US-Venezuela

CONFLICT OVERVIEW

The short-lived conflict between the United States and Venezuela in early January 2026 follows two decades of animosity that ensued after the assumption to the presidency of Hugo Chávez in 1999.¹ His anti-imperialist rhetoric, particularly against the United States, was followed by a further deterioration in the relationship between the two nations during Nicolás Maduro’s rule, with ties deepening between the Venezuelan government and Cuba, China, Iran, and Russia, which provoked further concern in Washington.² The period between 2019 and 2025 was marked by a steady build-up in tensions, which included imposition of sanctions on Venezuela by the US government and saw it level accusations of narco-trafficking against President Maduro.³

On 28 July 2024, Venezuela held presidential elections that were, as described by The New York Times, ‘riddled with irregularities’.⁴ Electoral bias and undue influence were exerted by the government to ensure another Maduro presidency, a result enabled by the removal of opposition candidates early in the election process by the National Election Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral).⁵ In an updated criminal indictment, US prosecutors described President Maduro as the ‘de facto but illegitimate ruler of the country’ sitting ‘atop a corrupt, illegitimate government that, for decades, has leveraged government power to protect and promote illegal activity, including drug trafficking’.⁶

In 2025, strains in the relationship between the two States reached new heights after the US Department of Defense launched Operation Southern Spear on 2 September, with the United States bombing alleged drug-trafficking vessels it said were related to Venezuela. A total of 35 airstrikes in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific are known to have occurred between 2 September and 31 December 2025 in which 123 people were killedL. ⁷ – in clear violation of international human rights law.⁸ Two survivors were rescued.⁹

It is claimed, but not confirmed, that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) bombed a port in Venezuela in the last week of December 2025, reportedly targeting a location where Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan gang, was storing narcotics and possibly preparing to move the drugs onto boats. Without confirming the strike had occurred, Diosdado Cabello, the Minister of Interior, Justice, and Peace of Venezuela, denounced months of ‘imperial madness’ and ‘harassment, threats, attacks, persecution, robberies, piracy, and murders’.¹⁰

Key events in 2026

On 3 January 2026, the United States initiated Operation Absolute Resolve, which involved an invasion of Caracas by US Armed Forces and attacks on military sites elsewhere in the country. As part of the Operation, US Army Delta Force commandos captured President Maduro in his ‘safehouse’ and, together with his wife who was also detained, transported him back to the United States to face trial for alleged offences under US criminal law.¹¹

Conflict CLASSIFICATION AND APPLICABLE LAW

An international armed conflict between the United States and Venezuela may already have begun in late December 2025 with an alleged – but unconfirmed – airstrike against a Venezuelan port, but the conflict certainly existed on 3 January 2026. It ended very shortly thereafter.¹² Publicly, the Trump administration termed characterized Operation Absolute Resolve as a law enforcement.¹³ But the existence of an armed conflict is an objective – not subjective – determination under international law, as the US Department of Defense’s Law of War Manual itself recognizes.¹⁴Indeed, the force used by the United States clearly meets the test set out in the decision by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Tadić case on the criteria for the existence of an international armed conflict.¹⁵ Moreover, on 13 January 2026, the US Department of Justice released a previously classified memorandum assessing the legality of the (then future) Operation Absolute Resolve in which it acknowledged the existence of an armed conflict would occur in the event of its implementation. It further accepted the applicability of the law of armed conflict.¹⁶

The short-lived international armed conflict between the United States and Venezuela was regulated by customary international humanitarian law (IHL), in particular Hague Law rules governing the conduct of hostilities, and by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 to which both Venezuela and the United States are party. Venezuela is also a State Party to Additional Protocol I of 1977, but the United States is only a signatory.¹⁷ At the time of writing, the United States was not occupying Venezuela. This is despite US President Donald Trump’s claim in the aftermath of Operation Absolute Resolve that the United States ‘runs’ Venezuela and that it was ‘in charge’ of Venezuela.¹⁸

Despite occasional claims that an earlier non-international armed conflict existed between the United States and drug trafficking gangs linked to Venezuela, that is not correct. This is despite the suggestion by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in January 2026 that the United States was ‘at war against’ drug-trafficking organizations.¹⁹ In fact, the gangs at issue do not meet the organization criterion required by IHL, and the violence between the gangs and the United States did not meet the high threshold of intensity necessary for a non-international armed conflict to exist. Both criteria must be met for Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary IHL to apply to a situation of armed violence between a State and a non-State actor.

