Myanmar

During the reporting period, Myanmar was engaged in multiple non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) on its territory involving various ethnic armed groups (EAGs), notably the following:

Myanmar v Arakan Army (AA)
Myanmar v Chin National Defence Force (CNDF)
Myanmar v Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
Myanmar v Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)
Myanmar v Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)
Myanmar v Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)

These armed conflicts are all governed by Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary international humanitarian law (IHL). Myanmar is not a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977.

In Myanmar, multiple NIACs are ongoing between the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) and various EAGs. An EAG may be a stand-alone entity or a coalition of groups claiming to represent a specific ethnic identity.¹

Myanmar, located in South-east Asia, has an ethnically and culturally diverse population. Both prior to and during British colonial rule, ethnic minorities – primarily concentrated in border regions – traditionally exercised autonomous self-governance.²Formerly known as Burma, the country gained independence from British rule in 1948. Since then, it has experienced persistent internal tensions, largely driven by its ethnic diversity and a colonial legacy that exacerbated divisions among communities.³

The conflicts in Myanmar are predominantly still rooted in ethnic divisions, and various EAGs have engaged in prolonged armed resistance against the Tatmadaw.⁴ Following independence in 1948, Myanmar experienced a military coup in 1962, after which, until 2011, the country was governed by a military junta.⁵ On numerous occasions between 1962 and 2011, the junta clashed with ethnic minority groups that were seeking enhanced autonomy.⁶ The military regime’s rule has intensified the strength of the insurgency, triggered economic decline, and resulted in significant international isolation, including through the imposition of sanctions.⁷

In 1974, a new constitution was introduced in an attempt to transfer power to a civilian assembly. However, persistent tensions with ethnic minorities, particularly the Karen, Kachin, and Shan groups, undermined the process. ⁸ Another coup followed in 1988 leading to the establishment of the State Law and Order Restoration Council ⁹ which further suppressed pro-democracy movements and continued armed operations against EAGs. ¹⁰ In 1989, the State Law and Order Restoration Council officially changed the country’s name from the Union of Burma to the Union of Myanmar.¹¹

In 1990, general elections were held and decisively won by the National League for Democracy (NLD),¹² signalling the public’s desire to transition away from military rule.¹³ However, the military rejected the results, claiming the elections were intended only to determine whether a new constitution was necessary.¹⁴ In the aftermath of electoral defeat, the junta launched a series of campaigns in the 1990s and 2000s against ethnic groups including the Karen, Kachin, Shan, and Rohingya.¹⁵

Another new constitution was adopted by the junta in 2008, granting the military extensive powers, including control over key ministries and a guaranteed allocation of parliamentary seats. In 2010, the junta organized a general election, but the NLD boycotted the vote in protest against newly imposed electoral laws that prevented fair competition and restricted the ability to contest the results.¹⁶ The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) secured victory in this election.¹⁷ Although the military junta was formally dissolved in 2011, real power remained with the military as a transitional, military-dominated civilian government was formed which was presided over by a former general, Thein Sein.¹⁸

In 2015, the first multi-party elections were held,¹⁹ which the NLD, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won convincingly.²⁰ But due to the provisions in the 2008 Constitution, the NLD was required to enter into a power-sharing agreement with the military. As a result, while it led the civilian parliament, the military maintained control over the ministries in the executive. In 2015, clashes between Kokang separatists and government forces in Shan state intensified.²¹ Despite peace efforts and various ceasefire agreements between the government and approximately sixteen rebel groups,²² conflict persists across the country.²³

In 2017, the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar intensified significantly.²⁴ The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic minority who have been the victims of violence perpetrated by the Tatmadaw, described as constituting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.²⁵ Whether the violence against the Rohingya amounts to genocide is being adjudicated before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).²⁶

In August 2017, the crisis escalated dramatically; the United Nations has described the events as the “most significant exodus” of the Rohingya during which more than 740,000 people fled to Bangladesh to escape a renewed military crackdown.²⁷

In June 2019, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) emerged, consisting of the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), marking a major shift in the balance of power. ²⁸ In November 2020, the NLD once again won a decisive victory in Myanmar’s general election, securing an even greater number of parliamentary seats than in the 2015 election. ²⁹ The results were, however, rejected by the military-backed USDP, which, along with the military leadership, alleged electoral fraud. However, the Union Election Commission upheld the integrity of the election, with international and domestic observers endorsing the results as generally free and fair.³⁰ The dispute over the election outcome served as a precursor to the military coup that followed.³¹

On 1 February 2021, the day Myanmar’s newly elected parliament was scheduled to convene, the military staged a coup, seizing control of the government.³² President Win Myint, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and several other senior NLD officials were arrested. The military then installed Vice President Myint Swe, a retired general, as acting president.³³ Ms Suu Kyi remains in prison, serving a thirty-three-year sentence for corruption and other crimes, including breaching COVID-19 public safety rules.³⁴

The military coup of February 2021 triggered widespread anti-coup protests across Myanmar. These protests were met with a brutal crackdown by the security forces, which involved widespread extrajudicial killings and the destruction of homes and other civilian objects.³⁵ In addition to violent attacks, thousands of protesters were detained, imprisoned, and, in some cases, sentenced to death.³⁶

In response to escalating State violence, the mass political protests and acts of civil disobedience evolved into further support for organized armed resistance.³⁷ Civilians began arming themselves and joining local militia groups.³⁸ Simultaneously, ousted political figures and representatives of various ethnic groups established a parallel government, the National Unity Government (NUG), to coordinate diplomatic efforts and armed resistance against the military regime.³⁹

The 2021 coup ultimately saw the emergence of several new NIACs. However, the threshold for classification as a NIAC under IHL – most notably the criteria set out in the Tadić case – was not immediately satisfied by the mass protests in the initial aftermath of the coup. According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, a NIAC requires protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups themselves, displaying a minimum level of intensity and organization. But in February 2021, most civilian resistance consisted of loosely coordinated self-defence groups that lacked a unified command structure or a sustained operational capacity.⁴⁰

Following the widespread protests and military-provoked confrontations in the aftermath of the February 2021 coup, the military responded with excessive force, including with intentional lethal use of force.⁴¹ The military employed live ammunition, tear gas, and other riot control methods against protesters who relied on improvised weapons during this period.⁴² Although attacks on civilians escalated during February 2021, the situation in Myanmar lacked combat between identifiable organized parties and at that stage the crisis could be characterized as violent political upheaval. The escalation drew international condemnation, most notably through a Presidential Statement by the UN Security Council condemning violence against peaceful protestors.⁴³

During March 2021, the nature of the violence shifted as civilians organized into resistance groups opposing the military junta.⁴⁴ The frequency and nature of attacks also changed in the period between March and May 2021.⁴⁵

Between March and May 2021, the situation in Myanmar worsened significantly, with EAGs and newly formed local defence forces mounting coordinated attacks against the Tatmadaw. Notable among these actors are the KIA and the Chinland Defence Forces (CDF), which launched sustained operations targeting military bases and infrastructure.⁴⁶ Initially, the newly formed EAGs carried hunting rifles and other makeshift weapons, but they quickly began to use improvised explosive devices.⁴⁷ The Tatmadaw responded by increased use of heavy weapons and airstrikes in civilian areas.⁴⁸ Clashes were no longer sporadic but frequent, often occurring simultaneously in different regions.⁴⁹

Based on the scale, intensity, and degree of organization evident at this stage, it is reasonable to conclude that the situation between the Tatmadaw and opposing organized armed groups met the threshold for classification as a NIAC during the period from March to May 2021. These NIACs have persisted into 2025 (see below).⁵⁰

In early September 2021, the NUG had formally ‘declared war’ on the junta and formed an armed division called the People’s Defence Force (PDF), an umbrella group supported by various militias.⁵¹ Several EAGs also joined the NUG in its fight against the junta.⁵² The final quarter of 2021 saw an intensification of the conflict and was marked by events such as the Mo So massacre, also known as the Christmas Eve massacre, during which the Tatmadaw burned more than thirty civilians beyond recognition in their vehicles, ⁵³ and the capturing of a military outpost in Chin state by the CDF and the Chin National Army (CNA) in September 2021.⁵⁴

Among the main non-State armed groups engaged in the NIAC against the Tatmadaw during 2021 were the CNA, the CDF, ⁵⁵the PDF, ⁵⁶ the KIA, ⁵⁷ and the KNLA.⁵⁸ Despite international condemnation, including statements by the UN Security Council, ⁵⁹ and regional organizations such as ASEAN,⁶⁰ tangible diplomatic or peacekeeping interventions have been absent. Sanctions and symbolic gestures of support for the NUG and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw have been declared by the United States, ⁶¹ but these measures have done little to stem the violence.

Fighting continued during 2022 and 2023, and by June 2023, multiple NIACs continued across most administrative regions in Myanmar, in particular, the Dry Zone, Shan, Sagaing, Kayin, and Chin states.⁶² By then, a diverse range of armed groups were fighting Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC), comprising newly formed anti-junta forces and long-standing EAGs. The anti-SAC groups emerged in response to the 2021 coup and the violent repression of peaceful protestors, while EAGs existed long before then, pursuing various ethno-nationalist agendas. In the aftermath of the coup, new alliances developed between these two categories of armed actors, significantly eroding the SAC’s authority, particularly in rural and ethnic-minority regions.⁶³

The nominal ‘People’s Defence Force’ is a term describing armed groups protecting civilians from military violence. By 2023, the term had come to include three types of anti-SAC forces: PDFs, which are larger and recognised by the NUG; People’s Defence Teams (PDTs), which are smaller village- or neighbourhood-based security units also established by the NUG; and Local Defence Forces (LDFs), which operate independently of the NUG but share its anti-junta objectives.⁶⁴ Estimates suggest these groups have a total of 95,000 fighters between them, of whom 65,000 are allied with the NUG and 30,000 being LDF fighters. The numbers fluctuate due to ongoing consolidation under the NUG umbrella.⁶⁵ Initially disorganized and inexperienced, many anti-SAC fighters were civilians – teachers, civil servants, and activists – who were motivated by the SAC’s crackdown on non-violent dissent. Over time, these groups evolved tactically, shifting from sporadic attacks and sabotage to sustained clashes, such as a February 2023 battle in Sagaing region where PDF forces resisted a military assault for three days.⁶⁶

However, not all EAGs support the NUG. The AA, which controls large areas of Rakhine state, remains sceptical of the SAC as well as the NUG because of the NLD’s past repression of Rakhine nationalism. After concluding a temporary ceasefire with the military following the 2020 elections, the AA resumed hostilities in 2022 before ending their military operations later that year. Other EAGs, particularly in Shan state – including the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Shan State Progress Party – focus on preserving their autonomy and economic interests and often respond to Chinese pressure to remain neutral.⁶⁷

By the middle of 2023, several EAGs were involved in NIACs against the Tatmadaw and against other EAGs. The main non-State actors that are party to the NIACs are the AA, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the MNDAA, and the TNLA.⁶⁸ EAGs such as the KNLA, the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force, and the CNA, continue to mount joint campaigns and exercise de facto control over parts of the country.⁶⁹ Other resistance groups such as the Urban Owls and Ye Belu carried out targeted assassinations and sabotage operations, particularly in urban and coastal regions in the period up to June 2023.⁷⁰

The Gambia v Myanmar case before the International Court of Justice

During the reporting period, there have been further developments in the case. For ease of reference, the report provides a brief overview of events prior to 1 July 2023. On 11 November 2019, The Gambia filed an application with the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court), launching an application against Myanmar for violations of the Genocide Convention against its Rohingya minority.⁷¹ The Gambia submitted that the Court’s jurisdiction was derived from Article IX of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The application sought provisional measures, which were ordered on 23 January 2020. Myanmar was, among other things, ordered to take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article II of the Genocide Convention, and to ensure that its military, as well as any irregular armed units, do not commit genocide.⁷² On 20 January 2021, Myanmar registered preliminary objections to the Court’s jurisdiction, but in a ruling on 22 July 2022, the Court determined the case could proceed to the merits phase.

