Syria

Conflict Overview

The period under review was characterized by a sharp escalation in violence across Syria, resulting in profound, widespread impacts on civilians. Following a large-scale offensive led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), one of Syria’s most powerful armed opposition groups, President al-Assad’s government fell on 8 December 2024. The new government led by HTS has engaged in new armed conflicts that have seen further serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). Peace and stability in Syria remain elusive fifteen years after the outbreak of major armed violence.

In the aftermath of the pro-democracy uprisings known as the Arab Spring that swept nations in North Africa and the Middle East from December 2010, protests against the government of Bashar al-Assad broke out in March 2011. The protests were brutally suppressed by the Syrian security forces. By January 2012, civil unrest had escalated into multiple non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) across much of the country, opposing the Syrian government, led by Bashar Al-Assad, and a number of non-State armed groups. The Syrian armed forces were supported by Russian armed forces and Iranian-backed militia, in particular Hezbollah. The hostilities had devastating humanitarian consequences with each of the many armed conflicts involving systematic violations of IHL. Chemical weapons were used by both the Syrian armed forces and certain non-State armed groups.

During thirteen years of armed conflict in Syria, there were also multiple international armed conflicts (IACs). The emergence in 2013 of Islamic State (also called the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, ISIL, or Da’esh) led to the formation of an international coalition in 2015 (‘Operation Inherent Resolve’). Led by the United States and involving more than seventy States, the coalition sought to contain the influence of Islamic State in the region and beyond. As a result, much of the territory that had been under the control of Islamic State from 2013 to 2019 was retaken by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) with support from the international coalition. The coalition’s military intervention in Syria took place without the consent of the Syrian Government, meaning that it constituted an IAC.

From 2016, Turkish armed forces carried out air and ground operations against both Islamic State and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) along the border between Türkiye and Syria. In so doing, it acted with the help of the Syrian opposition armed group, the Free Syrian Army – and later the Syrian National Army. Türkiye considers the YPG and the SDF as the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Türkiye has conducted a series of major military operations that saw it establish control over a part of northern Syria and a belligerent occupation that are part of an IAC with Syria.

Part of Syrian territory, the Golan Heights, has been occupied by Israel since 1967. Israel has also carried out airstrikes on Syrian territory without the consent of the Syrian government, a trend that has continued into the current reporting period. These constitute separate forms of the IAC between Syria and Israel.

On 27 November 2024, a coalition of armed groups led by HTS launched the ‘Repelling the Aggression’ campaign against government forces in Aleppo. Simultaneously, Turkish-backed factions of the Syrian National Army (SNA) initiated separate offensives targeting Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) controlled areas in northern Aleppo. By 8 December, opposition forces had seized Damascus, effectively ending Assad’s long-standing rule and forming a transitional government led by HTS.¹

This decisive event transformed the dynamics of armed groups operating in Syria. The operational capacity of Iranian-backed militias significantly degraded, suffering from both persistent Israeli attacks and the loss of their strategic alliance with the Syrian government.² The interim government under HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has sought to unify the fragmented armed opposition throughout the country, with varying degrees of success. Persistent divisions among the different groups present in Syria have led to regular clashes, particularly between factions affiliated with the new government and ‘remnants’ of the former government.

In early March 2025, these tensions led to mass killings of civilians, particularly among the Alawi community, as well as attacks against civilian infrastructure.³ Between 28 and 30 April, a further series of violent incidents between supporters of the new government and Druze militias in the predominantly Druze areas of the country involved the killing of many civilians and extensive destruction of buildings. This highlights the difficulties the interim government faces in trying to establish centralized control over diverse factions.⁴

The current reporting period also saw a resurgence in activity by Islamic State. In 2024, reported attacks by the group more than tripled (to around 700) compared to the previous year, and involving the killing of a total of 750 soldiers and civilians.⁵ Islamic State maintained a strong operational presence in the first half of 2025.⁶

Türkiye and the SNA have progressively increased the number and extent of their military operations in Syria through to March 2025. In late 2024, the SDF seized control of several towns that had been controlled by the former Syrian government. The SNA launched an offensive against SDF-controlled areas, including Manbij, Kobani, and the east of Aleppo.⁷ As part of this offensive, Türkiye conducted airstrikes that killed and injured many SDF fighters and civilians, and destroyed critical infrastructure within SDF-controlled territory, provoking widespread displacement. The conflict between the SDF and Türkiye, as well as Turkish-backed SNA factions, continued despite the interim government’s efforts to unify Syrian opposition groups under its banner.⁸

Following the situation in Gaza from October 2023, Israel intensified its campaign of airstrikes targeting Iranian, Syrian, and Hezbollah positions in Syria, including beyond the 1974 disengagement line. With the change of government in Syria, Israel’s attacks increased further, with regular airstrikes targeting military airfields, anti-aircraft batteries, missiles, drones, fighter jets, tanks, arms depots and production sites, and naval facilities.⁹ A number of airstrikes seemingly sought to protect Druze communities that had been fighting the new governmental forces.¹⁰ As of early 2025, Israel had declared an indefinite military presence on Mount Hermon, sent its troops to the demilitarization areas in southern Syria, and announced plans to expand settlements beyond the occupied Golan Heights. By March 2025, Israel had seized control over key strategic terrain from the new Syrian armed forces.¹¹

The situation in Gaza also saw a rise in violent clashes in Syria between United States (US) forces and Iranian-linked militia groups operating under the banner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), and reaching the threshold for a NIAC.¹²Although clashes declined after February 2024, with no incidents since December of that year, warnings issued by IRI factions suggest the situation remains highly volatile.

Conflict Classification and applicable law

During the reporting period, multiple international and non-international armed conflicts occurred on the territory of Syria. The ongoing IACs were the following:

Syria (supported by Russia until December 2024) v Combined Joint Task Force of Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR)
Israel v Iran
Syria v Israel
Syria v Türkiye.

Belligerent occupation persisted given that certain parts of the territory claimed by Syria remain under occupation:

The Golan Heights are under military occupation by Israel
Parts of northern Syria are under military occupation by Türkiye.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other rules of customary IHL, in particular on the conduct of hostilities, apply to the four IACs in Syria. While Syria is a State Party to Additional Protocol I of 1977,¹³ Iran, Israel, Türkiye, and the United States are not.

Additionally, multiple NIACs occurred during the reporting period:

CJTF-OIR operating alongside the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) v Islamic State
Syria (supported by Shia militias, Hezbollah, Russia, and the Wagner Group until December 2024) v Islamic State
Türkiye (operating alongside the Syrian National Army) v SDF
Israel v Hezbollah
Syria (new government) v Pro-Former Government Forces (PFGF).

The establishment of the new government under the HTS leadership of al-Sharaa satisfies the effective control criterion so as to be considered the new governmental authority of Syria. As a result, the HTS ceased to exist as a non-State armed group, leading to the termination of two NIACs to which the HTS was a party: between the HTS and the former Syrian government (supported by Shia militias, Hezbollah, Russia, and the Wagner Group until December 2024) and between the HTS and Islamic State.

The NIACs are governed by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other rules of customary IHL, in particular on the conduct of hostilities. Since Syria is not a party to Additional Protocol II of 1977,¹⁴ this treaty does not apply.

Syria is not a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.¹⁵ Iran has signed but not ratified the Statute. Although Israel has signed the Statute, it subsequently notified the depositary (the UN Secretary-General) it did not intend to become a party to it.¹⁶ Türkiye is also a State not party and has not signed the Statute.

Compliance with IHL

Overview

Syria continued to witness sustained levels of violence over the course of the second half of 2024 and the first half of 2025, with grave consequences for the civilian population. Heightened regional tensions, in particular those linked to the ongoing conflict in Gaza, contributed to an escalation of hostilities across Syria. In the lead-up to the flight of President al-Assad to Moscow, the situation deteriorated markedly, with frequent attacks in densely populated urban areas putting civilians at ever greater risk.

The change of government also brought to light further compelling evidence of widespread and systematic murder, arbitrary detention, torture, and enforced disappearances, particular in detention facilities that had been under the former government’s control. Following the establishment of an interim government, the security landscape remained volatile. Efforts to dismantle remnants of the former government led to renewed clashes, particularly in coastal areas. Targeted and indiscriminate air and ground operations by multiple State and non-State actors in areas under foreign occupation further contributed to persistent civilian harm throughout the reporting period.

These overlapping and intensified hostilities across Syrian territory resulted in a grave deterioration in the protection afforded to civilian infrastructure across the Syrian territory, including specially protected civilian objects such as medical facilities and dams. Airstrikes in populated areas or the vicinity of civilian infrastructure often involved civilian casualties and significant destruction. Patterns of civilian harm from direct, indiscriminate, and disproportionate attacks by armed groups, government forces, and external State actors have all been reported. Landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and explosive remnants of war (ERW) continue to endanger civilian lives, obstruct the population’s safe movement and access to services and affect land cultivation and cattle farming.