Venezuela is a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.20 This means that acts by Venezuelan nationals and conduct on the territory of Venezuela, including by the United States, potentially fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.

Venezuela has been under investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for alleged commission of crimes against humanity against individuals protesting against the government since at least April 2017. In 2020, the Office found a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against humanity, particularly in the context of detention, had been committed in Venezuela.²¹ On 27 June 2023, the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber I authorized the Office of the Prosecutor to resume its (suspended) investigation into Venezuela, and on 1 March 2024, the Appeals Chamber rejected the Venezuelan government’s appeal against that decision.²²

In December 2025, Venezuela’s parliament voted in favour of Venezuela’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute,²³ but, at the time of writing, this had not been followed by formal notice from the government to the depositary of the Statute, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Venezuela had earlier made the claim that sanctions imposed against it by the United States themselves amounted to crimes against humanity.²⁴ Although a preliminary examination by the Office of the Prosecutor was nominally still ongoing, Venezuela’s allegations lack legal merit. Crimes against humanity require a ‘widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population’ – a reality that the circumstances of the sanctions did not come close to meeting.²⁵

Compliance with IHL

Overview

While the US attack against Venezuela on 3 January 2026 was an act of aggression – a clear violation of the prohibition of inter-State use of force under jus ad bellum²⁶ – compliance with the rules of IHL is adjudged separately and without prejudice to any such determination.²⁷ IHL thus applies in parallel to the rules of jus ad bellum to govern the conduct of both the United States and Venezuela in any armed conflict. Applicable rules include the principles of distinction and proportionality in attack, as the US Department of Justice has recognized.²⁸

Operation Absolute Resolve does not appear to have involved the perpetration of serious violations of Hague Law rules of IHL by the US military – those that govern combat in an armed conflict (the ‘conduct of hostilities’). But the earlier attack allegedly targeting a port in Venezuela in December 2025, if it did in fact occur, would have done so.²⁹ Moreover, the detention and prosecution of President Maduro and the detention of his wife, Cilia Flores, involves compliance with multiple Geneva Law rules of IHL – those that protect persons in the power of the enemy.

Civilian Objects under Attack

Under customary IHL, attacks may only be directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects.³⁰ Civilian objects are all objects that are not military objectives³¹ and, as such, are protected against attack.³² Military objectives are those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective contribution to military action.³³

If the US airstrike against the port did indeed occur, this amounts to an attack on a civilian object. No casualties were reported.³⁴ The storage or transportation of narcotics is not an object which, by its nature, location, purpose, or use, makes an effective contribution to military action. The strike would therefore seem to have been a serious violation of IHL.³⁵‘Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives’ is a war crime within the material jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.³⁶

In the attack of 3 January 2026, US forces focused their attacks on a limited number of sites, primarily the Fort Tiuna Military Complex where Maduro was known to have several bunkers.³⁷ To the extent they are known, the targets appear to have been lawful military objectives. It also appears that US Cybercommand also shut down the electrical grid,³⁸ which would potentially have significant consequences for the civilian population. If, however, the impact on the electrical grid was short-lived, this would be unlikely to violate the principle of proportionality in attack.³⁹