On 15 November 2023, the Maldives filed a declaration of intervention in the case pursuant to Article 63 of the Court’s Statute.⁷³ On the same date, a joint declaration was filed by Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (the ‘Joint Declarants’).⁷⁴ Myanmar expressed its objection to the admissibility of the declarations of intervention. On 3 July 2024, however, the Court held the declarations admissible, insofar as they pertain to the interpretation of the Genocide Convention. During the reporting period, four other States filed declarations of intervention, namely, Slovenia (on 22 November 2024),⁷⁵ the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (on 11 December),⁷⁶ Belgium (on 12 December),⁷⁷ and Ireland (on 20 December 2024).⁷⁸

Arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court

Investigations into the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC started in November 2019. ⁷⁹ This occurred following a July 2019 request by the OTP to Pre-Trial Chamber III to initiate an investigation into crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.⁸⁰ Such crimes must, at a minimum, have occurred within the territory of Bangladesh, a State Party to the Rome Statute, and in connection with the violent events in Rakhine state, Myanmar, in 2016 and 2017, ⁸¹ or be a crime perpetrated since 9 October 2016 and closely linked to those events.⁸²

On 27 November 2024, the OTP announced the issuance of an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Defence Services, for crimes against humanity related to the deportation and persecution of the Rohingya. The Prosecutor stated that additional applications of this nature would follow.⁸³ The OTP alleges that the Tatmadaw committed these crimes between 25 August and 31 December 2017, with support from the police and non-Rohingya civilians.⁸⁴

Operation 1027

The June 2019 emergence of the 3BHA, comprising the AA, the MNDAA, and the TNLA marked a significant escalation in the complex situation of the ongoing civil war in Myanmar.⁸⁵ On 27 October 2023, the alliance launched the first phase of its high-profile military offensive, dubbed ‘Operation 1027’, against the Myanmar military regime.⁸⁶ It constituted a co-ordinated military offensive targeting key positions of Tatmadaw forces in northern Shan state and Rakhine state.⁸⁷ The initial phase of the offensive resulted in the 3BHA capturing a significant amount of territory on the border with China.⁸⁸ During late 2023 and early 2024, the MNDAA recaptured the Kokang Self-Administered Zone, which was established after the 1989 ceasefire between the Tatmadaw and the MNDAA, and over which it had lost control in 2009.⁸⁹ As a result of this, the MNDAA was able to seize control of significant border towns with China, such as Chin Shwe Haw and Mong Ko.⁹⁰ Concurrently, the TNLA consolidated its sway over northern Shan state through the capture of towns, including Hsenwi.⁹¹ In the western region, the AA initiated a series of co-ordinated offensives in Rakhine, capturing several townships and even seizing the headquarters of the Western Military Command in Ann Township. Following a January 2024 truce brokered by China – the so-called Haigen Agreement between the 3BHA and the junta – fighting came to a temporary halt.⁹²

After a five-month pause, and following repeated violations of the truce by the junta, including bombardment of ethnic areas, hostilities resumed in late June 2024 under the name of ‘Operation 1027 Phase Two’.⁹³ The 3BHA stepped up its offensive, signalling the insurgents’ sustained commitment to press ahead with their campaign.⁹⁴ On 3 August 2024, the MNDAA and its allies managed to seize the headquarters of the Northeastern Regional Military Command in Lashio, in northern Shan state, which came as a major shock to the military junta.⁹⁵ The MNDAA, however, handed over Lashio to the military junta in April 2025, in pursuit of implementing a ceasefire deal between the two parties brokered by China (see below).⁹⁶ Between June and August 2024, the 3BHA made several advances north and east of Mandalay.⁹⁷ Since the launch of Operation 1027, the military has lost a vast amount of territory: almost all of Rakhine state, much of northern Shan state, and important and lucrative resources in Kachin state. Anti-coup resistance groups now control many areas in Sagaing and Mandalay regions in the centre of the country. ⁹⁸

The 3BHA incorporated the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs – drones) and surprise assaults, thereby facilitating the seizure of a substantial quantity of weapons, equipment, and pivotal infrastructure.⁹⁹ The unprecedented level of co-ordination among Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups is a defining feature of Operation 1027.¹⁰⁰ Ethnic unity is an important change from previous years when internal divisions and rivalries often prevented effective cooperation.¹⁰¹

The Myanmar military has encountered considerable challenges in responding to these developments, including but not limited to low morale, equipment losses, and manpower shortages. It is especially the financial implications of the loss of control over border trade routes that has had a significant economic impact on the regime.¹⁰² The junta’s response to the growing threat has been the consolidation of its power in the areas it still controls.¹⁰³

These developments resulted in the 3BHA acquiring enhanced political influence.¹⁰⁴ While the NUG did not directly spearhead Operation 1027, it expressed strong support for the offensive, seeing the successes of the 3BHA as critical in weakening the junta’s grip on power. The participation of the PDFs alongside EAGs highlights a growing consolidation of forces opposed to the junta and the increasing complexity of Myanmar’s civil war.¹⁰⁵ Throughout the operation, a number of resistance groups took the initiative and launched attacks against regime forces in different regions, in a show of solidarity with the 3BHA.¹⁰⁶

Operation 1027 is a turning point in the revolt against the military dictatorship, as it is the largest and most organized offensive against the military regime since the 2021 coup.¹⁰⁷

Ceasefire negotiations and mediation by China

China seems eager to see an end to the violent turmoil that has consumed its southern neighbour since the military coup in 2021, as it has extensive economic interests in Myanmar, including energy pipelines and mining projects.¹⁰⁸ China backs the military junta but maintains contact with the rebels, especially those on its border.¹⁰⁹ China’s relations with the junta were strained in the months leading up to the January 2024 ceasefire negotiations over its failure to crack down on online scams that Beijing claims target Chinese citizens.¹¹⁰

China’s support is indispensable to the junta, as the junta needs Beijing’s backing to stop insurgent offensives in northern Shan state and to gain international legitimacy.¹¹¹ In return, the junta has endorsed Beijing’s ‘One China’ policy and has enacted the Private Security Service Law to protect Chinese investment by allowing Chinese security firms to enter and to operate in Myanmar.¹¹²

On 12 January 2024, the Tatmadaw and the 3BHA entered into a ceasefire agreement during Chinese-mediated talks.¹¹³ The talks took place on 10 and 11 January in the Chinese city of Kunming in Yunnan Province which borders Myanmar.¹¹⁴ The Haigeng Agreement, named after the hotel in Kunming that hosted the talks, led to a 40 per cent drop in political violence from the previous month in northern Shan state, which had seen intense fighting in the preceding months.¹¹⁵ However, other states did not benefit from this lull in fighting. In northern Shan, the temporary ceasefire agreement between the Myanmar junta and the 3BHA broke down and clashes resumed in several townships in the last week of June 2024.¹¹⁶ China kept urging all sides to talk while simultaneously putting pressure on the insurgents through border closures and by cutting off essential supplies such as fuel.¹¹⁷ Under pressure from China, the MNDAA and TNLA agreed to a renewed four-day ceasefire in Shan state from 14 to 18 July 2024.¹¹⁸ This ceasefire was later extended to 31 July 2024. The ceasefire, however, was not agreed to by the third member of the alliance, the AA. ¹¹⁹

On 3 December 2024, the MNDAA announced an immediate ceasefire in its areas to protect the civilian population and to stabilise the border between China and Myanmar. It emphasized the importance of the resolution of conflicting issues, including those in Lashio, through dialogue and under China’s facilitation.¹²⁰ Over the course of several rounds of meetings in Kunming, during which China detained the group’s leader, Peng Deren, China applied sufficient pressure on the MNDAA to surrender Lashio to the junta.¹²¹

In April 2025, a Chinese ceasefire monitoring team was sent to Lashio to supervise the handover of the capital of northern Shan state to the Myanmar military.¹²² On 21 April, regime troops and officials began returning to Lashio town. ¹²³ In essence, China helped the Tatmadaw achieve an outcome it was unable to achieve on the battlefield. It is claimed that China’s interference in Lashio’s handover could set a worrying precedent that could see it pressuring other armed groups to give up territory.¹²⁴

Despite the ceasefire, the AA persisted in its efforts to expel the regime from Rakhine state, intensifying its attacks on Kyaukphyu township since late April 2025.¹²⁵

2025 earthquake and subsequent ceasefires

The epicentre of the 7.7-magnitude earthquake that struck Myanmar on 28 March 2025 was twenty kilometres north of Sagaing town in Sagaing region. The earthquake had the greatest impact in Sagaing and Mandalay, two regions also hardest hit by violence since the 2021 coup. In a country where 90 per cent of the population is exposed to conflict, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that more than 17 million people have been affected by the earthquake. The NUG, some EAGs, and the military declared unilateral ceasefires following the earthquake.¹²⁶

The unilateral ceasefires declared since 28 March 2025 included a two-week ceasefire by NUG issued on 29 March; a ceasefire by the 3BHA issued on 1 April, originally intended to end on 30 April 2025 but later extended until end-June 2025; the Tatmadaw ceasefire on 2 April for a three-week period but which was later extended to end-June 2025 (whose purpose was ‘rescue and recovery operations’); and the KIA ceasefire, which held between 2 and 22 April 2025.¹²⁷

Unfortunately, the violence continued regardless of the ceasefire agreements, as multiple breaches of the ceasefire agreements were reported during the period by all parties.¹²⁸ Some observers have suggested the temporary ceasefires were only ‘for show’,¹²⁹ and that ‘there has been no political signal from the military that it aims to transform these ceasefires into a meaningful dialogue toward peace that addresses the demands of resistance groups’.¹³⁰ The months following the earthquake saw communities carrying on with their struggles due to lack of assistance from the government and donors both locally and internationally, especially in terms of recovery and reconstruction. ¹³¹

Preparations for December 2025 elections

Myanmar is scheduled to hold general elections on 28 December 2025. These will be the first general elections since the 2021 coup.¹³² The deadline for new political parties to register for the expected elections expired on 9 May 2025, with no major opposition parties putting forward applications at the time of reporting.¹³³ On 7 June 2025, the Election Commission announced that voting could take place in up to 267 of the 330 townships, in phases, with the first stages expected to begin in December 2025.¹³⁴

The evolving violent situation between the ARSA and the AA

The ARSA and the AA have been sporadically clashing, predominantly in the border regions between Myanmar and Bangladesh. An assessment of the facts reveals that this situation, at the time of reporting, falls below the threshold of a NIAC.

