Conflict Overview
Conflict History
Iraq’s current armed conflicts have deep roots: a Shia majority long excluded from power, the unresolved Kurdish question, and the country’s position between rival neighbours.1Center for Preventive Action, ‘Instability in Iraq’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 July 2026. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq fought an eight-year war with Iran in 1980–88 and invaded Kuwait in 1990, which led to a United States (US)-led military response and more than a decade of United Nations (UN) sanctions.2K. Burch, ‘Iran-Iraq War’, EBSCO, 2021; S. L. Danver, ‘Warfare in Iraq’, EBSCO, 2019; ‘The Gulf War 1990–1991’, Naval History and Heritage Command; D. Ali, ‘How to Kill and Entire Country: The Legacy of the Sanctions against Iraq’, Transnational Institute, 2023. After the uprisings that followed the 1991 Gulf War, a Kurdish autonomous area emerged in the north under the protection of a no-fly zone, the origin of today’s Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).3‘Iraq’s Kurdistan region, autonomous since 1991’, Institut Kurde de Paris, 27 September 2018; H. Ariav and M. Ferragamo, ‘The Kurds’ Long Struggle With Statelessness’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 December 2022.
In March 2003, a US-led coalition invaded Iraq and overthrew the government of Saddam Hussein.4J. Pritchard, ‘Iraq War’, EBSCO, 2019. The occupation authorities banned the Ba’ath Party and dissolved the army and security services, decisions widely seen as having fuelled the insurgencies that followed.5Coalition Provisional Authority, ‘Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities’, 23 May 2003; ‘400,000 lose jobs in Iraq disband order’, Al Jazeera, 23 May 2003; ‘De-Baathification and Dismantling the Iraqi Army’, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, January 2016. Sectarian violence peaked after the bombing of the al-Askari shrine in Samarra in 2006, and more than four million Iraqis were displaced inside and outside the country.6UNHCR, ‘Iraq: Rate of displacement rising’, Briefing notes, 28 August 2007. By the time the last US troops left in December 2011, more than 114,000 violent civilian deaths had been documented.7Iraq Body Count, ‘Analysis and overview, 2011’, 2 January 2012.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq rebuilt itself on Sunni grievances and the war in Syria, and in June 2014 – by then calling itself Islamic State – it seized Mosul and went on to control about a third of the entire country. In August 2014, its fighters attacked the Yazidi community of Sinjar, killing or abducting around 9,900 people within days, in what a UN commission of inquiry later concluded to be genocide.8‘UN human rights panel concludes ISIL is committing genocide against Yazidis’, UN News, 16 June 2016; V. Cetorelli, I. Sasson, N. Shabila and G. Burnham, ‘ISIS genocide of the Yazidi religious minority of Sinjar, Iraq’, N-IUSSP, 5 June 2017. The collapse of the Iraqi army prompted Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to call Iraqis to arms, giving rise to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which also absorbed Shia militias, several of them backed by Iran.9‘Iraq conflict: Shia cleric Sistani issues call to arms’, BBC News, June 2014; Reuters, ‘Iraq declares final victory over Islamic State’, Egypt Today, 9 December 2017. Iraqi forces, the PMF, and the Peshmerga, supported by a US-led coalition, retook Mosul in July 2017, and the government declared victory over Islamic State that December.10‘Mosul Has Been Liberated From ISIS Control, Iraq’s Prime Minister Says’, NPR, 9 July 2017; Reuters, ‘Iraq declares final victory over Islamic State’.
Islamic State has since continued a low-level insurgency in rural areas of the north and centre.11‘Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria’, International Crisis Group, 11 October 2019. The PMF were formally incorporated into the State security forces, but several of its constituent armed groups retained close ties to Iran and continued to act outside government command.12I. Saliba, ‘Iraq: Legislating the Status of the Popular Mobilization Forces’, Global Legal Monitor, Library of Congress, 7 December 2016; R. Mansour and F. A. Jabar, ‘The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future’, Carnegie Middle East Center, 28 April 2017; ‘Who are the Islamic Resistance in Iraq?’, Al Jazeera, 10 February 2024. Following the renewed hostilities between Israel and Hamas that erupted on 7 October 2023, a growing number of Iran-aligned factions, operating under the banner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), launched more than 160 attacks on US forces in Iraq, Jordan, and Syria within the space of four months, as well as drones and missiles at Israel. These prompted US strikes in Baghdad that the Iraqi government condemned as violations of its sovereignty.13‘Timeline of Proxy Attacks: Iraq, Syria and Jordan’, The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, 1 February 2024; Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ‘The Islamic Resistance in Iraq’, 3 November 2024; P. Nieberg, ‘US airstrike hits Baghdad for second time this year’, Task & Purpose, 7 February 2024; ‘Iraq slams US after strike kills pro-Iran commander’, Al-Monitor, 7 February 2024; ‘US strike kills Kataeb Hezbollah commander in Baghdad’, The New Arab, 7 February 2024.
In September 2024, Baghdad and Washington agreed to end the military mission of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-OIR), although some forces remained in the KRI until September 2026.14US Central Command, ‘US Forces End Operation Inherent Resolve Mission in Iraq’, 30 September 2026; ‘US announces end of coalition mission in Iraq after Erbil withdrawal’, Middle East Eye, 30 September 2026; ‘US troops have fully withdrawn from Iraq, ending a 12-year mission. What’s next’, Associated Press via WCAX, 30 September 2026; ‘Liesse à Bagdad lors du retrait d’Irak des dernières troupes occidentales dont celles de la France’, Lignes de défense, Ouest-France blog, 30 September 2026. When Israel and Iran fought a short-lived IAC in June 2025 (see the War WATCH entry on this conflict), the Iraqi factions stayed out of it.15B. Ozcelik and T. Badawi, ‘Why Did Iraq’s Militias Sit Out the Iran–Israel War and Why it Matters’, Royal United Services Institute, 14 August 2025.
Northern Iraq has also long been an arena for the conflict between Türkiye and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). After a ceasefire collapsed in 2015, Türkiye stepped up its operations against the PKK in the north. In 2018, it established military bases in the KRI and launched a series of air and ground offensives in an operation code-named ‘Claw’ – operations that the Iraqi government has repeatedly condemned.16P. Iddon, ‘Operation Claw-Lock: Turkey’s conflict with the PKK’, The New Arab, 27 April 2022; ‘Six Turkish soldiers killed in anti-PKK military operation in Iraq’, Al Jazeera, 10 August 2023; ‘Turkey to end “Claw-Lock” operation in northern Iraq soon, Erdoğan says’, Duvar English, 14 July 2024. In May 2025, the PKK announced its dissolution, and in October it said it was withdrawing its remaining fighters from Türkiye to northern Iraq.17‘PKK announces its decision to lay down arms, ending 40 years of conflict in Turkey’, Global Voices, 14 May 2025; ‘Historic Day as First PKK Fighters Lay Down Arms in Sulaymaniyah’, Peregraf, 11 July 2025. The KRI also hosts armed Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, whose bases Iran struck with missiles and drones in 2018 and again in 2022, accusing them of fuelling protests in Iran.18‘Rockets hit Iranian Kurdish opposition offices in Iraq’s Koya’, Al Jazeera, 8 September 2018; S. Mahmoud, ‘Iran attacks groups in northern Iraq in new drone bombing campaign’, The National, 28 September 2022. Under a security agreement signed in March 2023, Baghdad committed to disarming these groups.19‘Iran says deal agreed with Iraq for disarming, relocation of Kurdish rebels’, Al Jazeera, 28 August 2023.
Key Events in 2026
Following the US-Israeli attack on Iran on 28 February 2026, which killed Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iraq became one of the main theatres of the spill-over of hostilities.20‘How the US-Israeli strikes on Iran unfolded and the aftermath, moment by moment’, CNN, 1 March 2026. The same day, strikes attributed to the United States hit the Jurf al-Sakhar base south of Baghdad, killing two Kata’ib Hezbollah fighters.21Agence France-Presse, ‘Two killed in strikes on Iraq base, pro-Iran group threatens US’, Institut kurde de Paris, 28 February 2026. Over the following weeks, Iran-aligned factions operating under the banner of the IRI launched hundreds of rocket and drone attacks on the US Embassy in Baghdad, US-linked facilities near Baghdad airport, oil infrastructure, and Peshmerga bases in the Kurdistan Region.22‘US embassy attacked in Baghdad, strikes hit Iran-backed fighters’, Le Monde, 14 March 2026; J. Burke, ‘Iran-backed militias intensify attacks against US, Israel and allies’, The Guardian, 6 March 2026. The United States carried out repeated airstrikes on PMF positions across the country.23‘ISHM: March 5 – 19, 2026’, Enabling Peace in Iraq Center, March 2026. By the time a ceasefire between the United States and Iran took effect on 8 April, the PMF said that eighty of its members had been killed and more than 270 wounded.24‘Iraq’s PMF Reports 80 Fighters Killed in US-Israel War on Iran’, Peregraf, 10 April 2026. Nevertheless, hostilities in and from Iraq continued throughout the reporting period.25Associated Press, ‘As last US troops pack up in Iraq, militias signal their weapons will stay’, Times LIVE (South Africa), 15 September 2026; A. Rizgari, ‘Iran’s Strikes on the Kurdistan Region: The Limits of Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors’, Opinio Juris, 21 August 2026; ‘US-Saudi Strikes in Iraq Kill 20: Former Paramilitaries’, The Defense Post, 29 July 2026; J. Wirtschafter, ‘U.S.-Saudi strikes on Iraq’s pro-Iran militias underscore Baghdad’s fragile grip on country’, The Washington Times, 29 July 2026; ‘Trump says it’s “our turn” after intercepted Iranian attack, US completes Iran strikes’, CNN, 29 July 2026.
The KRI bore most of the impact. Iran-aligned militias attacked US forces and Peshmerga bases there, while Iran launched a sustained campaign of missile and drone strikes against the Iranian Kurdish opposition parties based in the Region, which it accused of preparing to act against it.26Rizgari, ‘Iran’s Strikes on the Kurdistan Region: The Limits of Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors’. By late May, Community Peacemaker Teams had recorded 751 attacks on the Region, around forty per cent of them from Iran and the other sixty per cent by Iran-aligned militias.27Community Peacemaker Teams – Iraqi Kurdistan, ‘Three Months of Iran-Linked Attacks on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: 751 Attacks, 22 Killed, 112 Injured’, May 2026; ‘Kurdistan Region records 751 attacks in three months’, Shafaq News, 1 June 2026. A Kurdish official told the International Crisis Group that the strikes were a warning to the KRI to keep the opposition groups out of the war.28International Crisis Group, ‘The US-led Anti-ISIS Coalition Is Leaving Iraq: What Happens Next?’, Commentary, 29 September 2026.