Civilian under Attack

Under customary IHL, civilians enjoy general protection from the effects of hostilities, unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.⁴⁰ Accordingly, parties to any armed conflicts must at all times distinguish between combatants and civilians, and are prohibited from directing attacks against civilians.⁴¹ In case of doubt, persons should be treated as civilians.⁴²Civilians may be incidentally affected by attacks against lawful targets. However, such attacks must not be disproportionate,⁴³ and the attacker must take all feasible precautions to avoid or, in any event to minimize, incidental civilian impact.⁴⁴

General Caine, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of the US Military, provided details on the conduct of Operation Absolute Resolve at a press conference in Mar-a-Lago, Florida, on 3 January 2026. He revealed that multiple components of the US Armed Forces were involved in its execution.⁴⁵ More than 150 aircraft, he said, were launched from twenty military bases on land and at sea.⁴⁶ The extraction team entering Venezuelan airspace was transported in helicopters secured by combat aircraft that destroyed air defence systems around Caracas to ensure their safe passage.⁴⁷

Although all figures should be treated with caution, it is initially reported that seventy-seven people were killed – forty-two members of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, thirty-two Cuban Special Forces personnel, and three civilians (one a woman of eighty years struck in her home).⁴⁸ The European Union expressed its regret over the deaths that occurred during the US operation in Caracas to arrest President Maduro, while noting that the number of fatalities had still to be confirmed.⁴⁹ On 7 January 2026, Venezuelan Interior Minister Cabello announced a death toll ‘so far’ of 100 victims.⁵⁰ On 16 January 2026, revising the number of Venezuelan troops who had been killed upwards to forty-seven, including nine women, Venezuelan Minister of Defence Vladimir Padrino Lopez ‍said that a total of eighty-three people had been killed in the US attacks. More than 112 people were reported to have been injured. In Havana, Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel gave a speech in which he said Washington had ‘opened the door to an era of barbarism, plunder, and neo-fascism’.⁵¹

At the time of writing, however, there was no evidence of the targeting by the United States of civilians or of indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks affecting civilians during its 3 January 2026 military operations.

Protection of Persons in the Power of the Enemy

Under customary IHL, special protection is afforded to ‘protected persons’, including several categories of civilians or persons hors de combat who face a specific risk of harm, such as women, children, refugees, and IDPs.⁵² IHL provides certain fundamental guarantees for anyone who is in the power of a party to a conflict, prohibiting torture and other inhumane or degrading treatment, arbitrary detention, and unfair trials.

Prisoners of war

As is well known, on 3 January 2026, the United States captured President Maduro whom it continued to detain at the time of writing. Mr Maduro has been formally charged with offences concerning drug trafficking (‘narco-terrorism conspiracy’ and ‘cocaine importation conspiracy’) and weapons possession (including machine-guns).⁵³ In his constitutional capacity as commander in chief of the Venezuelan Armed Forces,⁵⁴ however, he is a prisoner of war under Geneva Convention III, as are all other ‘Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict’.⁵⁵ At his arraignment in New York on 5 January 2026, Mr Maduro claimed to have been kidnapped, shouting back at a member of the public who said that he would ‘pay’ for his crimes that he was a prisoner of war.⁵⁶

Under Geneva Convention III, prisoners of war ‘must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity’.⁵⁷ Video footage showed Mr Maduro in handcuffs coming from the plane after it landed at Stewart Air National Guard Base in New York state. He was then taken to the offices of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) where The White House shared a video of him at the office on social media, accompanied by the caption: ‘Perp walked.’⁵⁸

Under combatant’s privilege, whose customary law status is recognized by the United States,59 Mr Maduro is entitled to immunity from prosecution under domestic US law for any lawful involvement he has had in hostilities in any international armed conflict against the United States while he was president. It is thus stipulated by Geneva Convention III that: ‘No prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by international law, in force at the time the said act was committed.’⁶⁰ The privilege attaches to ‘all members of the armed forces regardless of their function or the service they provide’.⁶¹ That is so, even if he is a member ‘of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority’ that is ‘not recognized by the Detaining Power’.⁶²

Conceivably, the United States could have handed over Mr Maduro to the International Criminal Court for prosecution for crimes against humanity, had the Court issued an arrest warrant for him. But that is not the case (and that leaves aside the very significant animosity towards the Court of the current US administration).⁶³ The United States does not have domestic legislation allowing generally for the prosecution for crimes against humanity, although the Torture Victims Protection Act⁶⁴ would potentially allow Mr Maduro to be tried for acts of torture committed in Venezuela and for which he bears legal responsibility under an accepted mode of liability.