In 2017, Harakah al-Yaqin changed its name to the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).¹³⁵ This group represents the Rohingya, who originate from the region of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.¹³⁶ ARSA operates in the state of Rakhine in western Myanmar ¹³⁷ as well as in refugee camps in Bangladesh. ¹³⁸ ARSA aims to achieve autonomy and self-governance for the Rohingya in Rakhine.¹³⁹ The authorities in Myanmar, however, paint a very different picture; they accuse ARSA of being Islamist ‘terrorists’ who want to impose Sharia law.¹⁴⁰

Until 2023, ARSA actively fought the military government in Myanmar, but at that point it allied with the Tatmadaw and conducted joint operations against the AA in Rakhine state.¹⁴¹ On 19 March 2025, the Bangladeshi police arrested Ataullah Abu Ammar Jununi, the leader of ARSA, on charges including murder, illegal entry, and militant activity, and on 22 April 2025, he was jailed.¹⁴² The organizational structure of ARSA allowed Jununi to be temporarily replaced with the current spokesperson, Maulana Borhan, who is the acting chief in Jununi’s absence.¹⁴³

A distressing development reflects the activity of ARSA in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. The group utilises a narrative of being ethno-nationalist liberators of the Rohingya people as a part of a recruitment drive.¹⁴⁴ It is reported that at least as early as April 2025, forced recruitment drives were carried out in the Bangladeshi refugee camps.¹⁴⁵

Little information is available concerning the ferocity of fighting between ARSA and the AA. Sporadic clashes between them commenced in 2023. ¹⁴⁶ Sporadic low intensity clashes continued throughout the first quarter of 2025.¹⁴⁷ The AA has launched clearance operations to drive ARSA from the border area in the western Arakan sate. The operations, which began on 14 February 2025, produced fighting that lasted for four days.¹⁴⁸ A clearance operation against ARSA between 1 to 8 April 2025 resulted in the death of forty ARSA fighters.¹⁴⁹

From the limited information available, the violent incidents are akin to law enforcement activities. The AA are essentially policing the territory under their control by employing operations to chase ARSA from the Myanmar territory across the border to Bangladesh. The violence resulting from these operations does not equate to protracted armed violence, and domestic law regulates the evolving situation between ARSA and the AA.

The nature and shifting alliances of the PDF

Hundreds of armed resistance groups, known as PDFs, emerged in Myanmar following the 2021 coup. The PDF moniker was initially attached to the NUG’s announcement of a ‘People’s Defense Force’, but this label has since evolved into a catch-all term representing the wide variety of new armed formations.¹⁵⁰ The PDFs are diverse in typology and range from local self-defence forces to urban guerrilla cells and mobile tactical units. Some PDFs are integrated into EAG command structures, ¹⁵¹ while others have evolved into organized armed groups in their own right.

PDFs differ greatly in terms of ideology, size, allies, and capabilities.¹⁵² What the PDFs initially had in common was their mutual opposition to the Tatmadaw. At the time of reporting, however, a growing trend saw some PDFs distancing themselves from the NUG and choosing instead to align with EAGs that offer them support and patronage.¹⁵³

For purposes of classification, the circumstances relevant to the various PDFs should, therefore, be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army

Background

The AA was founded in April 2009 in Kachin state on the border of Myanmar and China.¹ Initially, the establishment of AA was supported by the KIA and the two groups often fought alongside each other until the AA refocused its attention on Rakhine state (formerly Arakan state).² The AA fosters the political goal of creating an ‘Arakan Nation’ through the ‘way of Rakhita’ – an ideology encapsulating the national liberation struggle of the people of Arakan and the restoration of the sovereignty of Arakan.³ The AA aims to represent all people living in Rakhine state, which is different from other EAGs that view the struggle explicitly as nationalists, basing the fight exclusively on ethnic lines.⁴

The AA has engaged in a NIAC with the Tatmadaw since 2009.⁵ The intensity of the conflict peaked between 2018 and 12 November 2020, when a ceasefire agreement was reached.⁶ Fighting between the Tatmadaw and the AA reignited on 5 July 2022 and intensified in August 2022, ending the existing ceasefire.⁷ Another humanitarian ceasefire agreement was reached on 2 November 2022.⁸ Fighting resumed again in 2023 with Operation 1027 (see above).⁹

Intensity

The Myanmar Peace Monitor has documented a total of 452 armed clashes between the AA and Tatmadaw in the period between January 2020 and June 2024.

The Tatmadaw has, on various occasions, employed heavy weaponry as well as other military tactics such as drone strikes and other forms of aerial strikes against the AA.¹⁰ The AA’s communications and military tactics are sophisticated. This prompted the NLD to make an unparalleled demand to all mobile service providers in 2019 to prevent internet services in nine townships with a high AA presence, leading to the world’s longest internet blackout, lasting one and half years.¹¹ In clashes with the Tatmadaw, the AA has captured sophisticated heavy military weapons including tank destroyers and 105mm M101 howitzers.¹² The AA retains consolidated control over mainland Rakhine, ¹³and, at the time of reporting, had captured and maintained control of multiple Tatmadaw bases along the borders of Rakhine, Magway, Bago, and Ayeyarwady.¹⁴ As of June 2025, the AA continued to put pressure on the regime in the capital of Rakhine state, Sittwe, as well as in the neighbouring regions. ¹⁵ Notably, an intense clash on 11 June between the AA and the military in Pyaing Say Kay village, Kyaukpyu township, killed a large number of soldiers.¹⁶

In March 2025, OCHA reported the resumption of the conflict in Rakhine between the AA and Tatmadaw.¹⁷ On various occasions, the United Nations has expressed concern over this situation. On 28 February 2025, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, expressed his ‘deep concern’ over the escalation of violence in the region.¹⁸ Clearly, the conflict situation satisfies the notion of protracted armed violence.

Organization

The AA has a sophisticated command structure. The AA has a political and a military wing, the latter reportedly having between 15,000 ¹⁹ and 30,000 fighters.²⁰ Twan Mrat Naing is the founder and Commander-in-Chief of the AA military wing.²¹ Brigadier-General Nyo Twan Awng is the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the United League of Arakan, which is the political wing of the movement, and the Vice Commander-in Chief of the AA.²² The leadership of the AA is described as ‘young’, ‘educated’, and able to evolve.²³ It also incorporates the experiences of an older generation of the Rakhine revolutionary movement.²⁴

The military wing of the AA is structured in nine military regional commands to achieve greater coordination and efficiency in executing operations against the Tatmadaw. These military regional commands are directed by colonels and lieutenant-colonels and are supervised by a war office at a secret location, where Twan Mrat Naing and his deputy, Brigadier-General Dr Nyo Twan Aung, are assisted by a group of senior officers. ²⁵ This sophisticated command structure allows for the structured training of fighters belonging to the AA and thus the AA possesses the ability to comply with IHL.

There is strict military discipline in the regional command divisions.²⁶ Supplementary to internal disciplinary measures in place, the political wing, the United League of Arakan, has created an administrative and justice system²⁷ which supports people in Rakhine state who report criminal incidents.²⁸

The AA employs a mix of guerilla warfare and conventional assaults in its approach to operations against the Tatmadaw.²⁹

The AA’s strategic military tactics have been successful and enable it to control trade routes along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, cutting off key supply lines for the Tatmadaw.³⁰ Tactics the AA employs include building and fostering alliances with other EAGs in the region through, e.g. the Northern Alliance, the Federal Political Negotiation and Coordination Committee, ³¹ and the 3BHA. ³² The AA’s military tactics are considered so successful that it often provides training to resistance forces as well as technical advice to its allies.³³

The AA is successful in its recruiting initiatives³⁴ and has not engaged in forced recruitment practices.³⁵ The AA benefits from a reliance on its allies to source small arms and procure larger equipment, such as artillery and armoured vehicles through their successful clashes with the Tatmadaw.³⁶ The UWSA is an important logistical partner of the AA and often provides it with arms and other military equipment.³⁷

The AA is sophisticated in its approach to communication with the outside world. The AA has an official spokesperson who is, at the time of reporting, Khaing Thu Kha.³⁸ Furthermore, the AA has its own website where it posts press releases.³⁹

As of the end of June 2025, the AA was sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.

1
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023.
2
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025; See ‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, International Crisis Group, 27 August 2024.
3
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023.
4
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025.
5
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023.
6
S. Strangio, ‘Ceasefire Raises Hopes of Elections in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, The Diplomat, 7 December 2020.
7
‘Six AA Fighters Killed as Myanmar Regime Bombs Outpost in Karen State’, The Irrawaddy, 5 July 2022.
8
‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, International Crisis Group, 27 August 2024; ‘Informal ceasefire with Myanmar military ‘not permanent’ solution, Arakan Army says’, Myanmar Now, 28 November 2022.
9
United League of Arakan/Arakha Army – ULA/AA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024.
10
United League of Arakan/Arakha Army – ULA/AA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024.
11
S. Long, ‘Rakhine: a precarious ceasefire hangs in the balance’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 26 July 2022.
12
War Noir, X, 27 December 2024.
13
M. Martin, ‘Arakan Army Posed to “Liberate” Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 20 February 2025
14
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025.
15
Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.
16
Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.
17
‘Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 45’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 28 March 2025.
18
‘UN rights chief concerned over escalating violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine’, Kuwait News Agency, 28 February 2025.
19
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025
20
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023; B. Lintner, ‘Rebel yell: Arakan Army leader speaks to Asia Times’, Asia Times, 18 January 2022.
21
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023; B. Lintner, ‘Rebel yell: Arakan Army leader speaks to Asia Times’, Asia Times, 18 January 2022; P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025.
22
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023.
23
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023.
24
United League of Arakan/ Arakha Army – ULA/AA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024.
25
R. Bhattacharyya, ‘5 Factors That Catapulted Arakan Army to Unprecedented Success Against the Myanmar Military’, The Diplomat, 28 December 2024.
26
R. Bhattacharyya, ‘5 Factors That Catapulted Arakan Army to Unprecedented Success Against the Myanmar Military’, The Diplomat, 28 December 2024.
27
‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, International Crisis Group, 27 August 2024
28
‘The Arakan Army’s Journey: From Rebels to Rulers and A New Arakan Paradigm’, Centre for Arakan Studies, 2 July 2024.
29
‘The Arakan Army’s Journey: From Rebels to Rulers and A New Arakan Paradigm’, Centre for Arakan Studies, 2 July 2024; J. P. Leider, ‘The Arakan Army, Rakhine State and the Promise of Arakan’s Independence’, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher Policy Brief Series 128, 2022.
30
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025.
31
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023; ‘The Arakan Army’s Journey: From Rebels to Rulers and A New Arakan Paradigm’, Centre for Arakan Studies, 2 July 2024
32
‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, International Crisis Group, 27 August 2024.
33
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023.
34
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025
35
R. Bhattacharyya, ‘5 Factors That Catapulted Arakan Army to Unprecedented Success Against the Myanmar Military’, The Diplomat, 28 December 2024.
36
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025.
37
S. Ramachandran, ‘The Arakan Army and Tatmadaw’s Tenuous Truces in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, The Jamestown Foundation, 16 December 2022; ‘The rapid rise of the Arakan Army’, Mizzima, 21 July 2022.
38
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023; ‘The Arakan Army’s Journey: From Rebels to Rulers and A New Arakan Paradigm’, Centre for Arakan Studies, 2 July 2024.
39
‘ULA/AA Press-Briefing’, Arakan Army.

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Chin National Defense Force (CNDF)

Background

The CNDF is an EAG and the armed wing of the Chin National Organization (CNO), which emerged in 2021 as a civilian response to the coup. ¹ An ethnolinguistic diverse group, the Chin are indigenous to Chin state in western Myanmar.² The Chin response to the Tatmadaw is fragmented – there are two Chin factions. The first is led by the Chin National Front (CNF), an EAG established in 1988, and its allies. The second is the Chin Brotherhood which, at time of reporting, is made up of six resistance groups including the CNDF. The cause of fragmentation among the Chin is based on different approaches to governance of the Chin people.³ Despite various unification attempts, ⁴ there is tension between the two factions, which includes sporadic clashes that have the potential to escalate to the level of NIAC.⁵

Intensity

The CNDF continues to suffer heavy losses in their fighting against the Tatmadaw. A memorial of fallen soldiers is installed at its headquarters in western Myanmar. An honour roll displays the names of eighty fallen fighters killed during May 2021. Airstrikes in November 2024 caused fifty casualties among the CNDF and its allies.⁶ The CNDF did make territorial gains during 2025 as it managed to capture the last junta base in Chin State Town in early April 2025. Consequently, the Chin Brotherhood has full control over the town of Falam in Northern Chin state.⁷

The CNDF has similar combat capabilities to the Tatmadaw, including man-portable air-defence systems, shoulder-fired anti-tank launchers, and 40mm grenade launchers. These similarities stem from the fact that the CNDF’s weaponry is primarily comprised of captured weapons. But it also relies on locally produced rifles.⁸ The Tatmadaw mostly responds through aerial bombardment of the CNDF and its allies.⁹

It is clear that the intensity of fighting between the CNDF and Tatmadaw equates to protracted armed violence.