Concerns were raised regarding the forcible displacement of civilians, especially in the coastal areas of Syria, as well as in the areas under foreign occupation. Looting and destruction of private property were frequently reported, especially in coastal areas and areas under Israeli and Turkish control. Children continued to be recruited by a range of armed groups in Syria, and the absence of effective protection left women and other at-risk populations disproportionately exposed to abuse and discrimination.

Civilian Objects under Attack

Under customary IHL, attacks may only be directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects.¹⁷ Civilian objects are all objects that are not military objectives¹⁸. and, as such, are protected against attack.¹⁹ Military objectives are those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective contribution to military action.²⁰

Attacks against medical facilities

Under IHL, medical units and transports must not be attacked and must be protected.²¹ Violations of these obligations may amount to war crimes.²²

In the context of the NIAC between HTS and the former government, most incidents of violence against medical units were reported in Idlib and Aleppo governorates, many of which were attributed to former Syrian government forces and the Russian forces operating either jointly with them or on their own. Between 30 November and 3 December 2024, at least fourteen attacks by Russian armed forces on healthcare facilities were recorded.²³ On 1 December 2025, an airstrike by either the Russian military or Syrian armed forces struck key civilian infrastructure in Aleppo city, including the University Hospital, and led to significant civilian harm.²⁴ The following day, further airstrikes struck several medical facilities, significantly damaging the building as well as ambulances and civilian cars, and causing a power outage.²⁵ The cumulative effect of these strikes was to render inoperable most of the region’s healthcare facilities, with fewer than eight of around one hundred remaining functional in the aftermath.²⁶

In the context of the NIAC involving Türkiye and the SNA against the SDF, attacks on medical facilities were also reported. On 18 January 2025, a drone strike seemingly conducted by Turkish armed forces or the SNA hit a Kurdish Red Crescent ambulance marked with protective emblems. The ambulance was carrying civilians wounded by an earlier attack near the Tishre Dam to Tabqa hospital.²⁷

In the NIAC between the interim Syrian government and the PFGF, at least six hospitals in Latakia and Tartus governorates were also affected in the context of the broader PFGF attack in the Jablah area. In one notable incident on 7 March 2025, the PFGF stormed Al Nour private hospital and prohibited medical staff inside from leaving the facility.²⁸ They then forced medical staff to treat their injured fighters and stored ammunition inside the facility in violation of IHL, disrupting medical services for several days.29

The attacks against or near hospitals led to the suspension of medical operations for several days, with a significant impact on the treatment of individuals affected by the attacks during the violent clashes in the area.³⁰ Use of medical units for military purposes appears to have occurred solely by the PFGF. In this context, although the hospital may have lost its protection from direct attack by enemy forces, it would still necessitate the issuance of an effective warning,³¹ and the rule of proportionality in attack would still apply.

Attacks against cultural property

Under customary IHL, cultural and religious property, including places of worship, holy sites, and objects of spiritual significance, is afforded special protection against attack.³²

In the context of the NIAC between Syria and Islamic State, on 22 June 2025, Islamic State conducted a suicide attack on St. Elias Church in Damascus, which killed at least 22 civilians and wounded more than 60 others. This attack was the first of its kind by Islamic State in Syria in years. Testimonies describe how an individual ‘was shooting at the church … he then went inside the church and blew himself up’.³³ Islamic State issued a statement explaining its motive.³⁴ It said the operation came ‘after provocation’ by Damascus Christians ‘against the call and the people of the faith’.³⁵ Taken together, available evidence indicates that Islamic State deliberately attacked the religious site, making it a war crime.³⁶

Attacks against works and installations containing dangerous forces

Under IHL, dams are afforded special protection due to the severe humanitarian risks posed by their destruction. The law imposes a heightened obligation on parties to a conflict to exercise particular care when conducting operations near such installations, even where military objectives may be present.³⁷ In the NIAC involving Türkiye and the SNA against the SDF, in late November 2024, after SNA forces captured Manbij during its Operation Dawn of Freedom, clashes intensified between Turkish armed forces with the SNA and the SDF. These occurred particularly near the Tishrin Dam on the Euphrates river close to Manbij in Aleppo governorate.

Reports document the daily use of heavy weaponry, including Turkish fighter jets, drones, artillery, and rocket fire in the first half of December.³⁸ This sustained bombardment caused structural damage to the dam, rendering it non-operational for several weeks. As of late January 2025, it was reported that more than 413,000 individuals residing in and around Manbij and Kobane had been deprived of both water and electricity, rendering essential facilities, including hospitals, inoperable for millions of people.³⁹

Although reporting does not conclusively attribute the damage to the dam to any single party, it is undisputed the damage resulted directly from armed confrontations in its immediate vicinity. There is no evidence demonstrating that any party to the NIAC used the dam for any purpose other than its intended function.⁴⁰Thus, the extensive military activity in close proximity to the Tishrin Dam offers reasonable grounds to suggest that all parties present, including the SNA, SDF, and Turkish armed forces, did not comply with their IHL obligations on the conduct of hostilities. Especially, given the foreseeable deprivation of water and electricity to hundreds of thousands of civilians, these attacks may amount to violations of the principles of proportionality and precautions in attack, as well as the specific duty to exercise special care when conducting operations near such installations under IHL.⁴¹

Attacks in densely populated areas

The fundamental rules and principles of IHL, in particular the obligations of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack, apply equally when hostilities are conducted in densely populated areas. These environments present heightened risks of incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects, and may result in reverberating effects that significantly impact the civilian population and their access to essential services.⁴²

In the context of the NIAC between HTS and the former Syrian government, widely documented incidents provide reasonable grounds to believe that the parties to this conflict have violated their IHL obligations in the conduct of hostilities, particularly through airstrikes and artillery in urban centres. Such incidents were particularly acute during the events leading up to the fall of the Assad government in December 2024. On 15 October, two airstrikes by the then governmental forces struck a power station west of Idlib, disabling two water stations that serve 30,000 civilians and severely impacting their access to clean water.⁴³ On 28 November, a rocket attack by HTS factions struck a university dormitory in Aleppo, causing civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian infrastructure.⁴⁴ On 1 December, a local market in Idlib was struck by several airstrikes from pro-government forces, killing and injuring civilians, destroying homes and causing severe damage to the marketplace.

Attacks against civilian airports

Israel attacked airports in Syria on multiple occasions during the reporting period, allegedly targeting Iranian militia and then, after the fall of al-Assad’s government, the HTS. On 9 December 2024, for instance, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) struck Qamishli airbase in northern Syria as well as Aqrba airport south-west of Damascus.⁴⁵ In early April 2025, the IDF issued a statement in which it confirmed striking ‘military capabilities’ at Syrian military bases in Hama city and Homs’ Tiyas military airbase, along with alleged military infrastructure sites in Damascus. The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the strikes resulted in the ‘near-total destruction’ of the military airbase in Hama and wounded dozens of civilians and soldiers.⁴⁶ The Ministry accused Israel of waging a campaign against ‘the stability of the country’.⁴⁷

The attacks continued into July 2025 with Mazzeh military airport one of the targets. Mohammed al-Hariri, a building caretaker, told Le Monde that in ‘fourteen years of war, we’ve never seen anything like this here.’ Israeli jets bomb as they please because we have no air defences’, he said. ‘And it’s civilians who pay the price.’⁴⁸ Targeting military airbases is not per se unlawful as it is by nature a military objective (as long as its partial or total destruction or neutralization, ‘in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage’).⁴⁹ Nevertheless, an attack on a lawful military objective must also not be expected to cause incidental civilian harm compared to the anticipated military advantage, otherwise it will be disproportionate and thus unlawful.⁵⁰

Civilians under Attack

Under customary IHL, civilians enjoy general protection from the effects of hostilities, unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.⁵¹ Accordingly, parties to armed conflicts must at all times distinguish between combatants and civilians, and are prohibited from directing attacks against civilians.⁵² In case of doubt, persons should be treated as civilians.53 Civilians may be incidentally affected by attacks against lawful targets. However, such attacks must not be disproportionate,⁵⁴ and all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, or in any event to minimize, incidental civilian impact.⁵⁵

Attacks directed against civilians

Civilians were deliberately targeted by the parties to the different armed conflicts. Direct attacks against civilians, as well as acts of violence aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population, are strictly prohibited under IHL, and can constitute war crimes.⁵⁶ Where such acts form part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack, they may also constitute crimes against humanity under international criminal law.⁵⁷

The NIAC between Türkiye and the SNA against the SDF: Deliberate attacks against civilians were reported in the context of the NIAC between Turkish armed forces backing the SNA and the SDF. Notably, on 18 January 2025, Turkish forces or their backed SNA forces conducted airstrikes against civilian protestors performing a traditional Kurdish dance near the Tishreen dam.58. The attack killed six civilians and injured sixteen others. The Turkish government accused the SDF of using civilians as human shields in the Tishrin Dam region, which it describes as a ‘strategically important point’ and the ‘last line of defence’ of the SDF.⁵⁹ Footage verified by Human Rights Watch shows how two small air-dropped munitions explode in a crowd of unarmed men and women at Tishrin Dam. A journalist present at the scene explained that the attack occurred without prior warning.⁶⁰ Taken together, the factual evidence provides reasonable grounds to suggest that Türkiye violated its obligation not to target civilians directly. At the very least, it failed to adhere to the principle of precaution, as no measures appeared to be taken to prevent or minimize civilian harm.

