Senegal

The non international armed conflict (NIAC) between the Senegalese government and the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) has ended by May 2026 at the latest. Common Article 3 and customary international humanitarian law (IHL) applied to this conflict. Senegal is also a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977, which requires an organized non-State armed group to hold sustained territorial control.

Origins and Context

Since 1982, the MFDC has been engaged in a low-intensity conflict with the central government over Casamance’s independence in Senegal’s southern region. This has been considered the oldest armed conflict in West Africa.¹ The region is differentiated from the rest of Senegal by having an abundance of mineral and other resources. It is a major contributor to the national economy, serving as the country’s primary food basket through the production of rice, and generates exportable commodities such as cotton.² The Casamance is characterized by a high degree of ethnic diversity, but the predominant ethnic group are the Diola people.³ Politically, the region is highly decentralized, unlike in the north of the country where political systems are centralized.⁴

The conflict in Casamance has a complex origin and multiple motivations.⁵ The history of colonization, the creation of colonial borders, the policies of successive Senegalese governments, and the marginalization of the Casamance people are among the internal contributing factors.⁶

According to Casamance separatists, the first president of Senegal, Leopold Senghor, had pledged that the region would gain independence from Senegal twenty years after the nation’s own independence from France.⁷ Casamance’s geographical position, separated from mainland Senegal by The Gambia and enclosed by the Guinea-Bissau border to the south, presents complicated external geostrategic challenges.⁸

Deterioration of the situation

In 1985, the MFDC established an armed wing known as ‘Atika’ that started carrying out military manoeuvres in late 1986.⁹ Atika was fully operational in 1990 under the command of Sidhi Badji (or Sidy Badji).¹⁰ An initial attack was carried out on 20 April 1990.¹¹

The 1990s saw guerrilla warfare reach its peak.¹² As the MFDC’s military wing underwent a process of radicalization, the Senegalese government reorganized and divided the Casamance province into Kolda and Ziguinchor regions, effectively eliminating the term ‘Casamance’ from general usage.¹³ The Senegalese government used torture of detainees to try and weaken the organization but later reverted to peaceful engagement in order to stem the rebellion.¹⁴

During the 1990s, President Abdou Diouf followed a three-pronged approach of military, political, and diplomatic efforts, but these failed to resolve the conflict.¹⁵ Sporadic and occasionally severe violence persisted despite several ceasefires signed in 1991, 1993 and 1999 , displacing large numbers of civilians along the Guinea-Bissau and Gambian borders.¹⁶

First wave of splintering within the MFDC

The 1991 ceasefire led to the first split within the MFDC, with its senior military leader, Sidy Badji, and his followers forming ‘Front Nord’, which operated along the Gambian border and abided by the ceasefire, while the ‘Front Sud’, led by Léopold Sagna, resumed operations along the Guinea-Bissau border.¹⁷ Following the second ceasefire on 8 July 1993, internal divisions within ‘Front Sud’ opposed the radicals led by Salif Sadio to the moderates led by Sagna who were loyal to the MFDC’s leader, Abbé Diamacoune Senghor.¹⁸ From 1995 to 1998, the ‘Front Sud’ intensified its operations, causing significant losses to the Senegalese army, and attempts at ceasefire and dialogue failed. In parallel, internal tensions within the ‘Front Sud’ pitting the moderates against Sadio’s hardliners grew further.¹⁹

Regional spill-over and subsequent improvement of the security situation after Abdoulaye Wade’s election,

In the late 1990s, the conflict spread to Guinea-Bissau, where the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Ansumana Mané, launched a coup in June 1998 against the president, Nino Veira, after being accused of supplying arms to ‘Front Sud’. Senegal’s army sided with Veira while the ‘Front Sud’ sent fighters to support Mané.²⁰ The conflict in Guinea-Bissau eventually ended with the victory of the government’s troops in 1999 and the killing of Mané in November 2000 after a failed second coup attempt in which some elements of the ‘Front Sud’ took part.²¹

After Diouf lost the presidential elections in March 2000, the newly elected President Abdoulaye Wade intensified his peace efforts, leading to the signing of a peace agreement in Ziguinchor on 30 December 2004.²²

Overall, security conditions improved under President Wade, but he too failed to achieve lasting peace.²³ Overall, fighting decreased, but clashes between the Senegalese army and the MFDC continued, with attacks by the rebels against civilians also reported.²⁴

Both the Senegalese army and the MFDC have committed atrocities against their enemies as well as against civilians in the conflict.³⁸ Even in 2025, areas of forest, fields, and rural tracks are uninhabitable because of landmines and explosive ordnance from the conflict.³⁹ The international community has, however, paid little attention to the conflict in Casamance.⁴⁰