Organization

The CNDF has a sophisticated organizational structure. It is reported that the CNDF is made up of ten battalions divided into four brigades.¹⁰ Peter Thang has been reported as either holding the position of deputy chairman or chief of staff, ¹¹ and Olivia Thawng Luai is the group’s defence secretary.¹² The names of other high-ranking officials are not in the public domain.

The nature of the organizational structure of the CNDF should facilitate the ability to implement IHL and for the commanders to discipline fighters who are non-compliant. Additionally, CNDF fighters have to complete two months of training prior to deployment.¹³ Such a training curriculum could be used as a vehicle to implement IHL.

The CNDF employ guerrilla tactics such as ambush tactics and hit-and-run attacks as part of its military strategy. The CNDF strategically designs military operations based on the terrain from where operations are launched. Thus, for example, attacks will differ if launched from dense jungles versus urban settings.¹⁴ Part of the CNDF’s military tactics includes keeping their geographic locations secret in order to maximize the effectiveness of surprise attacks or minimize the risk of aerial bombardments.¹⁵ Finally, military tactics include forming alliances for the purposes of launching joint operations against the Tatmadaw. Allies include the CDF, the CNF and certain PDFs. The CNO and CNDF are a part of the Chin Brotherhood.¹⁶

Territorial control provides the CNDF with greater logistical capacity. Coordination and co-operation with allies such as the AA who also control townships further promotes its logistics.¹⁷ The CNDF has had success as of June 2024 with recruitment drives through conscription from the Chin State and the neighbouring Sagaing region.¹⁸ The CNDF manages to source military equipment (including helmets, ammunition, and uniforms) from its allies as well as from ambushes.¹⁹ The CNDF also raises funds from international private donors, ²⁰ and through collecting taxes from its community.²¹

Finally, the CNDF has its own spokesperson, Salai Timmy, which enables this armed group to speak with a unified voice. ²² It also has an official website which is managed by its Information and Public Relations Department.²³

Clearly, the CNDF is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.

1
L. Lovett, ‘‘Inch by inch’: Myanmar rebels close in on key military base in Chin State’, Al Jazeera, 15 March 2025.
2
E. Berridge, ‘Chin National Defense Force’, Modern Insurgent, 19 February 2025.
3
L. Lovett, ‘‘Inch by inch’: Myanmar rebels close in on key military base in Chin State’, Al Jazeera, 15 March 2025.
4
L. Lovett, ‘‘Inch by inch’: Myanmar rebels close in on key military base in Chin State’, Al Jazeera, 15 March 2025; ‘Two factions of the Chin resistance agree to merge after talks in India’s Mizoram State capital Aizawl’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 28 February 2025
5
‘Disquiet on the Western Front: A Divided Resistance in Myanmar’s Chin State’, International Crisis Group, 19 March 2025.
6
L. Lovett, ‘‘Inch by inch’: Myanmar rebels close in on key military base in Chin State’, Al Jazeera, 15 March 2025; ‘Myanmar: Junta Drops ‘More Than 500’ Bombs On Chin State Town During Week Of Clashes’, Eurasia Review, 20 March 2025.
7
‘Chin Brotherhood takes over last junta base in Chin State town’, Myanmar Now, 5 April 2025.
8
E. Berridge, ‘Chin National Defense Force’, Modern Insurgent, 19 February 2025; ‘Two Dozen Myanmar Junta Troops Killed in Chin State Camp Raid’, The Irrawaddy, 21 April 2023.
9
‘Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 45’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 28 March 2025; ‘Pastor among 13 killed as Myanmar military bombs Chin State villages’, Barnabas Aid, 15 April 2025.
10
The Border Lens, ‘In conversation with Salai Peter Thang, Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) Chin State Myanmar’, YouTube, 10 May 2023.
11
‘Myanmar’s junta chief faces growing criticism over military failures: group’, Radio Free Asia, 30 May 2023
12
S. Johnny and L. Lovett, ‘‘How could I do any less?’: Chin State’s Mother of Resistance’, Myanmar Frontier, 6 March 2025; E. Fishbein, ‘Meet the women fighting Myanmar’s junta’, The New Humanitarian, 12 January 2023; L. Lovett, ‘‘I stopped counting after three’: the ‘girl sniper’ fighting on the frontline of Myanmar’s civil war’, The Guardian, 31 March 2025.
13
The Border Lens, ‘In conversation with Salai Peter Thang, Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) Chin State Myanmar’, YouTube, 10 May 2023.
14
E. Berridge, ‘Chin National Defense Force’, Modern Insurgent, 19 February 2025.
15
The Border Lens, ‘In conversation with Salai Peter Thang, Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) Chin State Myanmar’, YouTube, 10 May 2023.
16
E. Berridge, ‘Chin National Defense Force’, Modern Insurgent, 19 February 2025.
17
‘Chin Brotherhood takes over last junta base in Chin State town’, Myanmar Now, 5 April 2025; ‘Eighty-nine Chin resistance members killed in Falam Township’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 18 April 2025.
18
‘Forced recruitment pushes young people into the ranks of the resistance’, Agenzia Fides, 7 June 2024.
19
E. Berridge, ‘Chin National Defense Force’, Modern Insurgent, 19 February 2025; ‘Two Dozen Myanmar Junta Troops Killed in Chin State Camp Raid’, The Irrawaddy, 21 April 2023.
20
The Border Lens, ‘In conversation with Salai Peter Thang, Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) Chin State Myanmar’, YouTube, 10 May 2023
21
‘We Are Ready to Serve’, Chin National Organisation.
22
‘Eighty-nine Chin resistance members killed in Falam Township’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 18 April 2025.
23
‘We Are Ready to Serve’, Chin National Organisation.

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)

Background

The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) is a political group representing the Kachin ethnic minority in northern Myanmar.¹ The KIA is the armed wing of the KIO.²

The KIA was founded on 5 February 1961 with the goal of establishing an autonomous state for the Kachin people.³ Over time, KIA objectives evolved from seeking independence to demanding meaningful autonomy and the protection of Kachin rights and resources.⁴ The term ‘Kachin’ encompasses a diverse group of ethnicities, notably the Jingpo, Rawang, Lisu, Zaiwa, Lashi (Lachik), and Lawngwaw (Maru) peoples.⁵

A ceasefire agreement between the KIA and the Myanmar government was reached in 1994.⁶ In 2010, the military junta issued an ultimatum to all EAOs in Myanmar to transform into a border guard force under command of the military junta or face a resumption of conflict.⁷ The ultimatum was rejected by the KIA and KIO, and the ceasefire broke down in June 2011.⁸ As a consequence, the KIA has been fighting the Tatmadaw as of 2011, resulting in significant internal displacement and a continued humanitarian crisis in Kachin state.⁹

Intensity

According to the Myanmar Peace monitor, the KIA and allied forces have clashed with the Tatmadaw more than 602 times between January 2021 and 9 July 2024.¹⁰ In April 2025, clashes between the KIA and Tatmadaw continued to escalate.¹¹ Following the expiration of KIA’s earthquake-related unilateral ceasefire on 22 April 2025, there was an escalation in fighting between KIA and the military in the Bhamo and Hpakant regions. ¹² Notably, the KIA attempted to capture the regime’s last significant stronghold in Bhamo town. ¹³

The KIA continues to launch sustained and concerted military operations against the Tatmadaw. At the time of reporting, the KIA controlled thirteen of eighteen townships in Kachin.¹⁴ The fighting between the Tatmadaw and the KIA was sufficiently intense to be of concern to China to the extent that in the first quarter of 2025, it was committed to negotiating a ceasefire.¹⁵

The Tatmadaw’s choice of attack against the KIA is often aerial strikes, including sophisticated drone attacks.¹⁶ The use of aerial bombardment against the KIA signals an assessment that the KIA is a serious military opponent.¹⁷

Weaponry used by the KIA includes AK47s and improvised explosive devices and they are capable of producing weaponry which includes single shot rifles.¹⁸ Among the military tactics of the KIA is the forming of alliances with other EAGs, which includes the successful alliance with the TNLA, and one with the CNDF.¹⁹

The number of internally displaced persons in Kachin state as of 28 April 2025 was estimated at 227,200 people – a direct result of the severity of fighting in this region.²⁰

The intensity of fighting between the KIA and the Tatmadaw is sufficiently intense to equate to protracted armed violence.

Organization

The KIA and KIO are led by General N/Ban and the second in command is General Gam Shawng.²¹ The precise organizational structure of the KIA is unclear. The Kachin People’s Defence Force (KPDF) operates under the command of the KIA, as is the case with various other PDFs in Kachin.²² An executive decision has been taken to subsume PDFs active in areas in which the KIA operates in the command structure of the KIA. An example of this integration is presented by the Myo Hla PDF which was integrated into KIA’s Battalion 28 under its 11^th Brigade.²³

The KIA headquarters are based in Laiza, Kachin state.²⁴ It is reported the KIA has some 12,000 active fighters organized into between eight and eleven brigades.²⁵ Little information is available on the group’s disciplinary system, but the organization into battalions headed by brigades could ensure enforcement of discipline among fighters and enable the system of command to implement IHL. The KIA is well-trained,²⁶ which should ensure the ability to comply with IHL.

Its military tactics include guerrilla warfare, with claims that the KIA excels in hit-and-run tactics and ambushes, leveraging its knowledge of the terrain in Kachin state.²⁷ In recent years, however, the KIA has demonstrated increased capacity for conventional military operations, including the use of artillery and the capture of major military bases.²⁸ This development suggests an evolution in military tactics akin to the type employed by conventional armies.²⁹

The KIA has sufficient logistical capacity to meet the criteria of organization. For example, the group produces small arms as well as a range of modified AK47s and self-made landmines.³⁰ The KIA has built up an arsenal of small arms, mortars, and light artillery captured during clashes with the military junta or procured on the black market.³¹

The KIA is described as well-equipped and well-supplied.³² Its operations are funded from the profits of the group’s interests in jade mining, ³³ as well as trade in timber and gold.³⁴ The ‘taxation’ collected in territories under its control further contributes to financing military operations.³⁵ In the past, the KIA has trained and armed other EAGs which adds to its income.³⁶

The KIA has an official spokesperson, who acts as the spokesperson for the KIO as well, Colonel Naw Bu, allowing the EAG to speak with a unified voice.³⁷ The KIA employs sophisticated media strategies to promote its cause and to maintain support in the Kachin population.³⁸

Clearly, the KIA is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.