The NIAC between Syria and Islamic State (before December 2024): As part of Islamic State’s increasing presence in Syria, a rise in attacks against civilians was reported during the period. These attacks often targeted shepherds in the region of Homs, Deir Ez Zor, and Raqqa. For instance, on 28 August 2024, two shepherds were killed by Islamic State fighters and hundreds of their sheep were stolen near the town of Ma’adan.⁶¹ Similarly, a day after, near Qasr Halabat, Islamic State fighters attacked a group of shepherds, killing three and wounding five, and killing as many as 1,000 of their sheep (livestock being civilian objects under IHL).⁶² Absent evidence these individuals were directly participating in hostilities, they are civilians protected as such.63 Therefore, Islamic State fighters’ use of lethal force against them likely amounts to a war crime.⁶⁴

The IAC between Syria and Israel: The reporting period documented incidents indicating that Israeli forces may have directly targeted civilians in the context of the international armed conflict with Syria. On 20 December 2024, Israeli soldiers reportedly fired on unarmed protesters in Maariya.⁶⁵ In April 2025, approximately 2,000 residents of Nawa mobilized to prevent Israeli forces from seizing the Jabiliya Dam and Tel al-Jomaa, the principal water source for Nawa and six surrounding villages. Although several participants may have been lightly armed with hunting rifles, Israeli forces responded with drone strikes, resulting in the deaths of at least seven individuals and injuries to twelve others.⁶⁶

Use of improvised explosive devices

Throughout the reporting period, IEDs, landmines, and ERW continued to pose a grave and persistent threat to civilians across Syria.⁶⁷ When deployed in populated areas or locations frequently accessed by civilians, landmines may have indiscriminate effects.⁶⁸ If they are not directed at specific military objectives, this renders their use a violation of the principle of distinction. Where measures are not taken to limit their impact on civilians, this may also violate the principle of precautions in attack.⁶⁹

Former frontlines and areas that witnessed intense hostilities remained heavily contaminated, while ongoing conflict, particularly in parts of northeastern Syria, further exacerbated the scale and complexity of contamination. The United Nations recorded near-daily incidents involving explosive ordnance, with more than 600 civilian deaths and injuries reported between December 2024 and April 2025.⁷⁰ Children were disproportionately affected, accounting for a significant share of casualties. For instance, between 1 January and 17 February 2025 alone, 33 children were killed and another 103 were wounded.⁷¹

There is often, however, little or inconsistent publicly available evidence about the actors who deployed these landmines and other munitions. Most reported incidents are concentrated in areas controlled by the Syrian government, with the following most incidents occurring in Turkish-controlled regions. Some incidents of indiscriminate remotely controlled IEDs were reported in the context of the NIAC between Türkiye, backed by SNA, and the SDF.

Following SNA’s taking of control over Manbij in late 2024, several car bombings were reported, resulting in significant civilian harm. Notably, on 3 February 2025, a car bomb killed fifteen – eleven women, three children, and one man.⁷² An individual present claimed that the bombing was aimed ‘to kill as many civilians as possible, since it detonated the moment the truck passed by’.⁷³ It was also said that the place where the car exploded was a road known for being used by trucks that carry large numbers of civilians.⁷⁴ Reports are contradictory as to the perpetrator, with SDF and SNA fighters both accusing each other of being the authors of these attacks.⁷⁵ Reports suggest that this was the seventh car bombing attack in Manbij since the SNA had seized control in December 2024.⁷⁶

Airstrikes on densely populated areas

The use of airstrikes in densely populated areas was of particular concern in the three situations of armed conflict mentioned above. The most concerning incidents related to the armed conflict between Türkiye and the SDF have been addressed in the section above, ‘Deliberate Attacks on Civilians’. Considered below are the armed conflicts between the HTS and the former Syrian government and the NIAC between Israel and Hezbollah.

Between November 2024 and early 2025, civilian casualties rose sharply due to increased fighting between HTS and Syrian government forces supported by Russia. By 3 December, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported 69 civilians killed, including 26 children and 11 women, and 228 injured.⁷⁷

On 1 December, twenty-two civilians were killed, including three women and seven children, and at least forty other civilians were injured, reportedly as a result of multiple airstrikes by the then Syrian government forces in Idlib. According to information received, multiple airstrikes hit a local market and five residential areas in the city. Most of the victims were in the streets near their homes and in the market at the time of the airstrikes.⁷⁸ On 2 December, Syrian armed forces and/or the Russian military conducted an airstrike on a residential area in Idlib city, reportedly killing between five and six civilians and injuring at least thirty more, including children and women.⁷⁹

In the context of the NIAC between Israel and Hezbollah, Israeli armed forces conducted numerous airstrikes in residential areas. On 8 October 2024, an Israeli airstrike hit residential areas in Damascus, killing seven civilians, including children and women.⁸⁰ In early November, Israeli airstrikes hit several populated sites south of Damascus.⁸¹ According to Syrian State media, the attacks killed at least fifteen and wounded sixteen others, again including women and children.⁸² Israel’s military chief of staff explained that their armed forces were ‘conducting deep strikes and striking frequently in Syria and along the Syria-Lebanon border to prevent weapons transfers to Hezbollah’ and that the attack had ‘inflicted significant damage’ on a command centre allegedly belonging to an Iranian-backed militia.⁸³ These claims could not be verified.

Forced displacement

The armed conflicts in Syria have continued to generate significant displacement. Especially the events in November 2024 led to a new wave of displacement, with almost 696,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) newly recorded as of 12 June 2025.⁸⁴ The violent incidents during the NIAC between the Syrian government and the PFGF in coastal Syria, such as Latakia, Tartus, Homs, and Hama, have caused around 10,000 Alawis to flee, including to Lebanon.⁸⁵ The significant increase in violence during March 2025 has resulted in elevated feelings of insecurity among Alawite communities, as they have consistently been subjected to kidnappings and other forms of violence.⁸⁶

Under customary IHL, in both IAC and NIAC, parties are prohibited from ordering the displacement of the civilian population in relation to the conflict unless it is required for their security or for imperative military reasons.⁸⁷Breaches of these prohibitions are considered to constitute serious violations of IHL.⁸⁸ Such displacement must be temporary, with all possible measures taken to ensure proper shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition and that members of the same family are not separated.⁸⁹ The prohibition aims to protect civilian populations from arbitrary or punitive displacement and to uphold their rights to remain in or return to their homes.⁹⁰

The NIAC involving Türkiye and the SNA against the SDF: Intensified hostilities between the SDF and the Turkish-backed SNA have compelled approximately 100,000 people to seek refuge as clashes escalated in December 2024 between the conflicting parties.⁹¹Individuals residing in the Manbij region described a violent environment that engendered fear and insecurity among the civilian population. Personal accounts detail encounters with armed individuals who ordered residents to vacate their homes, with those refusing reportedly facing lethal consequences.⁹²Testimonies further reveal that the perpetrators, who engaged in intimidation, threats, and harassment, were predominantly affiliated with the SNA and regularly targeted the civilian community, chiefly of Kurdish ethnicity.⁹³

The IAC between Syria and Israel: Many civilians living in territory under Israeli occupation fled as the Israeli military intensified its presence, resulting in the destruction of homes and farmlands and the establishment of several new military bases.⁹⁴ Individuals describe how Israeli forces approached during the night, compelling residents to evacuate their homes before demolition: ‘We left with only our personal belongings’, explained one person displaced from his residence in Hamidiyah.⁹⁵ Farmers attempting to access their land have been obstructed by Israeli armed forces.⁹⁶ The evidence reveals that the displacement of civilians was caused by the acts of parties to an armed conflict, including the interim Syrian government, Israel, and Türkiye-backed SNA fighters. There is no available evidence to suggest that the orders to vacate were justified by military necessity.⁹⁷ In particular, acts compelling individuals to vacate their residences and employing violence and threats to accomplish this suggest breaches of the rules governing forced displacement. The incidents of forced displacement documented above thus constitute violations of IHL by at least Israel and the SNA. Considering the significant extent to which Türkiye is supporting the SNA, even if its armed forces were not directly involved in the unlawful conduct, it is obligated to take positive steps to prevent and suppress violations by others it supports or which are under its jurisdiction.

