, 25 February 2025; ‘Senegal, Separatist Casamance Rebels Sign Peace Accord’, The Defense Post, 25 February 2025. The deal, which marked the beginning of the end of the armed conflict in Casamance, resulted from earlier talks between Senegal and Badiate’s faction, which had previously led to the signing of the Mutual Commitment Declaration on the Terms of Disarmament on 4 August 2022. This process was facilitated by Guinea-Bissau’s President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, with both Embaló and Sonko present at the signing. The agreement comprises a presidential pardon for imprisoned rebels, as well as amnesty and reintegration for other rebels, and paves the way for investment that will benefit local communities.⁵⁰‘The State of Senegal and the Provisional Committee of the Unified Political and Combat Wings of the MFDC Take a Major Step in the Casamance Peace Process’, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 28 February 2025; ‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; ‘Senegal signs historic peace deal with Casamance separatists’, Africa News, 25 February 2025; B. Dione and B. Ahmed, ‘Senegal has signed a deal with separatist rebels. But will it end one of Africa’s longest conflicts?’, Independent, 28 February 2025. Prime Minister Sonko hailed the deal as a significant step towards establishing a definitive peace in the Casamance region.⁵¹ M. Özkan, ‘Senegal signs peace deal with separatist group, ending Africa’s oldest conflicts’, AA, 24 February 2025; ‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group. However, the most powerful faction militarily – Salif Sadio’s northern branch – has stayed outside the agreement and maintained its claims for independence.⁵² O. Badiane, ‘Que sait-on de l’accord signé à Bissau entre le Sénégal et le MFDC ?’, BBC News Afrique¸24 February 2025; ‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; B. Dione and B. Ahmed, ‘Senegal has signed a deal with separatist rebels. But will it end one of Africa’s longest conflicts?’, Independent, 28 February 2025.

Implementation of the ‘Diomaye Plan for Casamance’

The Diomaye Plan for Casamance for 2024–25, introduced by the new Senegalese government, seeks to promote lasting peace in Casamance through structural projects that will stimulate local development.⁵³‘Peace Agreement Offers Hope in Senegal’s Casamance Region’, African Defense Forum, 18 March 2025; S. Anne, ‘Casamance: the Diomaye plan, a springboard for peace and development’, Sene News, 28 December 2024; ‘Address to the Nation by the President of the Republic, His Excellency Mr. Bassirou Diomaye Faye’, Presidency of Senegal, 31 December 2024. Key elements of the plan include establishing regional steering committees in Ziguinchor, Sédhiou, and Kolda to oversee development initiatives and engage with all relevant local stakeholders.⁵⁴S. Anne, ‘Casamance: the Diomaye plan, a springboard for peace and development’, Sene News, 28 December 2024; Kagaye, ‘Casamance: The steering committee of the Diomaye plan takes stock of the actions in progress’, Sene News, 6 February 2025. Other areas of focus are the strengthening of the National Agency for the Revival of Economic and Social Activities in Casamance; demining; and support for local small and medium-sized enterprises.⁵⁵S. Anne, ‘Casamance: the Diomaye plan, a springboard for peace and development’, Sene News, 28 December 2024.

Departure of French troops from Senegal

Since Senegal gained independence in 1960, France’s military has continued to maintain a presence in the country, in accordance with bilateral military cooperation agreements.⁵⁶B. Dione and M. Banchereau, ‘France withdraws from Senegal, ending its permanent military presence in West Africa’, AP News, 17 July 2025; ‘Former colonial ruler France hands over its last military bases in Senegal’, Al Jazeera, 17 July 2025. As part of a wider regional backlash against what is regarded as a lasting effect of the colonial system, Senegal’s new government took a hardline stance against the presence of French troops in the country.⁵⁷B. Dione and M. Banchereau, ‘France withdraws from Senegal, ending its permanent military presence in West Africa’, AP News, 17 July 2025; ‘France hands back last military bases in Senegal, ending 65-year troop presence’, France 24, 17 July 2025; ‘French army leaves Senegal, ending military presence In West Africa’, Club of Mozambique, 18 July 2025; E. E. Olumba, ‘Senegal sees French troops depart as west Africa reassesses colonial ties’, The Conversation, 18 March 2025. In November 2024, President Faye requested that all 350 French troops withdraw from Senegal, declaring that a foreign military presence was inconsistent with its sovereignty.⁵⁸‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; ‘France hands back last military bases in Senegal, ending 65-year troop presence’, France 24, 17 July 2025; ‘Senegal president says no more ‘foreign military presence from 2025’’, Le Monde, 1 January 2025.

Dakar and Paris announced in February 2025 that French troops would leave by the end of the year, and they would set up a joint commission to monitor the departure and oversee the restitution of military bases by the end of 2025.⁵⁹‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; ‘French troops to exit Senegal by end of 2025’, Al Jazeera, 12 February 2025. On 17 July 2025, France handed over the last two sites it controlled in Senegal during a ceremony at Camp Geille, which was the largest of France’s military bases situated in central Dakar.⁶⁰B. Dione and M. Banchereau, ‘France withdraws from Senegal, ending its permanent military presence in West Africa’, AP News, 17 July 2025; ‘Former colonial ruler France hands over its last military bases in Senegal’, Al Jazeera, 17 July 2025; J. Crétois, ‘French troops leave Senegal, but Dakar maintains ties with Paris’, Le Monde, 18 July 2025; ‘French army withdraws last troops from Senegal bases’, Le Monde, 17 July 2025. The ceremony formally concluded the three-month withdrawal of approximately 350 French troops from Senegal which commenced in March 2025.⁶¹B. Dione and M. Banchereau, ‘France withdraws from Senegal, ending its permanent military presence in West Africa’, AP News, 17 July 2025; ‘France begins military base handover to Senegal’, Reuters, 7 March 2025; A. Miridzhanian and N. Dione, ‘France ends permanent troop presence in Senegal’, Reuters, 17 July 2025.

The French military’s chief of the defence staff’s spokesman, Colonel Guillaume Vernet, has said that the withdrawal from Senegal is in line with a new strategy for France in West and Central Africa.⁶²B. Dione and M. Banchereau, ‘France withdraws from Senegal, ending its permanent military presence in West Africa’, AP News, 17 July 2025; ‘French army leaves Senegal, ending military presence In West Africa’, Club of Mozambique, 18 July 2025. This strategy is to create a more flexible ‘partnership’ approach, instead of the previous policy of a permanent presence.⁶³B. Dione and M. Banchereau, ‘France withdraws from Senegal, ending its permanent military presence in West Africa’, AP News, 17 July 2025; ‘French army leaves Senegal, ending military presence In West Africa’, Club of Mozambique, 18 July 2025. The French military will continue to provide defence training, intelligence or targeted military support, the precise nature of which will depend on specific needs.⁶⁴A. Miridzhanian and N. Dione, ‘France ends permanent troop presence in Senegal’, Reuters, 17 July 2025.

State Parties

• Senegal

Non-State parties

• Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) (Northern faction, Southern faction, and Diakaye faction)