Protests in Dakar and Ziguinchor following Ousmane Sonko’s arrest

In early June 2023, in response to the arrest of the Mayor of Ziguinchor and opposition leader Ousmane Sonko, who had been notably convicted of ‘corruption of youth’ (see below), protests erupted in Dakar and Ziguinchor. Protesters notably erected barricades and were violently repressed by security forces, resulting in the deaths of at least 23 people, including deaths caused by firearms.⁴¹ Protests continued in the months that followed and were met with a brutal crackdown by Senegalese security forces.⁴²

Presidential elections in March 2024

Despite former President Sall’s numerous attempts to limit opposition and postpone the elections initially scheduled for February 2024,⁴³ which led to widespread protests that were violently suppressed.⁴⁴ The presidential poll was held peacefully on 24 March 2024 with candidates from the ruling party and the opposition competing.⁴⁵ On 25 March 2024, the Electoral Commission announced that Diomaye Faye, the candidate for the opposition Patriotes Africains du Sénégal pour le Travail, l’Éthique et la Fraternité, had won the poll. The decision was confirmed by the Constitutional Court on 29 March 2024. ⁴⁶ Faye won with 54.3 per cent of the vote, beating eighteen other candidates including that of the ruling coalition, Amadou Ba, who won 35.8 per cent.⁴⁷

On 2 April 2024, Faye, a leftwing pan-Africanist with family roots in the troubled region of Casamance, was sworn in as Senegal’s youngest president and promised systemic change, greater sovereignty, and peace after years of deadly unrest.⁴⁸ Faye is one of a group of political opponents who, ten days before the presidential ballot on 24 March, had been released from prison under an amnesty announced by President Macky Sall.⁴⁹ In his inaugural act as the leader of Senegal, Faye designated his primary supporter, Ousmane Sonko, as prime minister, who had been released from prison alongside him.⁵⁰ Sonko had previously been disqualified from running as a presidential candidate due to his conviction for defamation and ‘corruption of youth’ in May and June 2023.⁵¹

Peace agreement signed between Senegal and the MFDC Badiate’s faction

On 23 February 2025, the Senegalese government reached a peace agreement with the MFDC faction under the leadership of Cesar Atoute Badiate.⁵² The deal, which marked the beginning of the end of the armed conflict in Casamance, resulted from earlier talks between Senegal and Badiate’s faction, which had previously led to the signing of the Mutual Commitment Declaration on the Terms of Disarmament on 4 August 2022. This process was facilitated by Guinea-Bissau’s President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, with both Embaló and Sonko present at the signing. The agreement comprises a presidential pardon for imprisoned rebels, as well as amnesty and reintegration for other rebels, and paves the way for investment that will benefit local communities.⁵³ Prime Minister Sonko hailed the deal as a significant step towards establishing a definitive peace in the Casamance region.⁵⁴ However, the most powerful faction militarily – Salif Sadio’s northern branch – has stayed outside the agreement and maintained its claims for independence.⁵⁵

Implementation of the ‘Diomaye Plan for Casamance’

The Diomaye Plan for Casamance for 2024–25, introduced by the new Senegalese government, seeks to promote lasting peace in Casamance through structural projects that will stimulate local development.⁵⁶ Key elements of the plan include establishing regional steering committees in Ziguinchor, Sédhiou, and Kolda to oversee development initiatives and engage with all relevant local stakeholders.⁵⁷ Other areas of focus are the strengthening of the National Agency for the Revival of Economic and Social Activities in Casamance; demining; and support for local small and medium-sized enterprises.⁵⁸

Departure of French troops from Senegal

Since Senegal gained independence in 1960, France’s military has continued to maintain a presence in the country, in accordance with bilateral military cooperation agreements.⁵⁹ As part of a wider regional backlash against what is regarded as a lasting effect of the colonial system, Senegal’s new government took a hardline stance against the presence of French troops in the country.⁶⁰ In November 2024, President Faye requested that all 350 French troops withdraw from Senegal, declaring that a foreign military presence was inconsistent with its sovereignty.⁶¹

Dakar and Paris announced in February 2025 that French troops would leave by the end of the year, and they would set up a joint commission to monitor the departure and oversee the restitution of military bases by the end of 2025.⁶² On 17 July 2025, France handed over the last two sites it controlled in Senegal during a ceremony at Camp Geille, which was the largest of France’s military bases situated in central Dakar.⁶³ The ceremony formally concluded the three-month withdrawal of approximately 350 French troops from Senegal which commenced in March 2025.⁶⁴