Protection of Persons in the Power of the Enemy

Under customary IHL, special protection is afforded to ‘protected persons’, including several categories of civilians who face a specific risk of harm, such as women, children, refugees, and IDPs.⁹⁸ Furthermore, it provides for certain fundamental guarantees for anyone in the power of a party to a conflict, prohibiting acts such as torture, inhumane and degrading treatment, collective punishments, sexual violence, enforced disappearance, and unfair trials.

Murder of civilians

The NIAC between the new Syrian government and the PFGF: In the context of the NIAC between the interim government and the PFGF, there is prima facie evidence that these two actors have failed to uphold these obligations. Multiple reports suggest that individuals and groups affiliated with the interim government have perpetrated acts of violence against civilians and minority groups perceived to be associated with the PFGF. Of particular concern are the events that occurred between 7 and 9 March 2025 as part of the NIAC between the interim Syrian and the PFGF. Evidence demonstrates that interim government armed forces, PFGF fighters, and private individuals conducted systematic and targeted killings of Alawi civilians along Syria’s coastal regions. Investigative findings, including those reported by the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, point to coordinated acts of violence at more than forty locations, killing up to 1,500 men, women, children, older persons, and persons with disabilities. Witnesses described how individuals would first be identified as Alawi before being taken outside their houses to be shot and killed.⁹⁹ Victims were referred to as ‘Alawi pigs’ that had to be killed.¹⁰⁰ Additionally, the presence of lists of names, public humiliations, and video evidence of atrocities strongly indicates that these acts were deliberate and directed against the Alawi community.¹⁰¹ The interim president publicly condemned the attacks against the Alawi community in March and announced the formation of an investigative commission to determine responsibility.¹⁰² A report was submitted on 13 July, and a press conference presented the main findings on 22 July 2025.¹⁰³ The National Inquiry reported having preliminarily identified 298 alleged perpetrators from military factions and 265 linked to armed groups associated with the former government, referring their names to the Attorney General.¹⁰⁴ Such investigations must, however, be consistent with the obligation to ensure accountability for serious violations of IHL by all concerned.¹⁰⁵

Looting and pillage

IHL prohibits pillage and unlawful destruction of property during all armed conflict. Pillage consists of the systematic and violent appropriation by members of the armed forces of movable public or private property that belongs either to protected persons or to the adverse party to an armed conflict and constitutes a war crime.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, the wanton destruction of property not justified by military necessity is forbidden.¹⁰⁷ In occupied territory, private property must be respected and it may not be confiscated or destroyed unless required by imperative military necessity.¹⁰⁸

Evidence was gathered during the reporting period, providing reasonable grounds to believe that various parties to the armed conflicts in Syria have failed to comply with these obligations. The following incidents illustrate patterns of violations.

Syrian government-controlled areas (before December 2024): The December 2024 report by the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria documents persistent large-scale pillage, destruction of property, and appropriation of homes by former government forces.¹⁰⁹ Evidence shows a consistent pattern, beginning in 2011 and continuing until the change of government, whereby civilians forced to flee their homes were systematically dispossessed. Properties were seized, looted, and subsequently rented to members or supporters of the authorities. Legislation enacted by the former Syrian government facilitated and formalized these practices, reflecting a deliberate policy to dispossess displaced persons perceived as linked to opposition forces and consolidate control over abandoned property.¹¹⁰

HTS-controlled areas (before December 2024): The Commission of Inquiry report also found that members of the HTS had seized private property in Idlib and western Aleppo, mainly belonging to IDPs and perceived opponents. Minority groups, such as Christians, were particularly targeted. Also, the HTS reportedly tasked ‘Green Company’,¹¹¹ a Syrian agriculture investment entity located in Idlib, to identify and seize the lands of individuals who had left and redistribute them through auctions, where the HTS collected taxes from those winning the auctions, including in November 2024.¹¹²

Turkish-occupied territory: In the Afrin region, the reporting period documented evidence of widespread looting and appropriation of private and public property of Kurdish owners by SNA members, including homes, schools and medical facilities, as part of the offensive launched in November 2024.¹¹³ Returnees were detained and forced to pay fees to recover property.¹¹⁴ Others found their homes destroyed or occupied by SNA fighters and their families.¹¹⁵

Israeli-occupied territory: Multiple accounts indicate that the property of civilian residents was looted and unlawfully appropriated by Israeli armed forces throughout the Syrian Golan Heights and Mount Hermon region. In December 2024, Israeli forces declared agricultural lands to be closed military zones, warning residents to remain indoors. Testimonies describe demolitions of residences, uprooting of trees, and forcible expulsions of civilians, sometimes under the threat of immediate destruction of their property by tanks.¹¹⁶ A resident from al-Jazira, a military point previously controlled by the Syrian army and which was seized by Israeli forces on 9 December, describes how his house was raided: ‘There is terror because they would enter our homes and terrorize the children. They entered my home in the middle of the night.’¹¹⁷ Such practices continued in subsequent months.¹¹⁸ In June 2025, Israeli raids in Quneitra led to the demolition of entire neighbourhoods and the forced displacement of residents near military bases.¹¹⁹

Coastal areas of Syria (after December 2024): Widespread accounts in March 2025 described the looting of houses and religious artefacts belonging to the Alawi community by armed groups in coastal regions.¹²⁰ The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria found substantial evidence to believe that members of the interim government participated in such acts. Victims across various locations in these areas described how armed factions looted everything, including money, gold, electronic devices, and other valuables from civilians or in shops, and set houses on fire.¹²¹ Individuals were forced to give everything they possessed under threat of being killed or their family members being killed. A witness reportedly overheard an exchange between two armed men stating that “even if you set all the houses on fire, they won’t get out of their hiding place.”¹²² The multiple testimonies demonstrate that these acts were deliberately targeting the Alawi community. Armed fighters would raid civilian homes, ask individuals whether they are Alawi and treat them as ‘infidel pigs’, ‘children of animals’, their women as ‘prostitutes’, who all deserved to be killed.¹²³ Overall, the collected evidence reveals a consistent pattern of looting, appropriation, and deliberate destruction of civilian property by various State and non-State armed actors. In none of the above incidents did available evidence suggest that these measures were justified by imperative military necessity. Given their scale, persistence, and systematic character, especially the extensive numbers of acts deliberately targeting Alawi communities in March, there are reasonable grounds to conclude that the former Syrian government, the interim Syrian government, Israeli forces, HTS, and SNA have violated the prohibition of pillage under IHL.¹²⁴ Such acts may also constitute war crimes.¹²⁵ Moreover, the systematic nature of these violations created conditions that forced large numbers of civilians to flee their homes and prevented their return.¹²⁶ This is particularly concerning considering the lack of protection of housing, land, and property rights in Syria.¹²⁷ In situations of occupation, Israel has an additional obligation under IHL to respect private property and refrain from confiscation except where strictly required by military necessity.¹²⁸ The scale and persistence of the destruction, combined with official statements indicating long-term territorial consolidation, suggest that such acts were not militarily necessary but aimed at altering the demographic and territorial status of the occupied area.¹²⁹ These measures may therefore constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions¹³⁰ and war crimes.¹³¹ As regards acts committed by the SNA in areas under Turkish control, there are reasonable grounds to believe that Türkiye failed to discharge its duty, as an occupying power, to ensure the protection of civilian property.¹³² Credible allegations indicate that Turkish forces were aware of the violations perpetrated by armed groups they supported, yet failed to prevent or suppress them.¹³³

Arbitrary deprivation of liberty, torture, and death in detention

Under IHL, any deprivation of liberty must be lawful, non-arbitrary, and carried out with appropriate legal safeguards.¹³⁴ Persons deprived of liberty must be treated humanely at all times, with absolute prohibitions on torture and other ill-treatment.¹³⁵ Detaining authorities must ensure detainees have access to medical care, are held in humane conditions, and are protected from violence or reprisals. The death of a detainee in custody, particularly under suspicious or abusive conditions, may constitute a war crime.¹³⁶ Furthermore, enforced disappearance, which involves secret detention or the failure to disclose the fate or whereabouts of a detainee, violates IHL’s prohibition of the practice as well as the requirement to register detainees and the right of families to know the fate of their relatives.¹³⁷