Unlike the exchanges between the United States and the Iraqi factions, Iran’s strikes continued after the April ceasefire. In July, they reached the headquarters of the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, and on 17 August, according to the Region’s counterterrorism service, drones launched from Iran hit the office of the prime minister of the KRI. Iran denied having launched the attack.29Rizgari, ‘Iran’s Strikes on the Kurdistan Region: The Limits of Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors’. By the end of September, the Region’s Peshmerga Ministry said it had been attacked by more than 1,000 drones and ballistic missiles from Iran and allied militia.30‘Kurdistan Region faces air-defense gap as US troops leave Iraq’, Shafaq News, 30 September 2026.
Hostilities between the United States and Iran resumed in July, and drones were again launched at Erbil.31‘Coalition Air Defenses Shoot Down Five Drones Over Erbil’, Kurdistan24, 22 July 2026. After attacks from Iraq on US forces and Saudi oil facilities, US and Saudi forces jointly struck PMF sites in seven provinces in the night of 28 to 29 July. The PMF said the strikes killed at least twenty people, and Iraq’s National Security Council condemned them as an act of aggression.32‘US-Saudi Strikes in Iraq Kill 20: Former Paramilitaries’, The Defense Post, 29 July 2026; Wirtschafter, ‘U.S.-Saudi strikes on Iraq’s pro-Iran militias underscore Baghdad’s fragile grip on country’; ‘Trump says it’s “our turn” after intercepted Iranian attack, US completes Iran strikes’, CNN, 29 July 2026.
The legacy of the conflict with Islamic State also shaped the year. In January and February, after the Syrian Democratic Forces lost control of detention sites in north-east Syria, US forces transferred some 5,700 men and boys suspected of links with the group to Iraq, and Iraq accelerated the repatriation of its nationals from al-Hol camp.33Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Dire Prospects for Alleged ISIS-Linked Men, Boys’, Report, 5 October 2026; ‘Dozens of Iraqi nationals repatriated from al-Hol, leaving the camp “practically empty”’, The New Arab, 21 February 2026.
On 14 May, the Iraqi parliament approved a new government led by Ali al-Zaidi34.‘Iraq parliament approves new government in confidence vote’, Arab News, 15 May 2026. It came under pressure to bring Iran-aligned armed groups under State control, and set 30 September as the deadline for all non-State armed groups to disarm.35Associated Press, ‘US troops have fully withdrawn from Iraq, ending a 12-year mission. What’s next’, WCAX, 30 September 2026. While Muqtada al-Sadr announced the dissolution of his Saraya al-Salam militia in May, the most powerful Iran-aligned groups rejected disarmament or made it conditional on certain issues. Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, for example, demanded the withdrawal of US and Turkish forces and the removal of PKK fighters from northern Iraq.36Counter Extremism Project, ‘Iraq: Extremism and Terrorism’, 2026. On 30 September, the United States completed the withdrawal of its forces, ending the coalition’s twelve-year mission against Islamic State, a departure the Prime Minister of the KRI called ‘shameful’ at a time of continuing Iranian attacks.37Associated Press, ‘US troops have fully withdrawn from Iraq, ending a 12-year mission. What’s next’; ‘US announces all forces withdrawn from Iraq after 12-year mission’, Colorado Politics, 30 September 2026; International Crisis Group, ‘The US-led Anti-ISIS Coalition Is Leaving Iraq: What Happens Next?’. The deadline for disarmament has since been pushed back to June 2027.38‘US troops have fully withdrawn from Iraq, ending a 12-year mission. What’s next’; World Food Programme (WFP), ‘Iraq Country Brief, October 2026’, ReliefWeb, October 2026.
In the north, the peace process between Türkiye and the PKK continued. In September, Baghdad and Ankara agreed on the gradual handover of Türkiye’s Bashiqa camp near Mosul, and in October the PKK said it had left its positions in the Metina area. Türkiye nonetheless kept – and continued to expand – its positions in Duhok, where most displaced villagers were still unable to return home.39‘Duhok villagers seek Turkish withdrawal before returning’, Shafaq News, 18 October 2026; Community Peacemaker Teams, ‘The Fragility of Peace: Turkish military expansion and limited positive outcomes for displaced villages’, 26 February 2026.
The Humanitarian Situation
Even before the 2026 escalation, Iraq faced deep structural problems left by the war against Islamic State. Close to one million people were still internally displaced, 4.9 million returnees faced obstacles to rebuilding their lives, and water scarcity and desertification were eroding food production and livelihoods.40International Organization for Migration (IOM), ‘Iraq Crisis Response Plan 2026’, 2026; WFP, ‘Iraq Country Strategic Plan (2026–2029)’, 2026. The 2026 hostilities added new pressures. New displacement remained limited, but repeated drone and missile attacks, particularly in the KRI, deepened existing vulnerabilities.41IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, ‘Iraq: Update on Cross-border Mobility and Internal Displacement in Iraq, 15 June 2026’, 15 June 2026.
The disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz cut oil exports, Iraq’s main source of revenue, well below pre-crisis levels. The government drew on reserves and borrowing to pay public salaries, and social benefit payments to poor households became less reliable.42WFP, ‘Iraq Country Brief, October 2026’, ReliefWeb, October 2026. In the KRI, the shutdown of the Khor Mor gas field left many residents with only five to eight hours of electricity a day for weeks, and schools and universities moved to online teaching from the end of March.43‘Gas prices quadruple across Kurdistan Region as regional tensions disrupt supply’, Rudaw, 3 April 2026; Kurdistan Regional Government Department of Media and Information, ‘Education to Continue Online Across the Kurdistan Region’, 29 March 2026.
Conflict Classification and Applicable Law
International Humanitarian Law
As of 1 November 2026, two international armed conflicts (IACs) and one non-international armed conflict (NIAC) were taking place in Iraq.
International armed conflicts
Five IACs occurred in Iraq in recent years, two of which were ongoing at the time of writing:
- Iraq v Iran
- Iraq v Türkiye (ongoing by occupation; hostilities ended April 2025)
- Iraq v the United States (ended July 2026)
- Iraq v Israel (ended April 2026)
- Iraq v Saudi Arabia (ended July 2026).
Iraq is a party to the four Geneva Conventions as well as Additional Protocol I of 1977. However, as Additional Protocol I only applies between States Parties,44Art 96(2), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I); adopted at Geneva, 8 June 1977; entered into force, 7 December 1978. it does not apply to the ongoing IACs as neither Iran nor Türkiye is a State Party. The IACs taking place in Iraq are, therefore, governed by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary international humanitarian law (IHL).
Non-international armed conflicts
In addition, three NIACs occurred in Iraq in 2026, one of which was still ongoing at the time of writing:
- Iraq (supported by the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-OIR) until end-September 2026) v Islamic State
- Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) v Israel (ended April 2026)
- IRI v United States (March to April 2026).
The ongoing NIAC is governed by Common Article 3 and customary IHL. Iraq is not party to Additional Protocol II of 1977.45Art 1(1), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II); adopted at Geneva, 8 June 1977, entered into force, 7 December 1978.
International Disarmament Law
Iraq is neither a signatory nor a State Party to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).46Arms Trade Treaty; adopted at New York, 2 April 2013; entered into force, 24 December 2014. Of the States with which Iraq was in an international armed conflict in 2026, Israel and Türkiye are signatories, with the attendant obligation to refrain from acts which would defeat the treaty’s object and purpose. The United States signed the treaty in 2013 but subsequently notified the depositary that it did not intend to become a party.47Communication of the United States, received by the depositary on 18 July 2019. Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia has signed the ATT.
Iraq has been a State Party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) since 1 February 2008. As a State Party, importation of any anti-personnel mines is unlawful.48Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction; adopted at Oslo, 18 September 1997; entered into force, 1 March 1999. Türkiye, whose forces remain on Iraqi territory, is also a State Party and may not use anti-personnel mines in Iraq. As of 2026, Iraq remains one of the most heavily contaminated countries in the world, the legacy of decades of conflicts, from the 1980–88 war with Iran and the 1991 Gulf War as well as the 2003 invasion. Islamic State added large numbers of improvised mines and other improvised explosive devices across Anbar, Nineveh, Salah al-Din and Kirkuk during its control of territory from 2014 to 2017.49Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, ‘Iraq: Contamination, Land Release and Risk Education’, ICBL-CMC, updated 7 January 2026. Iraq’s deadline to clear all mined areas under the Convention has been extended to 1 February 2028, a deadline it will not meet.50Mine Action Review, ‘Iraq’, Clearing the Mines 2026, Norwegian People’s Aid, 2026.
Iraq is also a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions,51Convention on Cluster Munitions; adopted at Dublin, 30 May 2008; entered into force, 1 August 2010. with a deadline for clearance of cluster munition remnants of 1 November 2028. It will not meet this deadline either and will similarly be required to request further extensions. Iraq is still contaminated with cluster munition remnants, particularly from the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion, with some 228 square kilometres affected at the end of 2025.52Mine Action Review, ‘Iraq’, Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026, Norwegian People’s Aid, 2026, pp 51, 59.
Explosive ordnance contamination continues to claim lives and limbs, mostly from devices left behind rather than those newly used or laid.53ICRC, ‘Buried Wars: Landmines Shatter Iraq’s Childhood Dreams’, Article, 26 April 2026. Iraq is a State party to the Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which requires clearance of unexploded ordnance ‘as soon as feasible’ after the cessation of active hostilities.54Art 3(2), Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol V); adopted at Geneva, 28 November 2003; entered into force, 12 November 2006.
Iraq acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention in January 2009 and declared remnants of chemical weapons stored in two bunkers at the al-Muthanna site. Hazardous conditions inside the bunkers and the security situation, including Islamic State’s seizure of the site in 2014, delayed their destruction, which began in 2017 and was completed in March 2018. This was confirmed by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).55OPCW, ‘OPCW Director-General Congratulates Iraq on Complete Destruction of Chemical Weapons Remnants’, Press release, 13 March 2018.