Furthermore, as a prisoner of war, Mr Maduro must be released and repatriated ‘without delay after the cessation of active hostilities’.⁶⁵ This obligation is tied to the ‘facts on the ground’, rather than to the formal end of an armed conflict or to an agreement between the Parties, although active hostilities must have ceased ‘with a sufficient degree of stability and permanence to activate the obligation’.⁶⁶ This would appear to have occurred at the time of writing (mid-January 2026). The Convention applied from the time Mr Maduro came into the power of the United States ‘and until’ his ‘final release and repatriation’.⁶⁷

While the United States is not party to Additional Protocol I, which deems ‘unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians’ to be a grave breach of its provisions, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has concluded that ‘unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war’ is a war crime under customary law.⁶⁸ The fact that the international armed conflict between Venezuela and the United States has since ended does not end the protections afforded by Geneva Convention III.

Nevertheless, US domestic precedent indicates that the judiciary will recognize his right to prisoner of war status while allowing prosecution for domestic crimes under US law. The most salient precedent is with respect to Panamanian President Manuel Noriega, who was captured in 1989 and taken to the United States. He was charged with, and convicted, for offences under US domestic law, namely for drug trafficking, money laundering, and racketeering.⁶⁹ In his Opinion in the case, Senior District Judge Hoeveler held that:

The Defendant Noriega is plainly a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention III. He is, and will be, entitled to the full range of rights under the treaty, which has been incorporated into U.S. law. Nonetheless, he can serve his sentence in a civilian prison to be designated by the Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons (this is a pre-guidelines case) so long as he is afforded the full benefits of the Convention.⁷⁰

In commenting on the decision in a post on Opinio Juris in 2006, Geoffrey Corn declared:

The court’s holding that General Noriega was entitled to prisoner of war status did not, however, prevent his criminal punishment for pre-capture violations of US law. As noted above, Noriega remains both an inmate and a prisoner of war. This ‘dual status’ is consistent with the provisions of the Third Geneva Convention, which in no way bars the prosecution and criminal sanction of prisoners of war for offenses committed prior to capture. The power of the detaining state bring such individuals to justice extends to violations of both the domestic law of the detaining state, as was the case with General Noriega; and international law, such as pre-capture violations of the law of war. Prisoner of war status does result in the requirement to comply with certain minimal procedural standards during such prosecutions, and respect for a number of very basic privileges while sentence is being served. But the example of General Noriega clearly demonstrates that these obligations are not particularly burdensome, nor did they in any way meaningfully interfere with the General’s trial and punishment.⁷¹

Prisoners of war may be tried for crimes committed not only during captivity but also before capture.⁷² But Geneva Convention III specifies that prisoners of war prosecuted under the domestic law of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture ‘retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the … Convention’.⁷³ This can include conduct that amounts to an offence under the domestic law of the Detaining Power.⁷⁴

That said, the issue of head-of-state immunity must be addressed. In the 1990s, President Noriega was denied head-of-state immunity from prosecution in the United States.⁷⁵ But in its 2002 judgment in the Arrest Warrant case, the International Court of Justice held that it was ‘firmly established that … certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal’.⁷⁶ Moreover, as Schmitt and others have observed,⁷⁷ the United States has observed that

in addition to immunity from criminal jurisdiction, heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers who enjoy personal immunity also benefit from personal inviolability, a protection that informs their treatment in the criminal context.⁷⁸