Individuals in the hands of the Syrian government (before December 2024): Testimonies and photographic evidence have emerged during and after the fall of the Assad government, revealing a long-standing and systematic pattern of arbitrary arrests, torture, murder and enforced disappearances. Individuals were frequently detained based on intelligence lists alleging links to opposition groups, without being informed of the reasons for their arrest.¹³⁸ Survivors of Saydnaya prison described years of brutal daily beatings, torture, and forced confessions by prison guards.¹³⁹ Some recall having been stripped naked and told to pose for a photograph before being beaten, having their fingers chopped off, being deprived of food, drink, and sleep, and subjected to rape, electric shocks, and more. Some experienced this violence over lengthy periods, even years. Many detainees died under torture or were summarily executed.¹⁴⁰ The fate of an estimated 100,000 Syrians remains unknown, with evidence suggesting burial in mass graves and details concealed in secret archives.¹⁴¹

Individuals in the hands of the HTS (before December 2024): HTS systematically enforced its ideology through arbitrary detention, torture, and executions of dissenters. Detainees were subjected to cruel and degrading treatment, with many families denied information about the fate of their relatives.¹⁴²

Individuals in the hands of the SNA backed by Türkiye: In Ra’s al-Ayn and Afrin, civilians, predominantly of Kurdish origin, were arbitrarily detained by the SNA, often for alleged past links to the self-administration.¹⁴³ Detainees were beaten, tortured, denied food or water, and interrogated about their ethnicity. A Shahba resident recounted their treatment in prisons under SNA and Turkish control, including beating, removal of fingernails, toenails and teeth, as well as being burned.¹⁴⁴ Some were released only after ransom payments were made; in other cases, their fate remains unknown.¹⁴⁵

Individuals in the hands of the SDF: The reporting period also evidenced persistent patterns of prolonged and arbitrary detention of tens of thousands of individuals in SDF-held detention facilities and Al-Hol and Roj camps, including women and children allegedly affiliated with Islamic State.¹⁴⁶ Recent reports reveal that thousands of men suspected of links to Islamic State, are being detained without trial – 5,400 Syrians, 1,600 Iraqis, and 1,500 from fifty other nations. In total, around 42,500 people are being held in those two camps, many of whom are either relatives of Islamic State suspects or those displaced by ongoing violence.¹⁴⁷ As of 17 March 2025, approximately 23,000 of those individuals in the camps were foreigners, and more than sixty per cent were children, the majority under twelve years of age, with most of the remainder women.¹⁴⁸ While Iraq has expedited the repatriation of thousands of its nationals held in those camps, many other States have largely refused to do so, contending that they should be prosecuted in Syria or Iraq, or citing security challenges or even refusing to recognize their nationality.¹⁴⁹ The conditions in which these individuals have been held, often for more than seven years, are dire.¹⁵⁰ Reports indicate a lack of legal process, inadequate conditions, and denial of essential services.¹⁵¹ UN agencies have repeatedly called for urgent reforms, while the abrupt withdrawal of external funding, especially the sudden US cuts in January and February 2025, has further exacerbated humanitarian conditions.¹⁵² As one of the camp directors, Jihan Hanan, describes: ‘Nobody was prepared. Four hundred workers had their employment halted. Deliveries of bread and fuel stopped. Warehouses were left with no guards.’¹⁵³ International law does not obligate States to repatriate their nationals, and thus the individuals held in those camps cannot claim a right to repatriation.¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, people have a right to enter the State of their nationality.¹⁵⁵As the European Court of Human Rights has held, in exceptional circumstances where the life and physical well-being of nationals are at risk, a denial of repatriation requires appropriate safeguards against arbitrariness.¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, based on the principle of the best interests of the child and the right to family life under international human rights law, children should not be separated from their mothers.¹⁵⁷ Responses have markedly differed among States. While some States have intensified repatriation efforts, others, including some European States, continue to delay or even impede attempts at repatriation.¹⁵⁸ Certain European States have revoked individuals’ nationality on the grounds that these individuals engaged in ‘acts seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State’, thereby denying the right to return.¹⁵⁹Others have recognised an individual’s right to return but refused to take the necessary action to repatriate them.¹⁶⁰

Individuals in the hands of the IDF: Evidence of potential violation of the salient IHL rules emerged in Israeli-occupied territories. As part of Israeli raids and arrest campaigns in Syrian villages, including Maariya, civilians were seemingly detained without disclosure of their fate or whereabouts. In one case, a farmer was reportedly held incommunicado, raising concerns of enforced disappearance.¹⁶¹

Individuals in the hands of the Syrian government (after December 2024): During the reporting period, the UN Commission of Inquiry documented an increase in abductions and enforced disappearances of members of the Alawi minority, particularly women and girls.¹⁶² Victims were often seized in public areas, questioned about their sectarian identity, and forcibly abducted. While many of these incidents appear to involve criminal gangs, reports and testimonies suggest the involvement of a number of local commanders and fighters affiliated with the interim government.¹⁶³ Evidence indicates that members of the former Syrian government, the SNA, the SDF, and HTS (prior to December 2024) have committed serious violations of IHL. These include arbitrary detention, torture, and inhumane or degrading treatment, all of which are strictly prohibited under IHL and are likely to amount to war crimes.¹⁶⁴ In many instances, detainees were held without due process or legitimate security grounds over a prolonged period of time. Conditions in detention facilities and camps were so poor as to amount to inhuman treatment. Testimonies from many former detainees attest to widespread violent treatment amounting to torture and sometimes leading to death in detention.¹⁶⁵ In numerous cases, the fate and whereabouts of detainees were concealed, amounting to violations of IHL provisions aimed at preventing enforced disappearance,166 including the requirements concerning registration, visits and transmission of information with respect to persons deprived of their liberty in IAC,¹⁶⁷ and the obligation to register persons deprived of their liberty in NIAC.¹⁶⁸ These acts may violate the IHL obligation to respect family life¹⁶⁹ and to take all feasible measures to account for persons reported missing as a result of armed conflict and to provide their family members with information held on their fate.¹⁷⁰

Protection of children

Under IHL, children are afforded special protection in armed conflicts, recognizing their particular vulnerability. Core rules prohibit the recruitment and use of children under the age of fifteen years in hostilities, whether in State armed forces or non-State armed groups, and forbid their use in combat. Children are entitled to general protection as civilians, including against direct attack, arbitrary detention, sexual violence, and ill-treatment, as well as specific guarantees such as access to food, medical care, and education. If detained, they must be held separately from adults (unless with their family) and treated in a manner appropriate to their age. Evacuation and reunification of separated children with their families are also prioritized.

During the reporting period, children have continued to be disproportionately affected by the ongoing hostilities in Syria. Incidents of killing, maiming, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and recruitment have been widely documented. As of November 2024, at least 5,298 children had been reportedly either detained or forcibly disappeared by various parties to the conflict.¹⁷¹ Reports further indicate that at least 225 children have died as a result of torture, 216 of whom died in government-run detention centres.¹⁷² These acts constitute serious violations of IHL and are likely war crimes.

Although the overall incidence of child recruitment has reportedly decreased, continued cases were documented during the period under review. Most concern abduction and recruitment of children attributable to SDF forces.¹⁷³ The reported ages of the recruited children ranged from twelve to seventeen years and concern both boys and girls.¹⁷⁴

In territories under the effective control of foreign powers, such as those under Turkish control in northern Syria, Türkiye bears obligations under IHL to take all measures within its capacity to ensure that the special protection of children is afforded.¹⁷⁵

Positive developments include the signing of action plans in 2024 by the SNA and the SDF, committing to end the recruitment and use of children.¹⁷⁶These steps are in line with international obligations and are to be welcomed. However, in light of ongoing violations, additional measures are required to ensure full compliance with IHL and the protection of children from recruitment and use in hostilities.

Conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence

Rape and other forms of sexual violence in connection with armed conflict are prohibited and are considered to constitute serious violations of IHL.¹⁷⁷ The conflicts in Syria have been marked by severe incidents of gender-based violence, with women and girls disproportionately exposed to harm exacerbated by ongoing hostilities, displacement, and economic instability.

Special focus should be placed on women from minority groups, who face compounded vulnerabilities. For example, Kurdish women in the Afrin and Ra’s al-Ayn regions have been subject to intimidation and coercion by members of the SNA, resulting in a pervasive climate of fear that has effectively confined many to their homes.¹⁷⁸Alawi women have been disproportionately targeted for kidnapping, often in broad daylight in public spaces such as markets or routes to work and school.¹⁷⁹ Testimonies indicate that abductors frequently interrogate victims about their sectarian affiliation prior to abduction, underscoring the targeted nature of these crimes.¹⁸⁰

Furthermore, documented cases reveal that women and girls detained by parties to the armed conflicts, including the former Syrian government¹⁸¹ and the SNA,¹⁸² were subjected to rape and other forms of sexual violence.