International Criminal Law and Accountability
Iraq is not a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, nor are any of the other States that were parties to armed conflicts in Iraq in 2026: Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and the United States.56Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; adopted at Rome, 17 July 1998; entered into force, 1 July 2002. Iran is a signatory, while Israel and the United States signed but subsequently notified the depositary, the UN Secretary-General, that they did not intend to become parties.57United Nations Treaty Collection, ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Status’, as at 9 November 2026. The Court could nonetheless exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed in Iraq by nationals of States Parties, such as members of some CJTF-OIR forces or foreign Islamic State fighters, or following a declaration by Iraq accepting the court’s jurisdiction or a referral by the UN Security Council.58Arts 12 and 13, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Iraq continues to exhume and identify the victims of Islamic State, but with some 13,000 sets of remains awaiting identification and more than 1,200 Yazidi women still missing, many families still do not know the fate of their relatives.59‘Iraq’s Martyrs Foundation rejects claims Al-Anbar graves linked to ISIS’, Shafaq News, 18 May 2026.
Compliance with IHL
Overview
In 2026, Iraq was less a party to a single war than the ground on which several were fought. Most of the harm to civilians occurred in March and April, when the United States and Israel struck Iran-aligned groups across the country and those groups retaliated against US forces, and in the KRI, which was targeted throughout the year. Between 28 February and 28 May alone, Community Peacemaker Teams recorded 751 attacks in the KRI by Iran and Iran-aligned militias, which killed 22 people and injured a further 112.60Community Peacemaker Teams – Iraqi Kurdistan, ‘Three Months of Iran-Linked Attacks on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: 751 Attacks, 22 Killed, 112 Injured’, May 2026; ‘Kurdistan Region records 751 attacks in three months’, Shafaq News, 1 June 2026.
Because so many parties were involved, each section below groups incidents by conflict, always in the same order: the IAC between Iraq and Iran; the IRI’s NIACs with the United States and Israel; the IACs between Iraq and the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia; Türkiye’s occupation of Iraq; and the NIAC against Islamic State. The IRI’s conflicts lasted only from March to April 2026, so attacks by Iran-aligned militias after April are not treated as IHL violations. Where it is unclear which party carried out an attack, the incident is described at the end of the relevant section without being attributed to any party.
The clearest violations were committed by Iran. Its missile and drone strikes on members of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties and on the camps where their families live, which continued long after the April ceasefire, were attacks on civilians and civilian objects. The US and Israeli strikes on the PMF were largely directed at lawful targets, but repeated follow-up strikes on ambulances, medical units, and those evacuating the wounded raise serious concerns. The IRI exposed civilians in Baghdad and Erbil to harm by launching drones at military objectives in populated areas and it abducted a US journalist in what bears the hallmarks of hostage-taking. Islamic State’s attacks were sporadic, though the mines and other devices it left behind continued to kill and maim civilians. Türkiye’s occupation in the north entered its second year without active hostilities, yet most of the displaced were still unable to return to their villages, and little information is available on the situation of the residents who remain.
Serious protection concerns persist for those in the power of the Iraqi authorities. The transfer of more than 5,700 men and boys from Syria in early 2026 left thousands in overcrowded detention, where several died, amid credible allegations of torture and well-founded fears of unfair trials and the death penalty.
Civilian Objects under Attack
Under customary IHL, attacks may only be directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects.61ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 7: ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives’. Civilian objects are all objects that are not military objectives62ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 9: ‘Definition of Civilian Objects’. and, as such, are protected against attack.63ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 10: ‘Civilian Objects’ Loss of Protection from Attack’. Military objectives are those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective contribution to military action, and whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.64ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 8: ‘Definition of Military Objectives’. Additionally, certain civilian objects are afforded special protection due to their importance to the survival of the civilian population.65ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 28: ‘Medical Units’; and Rule 38: ‘Attacks against Cultural Property’. Indiscriminate attacks are unlawful.66ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 11: ‘Indiscriminate Attacks’.
Attacks on residential areas
In the context of the international armed conflict between Iraq and Iran, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) carried out missile and drone strikes throughout the reporting period on camps in the KRI housing members of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties and their families. By 19 March, the Hengaw Organization for Human Rights – an independent, non-governmental human rights organization founded in 2016 – had recorded at least 112 attacks by the IRGC and Iran-backed groups on sites linked to these parties, including camps housing families in Bahrka, Degala, Dukan, Koya, and Sulaymaniyah.67‘IRGC missile and drone attacks target civilian camps and Kurdish opposition bases in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region’, Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 19 March 2026. The strikes continued after the ceasefire of 8 April.
Hengaw counted at least fifty further attacks by mid-June, many of which it said targeted densely populated camps and residential areas where families of the parties’ members lived. One strike on Jezhnikan camp on 17 April, which the IRGC publicly claimed, killed a seventeen-year-old boy, and attacks on camps near Koya, Khabat, and Sulaymaniyah continued until at least October.68‘Hengaw records 50 post-ceasefire IRGC attacks on Kurdish opposition parties’, Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 17 June 2026; ‘Despite ceasefire, IRGC launches 18 attacks on Kurdistan parties’ camps, leaving 4 dead and 9 injured’, Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 24 April 2026; ‘Wounded Peshmerga dies after IRGC drone strike on Komala camp’, Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 14 April 2026; ‘IRGC attacks on PDKI bases kill two women peshmerga and a minor’, Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 17 April 2026; ‘Drone, missile attacks on Iranian opposition sites in Erbil kill 3 people’, Shafaq News, 17 April 2026; S. Frantzman, ‘Iran targets Kurdish opposition groups in Iraq with new round of drone attacks’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 13 October 2026; Reuters, ‘Iran launches drone strikes on Iranian Kurdish opposition camp in northern Iraq’, The Jerusalem Post, 12 October 2026. Members of these parties are civilians, and the camps where they and their families live are civilian objects. Directing attacks at them violates the principle of distinction. The repeated and deliberate character of Iran’s strikes on the camps, some of which the IRGC openly claimed, leaves little doubt that they were the object of the attacks.
In the context of the NIAC between the IRI and the United States, which lasted from March to April 2026, IRI factions launched hundreds of missiles and drones at US positions in Iraq, many in Baghdad and Erbil.69‘Iraq Unable to Avoid the U.S.-Iran Crossfire’, The Soufan Center, 16 March 2026; A. Williams, ‘Iran-backed groups targeted U.S. facilities in Iraq 600 times, U.S. official says’, NBC News, 7 May 2026. Some of these attacks caused harm in residential areas when drones were intercepted over them. On 15 March, for example, an intercepted drone injured at least four people in Erbil’s Karezan neighbourhood, in an attack claimed by an IRI group.70D. Taib Menmy, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan region under drone fire as oil export dispute deepens with Baghdad’, The New Arab, 15 March 2026.
In the context of the IACs between Iraq and the United States and Israel, respectively, strikes on PMF sites caused casualties in nearby homes. On 11 March, a strike on an arms depot at a PMF base near Suwaira, in Wasit governorate, set off secondary explosions that killed a woman in her home.71Agence France-Presse, ‘Shrapnel from bombing kills woman in Iraq: health, security officials’, Arab News, 11 March 2026; Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights, ‘Iraqi Civilians must be neutralized from regional conflict’, 12 March 2026. Attackers must refrain from attacks expected to cause excessive incidental civilian harm, while defenders must, to the extent feasible, avoid locating military objectives such as weapons depots near densely populated areas.72ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 14: ‘Proportionality in Attack’; Rule 15: ‘Principle of Precautions in Attack’; and Rule 22: ‘Principle of Precautions against the Effects of Attacks’.
Responsibility has not been established for several other incidents in which homes were hit during March and April. Drones heading for sites hosting US forces, which both Iran and IRI factions attacked, repeatedly fell on homes in Erbil and Baghdad when intercepted, injuring civilians, including three children in Khabat district on 31 March.73‘Hundreds of drones target Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE amid Iran war’, Al Jazeera, 4 March 2026; ‘Iraq Unable to Avoid the U.S.-Iran Crossfire’, The Soufan Center, 16 March 2026; Airwars, ‘Incident DEBIRQ260303b’, Last updated 11 August 2026; ‘Intercepted drone debris wounds 3 children in Erbil’, Shafaq News, 31 March 2026; ‘“No guarantees for our safety”: Drone attacks near Baghdad Airport alarm residents’, Shafaq News, 13 March 2026; Airwars, ‘Incident DEBIRQ260330a’, Last updated 11 August 2026. On 7 April, a drone killed a couple in their sleep in Zargazawi village, west of Erbil, an attack the KRI’s Counter-Terrorism Directorate attributed to Iran and others to Iran-aligned groups in Iraq. The same night, a projectile of unknown origin killed a father and his eight-year-old son in western Baghdad.74‘Drone Strike Kills Married Couple in Erbil, Kurdistan Counter-Terrorism Blame Iran’, Peregraf, 7 April 2026; Community Peacemaker Teams, ‘The shadow of war: fear and scarcity continue to shape daily life across Iraqi Kurdistan’, 16 June 2026; ‘Drone ‘launched from Iran’ kills married couple in Kurdistan’, Rudaw, 7 April 2026; Airwars, ‘Incident DEBIRQ260407b’, Last updated 11 August 2026; Agence France-Presse, ‘Projectiles in Iraq Kill Seven, including a Child’, News of Bahrain, 8 April 2026.
Attacks on schools
The attacks in the KRI severely disrupted education: classes in all schools and universities were suspended from 28 February. After a night of widespread drone attacks cancelled a planned return on 29 March, in-person teaching did not resume until September.75‘Iraqi Kurdistan halts schools as US-Israel-Iran confrontation intensifies’, Shafaq News, 28 February 2026; ‘Kurdistan Region extends school, university closure until March 23’, 964media, 6 March 2026; ‘Kurdistan Region Endures Difficult Night Under Widespread Drone Attacks’, Peregraf, 29 March 2026; Kurdistan Regional Government Department of Media and Information, ‘Education to Continue Online Across the Kurdistan Region’, 29 March 2026; ‘1.75M+ students begin new Iraqi Kurdistan school year’, Shafaq News, 20 September 2026.