1
C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025.
2
‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024.
3
M. Martin, ‘Update on the Armed Resistance in Myanmar’s Kachin State’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 July 2024; C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025.
4
M. Martin, ‘Update on the Armed Resistance in Myanmar’s Kachin State’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 July 2024.
5
‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War.
6
‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; ‘Memoirs of Kachin Peace Efforts (1994)’, Kachinland News, 31 October 2024.
7
H. Beech, ‘On Burmese New Year, a String of Attacks’, Time Magazine, 19 April 2010.
8
M. Martin, ‘Update on the Armed Resistance in Myanmar’s Kachin State’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 July 2024.
9
‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War.
10
‘Kachin Independence Organisation/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024.
11
‘Heavy fighting erupts as KIA ambushes advancing Myanmar junta troops near Hpakant’, Mizzima, 27 April 2025; M. Maung, ‘Battles resume in Kachin State’, Myanmar Now, 28 April 2025; M. Maung and M. Shwe Wah, ‘Myanmar military attacks KIA-controlled territories, including Laiza, with aircraft and drones’, Myanmar Now, 27 February 2025; ‘KIA Resumes Bhamo Attacks on Myanmar Junta After Quake Ceasefire’, The Irrawaddy, 30 April 2025.
12
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.
13
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.
14
Z. Abuza and N. N. Thant Aung, ‘Too Little, Too Late: China Steps Up Military Aid to Myanmar’s Junta’, Stimson, 4 March 2025; S. M. Thazin Aung, ‘Reinventing Territorial Self-Governance in Myanmar: Kachin’s New Approach and Its Dilemma in Post-Coup Myanmar’, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 7 March 2025; ‘Kachin Special Region 1 now under Kachin Independence Army control’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 21 November 2024.
15
M. Micheals, ‘Crossing the Rubicon: Are Myanmar’s ethnic armies prepared to go all in?’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2025.
16
M. Maung and M. Shwe Wah, ‘Myanmar military attacks KIA-controlled territories, including Laiza, with aircraft and drones’, Myanmar Now, 27 February 2025; M. Maung and M. Shwe Wah, ‘Myanmar junta strikes Kachin armed group’s stronghold as clashes in Bhamo continue’, Myanmar Now, 27 January 2025.
17
‘Junta Airstrike Kills Nearly 40 Trainees at KIA Camp Amid Crisis’, Kachin News, 1 April 2025; ‘Myanmar’s junta seeks to regain air edge with foreign night vision drones’, Radio Free Asia, 15 March 2025.
18
War Noir, ‘Manufacturing the Revolution: Weapons and Explosives Craft-Produced by Myanmar’s Anti-Junta Fighters’, Militant Wire, 31 October 2022.
19
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 22.
20
‘Myanmar’ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Operational Data Portal.
21
‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024.
22
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 4.
23
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 13.
24
‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024.
25
‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024; ‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 13.
26
‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024
27
‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025.
28
C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025.
29
‘The Long War Pt. 4; The Kachin Independence Army (KIA)’, Military Matters, 30 November 2020.
30
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 22.
31
‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024.
32
‘The Long War Pt. 4; The Kachin Independence Army (KIA)’, Military Matters, 30 November 2020.
33
‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War; M. Micheals, ‘Myanmar regime brings significant escalation to the doorstep of key opponent’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2023
34
‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; ‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War.
35
‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; ‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War.
36
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 22.
37
‘KIA Expects Kachin State Conflicts to Escalate in 2025’, Burma News International, 3 January 2025.
38
C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025.

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Karen National Union (KNLA)

Background

The KNLA is the military wing of the political movement, the Karen National Union (KNU).¹ Formed in 1949, it is the oldest EAG in Myanmar.² Post-World War II, the situation reflected the fact that the Karen people had sided with British forces, whereas the Burmese had co-operated with Imperial Japan.³ Since Myanmar’s independence from Britain, the KNLA has engaged in a conflict against the military junta. This NIAC between the KNLA and the Tatmadaw (and previous versions of the military junta) has lasted for more than seventy-five years.⁴

The KNU’s objectives include ensuring the autonomy and self-determination of the Karen people through the establishment of a democratic Karen state.⁵ The KLNA describes its mission as being to serve as a self-defence force for the protection of the Karen people and the KNU.⁶ The KLNA believes that to be able successfully to act in self-defence it must defend against Tatmadaw aggression, aim to ban narcotics, provide village security, and provide security for humanitarian relief missions.⁷

Intensity

KNLA brigades control their own territory in a relatively autonomous way under a central command.⁸ Stable territorial control confirms the KNLA has the capacity to oppose the Tatmadaw by its military operations and the territory to evade government control. The military tactics the KNLA employs include maintaining a defensive force and engaging in guerilla warfare and ambush tactics suited to the jungle environment.⁹ The junta, too, deploys special forces for special operations against the KNLA. ¹⁰

Part of the KNLA strategy is to form alliances. As of 2023, the KNLA was associated with more than a dozen other insurgent groups; it is a part of the 4K Coalition which consists of the Karenni Army, the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front and the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force. Other allies are the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, the AA, the Bamar People’s Liberation Army, DKBA-5, the KIA, and the PDF.¹¹ The KNLA/KNU openly allies with the NUG, which was founded on 31 January 2007 by Major-General Saw Htein Maung, the commander of the KNLA’s 7^th Brigade. ¹²

Similarly, in the south-eastern Tanintharyi region, the KNLA and the KNDO, in collaboration with other resistance forces, captured the last remaining regime position at the Htee Khee base on 9 May 2025, which serves as the overland route from Thailand to the regional capital, Dawei. On 7 May 2025, regime bases along the Thai border came under attack from KNLA and KNDO forces in neighbouring Kayin State.¹³ On 6 and 10 June 2025, the KNLA and allied resistance forces gained further ground against the regime by capturing bases in Kyaukkyi township (Bago region) and Dawei township (Tanintharyi region). Additionally, the large Thay Baw Boe base in Kayin state was seized by the KNLA on 3 June 2025 following a ten-day offensive, with forty government troops reportedly killed.¹⁴

Organization

The KNLA is a part of the sophisticated organizational structure of the KNU. The Karen Defence Department was formed in 1956 and comprises the KNLA and the KNDO, as well as militia and home guard units.¹⁵ The KNLA command structure is as follows: seven brigades and three battalion headquarters. Each brigade is divided into five battalions, each battalion consists of four companies, and each company has three platoons. A majority of the PDFs operating in Karen are under the KNLA umbrella. Each brigade has a joint coalition committee. In this case, where a PDF is a part of a KNLA brigade, the commander is from the KNLA, and the deputy is from the PDF.¹⁶ The KLNA has three central branches: the General Staff Office, an Adjutant General Office and a Quartermaster Office.¹⁷ The organizational structure of the KNLA corresponds to that of a modern military.

The KNLA/KNU’s organizational structure satisfies the requirement that it has the capacity to comply with IHL and enforce discipline amongst its fighters. The KNU’s declared core values, which include honesty and equality, further support discipline in all departments¹⁸ and are published on its website as an expression of humanitarian policy.¹⁹

In 2015, Geneva Call presented and explained the international norms pertaining to children affected by armed conflict and exposed sexual and gender-based violence and gender discrimination to nearly forty officers from the KNLA, from six of the seven KNU brigade areas, as well as from the associated KNDO and the Karen National Police Force. Geneva Call demonstrated how these norms are refined and appear in a condensed form in its Deeds of Commitment protecting children in armed conflict and prohibiting sexual violence and gender discrimination. These commitments were agreed to by the KNU in 2013.²⁰

The proper functioning of the disciplinary system was evident when, in 2022, KNU suspended Nerdah Bo Mya, at the time the commander-in-chief of an armed force, for killing twenty-five civilians. It was explicitly stated that his suspension was the result of the accused contravening the Geneva Conventions.²¹

The KNU has an official website²² on which it releases official statements,²³ hosts official documents such as ceasefire agreements,²⁴ and posts news related to the KNLA. ²⁵

Clearly, the KNLA is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.

1
M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024.
2
S. Loong, ‘The Karen National Union in Post-Coup Myanmar’, Stimson, 7 April 2022.
3
M. H. Aung and D. I. Steinberg, ‘The British in Burma, 1885–1948’, Britannica.
4
M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024.
5
‘About KNU’, Karen National Union.
6
‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union.
7
‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union.
8
H. M. Kyed and M. Gravers, ‘Non-state armed groups in the Myanmar peace process: What are the future options?’, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2014.
9
M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024; A. Nachemson, ‘How the Karen became crucial to Myanmar’s anti-coup resistance’, Al Jazeera, 6 May 2022.
10
M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024; S. Y. Naing, ‘‘Special Force’ Joins KNLA on High Alert’, The Irrawaddy, 19 October 2010.
11
M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024.
12
M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024.
13
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.
14
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.
15
‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union.
16
A. Nachemson, ‘How the Karen became crucial to Myanmar’s anti-coup resistance’, Al Jazeera, 6 May 2022.
17
‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union.
18
‘About KNU: Values’, Karen National Union
19
‘Policies’, Karen National Union.
20
‘Burma/Myanmar: 40 high-ranking officers from the Karen National Liberation Army are trained on child protection’, Geneva Call, 25 November 2015.
21
S. Loong, ‘Southeast Myanmar: a shared struggle for federal democracy’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 September 2022.
22
Karen National Union
23
‘Statements’, Karen National Union
24
‘Peace Process’, Karen National Union
25
‘News’, Karen National Union.

Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)

Background

The MNDAA, also known as the Kokang Army,¹ originated from the remnants of the military wing of the Communist Party of Burma, which was disbanded in 1989. The MNDAA represents the Kokang ethnic Chinese community.² The MNDAA operates in the northern Shan state of Myanmar, in close proximity to the Chinese border.³

Founded in March 1989,⁴ it has been actively engaged in a NIAC against the Tatmadaw since August 2009.⁵ The MNDAA is currently part of the 3BHA, formed in June 2019,⁶ which also consists of the AA and the TNLA.⁷

Intensity

Clashes with the Tatmadaw occur frequently, often lasting for several days, ⁸ and resulting in many casualties.⁹

The MNDAA employs heavy weaponry in such clashes. For the most part, the weapons have been seized from the Tatmadaw and include grenades, mortar shells, RPGs, and bombs.¹⁰ The MNDAA and the other members of the 3BHA are also reported to have access to anti-aircraft weapons.¹¹

The MNDAA continues to hold territory in northern Shan state.¹² As a result of the second phase of Operation 1027 in mid-2024, the MNDAA captured additional territory, including the capital Lashio and the Northeast Military Command headquarters of the Tatmadaw, and held control for eight months prior to ceasefire negotiations with the junta¹³ according to which it was to hand over Lashio city to the Myanmar government by 21 April 2025.¹⁴ China’s concern over the conflict escalating further led to its facilitation and monitoring of the 2025 ceasefire agreement.¹⁵

It is clear at the time of reporting that the fighting between the MNDAA and Tatmadaw equates to protracted armed violence.

Organization

The Kokang EAG has a political wing, a military wing and a justice department.¹⁶ The political wing of the Kokang EAG is the Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party (MNTJP). The military wing, the MNDAA, has a sophisticated command structure. The military wing consists of a Central Military Commission,¹⁷ and deploys several battalions. From 2015, the MNDAA formed political and supply departments as well as command and control, and artillery battalions. The MNDAA has at least four brigades: Brigade 211, Brigade 311, Brigade 511 and Brigade 611. ¹⁸

The close working relationship between the Justice Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission ensures the imposition of discipline among MNDAA fighters.¹⁹

At the time of reporting, Peng Daxun (Peng Deren) is the MNDAA’s Commander-in-Chief as well as the MNTJP’s General Secretary and the Chairman of the Special Region 1 (Kokang) Administrative Committee.²⁰ The deputy Commander-in-Chief is Yang Winxian, the secretary is Pheung Ah Di (aka U Tun Myat Linn) and in charge of external relations is Pheung Win Naing. Yang Guanghua is deputy Chief-of-Staff of Allied Command of the MNDAA.²¹

It is estimated that by the end of April 2025, the MNDAA had 6,000 to 8,000 active fighters.²² MNDAA fighters are well-trained and provide training for other EAGs.²³ The fact that other EAGs use the MNDAA to train fighters speaks to the MNDAA’s command of military tactics and discipline. Further testament to the MNDAA’s success in military tactics is the leading role it played in the planning and execution of a joint operation, Operation 1027.²⁴

The MNDAA training programmes are sufficiently effective that rapidly after completion fighters are deployed and have the ability to operate independently after undergoing training.²⁵ The training programme and sophisticated command structure²⁶ confirm the ability of the MNDAA to comply with and implement IHL.