Such inviolability includes protection from arrest by other States while in office.⁷⁹

Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and treatment of detainees

Arbitrary deprivation of liberty is prohibited under IHL, as it is under international human rights law.⁸⁰ Among other fundamental rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is a party, protects the right of anyone in detention to habeas corpus⁸¹ – the right to challenge the legality of one’s detention.⁸² Having been detained in the context of an international armed conflict, Ms Cilia Flores is a protected person under Geneva Convention IV of 1949.⁸³ As Article 4(1) stipulates:

Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.⁸⁴

As a protected person, she is entitled ‘in all circumstances’ to respect for her person, honour, family rights, and religious convictions and practices. She must at all times be ‘humanely treated’ and ‘protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity’. She must be ‘especially protected’ against ‘any attack’ on her ‘honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault’.⁸⁵ Furthermore, she may not be punished for an offence she has not ‘personally committed’.⁸⁶

1
‘Venezuela y Estados Unidos: una relación de altibajos históricos’, Al Diálogo, 26 August 2025.
2
C. Caraballo and J. I. de Onzono, ‘Aliados del “oro negro” venezolano: la red que el chavismo tejió con Cuba, China, Rusia e Irán’, Euronews, 13 January 2026.
3
‘EE. UU. y Venezuela: la historia de sus principales disputas’, El Espectador, 3 January 2026.
4
I. E. Barros Leal and G. Glatsky, ‘A Timeline of Tension Between the US and Venezuela’, The New York Times, 3 January 2026 (Updated 7 January 2026).
5
Freedom House, ‘Venezuela, Election watch: 2024’, accessed 18 January 2026.
6
US District Court for the Southern District of New York, United States v Nicolas Maduro Moros, Diosdado Cabello Rondon, Ramon Rodriguez Chacin, Cilia Adela Flores de Maduro, Nicolas Ernesto Maduro Guerra, a/k/a ‘Nicolasito’, a/k/a ‘The Prince’, and Hector Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, Sealed Superseding Indictment, paras 5, 3.
7
Gamio, C. Rosenberg, and C. Savage, ‘Tracking U.S. Military Killings in Boat Attacks’, The New York Times, Updated 10 January 2026.
8
M. Schmitt, R. Goodman, and T. Bridgeman, ‘International Law and the U.S. Military and Law Enforcement Operations in Venezuela’, Just Security, 5 January 2026.
9
Gamio et al, ‘Tracking U.S. Military Killings in Boat Attacks’.
10
J. E. Barnes and T. Pager, ‘C.I.A. Conducted Drone Strike on Port in Venezuela’, The New York Times, 29 December 2025.
11
Barros Leal and Glatsky, ‘A Timeline of Tension Between the US and Venezuela’; G. Evans, ‘Spies, drones and blowtorches: How the US captured Maduro’, BBC, 4 January 2026; J. E. Barnes, T. Pager, and E. Schmitt, ‘Inside “Operation Absolute Resolve”, the US Effort to Capture Maduro’, The New York Times, 3 January 2026.
12
Although US President Donald Trump declared that the United States was prepared to conduct a second wave of attacks against Venezuela, he also said he did not think it would be necessary. Barnes, Pager, and Schmitt, ‘Inside “Operation Absolute Resolve”, the US Effort to Capture Maduro’.
13
‘Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Kristen Welker of NBC’s Meet the Press’, US Department of State, 4 January 2026.
14
US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War Manual, June 2015 (Updated July 2023), §§3.3.1, 3.32, 3.4, 3.4.2, 3.4.2.1, 3.4.2.3.
15
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, (Appeals Chamber) (Case No IT-94-1-AR72), 2 October 1995, para 70. See also ICRC, ‘How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?’, Opinion Paper, 2024, pp 9–10.
16
Assistant Attorney General Elliot Gaiser, ‘Memorandum for Legal Advisor, National Security Council’, Office of Legal Counsel, US Department of Justice, 23 December 2025, §II.
17
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts; adopted at Geneva, 8 June 1977; entered into force, 7 December 1978. Venezuela adhered to Additional Protocol I in 1998.
18