In the context of the IAC between Iraq and Iran, the IRGC also directly threatened educational institutions. At the end of March, it declared that universities in the KRI linked to the United States would remain potential targets, and warned people to stay away from them.76‘Iranian threats leave US university students in Iraqi Kurdistan living in fear and uncertainty’, The New Arab, 6 April 2026; ‘Home of Kurdistan Region president targeted, American universities threatened as attacks escalate in Iraq’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 30 March 2026. Universities and other buildings dedicated to education are civilian objects, and IHL prohibits threats of violence whose primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population.77ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 2: ‘Violence Aimed at Spreading Terror among the Civilian Population’.
Attacks on energy infrastructure
Even where they caused no direct damage, the hostilities severely disrupted the Kurdistan Region’s energy supply, as security threats to staff forced the suspension of production at the Khor Mor gas field – which supplies most of the fuel for the region’s electricity – for more than forty-two days from 28 February and again in July.78‘KRG expects major power drop after Khor Mor shutdown’, Rudaw, 28 February 2026; ‘KRG dispatches fuel to avoid “household gas crisis” following major facility shutdown’, Rudaw, 17 July 2026; ‘Dana Gas resumes production at Kurdistan’s Khor Mor field’, Shafaq News, 27 July 2026. Residents were at times left with five to eight hours of power a day, and the July shutdown reduced Erbil’s water supply by around thirty per cent.79‘Gas prices quadruple across Kurdistan Region as regional tensions disrupt supply’, Rudaw, 3 April 2026; ‘Dana Gas Suspends Production at Khor Mor Gas Field Over Security Threats’, Peregraf, 16 July 2026.
In the context of the NIAC between the IRI and the United States, drones struck the Sarsang oilfield in Duhok governorate, operated by the US company HKN Energy, on the night of 5 March. The strike started a fire and halted production, and the KRI Ministry of Natural Resources blamed an ‘outlaw group in Iraq’.80Reuters, ‘Oilfield in Iraqi Kurdistan halts production after drone strike, sources say’, The Print, 5 March 2026; ‘KRG says oil production halted at Sarsang field following drone strikes’, The New Region, 6 March 2026; Y. Al-Maleki, ‘Kurdistan Producers Restart Oil Fields, But Dana Shuts Khor Mor’, Middle East Economic Survey, 17 July 2026.
In the context of the NIAC between Iraq, supported by the CJTF-OIR, and Islamic State, Islamic State fighters blew up a tower of the Haditha-Baiji high-voltage transmission line on the night of 18 September, taking the line out of service. Iraqi security forces thwarted an attempt against a second tower.‘81Suspected ISIS attack puts Anbar power transmission tower out of service’, Rudaw, 19 September 2026; ‘ISIS attack brings security sweep in western Iraq’, Shafaq News, 19 September 2026. Attacks on electricity infrastructure serving the civilian population raise serious concerns under the principle of proportionality in attack.
Responsibility for several other attacks on energy infrastructure has not been established. Drones struck the Lanaz refinery near Erbil on 13 and 14 March, warehouses storing Castrol oil products on the Erbil to Mosul road on 1 April, and the Khor Mor gas field on 28 July, a day after production had restarted, but no one claimed these attacks, and responsibility remains disputed between Iran and Iran-aligned militias.82‘Drone attack hits oil refinery in Erbil’, Shafaq News, 13 March 2026; ‘Drone Strike Hits Lanaz Oil Refinery in Erbil for Second Time in Two Days’, Peregraf, 14 March 2026; P. Sykes and R. Tuttle, ‘Iran denies attack on Lanaz oil refinery in Northern Iraq’, Bloomberg via The Edge Singapore, 15 March 2026; ‘Drone strikes hit British Castrol Oils in Erbil’, The New Region, 1 April 2026; ‘Drone strikes on Erbil motor oil warehouses cause $5m damage: Company’, The New Region, 2 April 2026; ‘Pro-Iran factions strike UK’s Castrol warehouses in Erbil’, Al Bawaba, 1 April 2026; A. Salem, ‘Drone attack targets Khor Mor gas field in northern Iraq’, Iraqi News, 28 July 2026.
Oilfields, transmission lines and other power infrastructure are civilian objects unless they make an effective contribution to military action and their destruction offers a definite military advantage, whatever the nationality of the company operating them.83ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 8: ‘Definition of Military Objectives’; and Rule 10: ‘Civilian Objects’ Loss of Protection from Attack’.
Attacks on medical units, transports, and personnel
Military medical units are not civilian objects. Nonetheless, IHL grants all medical units, personnel, and transports, whether military or civilian, specific, enhanced protection. They must be respected and protected in all circumstances, losing that protection only if used, outside their humanitarian function, to commit acts harmful to the enemy, and only after a warning has gone unheeded.84Arts 19 and 21, Geneva Convention I; Arts 24 and 35, Geneva Convention I; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 25: ‘Medical Personnel’; Rule 28: ‘Medical Units’; and Rule 29: ‘Medical Transports’; Art 21, Geneva Convention I; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 28: ‘Medical Units’. The wounded and sick, whether civilians or members of the armed forces, must be respected, protected, and evacuated without delay.85Arts 12 and 15, Geneva Convention I; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 109: ‘Search for, Collection and Evacuation of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked’; and Rule 110: ‘Treatment and Care of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked’.
In the context of the IACs between Iraq and the United States and Israel, respectively, PMF units, being Iraqi State forces, were generally lawful targets, but their medical units and the wounded were not. Yet one of the most consistent patterns of the March campaign was that of follow-up strikes on those evacuating casualties. Ambulance crews were struck while evacuating casualties after strikes in the Akashat area of Anbar on 1 and 12 March and near K2 air base in Salah al-Din on 19 March, and on 22 March the PMF’s medical department in Jurf al-Sakhar, Babil governorate, was hit in four separate strikes.86‘Ambulance crews targeted in Al-Anbar after strike on Kataib Hezbollah’, Shafaq News, 1 March 2026; ‘Over 120 killed or wounded in airstrikes on PMF site in Al-Anbar’, Shafaq News, 12 March 2026; ‘Strikes on PMF bases in Iraq kill at least 30: Sources’, The New Region, 12 March 2026; ‘Nearly 30 PMF fighters killed in western Iraq strikes: Officials’, Rudaw, 12 March 2026; ‘Dozens of airstrikes target Iran-backed militias across Iraq’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 13 March 2026; T. Hasanova, ‘Al-Hashd al-Shaabi reports fatality after strike near Al-Siniya Airport’, Caliber.az, 19 March 2026; ‘PMF confirms escalating airstrikes on positions in Iraq, blame US’, Syriac Press, 19 March 2026; ‘PMF bases targeted three times in Babil province’, Rudaw, 22 March 2026. The most widely reported incident occurred on 25 March, when an airstrike followed by cannon fire hit the military clinic at Habbaniyah air base in Anbar, killing seven military personnel and wounding thirteen, according to Iraq’s Ministry of Defence.87‘Airstrike on Al-Habbaniyah Military Clinic Kills 7, Injures 13, Iraqi Defense Ministry Says’, Kurdistan24, 25 March 2026; ‘Iraq denounces deadly military clinic strike, moves toward UN action’, Annahar, 25 March 2026. Video of the attack reportedly showed a US A-10 attack aircraft, although the United States has denied targeting the clinic.88M. Salim, S. Westfall, A. Horton, M. Kelly (The Washington Post), ‘Iraq accuses U.S. of killing 7 soldiers in strike on a military base clinic’, Anchorage Daily News, 25 March 2026; AFP, ‘US says claims it targeted Iraqi security forces “categorically false”’, L’Orient Today, 26 March 2026.
There is no publicly available evidence that these units were being used to commit acts harmful to the enemy, nor that any warning was given, so insofar as they were directly targeted, the attacks violated the obligation to respect and protect medical units, personnel, and transports, and the wounded, who are hors de combat. Even where they were not the object of the attack, in the ICRC’s view, attacks expected to cause excessive incidental damage to medical units are also prohibited.89ICRC, ‘Commentary on Article 19 of the First Geneva Convention’, 2016, para 1797; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 47: ‘Attacks against Persons Hors de Combat’. The recurrence of strikes on sites where casualties were being evacuated raises serious concerns about compliance with these obligations.
Responsibility has not been established for attacks on two hospitals near Koya in the KRI on 4 March and 8 June, respectively. The second struck the hospital in Azadi camp, which houses families of members of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, although neither caused casualties.90Insecurity Insight, ‘Attacks on Health Care News Brief, 4–17 March 2026’, March 2026; ‘Three drones target Erbil’s Azadi camp, one hits hospital’, Shafaq News, 8 June 2026.
Civilians under Attack
Under customary IHL, civilians enjoy protection against attack, unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.91ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 1: ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants’; and Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’. Accordingly, parties to armed conflicts must at all times distinguish between combatants and civilians, and are prohibited from directing attacks against civilians. In case of doubt, persons must be treated as civilians.92ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’. According to the ICRC, State practice on doubt in NIACs is limited, but applying the same presumption as in IACs ‘seems justified’. Civilians may be incidentally affected by attacks against lawful targets. However, such attacks must be proportionate, and the attacker must take all feasible precautionary measures to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental effects on civilians.93ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 14: ‘Proportionality in Attack’; and Rule 15: ‘Principle of Precautions in Attack’.
Attacks against civilians
In the context of the IAC between Iraq and Iran, IRGC missile and drone strikes on the bases and positions of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties killed numerous party members during the reporting period. The deadliest, on 17 July, killed nine people at Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan bases near Zargwez, in Sulaymaniyah province, and strikes on the parties’ bases continued from April until at least the end of October.94‘IRGC attacks on PDKI bases kill two women peshmerga and a minor’, Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 17 April 2026; ‘Iranian media say drone strikes Komala base in Iraq’, Bangladesh Pratidin, 25 October 2026, citing Mehr News Agency. Members of these political parties are civilians who lose protection against attack only for such time as they directly participate in hostilities, and directing attacks against them violates the principle of distinction.95ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 1: ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants’; and Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’. Iran’s repeated targeting of the parties’ bases, which the IRGC and Iranian media openly acknowledged, shows that the people at those bases were the object of the attacks.