The French military’s chief of the defence staff’s spokesman, Colonel Guillaume Vernet, has said that the withdrawal from Senegal is in line with a new strategy for France in West and Central Africa.⁶⁵ This strategy is to create a more flexible ‘partnership’ approach, instead of the previous policy of a permanent presence.⁶⁶ The French military will continue to provide defence training, intelligence or targeted military support, the precise nature of which will depend on specific needs.⁶⁷

Non-international armed conflict

Non-international armed conflict between Senegal and Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) Ended May 2026

Background

The MFDC was established as a political movement in 1947 with the objective of obtaining regional autonomy for Casamance.¹ Since 1982, the MFDC has used violence to fight for independence for the whole of the Casamance region as well as to secure recognition of its historical borders.² As mentioned, the MFDC’s insurrection reached its height in the 1990s.³ In February 2021, the President of Guinea-Bissau, Umaro Sissoco Embaló, launched a military offensive against MFDC strongholds that were located along the Senegalese-Guinea-Bissau border, and formally authorised Senegalese military intervention in pursuit of Casamance separatist insurgents within Bissau-Guinean territory.⁴ This led to a resurgence in hostilities between Senegalese forces and Casamance rebels, thus bringing an end to the fragile truce that had been in effect for several years.⁵ In March 2022, the military undertook a renewed operation to target the bases of Salif Sadio’s faction in the Bignona department, close to the Gambian border, which weakened the MFDC as the bases provided funding for timber and drug trafficking.⁶ In March 2023 and in February 2025, the MFDC’s Diakaye’s faction, and the Badiate’s faction, signed respective peace agreements with the Senegalese government.⁷ The MFDC’s faction under the leadership of Salif Sadio, however, stayed outside the agreement and continues to clash with the Senegalese government.⁸

Intensity

The Senegalese armed forces continue to conduct security operations in territory where the MFDC is operational. However, these operations are underreported.⁹ Very few violent incidents in this ongoing NIAC were reported between 2023 and 2025. In 2023, the first incident occurred when Senegalese paratroopers clashed with MFDC rebels close to the town of Diakine on 14 October 2023.¹⁰ The same day, a Senegalese patrol was ambushed by the MFDC in the village of Sindian (Bignona, Casamance). Five soldiers lost their lives, four were injured, and the MFDC also seized weapons and ammunition.¹¹ In another incident on 14 December 2023, a military vehicle carrying twelve soldiers and ammunition detonated an anti-tank mine, killing five soldiers. Five other soldiers were reportedly killed a few days earlier in southern Casamance, with the exact circumstances not reported.¹² In late December 2023, the Senegalese army, supported by the Gambian army, launched an attack from several Gambian villages against the MFDC’s Northern Front, using shells. Government soldiers were repelled by MFDC elements, and two Senegalese soldiers were killed and four others were injured.¹³

A series of attacks reportedly occurred in mid-April 2025, following the MFDC’s attack on the locality of Djinaky on 13 April 2025, during which stores were looted and cell phones and large amounts of money stolen. In response, the Senegalese army launched a large-scale operation in the southern district of Bignona to hunt down the assailants. On 16 April 2025, MFDC elements ambushed Senegalese soldiers near Mongone. One soldier was injured and another kidnapped. ¹⁴ On 22 April, the explosion of a improvised explosive device near Ziguinchor killed five soldiers.¹⁵ On 21 May 2025, another skirmish occurred between the Senegalese army and elements of MFDC in Djibidione following the group’s attempted resistance of a military patrol.¹⁶ In August 2025, the self-proclaimed spokesperson for the MFDC Mangoucourou section, Hamidou Djiba, was arrested by the national gendarmerie.¹⁷ In early November 2025, the newly elected President Bassirou Diomaye Faye reportedly strengthened military positions in Casamance by deploying more officers, personnel, and reconnaissance drones.¹⁸

No further incidents were reported until early 2026. On 23 February 2026, MFDC fighters reportedly ambushed two military vehicles transporting military supplies, killing at least two soldiers and injuring four more. The attackers used automatic weapons to attack the convoy from multiple directions and also looted equipment.¹⁹ In March 2026, Casamance experienced a temporary surge of violence. On 12 March 2026, violent clashes between the military and the MFDC occurred during an operation to destroy cannabis fields in Kadialok, a village in Casamance close to the Gambian border. At least one soldier was killed and six more injured.²⁰ In the second half of March 2026, military operations intensified against MFDC elements involved in cannabis production in Bignona, and fighting between the army and the MFDC forced inhabitants to flee towards The Gambia. As a result, the Gambian early alert and response centre (‘Centre de Coordination du mécanisme national d’alerte précoce et de réponse’) issued a warning on 21 March 2026, emphasizing humanitarian risks and advising against any non-essential travel in the area. While the precise number of casualties was not reported, three Senegalese soldiers died and three others were injured in an accidental explosion during a cannabis field removal operation.²¹

