Snapshot
Cameroon faces long-running non-international armed conflicts rooted in Anglophone grievances in the west and regional jihadist violence in the north. After independence, the Government privileged French and progressively replaced English legal institutions in the Anglophone regions. Protests that began in 2016 escalated into violence, and on 1 October 2017 Ambazonian separatist groups declared the independence of the Northwest and Southwest regions, triggering hostilities with State forces that continued throughout 2026. In the Far North, violence linked to Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) spread from Nigeria and Chad, and Cameroon has fought Boko Haram since 2014 with the support of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), whose mandate was renewed in 2025. Under pressure from Nigerian air campaigns, ISWAP increasingly turned to Cameroon’s border areas, and a separate conflict with the group emerged in February 2026. A papal visit in April 2026 brought a brief separatist ceasefire, but attacks resumed once it ended.
Classifications and Parties to the Conflicts
- NIAC between Cameroon and Ambazonian separatists
- NIAC between Cameroon (supported by the MNJTF) and Boko Haram
- NIAC between Cameroon and ISWAP
Armed groups and State forces alike committed serious violations against civilians in Cameroon, although information on specific incidents remained difficult to secure and confirm. In the Far North, Boko Haram repeatedly attacked villages, killing civilians, kidnapping children and forcing thousands to flee, including in a September 2026 attack on Madegwa village in Logone-et-Chari division that killed at least fifteen civilians and prima facie amounts to a war crime. In the Northwest and Southwest regions, Ambazonian separatists increasingly used improvised explosive devices, mostly against security forces on roads but also in populated areas, and in May 2026 carried out a rare incursion into the Francophone West region. The Ambazonia Defence Forces continued to kill civilians and abduct them for ransom, while separatist lockdowns disrupted schooling and basic services and constrained humanitarian access. Cameroonian defence and security forces were in turn reported to have committed extrajudicial killings, burnt villages, made arbitrary arrests, tortured suspected separatists and committed sexual violence. Efforts at transitional justice remained minimal.
Classification
Historical Background
Anglophone Grievances and Ambazonian Separatism
Following independence and the consolidation of English and French speaking territories, the Government of Cameroon privileged French as the national language and progressively replaced English legal institutions with French ones in traditionally Anglophone areas. Anglophone communities, representing a minority of the population and describing persistent marginalization by a Francophone political establishment, mobilized in protests from 2016, with violence emerging after a prolonged period of unrest. On 1 October 2017, Ambazonian separatist groups declared the independence of the Northwest and Southwest regions as Ambazonia. Hostilities between State forces and separatist armed groups escalated in late 2017, and the resulting non international armed conflict (NIAC) continued throughout the reporting period.
Regional Jihadist Spillover and Multinational Joint Task Force
Cameroon’s position in the Gulf of Guinea and its borders with conflict-affected neighbours exposed it to regional jihadist dynamics. Violence linked to Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) expanded from Chad and Nigeria into Cameroonian territory, underpinning a decade-long NIAC between Cameroon and Boko Haram. The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council reactivated the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in January 2025, composed of forces from several regional States, and it has remained active in Cameroon.
Displacement Pressures
Cameroon’s proximity to the Central African Republic contributed to refugee influx, while the two NIACs in Cameroon were linked to severe internal displacement and limited international attention.
Key Developments (January 2025–September 2026)
Between January 2025 and September 2026, the situation saw several major developments:
- Renewal of the mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF): In January 2025, AU reiterated concern about Boko Haram activity and renewed the MNJTF mandate for a further year from early 2026, reaffirming that the regional collective response needs sustained, well-coordinated and multipronged engagement. External partners also signalled continued support for operations against Boko Haram.
- Operation Ghost Town:Ambazonian separatists continued to use so-called ghost town lockdowns to disrupt economic life, schooling, and basic services as a means of demonstrating influence. These restrictions further constrained humanitarian access.
- Intercommunal violence: Intercommunal violence persisted, particularly in the Far North, driven by competition over grazing land and water and exacerbated by climate-related scarcity, alongside ethnic and religious tensions. Clashes have included a July 2026 incident that occurred in the aftermath of a land demarcation operation, and episodes of xenophobic violence in the South that prompted local reconciliation efforts.
- Humanitarian crisis:Humanitarian needs remained high due to the combined effects of armed conflicts, major flooding and landslides. Severe outbreaks of cholera and other health emergencies affected large parts of the population in 2025.
- 2025 Presidential elections: The removal of presidential term limit enabled President Paul Biya to run for an eighth term amid allegations of fraud and intimidation, restrictions affecting opposition figures and contested candidacies. Biya’s declared victory following the October 2025 election triggered protests, which were met with force, deaths, arrests and a temporary lockdown.
- Delays in government formation and postponement of parliamentary and municipal council elections: Political deadlock deepened in 2026 as President Biya delayed both the formation of a new government and the legislative and municipal elections, while the opposition turned to boycotts, foreign courts, and diaspora mobilisation.