K. Liptak, K. Holmes, and J. Hansler, ‘A clearer picture is emerging of what Trump meant when he said the US will ‘run’ Venezuela’, CNN, 4 January 2026 (Updated 5 January 2026).
19
‘Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Kristen Welker of NBC’s Meet the Press’.
20
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; adopted at Rome, 17 July 1998; entered into force, 1 July 2002 (ICC Statute).
21
ICC, ‘Venezuela I: Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela I’, ICC Doc ICC-02/18.
22
Ibid.
23
I. Griner, ‘Venezuela seeks withdrawal from International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute’, Al Jazeera, 12 December 2025.
24
ICC, ‘Preliminary examination: Venezuela II’.
25
Art 7(1), ICC Statute.
26
See, eg, UN Geneva, ‘Venezuela: La ONU y América Latina claman por la paz y el respeto del derecho internacional’, News release, 5 January 2026; Schmitt et al, ‘International Law and the U.S. Military and Law Enforcement Operations in Venezuela’; M. D. Cooper, ‘Regarding United States Action in Venezuela’, American Society of International Law, 5 January 2026.
27
US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War Manual, §3.5.1.
28
Gaiser, ‘Memorandum for Legal Advisor, National Security Council’, §III.
29
In late December 2025, President Trump acknowledged in an interview that the United States had bombed a ‘big facility where ships come from’ as he talked about his administration’s campaign against Venezuela. Asked about it again days later, he said the United States attacked ‘in the dock area where they load the boats up with drugs’. He did not confirm whether the attack was conducted by the military or the CIA. N. Bertrand, Z. Cohen, and J. Sciutto, ‘Exclusive: CIA carried out drone strike on port facility on Venezuelan coast’, CNN, 30 December 2025.
30
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary IHL Rule 7: ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives’.
31
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 9: ‘Definition of Civilian Objects’.
32
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 10: ‘Civilian Objects’ Loss of Protection from Attack’.
33
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 8: ‘Definition of Military Objectives’. In addition, the object’s partial or total destruction, capture, or neutralisation must offer a definite military advantage in the prevailing circumstances.
34
Ibid.
35
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 156: ‘Definition of War Crimes’.
36
Art 8(2)(b)(ii), ICC Statute.
37
R. C. Berg, M. F. Cancian, J. S. Bermudez Jr., J. Jun, H. Ziemer, and C. H. Park, ‘Imagery from Venezuela Shows a Surgical Strike, Not Shock and Awe’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 January 2026.
38
S. Baker, ‘Trump says the US shut off the lights in Venezuela’s capital using “certain expertise”. Here’s how it may have done it’, Business Insider, 8 January 2026.
39
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 14: ‘Proportionality in Attack’.
40
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’.
41
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 1: ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants.
42
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 6: ‘Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’. The United States has accepted – after earlier denials – that this is a rule of customary law. US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War Manual, §5.4.3.4.
43
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 14: ‘Proportionality in Attack’.
44
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 15: ‘Principle of Precautions in Attack’.
45
D. Caine, ‘Press Briefing on Operation Absolute Resolve’, American Rhetoric, 3 January 2026.
46
M Olay, ‘This Week in DOW: Taking Down Maduro, Seizing Suspicious Vessels, Launching Arsenal of Freedom Tour’, US Department of War, 9 January 2026.
47
Caine, ‘Press Briefing on Operation Absolute Resolve’.
48