The more than four-decades-old NIAC involving MFDC factions has contributed to thousands of internally displaced persons in the Casamance region (see above).²²

Although the NIAC has come to an end, the MFDC Sadio’s faction has abstained from any ceasefire or peace agreements and has remained active (see above),²³ since the temporary surge of violence in March 2026, no further clashes have been reported. Moreover, several violent incidents relate to explosive ordnances (see above) presumably planted earlier by the MFDC. The broader progressive decrease of violence, coupled with the two peace agreements apparently effectively implemented and sustained stabilization efforts (see above), has significantly de-escalated the situation.²⁴ As a result, by May 2026 at the latest, the violence between the MFDC active faction(s) and Senegal has no longer been sufficiently intense for a NIAC to exist.

Organization

The MFDC is divided into a political and a military wing.²⁵ The political wing has local and external branches whose function it is to champion the quest for the independence of the Casamance region.²⁶ The military wing, however, rarely acts in unity with the ideals set out by its political counterpart. The political counterpart tends to ignore recommendations made by the military wing.²⁷

The military wing is called either the ‘maquisards’ or ‘Atika’, which means ‘warrior’ in Diola.²⁸ The MFDC’s Provisional Committee exercises command over the political and military wings of the MFDC.²⁹ The Provisional Committee also issues press statements on behalf of the MFDC.³⁰

As mentioned, the military wing of the MFDC has splintered over time and consists of three main factions: the MFDC Northern Front (led by Salif Sadio), the MFDC Southern Front (led by César Atoute Badiate) and the MFDC’s Diakaye faction (led by Fatoma Coly) (see above).³¹ The existence of hierarchical leadership at a factional level enables each faction to impose discipline as well as IHL.

The MFDC raises funds through illicit timber trade and drug trafficking.³² The MFDC trades drugs for arms³³ and has historically obtained arms from sympathetic governments.³⁴ Military tactics include hiding in border areas adjacent to Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia to avoid the Senegalese armed forces.³⁵

The Diakaye’s faction signed a peace agreement on 10 March 2023,³⁶ and Badiate’s faction entered a peace agreement on 23 February 2025.³⁷ Sadio’s faction has not concluded a peace agreement³⁸ and continues to oppose the Senegalese Government (see above).³⁹

The MDFC remains sufficiently organized under IHL.

By May 2026 at the latest, the NIAC between Senegal and the MFDC has ended.