In the context of the IACs between Iraq and the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, respectively, strikes also caused casualties among civilians and police. In early March, a shepherd was found dead near al-Nukhaib in an area where, according to Iraqi security sources, an Israeli force was operating, and on 28 March, a second strike in western Mosul wounded five police officers as they evacuated colleagues killed in a first strike on a position the PMF said it also used.96‘Iraqi shepherd from Karbala killed in Najaf desert airstrike’, Shafaq News, 6 March 2026; ‘SCOOP: Israel’s Footprint in Iraq’, Alhurra, 25 May 2026; ‘Two killed in Mosul airstrike, Interior Ministry says’, Shafaq News, 28 March 2026; Agence France-Presse, ‘Strike kills three fighters in northern Iraq’, Institut kurde de Paris, 28 March 2026. Attacks must not be directed against civilians, and all feasible precautions must be taken to verify that targets are lawful military objectives.97ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’; and Rule 16: ‘Target Verification’.
In the context of the NIAC between Iraq, supported by the CJTF-OIR, and Islamic State, the group continued sporadic attacks on civilians. This includes the mortar shelling of the village of al-Malha, in Kirkuk governorate, which killed one woman and wounded several others.98‘ISIS mortar attack kills woman in Kirkuk’, Shafaq News, 27 September 2026. Mortar fire directed at a village is prohibited either as an attack on civilians or, if not directed at a specific military objective, as an indiscriminate attack.99ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 11: ‘Indiscriminate Attacks’; and Rule 12: ‘Definition of Indiscriminate Attacks’.
Protection of Persons in the Power of the Enemy
Under IHL, persons who are not, or are no longer, taking a direct part in hostilities, including those deprived of their liberty, must be treated humanely in all circumstances and without adverse distinction.100Common Art 3, 1949 Geneva Conventions; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 87: ‘Humane Treatment’. Murder, torture, cruel treatment, hostage-taking, outrages upon personal dignity, and the passing of sentences without a fair trial are prohibited at any time and in any place.101Common Art 3(1), 1949 Geneva Conventions; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 89: ‘Violence to Life’; Rule 90: ‘Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment’; Rule 96: ‘Hostage-Taking’; and Rule 100: ‘Fair Trial Guarantees’. Certain persons, such as children, persons with disabilities, and displaced persons, are entitled to special respect and protection, and parties must account for the dead and the missing.I102CRC, Customary IHL Rule 116: ‘Accounting for the Dead’; Rule 117: ‘Accounting for Missing Persons’; Rule 131: ‘Treatment of Displaced Persons’; Rule 135: ‘Children’; and Rule 138: ‘The Elderly, Disabled and Infirm’.
Hostage-taking
In the context of the non-international armed conflict between the IRI and the United States, Kata’ib Hezbollah abducted the US freelance journalist Shelly Kittleson from a street corner in central Baghdad on 31 March. The group held her for a week and released a video of her in captivity, before freeing her on 7 April on condition that she leave Iraq immediately.103‘US journalist Shelly Kittleson released after weeklong abduction in Iraq’, Al Jazeera, 7 April 2026; T. Reals, ‘American journalist Shelly Kittleson is released after being kidnapped in Iraq’, CBS News, 7 April 2026. According to an Iraqi official, she was freed in exchange for several Kata’ib Hezbollah members detained by the Iraqi authorities.104Q. Abdul-Zahra, ‘Kidnapped American journalist Shelly Kittleson has been released, Iraqi official says’, PBS News, 7 April 2026; A. Zaman, ‘US journalist Shelly Kittleson released by Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq’, Al-Monitor, 7 April 2026. Journalists are civilians and must be respected and protected.105ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 34: ‘Journalists’. Seizing a person and holding them in order to compel a third party, such as a State, to release detainees amounts to hostage-taking, which is prohibited under common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary IHL and constitutes a war crime.106Common Art 3(1)(b), 1949 Geneva Conventions; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 96: ‘Hostage-Taking’; Art 8(2)(c)(iii), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Treatment of detainees
In the context of the NIAC between Iraq, supported by the CJTF-OIR, and Islamic State, Iraq took into custody thousands more people suspected of links with Islamic State. Between 21 January and 12 February, US forces transferred 5,704 men and boys to a prison near Baghdad. They included more than 440 children, the youngest who was aged twelve, and as many as 1,000 young men who had been held without charge since their capture as boys.107Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Dire Prospects for Alleged ISIS-Linked Men, Boys’. Many arrived seriously ill, and fifteen died during or shortly after the transfer to a prison filled well beyond its capacity.108Ibid. Lawyers for French nationals transferred to Iraq in 2025 alleged that their clients had been tortured to extract confessions.109‘French ISIL suspects transferred from Syria allege torture in Iraqi prisons’, Al Jazeera, 29 January 2026. Human Rights Watch warned that adult detainees faced unfair trials followed by execution, recalling Iraqi terrorism courts’ record of brief hearings and convictions based on confessions obtained under torture.110Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Dire Prospects for Alleged ISIS-Linked Men, Boys’; ‘5,700 alleged ISIS members transferred to Iraq face unfair trials and execution, HRW warns’, JURIST, October 2026. By September, Iraq had completed its interrogations of those transferred in 2026, found insufficient evidence to keep holding 457 Syrians, and begun preparing their return.111D. Margolin, ‘Iraq’s Islamic State Trials: The U.S. Role’, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2026. In October, a Baghdad court sentenced ten French nationals transferred from Syria in 2025 to prison terms for Islamic State membership, nine of them for life.112A. Saad, ‘Iraqi court sentences six French men to life in prison for Islamic State membership’, Reuters, 27 October 2026; ‘Iraqi Court Sentences Seven French Nationals for Islamic State Membership’, Kurdistan24, 27 October 2026; S. Mahmoud, ‘Iraqi court hands life sentences to three more French ISIS members’, The National, 29 October 2026; O. Verdier, ‘Syrie: 110 enfants français toujours détenus dans les camps, malgré les appels au rapatriement’, RFI, 7 February 2026.
Detainees must be treated humanely in all circumstances, and torture and other ill-treatment are absolutely prohibited. They must be provided with adequate food, water, and medical care, children are entitled to special respect and protection, and no one may be sentenced without a fair trial affording all essential judicial guarantees.113Common Art 3, 1949 Geneva Conventions; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 87: ‘Humane Treatment’; Rule 90: ‘Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment’; Rule 100: ‘Fair Trial Guarantees’; Rule 118: ‘Provision of Basic Necessities to Persons Deprived of Their Liberty’; and Rule 135: ‘Children’. Detention without a legal basis, or its continuation once the reasons for it have ceased, is arbitrary and prohibited.114ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 99: ‘Deprivation of Liberty’; and Rule 128: ‘Release and Return of Persons Deprived of Their Liberty’.
Protection of persons with disabilities
Persons with disabilities affected by armed conflict are entitled to special respect and protection under customary IHL.115ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 138: ‘The Elderly, Disabled and Infirm’. In the context of the IAC between Iraq and Iran, the hostilities directly affected services for persons with disabilities. On 6 April, debris from an IRGC drone severely damaged two specialized education centres in Sulaymaniyah, one for blind students and one for students with intellectual disabilities, while in-person teaching was suspended.116‘Debris from Iranian drone strike ravages special needs schools in Sulaimani’, Rudaw, 21 April 2026.
More broadly, the number of people living with disabilities in Iraq remains unknown, but it is among the highest in the world after decades of armed conflict, and anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised nature, have caused thousands of amputations. By mid-2025, Iraq had registered 34,249 mine victims.117Committee on Victim Assistance, ‘Preliminary Observation: Iraq, Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance’, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025. In 2025, the ICRC provided physical rehabilitation services to 9,149 people at the centres it supports, including 1,065 prostheses and 319 adaptive wheelchairs, while its Erbil Physical Rehabilitation Centre served 7,750 people.118ICRC, ‘Facts and Figures 2025: Iraq’, March 2026.
Protection of women and children
The escalation of hostilities in 2026 heightened the risks facing women and girls. According to the UN Population Fund, it revived fears of conflict-related sexual violence and harassment at checkpoints in northern Iraq, and increased the risk of exploitation and of early and forced marriage among displaced women and girls. Insecurity also forced intermittent closures of services for survivors of gender-based violence in the Kurdistan Region, leaving coverage uneven.119UN Population Fund, ‘Middle East Gender-Based Violence in Emergencies Snapshot – April 2026’, April 2026.
In the context of the NIAC between Iraq, supported by the CJTF-OIR, and Islamic State, the fate of many of the group’s victims remained unknown. In 2026, more than 1,200 Yazidi women abducted in 2014 were still missing, and in January, around 400 Yazidis were believed to be still held in al-Hol camp in Syria.120‘Over 1,200 Ezidi Women Still Missing Nearly 12 Years After ISIS Genocide, KRG Says’, Kurdistan24, 19 June 2026; ‘Hussein Qaidi: Around 400 Kurdish Yezidis Remain in Al-Hol Camp’, ARK News, 30 January 2026. Under customary IHL, each party to the conflict must take all feasible measures to account for persons reported missing as a result of armed conflict and provide their families with any information it has on their fate.121ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 117: ‘Accounting for Missing Persons’.
Children also continued to bear the consequences of the conflict with Islamic State. More than 440 of the detainees transferred from Syria in early 2026, described above, were children.122Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Dire Prospects for Alleged ISIS-Linked Men, Boys’. During a visit to Iraq, the ICRC President described them as caught up in a war they did not choose, after nearly a decade in camps without access to education or health care.123ICRC, ‘ICRC President calls for sustained international engagement to prevent further military escalation in the Middle East on visit to Iraq’, 11 May 2026. Young people captured as children and who have since turned eighteen are increasingly excluded from repatriation efforts.124‘Yesterday’s children: now is the time to repatriate the children and the young people who have aged out of childhood in the camps and prisons of north-east Syria and Iraq’, ICRC Humanitarian Law & Policy blog, 22 October 2026. One young French man, taken to Syria by his parents at the age of twelve, was transferred to Iraq for trial in 2025 rather than repatriated.125O. Verdier, ‘Syrie: 110 enfants français toujours détenus dans les camps, malgré les appels au rapatriement’, RFI, 7 February 2026. Children affected by armed conflict are entitled to special respect and protection, and those unlawfully recruited or used in hostilities are entitled to assistance for their recovery and reintegration, even after they turn eighteen.126ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 135: ‘Children’; Art 6(3), Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict; adopted at New York, 25 May 2000; entered into force, 12 February 2002.
