Skip to content
Explore

Non-international armed conflicts in Myanmar

© Sian Khai Thang Khan, Kayin State, 2023. The ICRC provides an emergency assistance to internally displaced persons.

Snapshot

This version was last updated on : 13 October 2026
Asset 941

At a Glance

Myanmar has faced protracted internal violence since independence, with long-standing ethnic armed groups challenging central authority and a series of military coups. Following the 2021 military takeover, mass protests evolved into NIACs between the Tatmadaw (Myanmar armed forces) and a wide array of organized opposition forces, including National Unity Government (NUG)-aligned People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) and established ethnic armed groups (EAGs), alongside entrenched Rohingya displacement and repression. The reporting period was marked by international proceedings concerning crimes against the Rohingya, major territorial gains by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) composed of three EAGs under ‘Operation 1027’, fighting between Myanmar armed forces and other EAGs and China mediated ceasefire efforts. Despite episodic truces, hostilities persisted into 2025, confirming the continuation of four NIACs. In contrast, two armed conflicts ongoing in 2025 had ended. 

Asset 680

THE ARMED CONFLICT(S)

Classification(s) and Parties to the Conflict(s)

  • Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and Arakan Army (AA)  
  • Non-International Armed between Myanmar and Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) 
  • Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) 
  • Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) 
Asset 718

CIVILIAN HARM

Myanmar’s armed conflicts continued to generate widespread civilian harm, marked by airstrikes that were often indiscriminate or directly targeted civilians, including in disaster-affected areas, and by extensive use of anti-personnel mines, unguided bombs, and armed drones. More than six million people have been displaced within and outside the country, propelled by unlawful attacks and abuses. Villages, displacement sites, schools, hospitals, and religious and cultural property were repeatedly struck, sometimes through deliberate scorched-earth tactics, causing high civilian casualties, long-term disruption of essential services and large-scale displacement within Myanmar and across borders. Escalating humanitarian needs  persisted after major natural disasters in 2024 and 2025, yet authorities continued to systematically impede aid to opposition-held areas and conducted further attacks that obstructed relief. Persons in the power of parties to the conflicts were subjected to killings, mutilation, torture, arbitrary detention, forced recruitment, and widespread sexual violence. A sustained pattern of terror tactics by the Tatmadaw was reported, with beheadings and village-wide arson, often coupled with murder, pillage, and forced conscription. Alarmingly, children faced high levels of killing, maiming and recruitment. 

Classification

Historical Background

Origins and ethnic armed groups

Myanmar has experienced persistent internal violence since its independence in 1948, with conflicts largely rooted in ethnic diversity and colonial-era legacy. Ethnic armed groups (EAGs) emerged as autonomous actors – sometimes as coalitions – contesting central authority across border regions. Successive coups and constitutions failed to resolve these fault lines or prevent recurrent State confrontations with ethnic armed groups and between such groups. 

Post-2021 coup dynamics

The February 2021 military takeover triggered mass protests that escalated into organized resistance. New anti-junta formations coalesced alongside long-standing EAGs. The National Unity Government (NUG) ‘declared war’ on the junta and created the People’s Defence Force (PDF) as an umbrella supported by various militias. By mid-2021, clashes were frequent and multi-regional, with the Tatmadaw – the Myanmar armed forces – employing heavy weaponry and airstrikes and resistance groups shifting to sustained ambushes and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Organization of parties

Opposition actors comprised PDFs recognized by the NUG, smaller People’s Defence Teams (PDTs), independent Local Defence Forces (LDFs), and established EAGs such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Arakan Army (AA). Despite varied agendas and uneven alignment with the NUG, these forces displayed command structures, operational coordination, and de facto territorial control in several areas.

Conflict classification under IHL

The combination of organized armed groups and protracted, geographically dispersed hostilities from March 2021 supports classification as multiple NIACs [hyperlink to glossary] between the Tatmadaw and diverse organized actors, some also fighting each other. These NIACs [hyperlink to glossary] have persisted in 2025 with fluctuating alliances and frontlines, and international responses – sanctions, statements, and limited diplomacy – have not altered underlying realities.

Rohingya crisis

In Rakhine, large-scale displacement of Rohingya and entrenched restrictions on movement intersect with parallel hostilities involving the Tatmadaw and the AA, with civilians caught between front lines and administrative controls.