1
B. Sonko, ‘Kein Frieden in der Casamance’, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, September 2021. ↩︎
2
B. Sonko, ‘Kein Frieden in der Casamance’, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, September 2021. ↩︎
3
‘The Casamance uprising in Senegal: one of the longest conflicts in Africa’, European Institute for International Relations, 25 July 2023. ↩︎
4
L. Bird, ‘Cocaine Politics in West Africa: Guinea-Bissau’s protection networks’, Global Initiative Network, July 2022; A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; J. Deveaux, ‘Le Sénégal mène une vaste opération militaire en Casamance pour y affirmer son autorité’, FranceInfo, 11 February 2021. ↩︎
5
L. Bird, ‘Cocaine Politics in West Africa: Guinea-Bissau’s protection networks’, Global Initiative Network, July 2022. ↩︎
6
A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; ‘Sénégal: nouvelle opération militaire contre la rébellion en Casamance’, Jeune Afrique, 15 March 2022. ↩︎
7
A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; ‘Senegal, Separatist Casamance Rebels Sign Peace Accord’, The Defense Post, 25 February 2025; M. Özkan, ‘Senegal signs peace deal with separatist group, ending Africa’s oldest conflicts’, AA, 24 February 2025; ‘The State of Senegal and the Provisional Committee of the Unified Political and Combat Wings of the MFDC Take a Major Step in the Casamance Peace Process’, The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 28 February 2025. ↩︎
8
A. Diatta, ‘U.S. Withdrawal Shakes Casamance Peace Process, Sparks Concern Among Stakeholders’, The Gambia Journal, 9 February 2025; A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024. ↩︎
9
A. Pochon and C. Zammit, ‘D9.3 – Senegal Case Study’, Africa Maval, 15 December 2023, 67; ‘Senegal’, CIA.gov, 19 December 2023; ‘Senegal manhunt follows latest Casamance separatist flare-up’, APA News, 18 April 2025. ↩︎
10
F. Tendeng, ‘Senegal: Four soldiers killed by an anti-tank mine in Casamance’, The Gambia Journal, 16 December 2023; M. M. Tine, ‘Affrontements à Benghazi et Diakine: Ce qui s’est passé entre des membres du MFDC et les forces de sécurité’, SeneNews, 15 October 2023; C. Yanga, ‘Casamance: Affrontements violents entre l’armée et Atika’, Notre Continent, 16 October 2023. ↩︎
11
B. Mané, ‘Casamance : Au moins cinq militaires sénégalais tués dans une embuscade de combattants du MFDC’, Le Journal du Pays, 15 October 2023. ↩︎
12
B. Mané, ‘Casamance : Cinq soldats sénégalais tués et quatre blessés par l’explosion d’une mine’, Le journal du Pays, 16 December 2023. ↩︎
13
B. Mané, ‘Casamance : Deux militaires sénégalais tués lors d’une attaque de l’armée sénégalaise depuis la Gambie, repoussée par les combattants du MFDC’, Le Journal du Pays, 30 December 2023. ↩︎
14
‘Senegalese soldier missing, another injured in ambush near Mongone’, The Point, 22 April 2025; ‘A Senegalese Soldier Still Captive in Casamance: Behind-the-Scenes Diplomacy Ongoing for His Release’, The Gambia Journal, 17 May 2025; ‘Senegal manhunt follows latest Casamance separatist flare-up’, APA News, 18 April 2025. ↩︎
15
B. Mané, ‘Casamance : Cinq soldats sénégalais tués dans une explosion de mine à Badême au sud de Ziguinchor’, Le Journal du Pays, 23 April 2025. ↩︎
16
‘Affrontements en Casamance : accrochage entre l’armée et des supposés éléments du MFDC à Djibidione’, Emedia, 21 May 2025. ↩︎
17
‘Ziguinchor: The National Gendarmerie has apprehended Hamidou Djiba of the MFDC’, SeneNews, 23 August 2025. ↩︎
18
E. Tendeng, ‘Casamance : Les combattants du MFDC en état d’alerte face au choix fatal de l’escalade militaire de Diomaye Faye’, Le Journal du Pays, 4 November 2025. ↩︎
19
B. Mané, ‘Casamance : au moins deux militaires sénégalais tués dans une embuscade tendue par des combattants indépendantistes du MFDC’, Le Journal du Pays, 24 February 2026 ;B. Mané, ‘Casamance : Six soldats sénégalais tués lors d’affrontements avec des combattants indépendantistes du MFDC’, Le Journal du Pays, 13 March 2026. ↩︎