Transitional Justice
Iraq has no single, comprehensive transitional justice strategy. Since 2003 it has relied instead on a fragmented set of mechanisms, including criminal trials, vetting, and more recently, reparation programmes for survivors of Islamic State crimes.127Transitional Justice Evaluation Tool, ‘Iraq’.
Criminal accountability for Islamic State crimes continued to rest on Iraq’s 2005 Anti-Terrorism Law, which provides for the death penalty for affiliation with a terrorist group and under which defendants are typically prosecuted for membership rather than for specific crimes against victims.128Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Alleged ISIS Detainees Transferred from Syria at Risk of Abuse’. Iraq has not criminalized war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. In August 2026, the Council of Ministers approved an international crimes bill, which was referred to Parliament.129‘Dr. Khalaf Shingaly: The International Crimes Law Is the Key to Justice for Genocide Victims’, Sema TV, 25 August 2026; ‘Iraqi parliament advances international crimes bill with death penalty provisions’, Rudaw, 7 October 2026. Human Rights Watch criticized a draft law on the mandatory death penalty, which furthermore would apply retroactively.130Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Dire Prospects for Alleged ISIS-Linked Men, Boys’. The death penalty also continues to prevent evidence of international crimes collected by the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD), the UN investigative team whose mandate ended in 2024, from being shared with Iraqi courts.131‘Iraqi parliament advances international crimes bill with death penalty provisions’, Rudaw, 7 October 2026; Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Alleged ISIS Detainees Transferred from Syria at Risk of Abuse’, News release, 17 February 2026. States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or on their territory and, where appropriate, prosecute the suspects.132ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 158: ‘Prosecution of War Crimes’.
Reparations for survivors also progressed slowly. Five years after the adoption of the Yazidi (Female) Survivors Law, around 2,500 survivors had been approved for its reparation programme by mid 2026, but children born of sexual violence during captivity remain outside its scope.133‘Joint Statement on the Occasion of 5 Years Since the Enactment of the Yazidi Survivors Law in Iraq’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 1 March 2026; ‘From genocide to justice: Iraq’s reparations for Yazidi survivors’, Pressenza, July 2026. In August, a Turkmen parliamentary bloc called for the law’s protections to be extended to Turkmen, Shabak, Christian, and other children abducted or abused by Islamic State.134‘Turkmen bloc urges wider protections under Yazidi Survivors Law’, Shafaq News, 15 August 2026. In July, Iraq told the UN Security Council it was committed to supporting survivors’ reintegration and strengthening accountability for conflict-related sexual violence.135Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations, ‘Iraq reaffirms before the Security Council its commitment to supporting survivors of conflict-related sexual violence and advancing international accountability’, 10 July 2026.
In the context of the NIAC between Iraq, supported by the CJTF-OIR, and Islamic State, Iraq continued to exhume and identify the remains of the group’s victims, although progress remained slow. By mid 2026, the Martyrs Foundation had exhumed 54 of the 125 documented mass graves from the period of Islamic State control, recovering 3,258 sets of remains. Seventy-one had yet to be opened, including the Khasfa sinkhole south of Mosul, which is believed to contain thousands of bodies. In Sinjar, only ninety-six of the roughly 850 bodies exhumed from mass graves had been identified.136‘Iraq’s mass graves: A record of violence across five decades’, Shafaq News, 21 July 2026. In September, the authorities began re-exhuming some sixty victims buried near the Sharaf al-Din shrine in Sinjar for DNA testing, with the support of the ICRC and the International Commission on Missing Persons.137‘DNA testing to begin on 60 Sinjar remains’, Shafaq News, 21 September 2026. Across mass graves from all periods, the Medico-Legal Directorate was holding some 13,000 sets of remains awaiting DNA matching before they could be returned to families.138‘Iraq’s Martyrs Foundation rejects claims Al-Anbar graves linked to ISIS’, Shafaq News, 18 May 2026.
Some families did receive the remains of their relatives: in October, forty-seven victims recovered from a mass grave at Hammam al-Alil, south of Mosul, were identified and handed over for burial.139‘Iraq holds funeral for 47 identified mass grave victims in Nineveh’, Rudaw, 20 October 2026. These are obligations of means: parties to a conflict must take all possible measures to search for, collect, and identify the dead, endeavour to return their remains to their families, and take all feasible measures to account for persons reported missing.140ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 112: ‘Search for and Collection of the Dead’; Rule 114: ‘Return of the Remains and Personal Effects of the Dead’; Rule 116: ‘Accounting for the Dead’; and Rule 117: ‘Accounting for Missing Persons’. Iraq’s continuing exhumation and identification work, carried out with international support, reflects efforts to meet these obligations, although the scale of the backlog shows how much remains to be done.
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- 7Iraq Body Count, ‘Analysis and overview, 2011’, 2 January 2012. ↩︎
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- 12I. Saliba, ‘Iraq: Legislating the Status of the Popular Mobilization Forces’, Global Legal Monitor, Library of Congress, 7 December 2016; R. Mansour and F. A. Jabar, ‘The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future’, Carnegie Middle East Center, 28 April 2017; ‘Who are the Islamic Resistance in Iraq?’, Al Jazeera, 10 February 2024. ↩︎
- 13‘Timeline of Proxy Attacks: Iraq, Syria and Jordan’, The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, 1 February 2024; Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ‘The Islamic Resistance in Iraq’, 3 November 2024; P. Nieberg, ‘US airstrike hits Baghdad for second time this year’, Task & Purpose, 7 February 2024; ‘Iraq slams US after strike kills pro-Iran commander’, Al-Monitor, 7 February 2024; ‘US strike kills Kataeb Hezbollah commander in Baghdad’, The New Arab, 7 February 2024. ↩︎
- 14US Central Command, ‘US Forces End Operation Inherent Resolve Mission in Iraq’, 30 September 2026; ‘US announces end of coalition mission in Iraq after Erbil withdrawal’, Middle East Eye, 30 September 2026; ‘US troops have fully withdrawn from Iraq, ending a 12-year mission. What’s next’, Associated Press via WCAX, 30 September 2026; ‘Liesse à Bagdad lors du retrait d’Irak des dernières troupes occidentales dont celles de la France’, Lignes de défense, Ouest-France blog, 30 September 2026. ↩︎
- 15B. Ozcelik and T. Badawi, ‘Why Did Iraq’s Militias Sit Out the Iran–Israel War and Why it Matters’, Royal United Services Institute, 14 August 2025. ↩︎
- 16P. Iddon, ‘Operation Claw-Lock: Turkey’s conflict with the PKK’, The New Arab, 27 April 2022; ‘Six Turkish soldiers killed in anti-PKK military operation in Iraq’, Al Jazeera, 10 August 2023; ‘Turkey to end “Claw-Lock” operation in northern Iraq soon, Erdoğan says’, Duvar English, 14 July 2024. ↩︎
- 17‘PKK announces its decision to lay down arms, ending 40 years of conflict in Turkey’, Global Voices, 14 May 2025; ‘Historic Day as First PKK Fighters Lay Down Arms in Sulaymaniyah’, Peregraf, 11 July 2025. ↩︎
- 18‘Rockets hit Iranian Kurdish opposition offices in Iraq’s Koya’, Al Jazeera, 8 September 2018; S. Mahmoud, ‘Iran attacks groups in northern Iraq in new drone bombing campaign’, The National, 28 September 2022. ↩︎
- 19‘Iran says deal agreed with Iraq for disarming, relocation of Kurdish rebels’, Al Jazeera, 28 August 2023. ↩︎
- 20‘How the US-Israeli strikes on Iran unfolded and the aftermath, moment by moment’, CNN, 1 March 2026. ↩︎
- 21Agence France-Presse, ‘Two killed in strikes on Iraq base, pro-Iran group threatens US’, Institut kurde de Paris, 28 February 2026. ↩︎
- 22‘US embassy attacked in Baghdad, strikes hit Iran-backed fighters’, Le Monde, 14 March 2026; J. Burke, ‘Iran-backed militias intensify attacks against US, Israel and allies’, The Guardian, 6 March 2026. ↩︎
- 23‘ISHM: March 5 – 19, 2026’, Enabling Peace in Iraq Center, March 2026. ↩︎
- 24‘Iraq’s PMF Reports 80 Fighters Killed in US-Israel War on Iran’, Peregraf, 10 April 2026. ↩︎
- 25Associated Press, ‘As last US troops pack up in Iraq, militias signal their weapons will stay’, Times LIVE (South Africa), 15 September 2026; A. Rizgari, ‘Iran’s Strikes on the Kurdistan Region: The Limits of Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors’, Opinio Juris, 21 August 2026; ‘US-Saudi Strikes in Iraq Kill 20: Former Paramilitaries’, The Defense Post, 29 July 2026; J. Wirtschafter, ‘U.S.-Saudi strikes on Iraq’s pro-Iran militias underscore Baghdad’s fragile grip on country’, The Washington Times, 29 July 2026; ‘Trump says it’s “our turn” after intercepted Iranian attack, US completes Iran strikes’, CNN, 29 July 2026. ↩︎
- 26
- 27Community Peacemaker Teams – Iraqi Kurdistan, ‘Three Months of Iran-Linked Attacks on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: 751 Attacks, 22 Killed, 112 Injured’, May 2026; ‘Kurdistan Region records 751 attacks in three months’, Shafaq News, 1 June 2026. ↩︎
- 28International Crisis Group, ‘The US-led Anti-ISIS Coalition Is Leaving Iraq: What Happens Next?’, Commentary, 29 September 2026. ↩︎
- 29
- 30‘Kurdistan Region faces air-defense gap as US troops leave Iraq’, Shafaq News, 30 September 2026. ↩︎
- 31‘Coalition Air Defenses Shoot Down Five Drones Over Erbil’, Kurdistan24, 22 July 2026. ↩︎