The MNDAA are capable of securing weaponry and are able to finance military expenses owing to profits from the drug trade, in particular the harvesting of opium, heroin refining, and the production of methamphetamine.²⁷ Also, it is claimed that the group operates a gold mine in north-eastern Myanmar.²⁸ Lastly, the MNDAA speaks with one voice through an official spokesperson and information officer who is, at the time of reporting, Li Kyar Win.²⁹

As at end-June 2025, the MNDAA was sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.

1
‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024
2
‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025.
3
‘What is Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance that’s resisting the military?’, Al Jazeera, 16 January 2024.
4
‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024
5
Y. Xian, ‘Good Rebels or Good Timing?: Myanmar’s MNDAA and Operation 1027’, The Diplomat, 5 January 2024.
6
‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025
7
Z. Abuza, ‘Operation 1027 poses rare challenge to Myanmar junta’, Radio Free Asia, 10 November 2023.
8
H. Regan and A. Watson, ‘Myanmar rebels are claiming their biggest victory yet over junta forces. Could it be a turning point in the brutal civil war?’, CNN, 2 August 2024
9
N. Swe, ‘MNDAA reports major weapons seizure from Myanmar army’, Myanmar Now, 5 January 2022; ‘MNDAA attack kills junta brigadier general’, Myanmar Now, 8 December 2023.
10
N. Swe, ‘MNDAA reports major weapons seizure from Myanmar army’, Myanmar Now, 5 January 2022.
11
‘MNDAA to use seized anti-aircraft guns for air defense’, Than Lwin Times Media, 7 November 2023.
12
M. K. Jar, ‘MNDAA to Surrender Lashio but Hold Surrounding Country’, The Irrawandy, 7 April 2025.
13
‘Implications of the MNDAA & Military Council’s Negotiations in Kunming’, MoeMaKa, 25 March 2025
14
‘MNDAA to hand over administration of Lashio Town to Myanmar junta in April’, Mizzima, 6 April 2025.
15
‘China sends team to monitor Myanmar ceasefire, spokesperson confirms’, CGTN, 22 April 2025; C. Tan, ‘China deploys ceasefire monitors to Myanmar border region’, Nikkei Asia, 2 May 2025.
16
‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024.
17
S. Wansai, ‘MNDAA: Beating a bold revolutionary path to fulfill the people’s aspirations?’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 10 January 2023
18
‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party’, Spring Sprouts.
19
S. Wansai, ‘MNDAA: Beating a bold revolutionary path to fulfill the people’s aspirations?’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 10 January 2023.
20
‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024.
21
‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party’, Spring Sprouts.
22
‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025; ‘Myanmar rebels prepare to hand key city back to junta, China says’, France24, 22 April 2025.
23
K. Oo, ‘Myanmar’s Spring Revolution Aided by Ethnic Kokang Armed Group’, The Irrawaddy, 8 March 2023.
24
‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024.
25
S. Wansai, ‘MNDAA: Beating a bold revolutionary path to fulfill the people’s aspirations?’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 10 January 2023.
26
K. Oo, ‘Myanmar’s Spring Revolution Aided by Ethnic Kokang Armed Group’, The Irrawaddy, 8 March 2023.
27
‘Kokang rebels produce drugs in Asia World Company dam sites’, Burma News International, 14 July 2010; ‘Synthetic Drugs in East and Southeast Asia: Latest Developments and Challenges’ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023; Y. Xian, ‘Good Rebels or Good Timing?: Myanmar’s MNDAA and Operation 1027’, The Diplomat, 5 January 2024.
28
‘6 shot dead after confrontation over Myanmar gold mine operation’, Radio Free Asia, 7 March 2025.
29
See DVB English News, X, 1 December 2023; ‘6 shot dead after confrontation over Myanmar gold mine operation’, Radio Free Asia, 7 March 2025.

Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)

Background

The TNLA was founded in January 2009.¹ It is the armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF).² It has engaged in a NIAC with the Tatmadaw since at least 2011.³

The ideology of the TNLA is to establish a Ta’ang state that includes all of Namhsan and Mantong townships, and parts of Namhkam, Mongyai, Tangyan, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Lashio, and Namtu townships in northern Shan state, as well as Mogok township in the northern Mandalay region. ⁴ Other EAGs, including the KIO and the UWSA, supported the evolution of the TNLA by training its fighters and providing it with weapons. The TNLA has capitalized on the aftermath of the 2021 coup, strengthening its control over territory in northern Shan state and becoming one of the most powerful EAGs in Myanmar.⁵

In the direct aftermath of the coup, the TNLA infrequently engaged the military junta and on occasion covertly supported anti-junta forces in a bid to achieve its long-term goal, which is autonomy. It already functions as a quasi-state.⁶ The TNLA joined the 3BHA and played a significant role in Operation 1027. This successful alliance enabled the TNLA to gain control over fifteen of seventeen townships in its operational area.⁷

Intensity

Fighting between the Tatmadaw and the TNLA is frequent and intense.⁸ At the time of reporting, the most recent attacks have been an aerial bombardment by the Tatmadaw against the TNLA on 3 May 2025 after the collapse of ceasefire negotiations.⁹ The Tatmadaw often employs aerial assaults, including drone attacks, against the TNLA.¹⁰ These aerial assaults consistently cause casualties among both TNLA fighters and civilians,¹¹ and inflict significant destruction on property, including civilian homes.¹² Aerial assaults also contribute to an already significant number of internally displaced persons.¹³

Successful attacks against the Tatmadaw by the 3BHA, of which the TNLA is a member, have resulted in mass casualties on the side of the Tatmadaw.¹⁴ On various occasions the TNLA seized military-grade weaponry following successful assaults.¹⁵ Weaponry in its arsenal includes man-portable air defence systems, ¹⁶ other anti-aircraft weapons, radar systems, RPGs, and various types of landmines.¹⁷

The intensity of fighting between the TNLA and the Tatmadaw is of such a nature that the TNLA continues to control several territories in the Shan state.¹⁸ However, the military advanced in Shan state (North) against the TNLA in mid-2025, approaching the strategic town of Nawnghkio on the Mandalay-Muse Highway, which the TNLA had captured in July 2024. In the intense fighting to the south and west of the town, the military achieved gradual but steady progress by combining drones, artillery and air strikes with ground troops.¹⁹ The nature of the fighting reached such a level of intensity during the first quarter of 2025 that China unsuccessfully tried to broker a ceasefire between the TNLA and the military junta.²⁰

Clearly, the ferocity of the fighting between the TNLA and Tatmadaw is sufficiently intense to equate to protracted armed violence.

Organization

The TNLA and its political wing, the PSLF, at the time of reporting, are headed by the Chairman, General Tar Aik Phone (aka Tar Aik Bong).²¹ As the organization’s armed wing, the TNLA is officially part of the PSLF’s defence department.²² The TNLA command is structured to include various high-ranking officers, including two vice-command chairs, a General Secretary major-general,²³ a commander-in-chief major-general, ²⁴ and a deputy commander-in-chief head of the Central General Administration Department (with the rank of brigadier-general).²⁵ The TNLA are well-trained and provide training services to other organized armed groups.²⁶ Clearly, owing to a sophisticated command structure and the existence of training centres, the TNLA is capable of implementing IHL.

The TNLA’s command includes a Central Executive Committee and a Central Committee.²⁷ It is estimated the TNLA has between 5,000 and 10,000 fighters,²⁸ which are divided into seven brigades and more than thirty battalions.²⁹ In 2018, the TNLA established a police force ³⁰ as well as a legal department that acts as a judiciary.³¹ Thus, the TNLA is in a position to discipline its fighters.

The TNLA’s military success and the stable control over territory confirms a capacity to engage in military tactics. At the time of reporting, the TNLA exercises active control over Kutkai, Kyaukme, Mongton, Namkham, Namhsan, Namtu, Naungcho, and Thibaw, Muse and Mongmit in northern Shan state and Mogok in Mandalay region.³² The TNLA employs guerilla-style operations as a part of its military tactics.³³ Another feature of the TNLA’s military tactics is to co-operate in and co-ordinate alliances. It is a member of the United Nationalities Federal Council, the 3BHA, the Northern Alliance, and the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee. The TNLA governs the Pa Laung Self-Administered Zone located in northern Shan state, which was established under the 2008 constitution to meet the territorial demands of the Palaung/Ta’ang ethnic group.³⁴

The TNLA financially benefits from exploiting ruby mines located in Mogoke in the Mandalay Region which is under its control,³⁵ as well as from its training activities. ³⁶ These lucrative financial streams enhance its logistical capacity. The TNLA has sufficient command of logistics not only to train other resistance groups but also to equip and to arm such groups. As the TNLA controls several towns,³⁷ its territory is often used to move weapons and other supplies.³⁸

Lastly, the TNLA has a spokeswoman, Lway Yay Oo, and thus the group speaks with one voice.³⁹

Clearly, the TNLA is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.