Treatment of the dead

IHL contains explicit provisions on the respectful treatment of the dead in armed conflict, aimed at preserving human dignity and alleviating suffering for families of the deceased. It requires parties to a conflict to search for, collect, and evacuate the dead without delay,¹⁸³ and to prevent their despoilment or mutilation.¹⁸⁴ Bodies must be treated with respect and correctly identified whenever possible. IHL also obliges parties to record information on the dead and transmit it to the relevant authorities or agencies to help ensure families know the fate of their relatives.I¹⁸⁵ Burial or cremation must be conducted in a dignified manner, preferably according to the religious rites of the deceased, and graves must be respected and maintained.¹⁸⁶

The reporting period evidenced grave concerns over the treatment of dead bodies, especially in the context of the NIAC between the interim Syrian government and the PFGF. During the violent attacks against the Alawi community, witnesses described how dead bodies were left in the street and burned by armed members. Verified video footage also showed how armed men dressed in black ‘were celebrating the burning of dead bodies, stepping on them and calling them Alawi pigs and dogs’.¹⁸⁷

Bodies were often left in the street or houses for several days, and in various cases, buried without documentation and without death certificates being provided to family members. The accumulated evidence provides substantial grounds to assert that military forces associated with the interim Syrian government have breached their IHL and human rights obligations, including those requiring humane treatment of the deceased, as well as the duty to inform families of the fate of their relatives.

Moreover, the reporting period attests to the discovery and continued presence of mass graves across Syrian territory.¹⁸⁸ Among the sites discovered after the change of government in December are mass graves estimated to contain bodies of at least 100,000 men, women, and children killed by the former Syrian government, and are associated with serious violations of IHL.¹⁸⁹ The existence of mass graves engages Syria’s duties to investigate allegations of serious IHL violations, uncover the truth, prosecute those responsible, and ensure justice and reparations for the victims.

Transitional Justice

Amid the instability of the HTS-led government, the crimes of al-Assad and his forces continue to loom large. Calls for a transitional justice approach led to the new Syrian government establishing a ‘National Commission for Transitional Justice’ (NCTJ) and a ‘National Commission for the Missing’ in May 2025. The NCTJ’s mandate focuses on documenting violations and seeking justice for victims from the actions of the Assad government, thereby promoting accountability and reconciliation. The National Commission for the Missing is mandated with investigating the fate of the missing and forcibly disappeared, establishing a national database and providing legal and humanitarian support to affected families.¹⁹⁰

The work of the Commission should, however, encompass all parties involved in the multiple armed conflicts, some of which continue to this day. At the time, Human Rights Watch described the narrow mandate as ‘a missed opportunity for victim-led justice’.¹⁹¹ In welcoming the establishment of the two commissions, the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) urged the authorities to ensure close collaboration with, and representation of, victims, civil society, and affected communities from the outset and for clear coordination between the two bodies.¹⁹²

The signs over the coming months were not positive. Writing in September 2025, the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, a Syrian body headquartered in Washington DC, said that the NCTJ had been ‘slow to act’, declaring that:

The repercussions of neglecting transitional justice are already clear, as the country sees repeated outbreaks of conflict as well as individual acts of retribution against alleged former Assad affiliates. Pursuing a comprehensive transitional justice process would allow the government to address many of the underlying grievances fuelling ongoing violence, establishing the foundation for a peaceful future.¹⁹³

The Commission did, though, issue an initial report in August 2025, although it was largely procedural and speculative. The report identified specialized committees and offices within the commission but without indicating who will staff them, where they will work, and how the resources for this many positions will be obtained. The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre concluded that ‘its sheer breadth suggests … a failure to identify initial priorities and to establish a workplan that is achievable in a reasonable timescale’.¹⁹⁴