20
‘En Casamance, un soldat tué et six blessés lors d’une opération de l’armée sénégalaise’, Jeune Afrique, 13 March 2026 ; B. Mané, ‘Casamance : Six soldats sénégalais tués lors d’affrontements avec des combattants indépendantistes du MFDC’, Le Journal du Pays, 13 March 2026. ↩︎
21
’Sénégal: trois militaires meurent lors d’une opération contre le trafic de cannabis en Casamance’, RFI, 18 March 2026; ‘Sénégal/Gambie : opérations anti-MFDC et populations déplacées’, APA News, 21 March 2026. ↩︎
22
See also: A. Diatta, ‘U.S. Withdrawal Shakes Casamance Peace Process, Sparks Concern Among Stakeholders’, The Gambia Journal, 9 February 2025; ‘Senegal’, US Department of State, 2023. ↩︎
23
See also: O. Badiane, ‘Que sait-on de l’accord signé à Bissau entre le Sénégal et le MFDC ?’, BBC News Afrique¸24 February 2025; ‘Senegal manhunt follows latest Casamance separatist flare-up’, APA News, 18 April 2025. ↩︎
24
B. B. Ndiaye, ‘Building Trust to Buttress Senegal Against the Growing Threat of Violent Extremism’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 21 April 2026. ↩︎
25
O. Badiane, ‘Que sait-on de l’accord signé à Bissau entre le Sénégal et le MFDC?’, BBC, 24 February 2025. ↩︎
26
N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. ↩︎
27
B. Sonko, ‘Kein Frieden in der Casamance’, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, September 2021. ↩︎
28
N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. ↩︎
29
A. Y. Embalo, ‘Quelle est la portée de l’accord de paix signé à Bissau entre Dakar et le Front Sud du MFDC?’, RFI, 5 August 2022. ↩︎
30
‘Statement of Solidarity of the “Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance” (MFDC) amidst the COVID-19 pandemic’, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, September 2022. ↩︎
31
A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014; ‘Une faction du MFDC signe la cessation des hostilités avec le Gouvernement du Sénégal et dépose définitivement les armes’, Centre for Human Dialogue, 15 May 2023; ‘Senegal’s President Macky Sall met with delegation of former rebel faction led by Fatoma Coly’, West Africa Democracy Radio, 11 March 2024; ‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; O. Badiane, ‘Que sait-on de l’accord signé à Bissau entre le Sénégal et le MFDC?’, BBC, 24 February 2025; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. ↩︎
32
A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024. ↩︎
33
M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024. ↩︎
34
M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024. ↩︎
35
A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; L. Bird, ‘Cocaine Politics in West Africa: Guinea-Bissau’s protection networks’, Global Initiative Network, July 2022. ↩︎
36
A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; ‘Une faction du MFDC signe la cessation des hostilités avec le Gouvernement du Sénégal et dépose définitivement les armes’, Centre for Human Dialogue, 15 May 2023; ‘Sénégal: Déclaration de la porte-parole sur l’avancée du processus de paix en Casamance’, European Union External Action, 8 May 2022; M. Özkan, ‘Le Sénégal signe un accord de paix avec le Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance’, AA, 25 February 2025 ↩︎
37
O. Badiane, ‘Que sait-on de l’accord signé à Bissau entre le Sénégal et le MFDC?’, BBC, 24 February 2025; ‘The State of Senegal and the Provisional Committee of the Unified Political and Combat Wings of the MFDC Take a Major Step in the Casamance Peace Process’, The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 28 February 2025 ↩︎
38
‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014 ↩︎
39
‘Senegal manhunt follows latest Casamance separatist flare-up’, APA News, 18 April 2025. ↩︎