1
‘Palaung State Liberation Front/ Ta’ang National Liberation Army – PSLF/TNLA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024; ‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022.
2
C. Schutte, ‘Who is the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 5 February 2025.
3
‘Sixty-one Years of Ta’ang Revolution’, PeaceRep, 12 January 2024.
4
‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022.
5
‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023.
6
‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023.
7
C. Schutte, ‘Who is the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 5 February 2025.
8
Z. Abuza, ‘Tiny ethnic Ta’ang army is a bellwether for opposition fight against Myanmar junta’, Radio Free Asia, 29 August 2023.
9
‘Myanmar Junta Bombs TNLA Territory After Peace Talks Fail’, The Irrawaddy, 3 May 2025.
10
‘Myanmar junta continues attacks in northern Shan State despite ceasefire’, Myanmar Now, 23 April 2025; M. Pan, ‘Military attacks ethnic Ta’ang armed group’s base in northern Shan State using aircraft and drones’, Myanmar Now, 25 September 2023.
11
Z. Abuza, ‘Tiny ethnic Ta’ang army is a bellwether for opposition fight against Myanmar junta’, Radio Free Asia, 29 August 2023; ‘Junta’s Drones an Airstrikes Inflict Casualties on TNLA Fighters and Civilians Northern Shan State’, Burma News International, 21 June 2024
12
‘Myanmar Junta Airstrikes Kill 20 in TNLA Territory’, The Irrawaddy, 13 November 2024; ‘Ta’ang National Liberation Army claims 5 killed by airstrikes; Myanmar experts support Argentina arrest warrants’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 24 February 2025.
13
N. Swe, ‘Myanmar army drops massive aerial bombs during northern Shan State clashes, TNLA says’, Myanmar Now, 13 December 2022.
14
T. M. Thet and T. Kyaw, ‘Civilian casualties high in Kyaukme by TNLA’s military assaults’, NP News, 8 July 2024; ‘Inside ‘Operation 1027’, the anti-junta offensive in Myanmar’, Firstpost, 15 December 2023.
15
I. Naing, ‘Myanmar resistance captures strategic town near Mandalay’, Voice of America, 12 July 2024.
16
A. Davis, ‘China’s mobile missiles on the loose in Myanmar’, Asia Times, 28 November 2019
17
‘TNLA Seizes Anti-Aircraft Weapons in Battle at Nawnghkio’, Independent Mon News Agency, 11 July 2024.
18
‘Territories Under PSLF/TNLA Control’, ISP Myanmar, 22 March 2024.
19
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.
20
‘Myanmar Junta Bombs TNLA Territory After Peace Talks Fail’, The Irrawaddy, 3 May 2025.
21
‘What is Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance that’s resisting the military?’, Al Jazeera, 16 January 2024.
22
‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023.
23
‘Palaung State Liberation Front/ Ta’ang National Liberation Army – PSLF/TNLA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024; ‘An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 21 March 2024
24
‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022
25
‘TNLA says it will make a revolutionary government emerge in 2025’, Channel News Independent, 27 August 2024.
26
See ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023.
27
‘An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 21 March 2024.
28
‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023; A. Graceffo, ‘Backgrounder: Ethnic Armies in Myanmar Civil War’, Geopolitical Monitor, 27 February 2024; ‘What is Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance that’s resisting the military?’, Al Jazeera, 16 January 2024
29
‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022.
30
‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023
31
‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022.
32
‘Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army – PSLF/TNLA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024.
33
‘Myanmar Junta Seizes Key Village Near TNLA Stronghold in Northern Shan’, The Irrawaddy, 27 March 2025.
34
‘Understanding Inter-ethnic Conflict in Myanmar’, Reliefweb, 28 September 2018; A. Graceffo, ‘Backgrounder: Ethnic Armies in Myanmar Civil War’, Geopolitical Monitor, 27 February 2024.
35
‘Ta’ang rebels renew vow to crush Myanmar’s junta despite earlier ceasefire offer’, Radio Free Asia, 13 January 2025
36
‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023.
37
H. H. Zan, ‘Ta’ang Rebels Start Talks With Myanmar Junta in China’, The Irrawaddy, 17 February 2025
38
‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023.
39
S. Naing, ‘Myanmar rebel army ready for dialogue with junta, with China’s help’, Reuters, 26 November 2024; ‘Myanmar Junta Seizes Key Village Near TNLA Stronghold in Northern Shan’, The Irrawaddy, 27 March 2025.

State Parties

Myanmar

Non-state parties

Arakan Army (AA)
Chin National Defence Force (CNDF)
Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)
Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)