1
A. Belkaïd, ‘The Fall of the House of Assad’ Le Monde diplomatique,1 January 2025; S. Belhadj Klaz, ‘The Collapse of the Syrian Regime or How the Intelligence Services Disintegrated the Army’, Graduate Institute, Geneva, undated but accessed 1 October 2025.
2
R. Geist Pinfold, ‘Why Is Israel Escalating Its Strikes Against Syria?’ RUSI, 8 September 2025.
3
Statement by the President of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, 14 March 2025.
4
W. Christou, Deadly Syria clashes continue for second day outside Damascus, 30 April 2025.
5
‘ACLED Regional Overview Middle East: January 2025’, 15 January 2025.
6
‘Letter dated 21 July 2025 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2025/482, 24 July 2025, para 62.
7
Human Rights Watch, ‘Northeast Syria: Apparent War Crime by Türkiye-Backed Forces’, 30 January 2025.
8
R. Soylu, ‘Turkey and SDF Hold Direct Talks under US Mediation’ Middle East Eye, 3 June 2025.
9
M. Krever, ‘Israel Strikes Syria 480 Times and Seizes Territory as Netanyahu Pledges to Change Face of the Middle East’, CNN, 10 December 2024.
10
UN, ‘Guterres Condemns Violence against Civilians in Syria, Urges Israel to Stop Attacks’, United Nations News, 2 May 2025; and Geist Pinfold, ‘Why Is Israel Escalating Its Strikes Against Syria?’.
11
Geist Pinfold, ‘Why Is Israel Escalating Its Strikes Against Syria?’.
12
‘ACLED Regional Overview Middle East: January 2025’.
13
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts; adopted at Geneva, 8 June 1977; entered into force, 7 December 1978.
14
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts; adopted at Geneva, 8 June 1977; entered into force, 7 December 1978.
15
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; adopted at Rome, 17 July 1998; entered into force, 1 July 2002 (ICC Statute).
16
Notification of Israel, 28 August 2002.
17
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 7: ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives’.
18
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 9: ‘Definition of Civilian Objects’
19
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 10: ‘Civilian Objects’ Loss of Protection from Attack’.
20
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 8: ‘Definition of Military Objectives’. In addition, their partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, must offer a definite military advantage.
21
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 28: ‘Medical Units’.
22
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 156: ‘Definition of War Crimes’.
23
Insecurity Insights and Safeguarding Health in Conflict, ‘Syria: Violence Against Health Care in Conflict 2024’, 2025, p 5.
24
‘RS4940 – December 1, 2024’, Airwars.
25
‘RS4952 – December 2, 2024’, Airwars.
26
‘Syria Escalation: Deadly Attacks Continue, Healthcare and Access Compromised‘, UN News, 3 December 2024.
27
Human Rights Watch, ‘Northeast Syria: Apparent War Crime by Türkiye-Backed Forces’.
28
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (hereafter, UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria), ‘Violations against Civilians in Coastal and Western Central Syria in January-March 2025’, UN Doc A/HRC/59/CRP.4, 11 August 2025, para 57.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 28: ‘Medical Units’.
32
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 38: ‘Attacks Against Cultural Property’.
33
‘Syria Church Bombing Kills 25, Dozens Wounded’ Al Jazeera, 22 June 2025.
34
K. Salama, ‘سرايا أنصار السنّة” تتبنى الهجوم على الكنيسة في دم’, Deutsche Welle.
35
Ibid.
36
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 156: ‘Definition of War Crimes’.
37
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 42: ‘Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces’.
38
Human Rights Watch, ‘Northeast Syria: Apparent War Crime by Türkiye-Backed Forces’.
39
NES NGO Forum, ‘Update #10: Humanitarian Impact of Recent Developments in Syria on Northeast Syria (7 January 2025) – Syrian Arab Republic’, 2025.
40
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 7: ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives’; and Rule 8: ‘Definition of Military Objectives’.
41
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 14: ‘Proportionality in Attack’; and Customary IHL Rule 15: ‘Principle of Precautions in Attack’.
42
ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict’, Report, Geneva, 2024.
43
‘November 2024 Monthly Forecast: Syria’, Security Council Report, 31 October 2024.
44
Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Jeremy Laurence, ‘Syria: Tragic Escalation in Hostilities’, Press release, 3 December 2024.
45
M. Drummond, ‘Why is Israel bombing Syrian airbases?’, Explainer, Sky News, 10 December 2024.
46
‘More Israeli air raids on Syria despite UN warning’, France 24, 3 April 2025.
47
‘Israel launches air attacks on Syria’s Damascus and Hama’, Al Jazeera, 2 April 2025.
48
H. Sallon, ‘By bombing Damascus, Israel imposes red lines on Syria’s new government’, Le Monde, 17 July 2025.
49
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 8: ‘Definition of Military Objectives’.
50
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 14: ‘Proportionality in Attack’.
51
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’.
52
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 1: ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants‘.
53
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’. The accompanying commentary states that in NIACs, ‘the issue of doubt has hardly been addressed in State practice, even though a clear rule on this subject would be desirable as it would enhance the protection of the civilian population against attack.’ One ‘cannot automatically attack anyone who might appear dubious….’ The same approach with respect to IACs ‘seems justified’ in NIACs.
54
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 14: ‘Proportionality in Attack’.
55
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 15: ‘Principle of Precautions in Attack’.
56
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 156: ‘Definition of War Crimes’.
57
Art 7(1), ICC Statute. As noted above, Syria is not a State Party to the Statute.
58
Human Rights Watch, ‘Northeast Syria: Apparent War Crime by Türkiye-Backed Forces’
59
‘The Ministry of National Defense Reiterated Its Determination to Launch a Military Operation If the YPG Does Not Lay down Its Weapons in Syria’, Voice of America, 9 January 2025; ‘YPG Using Civilians as Human Shields in Tishrin Dam Area, Human Rights Violations: Ministry of National Defense’, Independet Türkçe, 9 January 2025.
60
Human Rights Watch, ‘Northeast Syria: Apparent War Crime by Türkiye-Backed Force’.
61
G. Waters, ‘ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency in August 2024’, The CounterPoint Blog.
62
ibid.
63
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’.
64
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 1: ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants.
65
‘Israeli Forces Fire at Syrian Protesters in Deraa, Wounding One’ Al Jazeera, 20 December 2024.
66
N. Danon, ‘Israel Wages War for Land and Water in Syria’s South’, New Lines Magazine, 5 May 2025.
67
Syrian Network for Human Rights, ‘Four Civilians Injured in a Bombing of a Booby-Trapped Television in E. Aleppo, November 20, 2024’, News release, 23 November 2024.
68
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 11: ‘Indiscriminate Attacks’; and Rule 12: ‘Definition of Indiscriminate Attacks’.
69
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 15: ‘Principle of Precautions in Attack’.
70
Human Rights Watch, ‘Syria: Landmines, Explosive Remnants Harming Civilians’, Report, 8 April 2025.
71
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, ‘Old Ordnance | Four Sibling Children Killed and Wounded by Explosion in Deir Ezzor Countryside’, News release, 17 February 2025.
72
‘Deadly Attacks in Eastern Aleppo Highlight Syria’s Vulnerability’, United Nations News, 4 February 2025; D. Gritten, ‘Car Bomb Blast in Northern Syria Kills at Least 20’, BBC News, 3 February 2025.
73
M. Nelson, ‘Manbij Suffers Seventh Car Bombing since SDF Expelled’, Syria Direct, 3 February 2025
74
Ibid.
75
‘Syria/Manbij Bombing: “The Terrifying Scenes Haunt Me Every Moment”’, Report, Syrians for Truth and Justice, 16 April 2025.
76
K. Chehayeb, ‘At Least 19 People, Mostly Women, Killed in Latest Car Bomb Attack in Syria’, PBS News, 3 February 2025; NES NGO Forum, ‘Update #12: Humanitarian Impact of Recent Developments in Syria on Northeast Syria‘, 20 January 2025.
77
OCHA, ‘Flash Update – Recent Escalation in Northern Syria (As of 3 December)’, OCHA, 2024.
78
Ibid.
79
‘RS4950 – December 2, 2024’, Airwars.
80
‘Syria Says Seven Civilians Killed in Israel Damascus Strike’ Le Monde, 8 October 2024.
81
‘Syria Condemns Deadly Israel Air Strikes on “Civilian Sites” near Damascus’, Al Jazeera, 5 November 2024.
82
M. Salem and E. Kourdi, ‘Fifteen Killed in Israeli Strikes on Damascus, Syrian State Media Say’, CNN, 14 November 2024.
83
L. Stack, A. Boxerman, and others, ‘Lebanese Official Says Israeli Strikes Killed at Least 12 Emergency Workers’ The New York Times, 14 November 2024.
84
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Syria Governorates IDPs and IDP Returnees Overview (As of 12 June 2025)’, Dashboards & Factsheets, 2025.
85
‘Syria: Violence in Alawite Areas May Be War Crimes, Say Rights Investigators’, United Nations News, 14 August 2025.
86
H. Davis, ‘Syrian Alawites Flee to Lebanon, with Little Aid to Meet Them’, The New Humanitarian, 4 June 2025.
87
ICRC, Customary IHL 129: ‘The Act of Displacement’.
88
CRC, Customary IHL Rule 156: ‘Definition of War Crimes’.
89
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 131: ‘Treatment of Displaced Persons’.
90
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 132: ‘Return of Displaced Persons’.
91
L. Lazo and F.-A. Landry, ‘Les Kurdes de Syrie fuyant les milices pro-turques sont au bord de la catastrophe humanitaire’, rts.ch, 4 January 2025.
92
Syrians for Truth & Justice, ‘Syria/Afrin: Promises by Transitional Authorities to Restore Rights and End Violations Against Kurds’, Report, 10 April 2025.
93
Rojav Information Center, ‘After Assad – Turkey and SNA Crimes against Civilians in NES’, Report, 2025.
94
M. Karabacak, O. Koparan, and S. Sevencan, ‘Israel Expands Military Presence in Southern Syria with 10 Bases, Residents Displaced’, Anadolu Ajansı, 7 July 2025.
95
ibid.
96
N. Danon, ‘Israel Wages War for Land and Water in Syria’s South’, New Lines Magazine, 5 May 2025.
97
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 129: ‘The Act of Displacement’.
98
ICRC, Customary IHL Rules 134–138: ‘Chapter 39. Other Persons Afforded Specific Protection’.
99
UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, ‘Violations against Civilians in Coastal and Western Central Syria in January–March 2025’, p 29.
100
Ibid.
101
M. Michael, ‘Syrian forces massacred 1,500 Alawites. The chain of command led to Damascus’, Report, Reuters, 30 June 2025; UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, ‘Violations against Civilians in Coastal and Western Central Syria in January-March 2025’, pp 29, 31–33.
102
C. Goldbaum, ‘Inside a City Swept by Roving Gunmen, Deadly Grudges and Fear’, The New York Times, 20 April 2025.
103
‘National Committee for Investigation and Fact-Finding: 938 Testimonies Were Collected, 238 Security and Army Personnel, 1,426 Mostly Civilians Were Killed’, Syrian Arab News Agency, 22 July 2025.
104
OHCHR, ‘UN Syria Commission finds March coastal violence was widespread and systematic: outlines urgent steps to prevent future violations and restore public confidence’, Press release, 14 August 2025.
105
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 158: ‘Prosecution of War Crimes’.
106
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 52: ‘Pillage’.
107