State Parties

Senegal

Non-State parties

Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) (Northern faction, Southern faction, and Diakaye faction)

1
V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018; ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) stands in solidarity with efforts to combat COVID-19 pandemic’, Centre pour le dialogue humanitaire, 17 April 2020; A. Y. Embalo, ‘Quelle est la portée de l’accord de paix signé à Bissau entre Dakar et le Front Sud du MFDC?’, RFI, 5 August 2022; A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; ‘Senegalese soldier missing, another injured in ambush near Mongone’, The Point, 22 April 2025. ↩︎
2
M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; ‘The Casamance uprising in Senegal: one of the longest conflicts in Africa’, The European Institute for International Relations, 25 July 2023. ↩︎
3
M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. ↩︎
4
N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. ↩︎
5
M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. ↩︎
6
M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. ↩︎
7
C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; ‘Kein Frieden in der Casamance’, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, September 2021. ↩︎
8
M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014; ‘Kein Frieden in der Casamance’, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, September 2021. ↩︎
9
C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. ↩︎
10
M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007. ↩︎
11
C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 281 ; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. ↩︎
12
‘The Casamance uprising in Senegal: one of the longest conflicts in Africa’, The European Institute for International Relations, 25 July 2023. ↩︎
13
M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. ↩︎
14
M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. ↩︎
15
M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. ↩︎
16
N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds) Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, pp 281–82; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024. ↩︎
17
C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 281. ↩︎
18
C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 281. ↩︎
19
C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 282. ↩︎
20
C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 282. ↩︎
21
C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007 ↩︎
22
C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 282; A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024. ↩︎
23
M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. ↩︎
24
C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007 ↩︎
25
V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 283; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; ‘The Casamance uprising in Senegal: one of the longest conflicts in Africa’, The European Institute for International Relations, 25 July 2023. ↩︎
26
V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 282; A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; ‘Casamance Peace Process: Diakaye Lays Down its Arms’, Le Quotidien, 15 May 2023. ↩︎
27
N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014; V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018, p 283; A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024. ↩︎
28
A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Can Senegal get the Casamance peace process over the finish line?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024. ↩︎
29
V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014; ‘Kein Frieden in der Casamance’, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, September 2021. ↩︎
30
V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014; ‘Kein Frieden in der Casamance’, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, September 2021. ↩︎
31
V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018; N. Okal et al, ‘Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences’, Crisis Management Initiative, December 2014. The attempt was, however, unsuccessful.‘Kein Frieden in der Casamance’, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, September 2021. ↩︎
32
A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Le Sénégal va-t-il enfin boucler le processus de paix en Casamance?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024. ↩︎
33
A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Le Sénégal va-t-il enfin boucler le processus de paix en Casamance?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; M. Drame, ‘Plus de 250 Combattants de Diakaye et de Irapa Déposent les Armes’, Seneplus, 15 May 2023. ↩︎
34
V. Foucher, ‘The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?’,in L. de Vries et al (eds), Secessionism in Africa Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007. ↩︎
35
A. Y. Embalo, ‘Quelle est la portée de l’accord de paix signé à Bissau entre Dakar et le Front Sud du MFDC?’, RFI, 5 August 2022; M. Evans, ‘Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)’, Chatham House, December 2024; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; ‘The Casamance uprising in Senegal: one of the longest conflicts in Africa’, The European Institute for International Relations, 25 July 2023; M. Gerth-Niculescu, ‘Senegal’s restless Casamance region sees deadly protests’, Deutsche Welle, 14 February 2024; D. Lemmi and M. Simoncelli, ‘Rebel conflict in Senegal’s Casamance region far from over’, Deutsche Welle, 9 January 2023. ↩︎
36
A. Y. Embalo, ‘Quelle est la portée de l’accord de paix signé à Bissau entre Dakar et le Front Sud du MFDC?’, RFI, 5 August 2022; C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; M. Gerth-Niculescu, ‘Senegal’s restless Casamance region sees deadly protests’, Deutsche Welle, 14 February 2024; D. Lemmi and M. Simoncelli, ‘Rebel conflict in Senegal’s Casamance region far from over’, Deutsche Welle, 9 January 2023; ‘UNHCR: Senegalese refugees in the Gambia and Guinea Bissau’, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 27 September 2018. ↩︎
37
B. B. Ndiaye, ‘Building Trust to Buttress Senegal Against the Growing Threat of Violent Extremism’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 21 April 2026. ↩︎
38
C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007. ↩︎
39
A. Kanté and P. M. Toupane, ‘Le Sénégal va-t-il enfin boucler le processus de paix en Casamance?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 July 2024; ‘Senegal: releasing land, rebuilding life’, Reliefweb, 19 May 2025. ↩︎
40
C. Panara, ‘Casamance Conflict’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, November 2007; ‘Kein Frieden in der Casamance’, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, September 2021. ↩︎
41