Berg et al, ‘Imagery from Venezuela Shows a Surgical Strike, Not Shock and Awe’; ‘Balance de víctimas tras la operación militar en Venezuela que terminó con la captura de Nicolás Maduro’, El Pinguino, 7 January 2026; ‘77 muertos identificados en ataques de United States: 42 militares venezolanos, 3 civiles y 32 cubanos entre las víctimas’, Conexión Migrante, 8 January 2026; A. Rodríguez, ‘Cuba dice que 32 efectivos suyos murieron durante la captura de Maduro por parte de EEUU’, My Journal Courier, 4 January 2026l.
49
‘La UE lamenta las muertes durante arresto de Maduro y dice que cifras están por confirmar’, Infobae, 8 January 2026.
50
Ibid.
51
‘Nearly 50 Venezuelan soldiers killed in US abduction of President Maduro’, Al Jazeera, 17 January 2026.
52
ICRC, Customary IHL Rules 134–138: ‘Chapter 39. Other Persons Afforded Specific Protection’.
53
US District Court for the Southern District of New York, United States v Nicolas Maduro Moros and ors.
54
Art 236(5), Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1999 (as amended through 2009).
55
Art 4(A)(1), Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; adopted at Geneva, 12 August 1949; entered into force, 21 October 1950 (Geneva Convention III).
56
M. Halpert, ‘“I’m a prisoner of war” – In the room for Maduro’s dramatic court hearing’, BBC, 5 January 2026.
57
Art 13, Geneva Convention III.
58
‘Video shows Maduro’s arrival in US and journey into custody’, BBC, 4 January 2026.
59
Gaiser, ‘Memorandum for Legal Advisor, National Security Council’.
60
Art 99(1), Geneva Convention III.
61
ICRC, Commentary on Article 4 of Geneva Convention III, Geneva, 2020, para 978.
62
Art 4(A)(3), Geneva Convention III [added emphasis].
63
‘Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court’, Press release, The White House, 6 February 2025; ‘Trump Launches Sanctions against the ICC’, JusticeInfo.net, 6 February 2025.
64
US Criminal Code Title 18, §2340A(a): ‘Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.’.
65
Art 118, Geneva Convention III.
66
ICRC, Commentary on Art 118, Geneva Convention III, paras 4452, 4455.
67
Art 5, Geneva Convention III.
68
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 156: ‘Definition of War Crimes’. See also ICRC, Commentary on Article 118 of Geneva Convention III, para 4464, and note 60.
69
President Noriega received a forty-year prison sentence in the United States. He was later extradited to France and then Panama, where he also faced convictions for murder and other crimes, dying in 2017 after serving time in prison in all three States.
70
US District Court for the Southern District of Florida, United States v Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791 S.D.Fla. (1992).
71
G. Corn, ‘Lessons from America’s Longest Held Prisoner of War’, Opinio Juris, 6 January 2006.
72
ICRC Commentary on Article 99 of Geneva Convention III, 2020, para 3958.
73
Art 85, Geneva Convention III.
74
ICRC Commentary on Article 85 of Geneva Convention III, 2020, para 3632.
75
S. Bomboy, ‘Looking Back: The Noriega case as legal precedent’, Blog post, National Constitution Center, 8 January 2026.
76
International Court of Justice,Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), Judgment, 14 February 2002, para 51.
77
Schmitt et al, ‘International Law and the U.S. Military and Law Enforcement Operations in Venezuela’.
78
United States, ‘Comments from the United States on the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Criminal Immunity of State Officials as Adopted by the Commission in 2022 on First Reading’, 2024, pp 3–4.
79
Schmitt et al, ‘International Law and the U.S. Military and Law Enforcement Operations in Venezuela’.
80
ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 99: ‘Deprivation of liberty’.
81
Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 35: Article 9 (Liberty and security of person)’, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/35, 16 December 2014, para 40.
82
Art 9(4), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force, 23 March 1976.
83
Schmitt et al, ‘International Law and the U.S. Military and Law Enforcement Operations in Venezuela’.
84
Art 4(1), Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; adopted at Geneva, 12 August 1949; entered into force, 21 October 1950 (Geneva Convention IV).
85
Art 27, Geneva Convention IV.
86
Art 33, Geneva Convention IV.