- 32‘US-Saudi Strikes in Iraq Kill 20: Former Paramilitaries’, The Defense Post, 29 July 2026; Wirtschafter, ‘U.S.-Saudi strikes on Iraq’s pro-Iran militias underscore Baghdad’s fragile grip on country’; ‘Trump says it’s “our turn” after intercepted Iranian attack, US completes Iran strikes’, CNN, 29 July 2026. ↩︎
- 33Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Dire Prospects for Alleged ISIS-Linked Men, Boys’, Report, 5 October 2026; ‘Dozens of Iraqi nationals repatriated from al-Hol, leaving the camp “practically empty”’, The New Arab, 21 February 2026. ↩︎
- 34.‘Iraq parliament approves new government in confidence vote’, Arab News, 15 May 2026. ↩︎
- 35Associated Press, ‘US troops have fully withdrawn from Iraq, ending a 12-year mission. What’s next’, WCAX, 30 September 2026. ↩︎
- 36Counter Extremism Project, ‘Iraq: Extremism and Terrorism’, 2026. ↩︎
- 37Associated Press, ‘US troops have fully withdrawn from Iraq, ending a 12-year mission. What’s next’; ‘US announces all forces withdrawn from Iraq after 12-year mission’, Colorado Politics, 30 September 2026; International Crisis Group, ‘The US-led Anti-ISIS Coalition Is Leaving Iraq: What Happens Next?’. ↩︎
- 38‘US troops have fully withdrawn from Iraq, ending a 12-year mission. What’s next’; World Food Programme (WFP), ‘Iraq Country Brief, October 2026’, ReliefWeb, October 2026. ↩︎
- 39‘Duhok villagers seek Turkish withdrawal before returning’, Shafaq News, 18 October 2026; Community Peacemaker Teams, ‘The Fragility of Peace: Turkish military expansion and limited positive outcomes for displaced villages’, 26 February 2026. ↩︎
- 40International Organization for Migration (IOM), ‘Iraq Crisis Response Plan 2026’, 2026; WFP, ‘Iraq Country Strategic Plan (2026–2029)’, 2026. ↩︎
- 41IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, ‘Iraq: Update on Cross-border Mobility and Internal Displacement in Iraq, 15 June 2026’, 15 June 2026. ↩︎
- 42WFP, ‘Iraq Country Brief, October 2026’, ReliefWeb, October 2026. ↩︎
- 43‘Gas prices quadruple across Kurdistan Region as regional tensions disrupt supply’, Rudaw, 3 April 2026; Kurdistan Regional Government Department of Media and Information, ‘Education to Continue Online Across the Kurdistan Region’, 29 March 2026. ↩︎
- 44Art 96(2), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I); adopted at Geneva, 8 June 1977; entered into force, 7 December 1978. ↩︎
- 45Art 1(1), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II); adopted at Geneva, 8 June 1977, entered into force, 7 December 1978. ↩︎
- 46Arms Trade Treaty; adopted at New York, 2 April 2013; entered into force, 24 December 2014. ↩︎
- 47Communication of the United States, received by the depositary on 18 July 2019. ↩︎
- 48Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction; adopted at Oslo, 18 September 1997; entered into force, 1 March 1999. ↩︎
- 49Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, ‘Iraq: Contamination, Land Release and Risk Education’, ICBL-CMC, updated 7 January 2026. ↩︎
- 50Mine Action Review, ‘Iraq’, Clearing the Mines 2026, Norwegian People’s Aid, 2026. ↩︎
- 51Convention on Cluster Munitions; adopted at Dublin, 30 May 2008; entered into force, 1 August 2010. ↩︎
- 52Mine Action Review, ‘Iraq’, Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026, Norwegian People’s Aid, 2026, pp 51, 59. ↩︎
- 53
- 54Art 3(2), Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol V); adopted at Geneva, 28 November 2003; entered into force, 12 November 2006. ↩︎
- 55OPCW, ‘OPCW Director-General Congratulates Iraq on Complete Destruction of Chemical Weapons Remnants’, Press release, 13 March 2018. ↩︎
- 56Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; adopted at Rome, 17 July 1998; entered into force, 1 July 2002. ↩︎
- 57United Nations Treaty Collection, ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Status’, as at 9 November 2026. ↩︎
- 58Arts 12 and 13, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. ↩︎
- 59‘Iraq’s Martyrs Foundation rejects claims Al-Anbar graves linked to ISIS’, Shafaq News, 18 May 2026. ↩︎
- 60Community Peacemaker Teams – Iraqi Kurdistan, ‘Three Months of Iran-Linked Attacks on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: 751 Attacks, 22 Killed, 112 Injured’, May 2026; ‘Kurdistan Region records 751 attacks in three months’, Shafaq News, 1 June 2026. ↩︎
- 61ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 7: ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives’. ↩︎
- 62
- 63
- 64
- 65
- 66
- 67‘IRGC missile and drone attacks target civilian camps and Kurdish opposition bases in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region’, Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 19 March 2026. ↩︎
- 68‘Hengaw records 50 post-ceasefire IRGC attacks on Kurdish opposition parties’, Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 17 June 2026; ‘Despite ceasefire, IRGC launches 18 attacks on Kurdistan parties’ camps, leaving 4 dead and 9 injured’, Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 24 April 2026; ‘Wounded Peshmerga dies after IRGC drone strike on Komala camp’, Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 14 April 2026; ‘IRGC attacks on PDKI bases kill two women peshmerga and a minor’, Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 17 April 2026; ‘Drone, missile attacks on Iranian opposition sites in Erbil kill 3 people’, Shafaq News, 17 April 2026; S. Frantzman, ‘Iran targets Kurdish opposition groups in Iraq with new round of drone attacks’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 13 October 2026; Reuters, ‘Iran launches drone strikes on Iranian Kurdish opposition camp in northern Iraq’, The Jerusalem Post, 12 October 2026. ↩︎
- 69‘Iraq Unable to Avoid the U.S.-Iran Crossfire’, The Soufan Center, 16 March 2026; A. Williams, ‘Iran-backed groups targeted U.S. facilities in Iraq 600 times, U.S. official says’, NBC News, 7 May 2026. ↩︎
- 70D. Taib Menmy, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan region under drone fire as oil export dispute deepens with Baghdad’, The New Arab, 15 March 2026. ↩︎
- 71Agence France-Presse, ‘Shrapnel from bombing kills woman in Iraq: health, security officials’, Arab News, 11 March 2026; Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights, ‘Iraqi Civilians must be neutralized from regional conflict’, 12 March 2026. ↩︎
- 72ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 14: ‘Proportionality in Attack’; Rule 15: ‘Principle of Precautions in Attack’; and Rule 22: ‘Principle of Precautions against the Effects of Attacks’. ↩︎
- 73‘Hundreds of drones target Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE amid Iran war’, Al Jazeera, 4 March 2026; ‘Iraq Unable to Avoid the U.S.-Iran Crossfire’, The Soufan Center, 16 March 2026; Airwars, ‘Incident DEBIRQ260303b’, Last updated 11 August 2026; ‘Intercepted drone debris wounds 3 children in Erbil’, Shafaq News, 31 March 2026; ‘“No guarantees for our safety”: Drone attacks near Baghdad Airport alarm residents’, Shafaq News, 13 March 2026; Airwars, ‘Incident DEBIRQ260330a’, Last updated 11 August 2026. ↩︎
- 74‘Drone Strike Kills Married Couple in Erbil, Kurdistan Counter-Terrorism Blame Iran’, Peregraf, 7 April 2026; Community Peacemaker Teams, ‘The shadow of war: fear and scarcity continue to shape daily life across Iraqi Kurdistan’, 16 June 2026; ‘Drone ‘launched from Iran’ kills married couple in Kurdistan’, Rudaw, 7 April 2026; Airwars, ‘Incident DEBIRQ260407b’, Last updated 11 August 2026; Agence France-Presse, ‘Projectiles in Iraq Kill Seven, including a Child’, News of Bahrain, 8 April 2026. ↩︎
- 75‘Iraqi Kurdistan halts schools as US-Israel-Iran confrontation intensifies’, Shafaq News, 28 February 2026; ‘Kurdistan Region extends school, university closure until March 23’, 964media, 6 March 2026; ‘Kurdistan Region Endures Difficult Night Under Widespread Drone Attacks’, Peregraf, 29 March 2026; Kurdistan Regional Government Department of Media and Information, ‘Education to Continue Online Across the Kurdistan Region’, 29 March 2026; ‘1.75M+ students begin new Iraqi Kurdistan school year’, Shafaq News, 20 September 2026. ↩︎
- 76‘Iranian threats leave US university students in Iraqi Kurdistan living in fear and uncertainty’, The New Arab, 6 April 2026; ‘Home of Kurdistan Region president targeted, American universities threatened as attacks escalate in Iraq’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 30 March 2026. ↩︎
- 77
- 78‘KRG expects major power drop after Khor Mor shutdown’, Rudaw, 28 February 2026; ‘KRG dispatches fuel to avoid “household gas crisis” following major facility shutdown’, Rudaw, 17 July 2026; ‘Dana Gas resumes production at Kurdistan’s Khor Mor field’, Shafaq News, 27 July 2026. ↩︎
- 79‘Gas prices quadruple across Kurdistan Region as regional tensions disrupt supply’, Rudaw, 3 April 2026; ‘Dana Gas Suspends Production at Khor Mor Gas Field Over Security Threats’, Peregraf, 16 July 2026. ↩︎
- 80Reuters, ‘Oilfield in Iraqi Kurdistan halts production after drone strike, sources say’, The Print, 5 March 2026; ‘KRG says oil production halted at Sarsang field following drone strikes’, The New Region, 6 March 2026; Y. Al-Maleki, ‘Kurdistan Producers Restart Oil Fields, But Dana Shuts Khor Mor’, Middle East Economic Survey, 17 July 2026. ↩︎
- 81Suspected ISIS attack puts Anbar power transmission tower out of service’, Rudaw, 19 September 2026; ‘ISIS attack brings security sweep in western Iraq’, Shafaq News, 19 September 2026. ↩︎
- 82‘Drone attack hits oil refinery in Erbil’, Shafaq News, 13 March 2026; ‘Drone Strike Hits Lanaz Oil Refinery in Erbil for Second Time in Two Days’, Peregraf, 14 March 2026; P. Sykes and R. Tuttle, ‘Iran denies attack on Lanaz oil refinery in Northern Iraq’, Bloomberg via The Edge Singapore, 15 March 2026; ‘Drone strikes hit British Castrol Oils in Erbil’, The New Region, 1 April 2026; ‘Drone strikes on Erbil motor oil warehouses cause $5m damage: Company’, The New Region, 2 April 2026; ‘Pro-Iran factions strike UK’s Castrol warehouses in Erbil’, Al Bawaba, 1 April 2026; A. Salem, ‘Drone attack targets Khor Mor gas field in northern Iraq’, Iraqi News, 28 July 2026. ↩︎