Foreign Involvement

China

1
A. Thiha, ‘It’s Time To Rethink Myanmar’s Ethnic Armed Organizations’, The Diplomat, 24 March 2023.
2
‘The State of Conflict and Violence in Asia: Myanmar’, The Asia Foundation, October 2017, 106.
3
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Civil War in Myanmar’, Council on Foreign Relations, 26 March 2025.
4
‘Myanmar: UN Fact-Finding Mission releases its full account of massive violations by military in Rakhine, Kachin and Shan States’, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 18 September 2018.
5
R. Ratcliffe, ‘Myanmar civil war: a quick guide to the conflict’, The Guardian, 31 January 2025.
6
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Civil War in Myanmar’, Council on Foreign Relations,26 March 2025.
7
R. Ratcliffe, ‘Myanmar civil war: a quick guide to the conflict’, The Guardian, 31 January 2025.
8
‘Myanmar profile – Timeline’, BBC News, 3 September 2018.
9
‘…formerly known as SLORC’, The Economist, 20 November 1997
10
L. Maizland, ‘Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict’, Council on Foreign Relations, 31 January 2022.
11
L. Maizland, ‘Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict’, Council on Foreign Relations, 31 January 2022.
12
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Civil War in Myanmar’, Council on Foreign Relations, 26 March 2025
13
‘Burma: 20 Years After 1990 Elections, Democracy Still Denied’, Human Rights Watch, 26 May 2010.
14
‘Burma: 20 Years After 1990 Elections, Democracy Still Denied’, Human Rights Watch, 26 May 2010.
15
‘Country report 70 – Myanmar’, German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 25 November 2024; ‘Identity Crisis: Ethnicity and Conflict in Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 28 August 2020.
16
T. Fuller, ‘Main Opposition to Boycott Myanmar Election’, The New York Times, 29 March 2010.
17
E. Teekah and A. McKenna, ‘Myanmar Civil War [2021 – present]’, Britannica, 20 February 2025.
18
L. Maizland, ‘Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict’, Council on Foreign Relations, 31 January 2022.
19
L. Maizland, ‘Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict’, Council on Foreign Relations, 31 January 2022
20
R. Ratcliffe, ‘Myanmar civil war: a quick guide to the conflict’, The Guardian, 31 January 2025.
21
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Civil War in Myanmar’, Council on Foreign Relations,26 March 2025.
22
‘The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organisations’
23
‘Myanmar profile – Timeline’, BBC News, 3 September 2018.
24
See ‘Myanmar profile – Timeline’, BBC News, 3 September 2018.
25
Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact Finding Mission on Myanmar’, UN Soc A/HRC/39/CRP.2, 17 September 2018; ‘Special Session of the Human Rights Council on the human rights situation of the minority Rohingya Muslim population and other minorities in the Rakhine State of Myanmar’, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 5 December 2017; ‘UN expert demands accountability for the Rohingya and an end to ‘paralysis of indifference’’, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 24 August 2023; ‘Far from the Headlines: Myanmar – The Rohingya crisis’, United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, 3 May 2024.
26
ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar).
27
‘Far from the Headlines: Myanmar – The Rohingya crisis’, United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, 3 May 2024.
28
‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025.
29
‘Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi’s party wins majority in election’, BBC News, 13 November 2020.
30
‘Few Serious Takers for Myanmar Junta’s Election Commission Meeting’, Ecoi.net, 21 May 2021.
31
E. Teekah and A. McKenna, ‘Myanmar Civil War [2021 – present]’, Britannica, 20 February 2025.
32
R. Ratcliffe, ‘Myanmar civil war: a quick guide to the conflict’, The Guardian, 31 January 2025.
33
E. Teekah and A. McKenna, ‘Myanmar Civil War [2021 – present]’, Britannica, 20 February 2025.
34
M. Yu et al., ‘Son of ousted Myanmar leader speaks to NPR about her imprisonment’, National Public Radio, 1 April 2025; F. Mao, ‘Aung San Suu Kyi jailed for a further seven years’, BBC, 30 December 2022.
35
L. B. Thang, ‘Understanding the Military Coup in Myanmar, Two Years Later’, East West Centre, 15 March 2025.
36
‘Daily Briefing in Relation to the Military Coup’, Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, 8 March 2023.
37
J. Curtis et al, ‘Myanmar’s civil war’, House of Commons Library, 9 April 2025.
38
J. Curtis, ‘One year on from Myanmar’s military coup’, House of Commons Library, 2 February 2022.
39
T. Robinson and J. Curtis, ‘Human rights in Myanmar’, House of Commons Library, 17 April 2023.
40
‘Myanmar coup: At least two killed as police disperse protesters’, BBC, 20 February 2021.
41
S. Ryan and G. Feely, ‘Atrocity crimes in Myanmar? Assessing violence in the wake of the 1 February 2021 attempted coup’, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 20 September 2021; ‘What’s happening in Myanmar’, Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, 7 May 2025; M. Z. Oo and S. Tønnesson, ‘Counting Myanmar’s Dead: Reported Civilian Casualties since the 2021 Military Coup’, Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2023, 40.
42
‘Myanmar: Several injured as security forces violently quash peaceful protests’, Amnesty International, 9 February 2021.
43
‘Myanmar: UN Security Council strongly condemns violence against peaceful protesters’, United Nations News, 11 March 2021; UNSC, ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/PRST/2021/5, 10 March 2021.
44
‘As slaughter of civilians continues, some decide it’s time to take up arms’, Myanmar Now, 30 March 2021; E. Fishbein et al, ‘‘The last fight’: With growing support for federal army, Kachin prepares for war’, Frontier Myanmar, 3 April 2021.
45
‘Myanmar Conflict Map’, International Institute for Strategic Studies; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.
46
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.
47
‘Taking Aim at the Tatmadaw: The New Armed Resistance to Myanmar’s Coup’, International Crisis Group, 28 June 2021; C. Molyneux, ‘The Use and Impact of Explosive Weapons in Myanmar’, Explosive Weapons Monitor, September 2024.
48
‘Myanmar: Vast arsenal and notorious troops deployed during nationwide ‘killing spree’ protest crackdown-new research’, Amnesty International, 11 March 2021; ‘Myanmar Conflict Map’, International Institute for Strategic Studies; ‘Taking Aim at the Tatmadaw: The New Armed Resistance to Myanmar’s Coup’, International Crisis Group, 28 June 2021.
49
‘Myanmar Conflict Map’, International Institute for Strategic Studies.
50
A. Davis, ‘Myanmar’s fluid war edging toward an endgame’, Asia Times, 18 February 2025; L. Lovett, and S. Johnny, ‘Q&A: Leader of Myanmar’s shadow government talks civil war strategy in 2025’, Al Jazeera, 4 January 2025.
51
J. Curtis, ‘One year on from Myanmar’s military coup’, House of Commons Library, 2 February 2022.
52
‘Myanmar’s Coup Shakes Up Its Ethnic Conflicts’, International Crisis Group, 22 January 2022.
53
‘Myanmar: Dozens killed in alleged military massacre’, DW, 26 December 2021; Z. M. Awng, et al, ‘Christmas eve killings reinforce views of ‘evil’ Myanmar military’, Al Jazeera, 30 December 2021
54
‘Chin rebel groups team up to capture military outpost near Indian border’, Myanmar Now, 13 September 2021.
55
‘Chin rebel groups team up to capture military outpost near Indian border’, Myanmar Now, 13 September 2021
56
‘Some 90 Myanmar Junta Soldiers Killed During Intense Weekend Fighting’, The Irrawaddy (Wayback Machine), 11 October 2021
57
‘KIA attacks Tatmadaw base in Kachin’s Mogaung township’, Myanmar Now, 13 March 2021
58
K. Ye Lynn, ‘10 Soldiers killed in Myanmar base attack’, AA, 28 March 2021.
59
‘Myanmar: UN Security Council strongly condemns violence against peaceful protesters’, United Nations News, 11 March 2021; UNSC, ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/PRST/2021/5, 10 March 2021; ‘Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Myanmar’, United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 29 December 2021
60
‘ASEAN Chairman’s Statement on the Developments in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar’, ASEAN, 1 February 2021; ‘Chairman’s Statement in the ASEAN Leader’s meeting’, ASEAN, 24 April 2021
61
‘Remarks by President Biden on the Administration’s Response to the Coup in Burma’ The White House, 10 February 2021; ‘S.2937 – Burma Act of 2021’, United States Congress, 2021 and the European Parliament, ‘European Parliament Motion for a Resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar’, European Parliament, 5 October 2021
62
‘Myanmar Conflict Map’, International Institute for Strategic Studies.
63
‘Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessments: Key developments and trends, 2023’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023, 143.
64
‘Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessments: Key developments and trends, 2023’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023, 143.
65
‘Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessments: Key developments and trends, 2023’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023, 144.
66
‘35 Junta Forces Killed in Three Days of Resistance Attacks’, The Irrawaddy, 6 March 2023.
67
‘Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessments: Key developments and trends, 2023’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023, 144.
68
I. R. Scarpino and N. Schochet, ‘Do ‘good rebels’ exist in Myanmar’, The New Humanitarian, 25 September 2024.
69
A. Connelly and S. Loong, ‘Conflict in Myanmar and the International Response’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023.
70
H. Thit, ‘Head of security for Yangon International Airport assassinated’, Myanmar Now (Wayback Machine), 21 June 2023.
71
‘Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for Provisional Measures filed in the Registry of the Court on 11 November 2019: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar)’, International Court of Justice, 11 November 2019; ‘Unofficial Summary: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar)’ International Court of Justice, 3 July 2024.
72
‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar) Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Order of 23 January 2020’, International Court of Justice, 23 January 2020.
73
‘Declaration of Intervention of the Republic of Maldives’ International Court of Justice, 10 November 2023.
74
‘Joint Declaration of Intervention of Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’, International Court of Justice.
75
‘Declaration of Intervention under Article 63 of the Republic of Slovenia’, ICJ, 22 November 2024
76
‘Declaration of Intervention of the Democratic Republic of the Congo under Article 63 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice’, ICJ, 10 December 2024
77
‘Declaration of Intervention of the Kingdom of Belgium under Article 63 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice’, ICJ, 12 December 2024
78
‘Declaration of Intervention by Ireland pursuant to Article 63 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice’, ICJ, 10 December 2024.
79
‘Information for victims: Bangladesh/Myanmar’, International Criminal Court; ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar’, International Criminal Court: Pre-Trial Chamber III, 14 November 2019.
80
‘Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15’, International Criminal Court: Pre-Trial Chamber III, 4 July 2019; ‘Information for victims: Bangladesh/Myanmar’, International Criminal Court.
81
‘Information for victims: Bangladesh/Myanmar’, International Criminal Court.
82
‘Information for victims: Bangladesh/Myanmar’, International Criminal Court.
83
‘Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Application for an arrest warrant in the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar’, International Criminal Court, 27 November 2024; ‘Information for victims: Bangladesh/Myanmar’, International Criminal Court.
84
‘Information for victims: Bangladesh/Myanmar’, International Criminal Court.
85
‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025.
86
‘Statement’, Arakan Army, 27 October 2023.
87
‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025.
88
Y. Sun, ‘Operation 1027: Changing the tides of the Myanmar civil war?’, Brookings, 16 January 2024.
89
‘Ethnic army overruns junta command center in Myanmar’s Kokang region’, Radio Free Asia, 5 January 2024; Y. M. W. Oo, ‘How politics shapes an ethnic group in Myanmar’, Global History Dialogues, 2023.
90
Y. Sun, ‘Operation 1027: Changing the tides of the Myanmar civil war?’, Brookings, 16 January 2024.
91
‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025.
92
‘Junta’s declaration of martial law may endanger peace agreement’, Mizzima, 9 March 2024.
93
N. Thit, ‘How Operation 1027 Transformed War Against Myanmar Junta’, The Irrawaddy, 26 October 2024; S. Mon, ‘Decisive year ahead for resistance groups in Myanmar as they threaten new territories’, ACLED, 12 December 2024.
94
B. Das, ‘Operation 1027: A year of transformations in Myanmar’s civil war’, Border Lens, 25 November 2024.
95
N. Thit, ‘How Operation 1027 Transformed War Against Myanmar Junta’, The Irrawaddy, 26 October 2024.
96
M. Kavi, ‘In Orchestrating Lashio Handover, China Tightens Its Grip on Myanmar’, The Irrawaddy, 24 April 2025.
97
J. Nicholls and N. Dalal, ‘Insight report: Re-launch of ‘Operation 1027’ underlines increasing threat of nationwide insurgency to Myanmar government’s stability in short term’, Janes, 18 November 2024.
98
S. Mon, ‘Q&A: Will the ceasefires after the earthquake bring peace to Myanmar?’, ACLED, 24 April 2025.
99
Y. Sun, ‘Operation 1027: Changing the tides of the Myanmar civil war?’, Brookings, 16 January 2024.
100
B. Das, ‘Operation 1027: A year of transformations in Myanmar’s civil war’, Border Lens, 25 November 2024; Y. Sun, ‘Operation 1027: Changing the tides of the Myanmar civil war?’, Brookings, 16 January 2024.
101
B. Das, ‘Operation 1027: A year of transformations in Myanmar’s civil war’, Border Lens, 25 November 2024.
102
‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025.
103
B. Das, ‘Operation 1027: A year of transformations in Myanmar’s civil war’, Border Lens, 25 November 2024.
104
‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025.
105
B. Das, ‘Operation 1027: A year of transformations in Myanmar’s civil war’, Border Lens, 25 November 2024.
106
N. Thit, ‘How Operation 1027 Transformed War Against Myanmar Junta’, The Irrawaddy, 26 October 2024.
107
N. Thit, ‘How Operation 1027 Transformed War Against Myanmar Junta’, The Irrawaddy, 26 October 2024; ‘Operation 1027 Conflict Map’, Centre for Information Resilience.
108
‘Ceasefire in northeast Myanmar ends as junta battles ethnic rebels’, Radio Free Asia, 25 June 2024; ‘Arakan Army fires rockets on junta naval base in Myanmar’s Rakhine state’, Radio Free Asia, 23 January 2024.
109
Z. Abuza and N. N. T. Aung, ‘Too Little, Too Late: China Steps Up Military Aid to Myanmar’s Junta’, Stimson, 4 March 2025.
110
‘Myanmar junta and armed rebels agree ceasefire’, The Guardian, 12 January 2024.
111
E. R. Garagarza, ‘China’s Myanmar Gambit: Seeking greater influence in the region’, Universidad de Navarra, 19 April 2023.
112
‘Myanmar firmly upholds One-China policy’, The Global New Light of Myanmar, 9 June 2025; M. Kavi, ‘Myanmar: Military regime passes law allowing Chinese private security firms to protect Chinese investments across the country’, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 19 February 2025.
113
H. Lee et al, ‘Regional Overview: Asia-Pacific, January 2024’, ACLED, 9 February 2024.
114
‘Myanmar junta and armed rebels agree ceasefire’, The Guardian, 12 January 2024.
115
H. Lee et al, ‘Regional Overview: Asia-Pacific, January 2024’, ACLED, 9 February 2024.
116
‘Ceasefire in northeast Myanmar ends as junta battles ethnic rebels’, Radio Free Asia, 25 June 2024.
117
‘China border restrictions prompts pricing surge in Myanmar’, Radio Free Asia, 24 October 2024.
118
‘Myanmar Alliance Agrees to Extend Ceasefire With Junta in Shan State’, The Defense Post, 22 July 2024; S. Strangio, ‘Myanmar Armed Groups Extend Ceasefire at China’s Urging’, The Diplomat, 22 July 2024.
119
‘Myanmar Alliance Agrees to Extend Ceasefire With Junta in Shan State’, The Defense Post, 22 July 2024.
120
‘MNDAA calls for ceasefire and political dialogue amid escalating conflict in Myanmar’, Mizzima, 6 December 2024; ‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Burma News International, 9 September 2025.
121
M. Kavi, ‘In Orchestrating Lashio Handover, China Tightens Its Grip on Myanmar’, The Irrawaddy, 24 April 2025; ‘MNDAA Declares Truce With Myanmar Junta After China Detains Leader’, The Irrawaddy, 4 December 2024.
122
M. Kavi, ‘In Orchestrating Lashio Handover, China Tightens Its Grip on Myanmar’, The Irrawaddy, 24 April 2025.
123
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.
124
M. Kavi, ‘In Orchestrating Lashio Handover, China Tightens Its Grip on Myanmar’, The Irrawaddy, 24 April 2025.
125
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.
126
S. Mon, ‘Q&A: Will the ceasefires after the earthquake bring peace to Myanmar?’, ACLED, 24 April 2025.
127
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group; N. Theresa, ‘Myanmar’s Post-Earthquake Ceasefires: Empty Gestures or Prelude to Peace?’, The Diplomat, 24 April 2025; ‘Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance extends ceasefire until end of June’, Mizzima, 5 June 2025; ‘Myanmar junta says extends temporary ceasefire to June 30’, Reuters, 3 June 2025.
128
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group; N. Theresa, ‘Myanmar’s Post-Earthquake Ceasefires: Empty Gestures or Prelude to Peace?’, The Diplomat, 24 April 2025.
129
S. Mon, ‘Q&A: Will the ceasefires after the earthquake bring peace to Myanmar?’, ACLED, 24 April 2025
130
S. Mon, ‘Q&A: Will the ceasefires after the earthquake bring peace to Myanmar?’, ACLED, 24 April 2025.
131
Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.
132
‘Myanmar’s military government announces elections for December 28’, Al Jazeera, 18 August 2025; S. Strangio, ‘Myanmar Military Administration Sets Date For Long-awaited Election’, The Diplomat, 19 August 2025; K. Ng and J. Head, ‘War-torn Myanmar to hold first general election since 2021 coup’, BBC, 18 August 2025.
133
Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.
134
Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group; ‘Regime elections to be held in 267 townships; Sixteen arrested, including six-year-old, for killing retired general’, Democratic Voice Burma, 9 June 2025; ‘Myanmar Junta Promises Voting in 267 Townships’, The Irrawaddy, 9 June 2025.
135
B. Lintner, ‘The truth behind Myanmar’s Rohingya insurgency’, Asia Times, 20 September 2017.
136
‘Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State’, International Crisis Group, 15 September 2016.
137
A. Pandey, ‘Myanmar’s Rohingya rebels – What you need to know’, DW, 9 October 2017
138
‘Bangladesh: Spiraling Violence Against Rohingya Refugees’, Human Rights Watch, 13 July 2023.
139
S. Czimmek, and A. Islam, ‘Rohingya militants active in Bangladeshi refugee camps’, DW, 24 September 2019.
140
F. Edroos, ‘ARSA: Who are the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army?’, Al Jazeera, 13 September 2019; ‘Myanmar: Who are the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army?’, BBC, 6 September 2017.
141
‘Crisis Mounts for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh’, International Crisis Group, 6 December 2023.
142
‘Bangladesh arrests leader of Rohingya insurgent group on criminal charges’, Reuters, 19 March 2025.
143
S. Bhattacharya, ‘Bangladesh: Change of Reign in Arakan Army’, Sri Lankan Guardian, 1 April 2025.
144
‘“I May be Killed Any Moment”: Killings, Abductions, Torture and other Serious Violations by Rohingya Militant Groups in Bangladesh’, Fortify Rights, 18 March 2025.
145
S. Rahman, ‘Dil Mohammed: The smuggler shaping a war in Arakan’, Dhaka Tribune, 16 February 2025.
146
‘‘They don’t represent us’: Rohingya armed groups wreak havoc in Rakhine’, Frontier Myanmar, 7 May 2025; ‘Rakhine State Clash Reported Between AA and Rohingya Militants’, The Irrawaddy, 22 July 2023.
147
N. M. Thu, ‘ARSA cross into Maungdaw from Bangladesh, clash with AA’, NarinJara, 29 April 2025.
148
‘AA and ARSA clash near Mee Taik village in northern Maungdaw’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 19 February 2025.
149
N. M. Thu, ‘ARSA cross into Maungdaw from Bangladesh, clash with AA’, NarinJara, 29 April 2025.
150
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025.
151
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025
152
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025.
153
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025.

Myanmar

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (July 2023- June 2025)

The Gambia v Myanmar case before the International Court of Justice

Arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court

Operation 1027

Ceasefire negotiations and mediation by China

2025 earthquake and subsequent ceasefires

Preparations for December 2025 elections

The evolving violent situation between the ARSA and the AA

The nature and shifting alliances of the PDF

Non International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-state parties

Foreign Involvement