- Judicial developments related to the Anglophone crisis: Judicial developments in 2026 included the conviction of three security force members for the 2020 Ngarbuh massacre, the Supreme Court’s annulment of the appeal ruling against ten jailed Anglophone separatist leaders, and the arrest of four suspected Ambazonia Defence Forces leaders for alleged war crimes in Belgium.
- Papal visit brought temporary truce in Anglophone regions: Pope Leo XIV’s 15–18 April 2026 visit to Cameroon, which included a peace gathering in Bamenda with faith leaders, traditional chiefs and conflict victims, put renewed pressure on the authorities to open a dialogue on the Anglophone conflict. Separatist groups observed a three-day ceasefire during the visit, but attacks resumed after the Pope left.
- Constitutional amendment and speculation over Biya’s succession: The April 2026 creation of an appointed vice-presidency through a constitutional amendment, followed by President Biya’s prolonged absence in Switzerland while the post and a new government remained vacant intensified uncertainty over his succession.
- Deaths of opposition and Anglophone detainees: The deaths in custody of opposition leader Anicet Ekane in December 2025 and of Anglophone detainee Patrick Ndango Asah on 9 May 2026 heightened concerns over the treatment of political and Anglophone prisoners.
- Increased US involvement: In 2026, following its stepped-up military role in Nigeria, the United States moved to deepen security cooperation with Cameroon in the Far North, where ISWAP and Boko Haram have regrouped, holding high-level talks in May and June amid reports of a planned troop redeployment to Maroua.
Non-International Armed Conflicts
Cameroon VS Ambazonian Separatists
The NIAC between Cameroon and Ambazonian separatists began in September and October 2017 in the Northwest and Southwest regions and involves multiple armed groups pursuing an independent Ambazonia, including the Ambazonia Defence Force, the Restoration Forces, the Bui Warriors, the Bui Unity Warriors and the Southern Cameroons Defence Forces. Fragmentation and intermittent infighting stem from competition over resources and ideological differences, complicating attribution of incidents to specific actors, while allowing an aggregated assessment of the violence directed against their common enemy – Cameroonian armed forces. The pattern of sustained clashes, ambushes, abductions and extensive use of improvised explosive devices (IED), including a sharp increase in such attacks in 2025, demonstrates protracted armed violence, with high reported fatalities and large-scale internal displacement. Frequent clashes continued throughout 2026. Therefore, the intensity threshold required under IHL is met throughout the reporting period. Several groups also exhibit sufficient organization through tiered leadership, internal discipline, coordinated communications, fundraising and taxation practices, and the demonstrated capacity to plan and carry out military operations, including attacks lasting several hours. These elements support the continued classification of the situation as a NIAC.
Cameroon vs Boko Haram
Boko Haram has operated in northern Cameroon since at least 2009 or 2011, and the first armed confrontation with the Cameroonian armed forces on Cameroonian territory was recorded in March 2014. The fighting has continued, with Cameroon supported by the MNJTF.Between January 2025 and September 2026, violent incidents and recurring clashes remained frequent and sustained, with repeated civilian casualties, evidencing protracted armed violence. Hostilities have involved assault rifles and heavy machine guns, ambushes and night raids on bases to seize military-grade equipment, extensive use of IEDs including car bombs, and reported adoption of drone technology to drop improvised munitions. Boko Haram has retained an identifiable leadership, specialized officials, a de facto religious council, military and civilian wings, territorial command arrangements and regional commanders overseeing militia-style units and enclaves. The group has generated income through taxation, pillage and ransom, and displayed recruitment and training practices, as well as the capability to implement IHL. The intensity and organization thresholds therefore remain met, and the NIAC persists.
Parties to the Conflict
State Parties
- Cameroon (supported by )
Non-State Parties
- Boko Haram
- Ambazonian separatists
- Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)
Civilian Harm
Reporting period: 2026
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
Anglophone separatists and Boko Haram have committed serious violations of IHL against civilians. According to Human Rights Watch, Cameroon’s security forces have also been implicated in grave abuses, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and the torture of suspected separatists.
Boko Haram has attacked civilians in their villages on multiple occasions. On the night of 16 to 17 September 2026, suspected Boko Haram fighters killed at least fifteen civilians in Madegwa village, Logone-et-Chari division, and prompting thousands to flee. Prima facie, these killings amount to war crimes.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
Boko Haram has attacked villages on numerous occasions as have Ambazonian separatists. Between 14 and 19 April, Boko Haram attacked several localities in Mayo-Tsanaga and Mayo-Sava divisions, killing at least one civilian in Kolofata town and kidnapping two children. On the night of 9 to 10 May 2026, in a rare incursion into the Francophone West region, separatists attacked Koumengba village in Bangourain commune.
VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY
Although information on specific incidents has proved difficult to secure and confirm, the Ambazonian Defence Forces have continued to killed civilians and abducted them for ransom. Cameroonian defence and security forces are said to have committed murders, burnt villages, made arbitrary arrests, and engaged in acts of sexual violence against local populations in separatist areas.
Armed groups and Cameroonian defence and security forces are said to have committed murders in separatist areas.