- 83ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 8: ‘Definition of Military Objectives’; and Rule 10: ‘Civilian Objects’ Loss of Protection from Attack’. ↩︎
- 84Arts 19 and 21, Geneva Convention I; Arts 24 and 35, Geneva Convention I; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 25: ‘Medical Personnel’; Rule 28: ‘Medical Units’; and Rule 29: ‘Medical Transports’; Art 21, Geneva Convention I; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 28: ‘Medical Units’. ↩︎
- 85Arts 12 and 15, Geneva Convention I; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 109: ‘Search for, Collection and Evacuation of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked’; and Rule 110: ‘Treatment and Care of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked’. ↩︎
- 86‘Ambulance crews targeted in Al-Anbar after strike on Kataib Hezbollah’, Shafaq News, 1 March 2026; ‘Over 120 killed or wounded in airstrikes on PMF site in Al-Anbar’, Shafaq News, 12 March 2026; ‘Strikes on PMF bases in Iraq kill at least 30: Sources’, The New Region, 12 March 2026; ‘Nearly 30 PMF fighters killed in western Iraq strikes: Officials’, Rudaw, 12 March 2026; ‘Dozens of airstrikes target Iran-backed militias across Iraq’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 13 March 2026; T. Hasanova, ‘Al-Hashd al-Shaabi reports fatality after strike near Al-Siniya Airport’, Caliber.az, 19 March 2026; ‘PMF confirms escalating airstrikes on positions in Iraq, blame US’, Syriac Press, 19 March 2026; ‘PMF bases targeted three times in Babil province’, Rudaw, 22 March 2026. ↩︎
- 87‘Airstrike on Al-Habbaniyah Military Clinic Kills 7, Injures 13, Iraqi Defense Ministry Says’, Kurdistan24, 25 March 2026; ‘Iraq denounces deadly military clinic strike, moves toward UN action’, Annahar, 25 March 2026. ↩︎
- 88M. Salim, S. Westfall, A. Horton, M. Kelly (The Washington Post), ‘Iraq accuses U.S. of killing 7 soldiers in strike on a military base clinic’, Anchorage Daily News, 25 March 2026; AFP, ‘US says claims it targeted Iraqi security forces “categorically false”’, L’Orient Today, 26 March 2026. ↩︎
- 89ICRC, ‘Commentary on Article 19 of the First Geneva Convention’, 2016, para 1797; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 47: ‘Attacks against Persons Hors de Combat’. ↩︎
- 90Insecurity Insight, ‘Attacks on Health Care News Brief, 4–17 March 2026’, March 2026; ‘Three drones target Erbil’s Azadi camp, one hits hospital’, Shafaq News, 8 June 2026. ↩︎
- 91ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 1: ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants’; and Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’. ↩︎
- 92ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’. According to the ICRC, State practice on doubt in NIACs is limited, but applying the same presumption as in IACs ‘seems justified’. ↩︎
- 93ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 14: ‘Proportionality in Attack’; and Rule 15: ‘Principle of Precautions in Attack’. ↩︎
- 94‘IRGC attacks on PDKI bases kill two women peshmerga and a minor’, Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 17 April 2026; ‘Iranian media say drone strikes Komala base in Iraq’, Bangladesh Pratidin, 25 October 2026, citing Mehr News Agency. ↩︎
- 95ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 1: ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants’; and Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’. ↩︎
- 96‘Iraqi shepherd from Karbala killed in Najaf desert airstrike’, Shafaq News, 6 March 2026; ‘SCOOP: Israel’s Footprint in Iraq’, Alhurra, 25 May 2026; ‘Two killed in Mosul airstrike, Interior Ministry says’, Shafaq News, 28 March 2026; Agence France-Presse, ‘Strike kills three fighters in northern Iraq’, Institut kurde de Paris, 28 March 2026. ↩︎
- 97ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’; and Rule 16: ‘Target Verification’. ↩︎
- 98‘ISIS mortar attack kills woman in Kirkuk’, Shafaq News, 27 September 2026. ↩︎
- 99ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 11: ‘Indiscriminate Attacks’; and Rule 12: ‘Definition of Indiscriminate Attacks’. ↩︎
- 100
- 101Common Art 3(1), 1949 Geneva Conventions; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 89: ‘Violence to Life’; Rule 90: ‘Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment’; Rule 96: ‘Hostage-Taking’; and Rule 100: ‘Fair Trial Guarantees’. ↩︎
- 102CRC, Customary IHL Rule 116: ‘Accounting for the Dead’; Rule 117: ‘Accounting for Missing Persons’; Rule 131: ‘Treatment of Displaced Persons’; Rule 135: ‘Children’; and Rule 138: ‘The Elderly, Disabled and Infirm’. ↩︎
- 103‘US journalist Shelly Kittleson released after weeklong abduction in Iraq’, Al Jazeera, 7 April 2026; T. Reals, ‘American journalist Shelly Kittleson is released after being kidnapped in Iraq’, CBS News, 7 April 2026. ↩︎
- 104Q. Abdul-Zahra, ‘Kidnapped American journalist Shelly Kittleson has been released, Iraqi official says’, PBS News, 7 April 2026; A. Zaman, ‘US journalist Shelly Kittleson released by Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq’, Al-Monitor, 7 April 2026. ↩︎
- 105
- 106Common Art 3(1)(b), 1949 Geneva Conventions; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 96: ‘Hostage-Taking’; Art 8(2)(c)(iii), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. ↩︎
- 107Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Dire Prospects for Alleged ISIS-Linked Men, Boys’. ↩︎
- 108Ibid. ↩︎
- 109‘French ISIL suspects transferred from Syria allege torture in Iraqi prisons’, Al Jazeera, 29 January 2026. ↩︎
- 110Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Dire Prospects for Alleged ISIS-Linked Men, Boys’; ‘5,700 alleged ISIS members transferred to Iraq face unfair trials and execution, HRW warns’, JURIST, October 2026. ↩︎
- 111D. Margolin, ‘Iraq’s Islamic State Trials: The U.S. Role’, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2026. ↩︎
- 112A. Saad, ‘Iraqi court sentences six French men to life in prison for Islamic State membership’, Reuters, 27 October 2026; ‘Iraqi Court Sentences Seven French Nationals for Islamic State Membership’, Kurdistan24, 27 October 2026; S. Mahmoud, ‘Iraqi court hands life sentences to three more French ISIS members’, The National, 29 October 2026; O. Verdier, ‘Syrie: 110 enfants français toujours détenus dans les camps, malgré les appels au rapatriement’, RFI, 7 February 2026. ↩︎
- 113Common Art 3, 1949 Geneva Conventions; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 87: ‘Humane Treatment’; Rule 90: ‘Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment’; Rule 100: ‘Fair Trial Guarantees’; Rule 118: ‘Provision of Basic Necessities to Persons Deprived of Their Liberty’; and Rule 135: ‘Children’. ↩︎
- 114ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 99: ‘Deprivation of Liberty’; and Rule 128: ‘Release and Return of Persons Deprived of Their Liberty’. ↩︎
- 115
- 116‘Debris from Iranian drone strike ravages special needs schools in Sulaimani’, Rudaw, 21 April 2026. ↩︎
- 117Committee on Victim Assistance, ‘Preliminary Observation: Iraq, Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance’, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025. ↩︎
- 118
- 119UN Population Fund, ‘Middle East Gender-Based Violence in Emergencies Snapshot – April 2026’, April 2026. ↩︎
- 120‘Over 1,200 Ezidi Women Still Missing Nearly 12 Years After ISIS Genocide, KRG Says’, Kurdistan24, 19 June 2026; ‘Hussein Qaidi: Around 400 Kurdish Yezidis Remain in Al-Hol Camp’, ARK News, 30 January 2026. ↩︎
- 121
- 122Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Dire Prospects for Alleged ISIS-Linked Men, Boys’. ↩︎
- 123
- 124‘Yesterday’s children: now is the time to repatriate the children and the young people who have aged out of childhood in the camps and prisons of north-east Syria and Iraq’, ICRC Humanitarian Law & Policy blog, 22 October 2026. ↩︎
- 125O. Verdier, ‘Syrie: 110 enfants français toujours détenus dans les camps, malgré les appels au rapatriement’, RFI, 7 February 2026. ↩︎
- 126
- 127
- 128Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Alleged ISIS Detainees Transferred from Syria at Risk of Abuse’. ↩︎
- 129‘Dr. Khalaf Shingaly: The International Crimes Law Is the Key to Justice for Genocide Victims’, Sema TV, 25 August 2026; ‘Iraqi parliament advances international crimes bill with death penalty provisions’, Rudaw, 7 October 2026. ↩︎
- 130Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Dire Prospects for Alleged ISIS-Linked Men, Boys’. ↩︎
- 131‘Iraqi parliament advances international crimes bill with death penalty provisions’, Rudaw, 7 October 2026; Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Alleged ISIS Detainees Transferred from Syria at Risk of Abuse’, News release, 17 February 2026. ↩︎
- 132
- 133‘Joint Statement on the Occasion of 5 Years Since the Enactment of the Yazidi Survivors Law in Iraq’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 1 March 2026; ‘From genocide to justice: Iraq’s reparations for Yazidi survivors’, Pressenza, July 2026. ↩︎
- 134‘Turkmen bloc urges wider protections under Yazidi Survivors Law’, Shafaq News, 15 August 2026. ↩︎
- 135Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations, ‘Iraq reaffirms before the Security Council its commitment to supporting survivors of conflict-related sexual violence and advancing international accountability’, 10 July 2026. ↩︎
- 136‘Iraq’s mass graves: A record of violence across five decades’, Shafaq News, 21 July 2026. ↩︎
- 137‘DNA testing to begin on 60 Sinjar remains’, Shafaq News, 21 September 2026. ↩︎
- 138‘Iraq’s Martyrs Foundation rejects claims Al-Anbar graves linked to ISIS’, Shafaq News, 18 May 2026. ↩︎
- 139‘Iraq holds funeral for 47 identified mass grave victims in Nineveh’, Rudaw, 20 October 2026. ↩︎
- 140ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 112: ‘Search for and Collection of the Dead’; Rule 114: ‘Return of the Remains and Personal Effects of the Dead’; Rule 116: ‘Accounting for the Dead’; and Rule 117: ‘Accounting for Missing Persons’. ↩︎