K. Sonko, ‘Ziguinchor – Nouvelle forme de manifestations : Des barrages à l’activité’, Le Quotidien, 7 June 2023; Amnesty International, ‘Senegal: Amnesty International calls for independent enquiry into deadly crackdown on protests’, 9 June 2023; M. Kessous, ‘Affrontements au Sénégal : à Ziguinchor, la jeunesse « prête à mourir pour se libérer »’, Le Monde Afrique, 9 June 2023. ↩︎
42
Maléguène, ‘Casamance : Trois manifestants blessés par balles à Ziguinchor par l’armée sénégalaise’, Journal du Pays, 3 August 2023. ↩︎
43
‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
44
‘Premiers heurts au Sénégal après un report à hauts risques de la présidentielle’, France 24, 04 February 2024; Human Rights Watch, ‘Senegal: Delayed Elections Spark Violence, Repression’, News release, 12 February 2024. ↩︎
45
‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; M. Soumaré and M. H. Boko, ‘Senegal: Who’s in Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko’s inner circle?’, The Africa Report, 14 August 2024. ↩︎
46
‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
47
‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; M. Chemam, ‘Bassirou Diomaye Faye becomes Senegal’s youngest president ever’, RFI, 2 April 2024. ↩︎
48
‘Bassirou Diomaye Faye sworn in as Senegal’s youngest president’, The Guardian, 2 April 2024; ‘Senegal President Faye names opposition leader Ousmane Sonko as prime minister’, France 24, 3 April 2024; ‘Could the Diomaye Faye-Sonko government win a historic peace in Casamance?’, Africa Confidential, 3 March 2025. ↩︎
49
‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; ‘Bassirou Diomaye Faye sworn in as Senegal’s youngest president’, The Guardian, 2 April 2024. ↩︎
50
‘Senegal President Faye names opposition leader Ousmane Sonko as prime minister’, France 24, 3 April 2024; ‘Senegal’s Faye appoints ally Ousmane Sonko as prime minister’, Al Jazeera, 3 April 2024; M. Chemam, ‘Senegal’s President Faye appoints Ousmane Sonko as prime minister’, RFI, 3 April 2024. ↩︎
51
‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; ‘Au Sénégal, l’opposant Ousmane Sonko a été condamné à deux ans de prison ferme pour « corruption de la jeunesse »’, Le Monde Afrique, 01 June 2023; ‘Senegal President Faye names opposition leader Ousmane Sonko as prime minister’, France 24, 3 April 2024; M. Chemam, ‘Senegal’s President Faye appoints Ousmane Sonko as prime minister’, RFI, 3 April 2024. ↩︎
52
‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; ‘Senegal signs historic peace deal with Casamance separatists’, Africa News, 25 February 2025; ‘Senegal, Separatist Casamance Rebels Sign Peace Accord’, The Defense Post, 25 February 2025. ↩︎
53
‘The State of Senegal and the Provisional Committee of the Unified Political and Combat Wings of the MFDC Take a Major Step in the Casamance Peace Process’, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 28 February 2025; ‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; ‘Senegal signs historic peace deal with Casamance separatists’, Africa News, 25 February 2025; B. Dione and B. Ahmed, ‘Senegal has signed a deal with separatist rebels. But will it end one of Africa’s longest conflicts?’, Independent, 28 February 2025. ↩︎
54
M. Özkan, ‘Senegal signs peace deal with separatist group, ending Africa’s oldest conflicts’, AA, 24 February 2025; ‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
55
O. Badiane, ‘Que sait-on de l’accord signé à Bissau entre le Sénégal et le MFDC ?’, BBC News Afrique¸24 February 2025; ‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; B. Dione and B. Ahmed, ‘Senegal has signed a deal with separatist rebels. But will it end one of Africa’s longest conflicts?’, Independent, 28 February 2025. ↩︎
56
‘Peace Agreement Offers Hope in Senegal’s Casamance Region’, African Defense Forum, 18 March 2025; S. Anne, ‘Casamance: the Diomaye plan, a springboard for peace and development’, Sene News, 28 December 2024; ‘Address to the Nation by the President of the Republic, His Excellency Mr. Bassirou Diomaye Faye’, Presidency of Senegal, 31 December 2024. ↩︎
57
S. Anne, ‘Casamance: the Diomaye plan, a springboard for peace and development’, Sene News, 28 December 2024; Kagaye, ‘Casamance: The steering committee of the Diomaye plan takes stock of the actions in progress’, Sene News, 6 February 2025. ↩︎
58
S. Anne, ‘Casamance: the Diomaye plan, a springboard for peace and development’, Sene News, 28 December 2024. ↩︎
59
B. Dione and M. Banchereau, ‘France withdraws from Senegal, ending its permanent military presence in West Africa’, AP News, 17 July 2025; ‘Former colonial ruler France hands over its last military bases in Senegal’, Al Jazeera, 17 July 2025. ↩︎
60
B. Dione and M. Banchereau, ‘France withdraws from Senegal, ending its permanent military presence in West Africa’, AP News, 17 July 2025; ‘France hands back last military bases in Senegal, ending 65-year troop presence’, France 24, 17 July 2025; ‘French army leaves Senegal, ending military presence In West Africa’, Club of Mozambique, 18 July 2025; E. E. Olumba, ‘Senegal sees French troops depart as west Africa reassesses colonial ties’, The Conversation, 18 March 2025. ↩︎
61
‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; ‘France hands back last military bases in Senegal, ending 65-year troop presence’, France 24, 17 July 2025; ‘Senegal president says no more ‘foreign military presence from 2025’’, Le Monde, 1 January 2025. ↩︎
62
‘Africa: Senegal’, International Crisis Group; ‘French troops to exit Senegal by end of 2025’, Al Jazeera, 12 February 2025. ↩︎
63
B. Dione and M. Banchereau, ‘France withdraws from Senegal, ending its permanent military presence in West Africa’, AP News, 17 July 2025; ‘Former colonial ruler France hands over its last military bases in Senegal’, Al Jazeera, 17 July 2025; J. Crétois, ‘French troops leave Senegal, but Dakar maintains ties with Paris’, Le Monde, 18 July 2025; ‘French army withdraws last troops from Senegal bases’, Le Monde, 17 July 2025. ↩︎
64
B. Dione and M. Banchereau, ‘France withdraws from Senegal, ending its permanent military presence in West Africa’, AP News, 17 July 2025; ‘France begins military base handover to Senegal’, Reuters, 7 March 2025; A. Miridzhanian and N. Dione, ‘France ends permanent troop presence in Senegal’, Reuters, 17 July 2025. ↩︎
65
B. Dione and M. Banchereau, ‘France withdraws from Senegal, ending its permanent military presence in West Africa’, AP News, 17 July 2025; ‘French army leaves Senegal, ending military presence In West Africa’, Club of Mozambique, 18 July 2025. ↩︎
66
B. Dione and M. Banchereau, ‘France withdraws from Senegal, ending its permanent military presence in West Africa’, AP News, 17 July 2025; ‘French army leaves Senegal, ending military presence In West Africa’, Club of Mozambique, 18 July 2025. ↩︎
67
A. Miridzhanian and N. Dione, ‘France ends permanent troop presence in Senegal’, Reuters, 17 July 2025. ↩︎

Senegal

Overview

Historical background