Key Developments (2025–2026)

Several major developments occurred between January 2025 and June 2026: 

  1. The Gambia v Myanmar case before the International Court of Justice: Since January 2025, there have been further developments in the case by The Gambia against Myanmar under the Genocide Convention. Since November 2023, several States had filed declarations of intervention, which Myanmar opposed, but on 29 July 2025 the Court declared them admissible to the extent that they concerned the interpretation of the Genocide Convention. Additional interventions were later accepted, and merits hearings were held in January 2026. 
  2. Criminal proceedings initiated against Myanmar’s military leader: In 2026, Timor-Leste opened investigations under universal jurisdiction into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against the Chin population following the 2021 coup. Indonesia also accepted a criminal complaint against Min Aung Hlaing for alleged genocide and other international crimes against the Rohingya during earlier military operations in Rakhine State. 
  3. Weakening of the Three Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027:The Three Brotherhood Alliance made significant territorial gains after Operation 1027, but its cohesion weakened in 2025 and 2026. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army entered into Chinese-mediated ceasefires with the junta, while the Arakan Army remained the only member engaged in sustained, large-scale combat. Clashes between the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army further indicated internal fragmentation.
  4. Chinese influence on Myanmar’s conflict: China remained a central external actor due to its economic and strategic interests in Myanmar. It supported the junta while maintaining contact with border-based armed groups, mediated ceasefires, and pressured ethnic armed groups into negotiations. It also gave the junta armed drones and other aerial warfare technologies.
  5. Developments related to the December 2025 elections: After lifting parts of the state of emergency and establishing new oversight structures, the junta organized phased elections between December 2025 and January 2026. Opposition actors rejected the process; many townships were excluded from voting; critics faced repression; and international reactions remained divided. The pro-military party was declared the winner in February 2026, followed by legal changes that strengthened executive power. After the elections, Min Aung Hlaing stepped down as commander-in-chief and became president in April 2026. The new government announced peace talks, prisoner amnesties and sentence reductions, while ethnic armed groups and the National Unity Government (NUG) formed a rival coordination mechanism. International responses were mixed, with some States engaging with the new administration and others remaining cautious.
  6. The evolving violent situation between the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Arakan Army (AA): The ARSA and the Arakan Army continued to clash sporadically, mainly near the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. But available information indicates low-intensity violence  that falls below the threshold of a NIAC.
  7. Arakan Army accused of massacres against Rohingya in 2024 and deteriorating humanitarian situation in Rakhine state: Rohingya advocacy groups accused the Arakan Army of killing large numbers of Rohingya civilians during its 2024 offensive in Rakhine State, a claim the AA denied. The humanitarian situation in Rakhine and Cox’s Bazar also deteriorated, marked by worsening food insecurity and a sharp rise in the Rohingya refugee population.
  8. The nature and shifting alliances of the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs): PDFs emerged after the 2021 coup as diverse armed formations, ranging from local self-defence groups to larger combat forces. Their links to the NUG, ethnic armed groups, and independent command structures vary significantly and therefore their classification as parties to armed conflict must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
  9. Escalation of airstrikes and drone attacks carried out by Myanmar’s military: The Tatmadaw increasingly relied on airstrikes and drones in 2025 and early 2026, partly in response to battlefield losses and a weakened ground force. Resistance groups also expanded their use of drones, placing Myanmar among the conflicts with the highest recorded armed drone activity.

Non-International Armed Conflicts

Asset 680

Tatmadaw vs Arakan Army

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army

The NIAC between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army continued as the end of June 2026. Founded in 2009 with support from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the AA later refocused on Rakhine state and pursued the political objective of an Arakan Nation. The intensity threshold remained satisfied through frequent clashes, sieges, ambushes, drone and airstrikes, and use of heavy weaponry in Rakhine and neighbouring regions. The Arakan Army expanded its territorial control, holding most of Rakhine state, Paletwa township, the border with Bangladesh, and a long coastline. The organization requirement was also met. The AA retained political and military wings, identifiable leadership, strict discipline, and logistical capacities.

Asset 680

Tatmadaw vs Chin National Defense Force

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Chin National Defense Force (CNDF)

The NIAC between the Tatmadaw and the KIA continued as of mid-2026. The KIA is the armed wing of the Kachin Independence Organisation and has fought the Tatmadaw since the breakdown of the 1994 ceasefire in 2011. The threshold for intensity was reached through protracted armed violence, including hundreds of clashes, sustained offensives and counteroffensives, and the capture and recapture of military bases and towns. Fighting was especially intense in Bhamo, Hpakant, and other areas of Kachin and Sagaing, while the group retained control over several townships. The organization condition was satisfied by identifiable leadership, integrated allied forces, use of guerrilla and conventional tactics, and a logistical capacity.

Asset 680

Tatmadaw vs Kachin Independence Army

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)

The NIAC between the Tatmadaw and the KIA continued as of mid-2026. The KIA is the armed wing of the Kachin Independence Organisation and has fought the Tatmadaw since the breakdown of the 1994 ceasefire in 2011. The threshold for intensity was reached through protracted armed violence, including hundreds of clashes, sustained offensives and counteroffensives, and the capture and recapture of military bases and towns. Fighting was especially intense in Bhamo, Hpakant, and other areas of Kachin and Sagaing, while the group retained control over several townships. The organization condition was satisfied by identifiable leadership, integrated allied forces, use of guerrilla and conventional tactics, and a logistical capacity.