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 50: ‘Destruction and Seizure of Property of an Adversary’.
108
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 51: ‘Public and Private Property in Occupied Territory’.
109
UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, ‘Pillage and Plunder: Unlawful Appropriation and Destruction of Properties of Refugees and IDPs in Syria’, UN Doc A/HRC/58/CRP.2, 6 December 2024.
110
F. Abdulghany, ‘Details of the Ousted Regime’s Plot to Steal the Wealth of Syrian Citizens: Syrian Network for Human Rights’, Syrian Network for Human Rights, 13 August 2025.
111
‘Green Company’, Telegram.
112
UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, ‘Pillage and Plunder: Unlawful Appropriation and Destruction of Properties of Refugees and IDPs in Syria’, para 66.
113
Human Rights Watch, ‘Syria: Türkiye-Backed Armed Groups Detain, Extort Civilians’, Report, 14 May 2025.
114
Ibid.; ‘Update December 4 – Northern Syria Offensive’, Rojava Information Center, 4 December 2024.
115
Syrians for Truth & Justice, ‘Looted Homes and Risky Return: Extortions and Violations Against Returnees to Afrin After the Regime’s Fall’, Report, 22 July 2025.
116
G. Alsayed and H. Malla, ‘Syrian Villagers near the Golan Heights Say Israeli Forces Are Banning Them from Their Fields’, AP News, 19 December 2024.
117
Danon, ‘Israel Wages War for Land and Water in Syria’s South’.
118
E. Brachet, ‘Syrians Condemn Presence of Israeli Army and Forced Displacements in the Golan Heights’ Le Monde, 24 December 2024.
119
‘IOF Demolish Entire Neighborhood, Expel Residents in Quneitra, Syria’, Al Mayadeen English, 17 June 2025.
120
OHCHR, ‘Oral Update by Mr. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Chair of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic at the 59th Session of the Human Rights Council’, Press release, 27 June 2025.
121
UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, ‘Violations against Civilians in Coastal and Western Central Syria in January–March 2025’, p 29.
122
Ibid, p 41.
123
Ibid, p 38.
124
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 52: ‘Pillage’.
125
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 156: ‘Definition of War Crimes’.
126
ICRC, Customary IHL 129: ‘The Act of Displacement’; and Rule 132: ‘Return of Displaced Persons’.
127
UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, ‘Pillage and Plunder: Unlawful Appropriation and Destruction of Properties of Refugees and IDPs in Syria’, paras 4–5.
128
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 51: ‘Public and Private Property in Occupied Territory’; Article 53, Geneva Convention IV.
129
Geist Pinfold, ‘Why Is Israel Escalating Its Strikes Against Syria?’.
130
Article 147, Geneva Convention IV.
131
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 156: ‘Definition of War Crimes’.
132
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 51: ‘Public and Private Property in Occupied Territory’; Art 53, Geneva Convention IV.
133
Common Article 3, Geneva Conventions; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 158: ‘Prosecution of War Crimes’.
134
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 99: ‘Deprivation of Liberty’.
135
Common Article 3, Geneva Conventions; Arts 13 and 14, Geneva Convention III; Arts 27 and 32, Geneva Convention IV; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 90: ‘Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment’.
136
Common Article 3, Geneva Conventions; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 89: ‘Violence to Life’.
137
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 98: ‘Enforced Disappearance’; Customary IHL Rule 117: ‘Accounting for Missing Persons’; Customary IHL Rule 123: ‘Recording and Notification of Personal Details of Persons Deprived of their Liberty’; Customary IHL Rule 125: ‘Correspondence of Persons Deprived of Their Liberty’.
138
UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, ‘“Web of Agony”: Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Ill-Treatment by Former Government Forces in the Syrian Arab Republic’, Report, UN Doc A/HRC/58/CRP.3, 27 January 2025, para 77.
139
Amnesty International, ‘Syrie. Les personnes victimes de torture à la prison de Saidnaya et dans d’autres centres de détention en subissent les conséquences dévastatrices sans bénéficier du soutien le plus élémentaire’, Report, 26 June 2025; and ‘Syrie. Nombreux décès, actes de torture et violations des droits humains infligés aux personnes détenues au lendemain de la défaite de l’État islamique – Nouveau rapport’, Press release, 17 April 2024; UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, ‘“Web of Agony”: Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Ill-Treatment by Former Government Forces in the Syrian Arab Republic’, paras 134–220.
140
Alice Cuddy, ‘Syria: Stories from People Freed from Saydnaya Torture Prison’ BBC News (14 December 2024.
141
L. Mas and E. Delmas, ‘Syria’s Mass Graves Reveal Assad Regime’s Industrial-Scale Repression’, Le Monde, 30 January 2025.
142
Syrian Network for Human Rights, ‘SNHR’s Annual Report on Arrests/Detentions in Syria’, Report, 4 January 2025, p 6.
143
Synergy Hevdestî, ‘Afrin: The Annual Report on Arbitrary Detention, Enforced Disappearance, and Torture During 2024’, Report, 2025.
144
Human Rights Watch, ‘Syria: Türkiye-Backed Armed Groups Detain, Extort Civilians’.
145
Synergy Hevdestî, ‘Afrin: The Annual Report on Arbitrary Detention, Enforced Disappearance, and Torture During 2024’.
146
Human Rights Watch, ‘Northeast Syria: Camp Detainees Face Uncertain Future’, 7 February 2025.
147
A. Mathari, ‘ Lost in limbo: calls for repatriation of Swiss jihadist detainees in Syria grow louder’, Swissinfo, 31 July 2025.
148
L. M. Tayler, ‘ISIS Suspects Held in Syria: Repatriation Reset under New US, Syrian Leaders?’ International Centre for Counter-Terrorism,18 March 2025.
149
Ibid; B Eriksson, ‘In a New Era for Syria, States Must Take Responsibility for Their Islamic State-Affiliated Prisoners and Families’, Just Security, 28 February, 2025.
150
N. Alder, ‘“Someone’s listening”: Fear and longing in al-Hol’, Al Jazeera, 12 March 2025.
151
Tayler, ‘ISIS Suspects Held in Syria: Repatriation Reset under New US, Syrian Leaders?’.
152
‘UN Experts Urge End to ISIL-Related Arbitrary Detention in North-East Syria and Accountability for International Crimes’, Press release, OHCHR, 7 April 2025.
153
Alder, ‘’Someone’s listening’: Fear and longing in al-Hol’.
154
A. Spadaro ‘Repatriation of Family Members of Foreign Fighters: Individual Right or State Prerogative?’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 70, No 251 (2020), p 264.
155
Art 12(4), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rightsl adopted at New York, 16 December 1966; entered into force, 23 March 1976 (ICCPR).
156
European Court of Human Rights, H. F. and ors vFrance, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 14 September 2022, paras 272–76; See also Art 12(4), ICCPR.
157
Art. 3, Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted at New York, 20 November 1989; entered into force, 2 September 1990; Art 23, ICCPR.
158
Eriksson, ‘In a New Era for Syria, States Must Take Responsibility for Their Islamic State-Affiliated Prisoners and Families’.
159
Art 8(1), Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness; adopted at New York, 30 August 1961; entered into force, 13 December 1975; Report of the Secretary General, ‘Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality’, UN Doc A/HRC/25/28, 19 December 2013, para 13.
160
T. Mehra and C. Paulussen, ‘The Repatriation of Foreign Fighters and Their Families: Options, Obligations, Morality and Long-Term Thinking’, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 6 March 2019.
161
Danon, ‘Israel Wages War for Land and Water in Syria’s South’.
162
Civil Peace Group in Syria – Homs, ‘Report on Kidnappings and Disappearance’, Post on social media site Instagram, 18 February 2025.
163
‘Syria: UN Experts Alarmed by Targeted Abductions and Disappearances of Alawite Women and Girls’, Press release, OHCHR, 23 July 2025.
164
Common Article 3, Geneva Conventions; Arts 13 and 14, Geneva Convention III; Arts 27 and 32, Geneva Convention IV; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 90: ‘Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment’.
165
Common Article 3, Geneva Conventions; Arts 13 and 14, Geneva Convention III; Arts 27 and 32, Geneva Convention IV; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 90: ‘Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment’; and Customary IHL Rule 89: ‘Violence to Life’.
166
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 98: ‘Enforced Disappearance’.
167
ICRC, Customary IHL, Chapter 37: ‘Persons Deprived of Their Liberty’.
168
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 123: ‘Recording and Notification of Personal Details of Persons Deprived of their Liberty’.
169
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 105: ‘Respect for Family Life’.
170
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 117: ‘Accounting for Missing Persons’.
171
Syrian Network for Human Rights, ‘On World Children’s Day: SNHR’s 13th Annual Report on Violations Against Children in Syria’, Report, 20 November 2024.
172
Ibid.
173
Human Rights Watch, ‘Northeast Syria: Military Recruitment of Children Persists’, 2 October 2024.
174
Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, ‘Child Recruitment Practices Continue in Syria Before and After the Fall of Assad’, Report, 5 June 2025.
175
Common Article 1, Geneva Conventions; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 144: ‘Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law Erga Omnes’.
176
Human Rights Watch, ‘Northeast Syria: Military Recruitment of Children Persists’.
177
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 93: ‘Rape and Other forms of Sexual Violence’; ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 156: ‘Definition of War Crimes’.
178
S. Akrem, ‘As Political Tides Change in Syria, Yazidi and Kurdish Women Fear Renewed Persecution’, More to Her Story, 7 January 2025.
179
‘Syria: UN Experts Alarmed by Targeted Abductions and Disappearances of Alawite Women and Girls’.
180
UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, ‘Violations against Civilians in Coastal and Western Central Syria in January-March 2025’, para 30, p 47.
181
A. Zaccour, ‘Women Released From Syria’s Prisons Share Their Stories of Incarceration’, New Lines Magazine, 9 May 2025.
182
A. Khoja, ‘Advocacy Group Documents Rape, Torture against Kurds in Syria’s Afrin’, North Press Agency, 19 December 2024.
183
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 112: ‘Search for and Collection of the Dead’.
184
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 113: ‘Treatment of the Dead’.
185
CRC, Customary IHL Rule 114: ‘Return of the Remains and Personal Effects of the Dead’.
186
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 115: ‘Disposal of the Dead’.
187
UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, ‘Violations against Civilians in Coastal and Western Central Syria in January–March 2025’, p 26.
188
Mas and Delmas, ‘Syria’s Mass Graves Reveal Assad Regime’s Industrial-Scale Repression’.
189
‘Iraq’s Mass Graves Contain 400,000 Bodies: Observers’, Basnews, 6 November 2024.
190
‘ICTJ Welcomes Establishment of Syria’s New National Commissions for Transitional Justice and the Missing’, Press release, 22 May 2025.
191
A. Autin, ‘Syria’s Transitional Justice Commission: A Missed Opportunity for Victim-Led Justice’, Human Rights Watch, 19 May 2025.
192
ICTJ, ‘ICTJ Welcomes Establishment of Syria’s New National Commissions for Transitional Justice and the Missing’.
193
Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, ‘A Roadmap for Transitional Justice in Syria – September 2025’, 24 September 2025.
194
Ibid.