Asset 680

Tatmadaw vs the Karen Liberation Army

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Karen National Union (KNLA)

The NIAC between the Tatmadaw and the KNLA continued as of June 2026. The KNLA, which is the military wing of the Karen National Union (KNU), has fought the Myanmar military, in different forms, since Myanmar’s independence. It pursues autonomy and self-determination for the Karen people. The required level of intensity was satisfied by protracted armed violence, including repeated clashes, the use of armed drones, aerial bombardment, strategic offensives along the Myanmar-Thailand border, and significant fighting in Karen, Mon, Tanintharyi, and Kayah areas. The KNLA also formed alliances with other resistance actors and remained capable of sustained operations against the Tatmadaw. The organizational criterion was met through its brigade and battalion structure and its ability to enforce discipline among fighters. 

Parties to the Conflict(s) and Other Main Actor(s)

State Party

  • Myanmar

Non-State Parties

  • Arakan Army (AA)
  • Chin National Defence Force (CNDF)
  • Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
  • Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)
  • Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) until the conflict ended as of June 2026
  • Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) until the conflict ended by end-December 2025

Other Resistance Movements

  • Several Ethnic Armed Organisations
  • Various People’s Defence Forces

Foreign involvement

  • China

Civilian Harm

Reporting period: 2026

ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

There have been continued serious violations of IHL by parties to the multiple armed conflicts in Myanmar. The Tatmadaw’s air attacks were often directed at civilians or were indiscriminate, and continue to cause many casualties. The military have emplaced anti-personnel mines in and around villages, and frequently used unguided gravity bombs in populated areas, resulting in extensive civilian harm. Reports also indicate the Arakan Army used armed drones against Rohingya civilians fleeing toward Bangladesh. More than six million people have been displaced across and beyond the country, propelled by unlawful attacks and abuses.

Airstrikes by the Myanmar have frequently been indiscriminate or have targeted civilians deliberately. A number of airstrikes had hit monasteries, including those which have been offering humanitarian assistance to local populations. A long-standing tactic of the armed forces, the ‘four cuts’ policy – designed to cut armed groups off from food, finances, intelligence, and recruits – has involved scorched-earth tactics that punish and terrorize whole communities.

ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE

Tatmadaw air operations in opposition-held areas caused severe civilian harm and widespread destruction as part of a deliberate scorched-earth tactic. Schools and medical facilities have been regularly targeted. Religious and cultural sites suffered extensive damage, with hundreds of buildings destroyed and recent strikes killing civilians at monasteries and churches.

Attacks against Villages and Shelters

Recent Tatmadaw air operations in opposition-held areas generated severe civilian harm and widespread destruction. But the clearest ‘scorched earth’ tactic of the Myanmar military is a campaign of arson against civilian homes. In April 2026, Data for Myanmar published a report documenting that, since the coup in 2021, the military or its affiliates had been responsible for the destruction of more than 121,000 homes. In January 2026, for instance, Myanmar military forces launched ‘clearance’ operations along the Ayeyarwady River in Myingyan township. Intentional destruction of civilian objects in the absence of military necessity is a serious violation of IHL.

VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY

Serious violations against persons in the power of parties to the conflict were pervasive. Civilians, including public officials and local politicians, were murdered by the Tatmadaw and organized armed groups through summary executions, mass killings, and acts of mutilation. A sustained pattern of terror tactics by the Tatmadaw was reported, with beheadings, dismemberment, and village-wide arson, often coupled with murder, pillage, and forced conscription. Torture by State forces and non-State armed groups occurred in detention and during attacks, sometimes preceding execution, with electroshock and severe abuses of Rohingya detainees. Children faced high levels of killing, maiming and recruitment. Arbitrary detention expanded after the coup, forced recruitment persisted, and conflict-related sexual violence remained widespread and severe.

Murders of civilians were widespread and perpetrated by both State forces and organized armed groups. The Myanmar military has regularly targeted detention facilities controlled by the Arakan Army in Rakhine state, with most of the victims former soldiers, along with their families. In January 2026, four bombs were dropped on a facility located in Kyauktaw township, destroying two dormitories where prisoners were being held and a clinic where wounded soldiers were being treated. The strike killed at least twenty-one people and injured thirty others, including several women and children. In another attack in March 2026, the Myanmar Air Force targeted an Arakan Army detention camp in Ann township, killing at least 116 prisoners and injuring 32 others. Among those killed were said to be high-ranking military officials, medical personnel, and women and children, many of whom were trapped inside prison wards and burned alive. A prisoner and survivor of the attack, General Thaun Htun, called the incident a ‘calculated and ruthless act,’ given that the military was ‘fully aware’ of their location after having conducted multiple reconnaissance flights before the attack.