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Armed conflicts in Iraq

© Khalaf Mike Mustafa, 19 March 2025, Erbil, Iraq. Omar, 25, stepped on a landmine while he was herding his flock.

Snapshot

This version was last updated on : 18 November 2026
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At a Glance

In 2026, Iraq became a theatre of the armed conflict that began with the US and Israeli attack on Iran on 28 February. Iran-aligned factions fighting under the banner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), which had attacked US forces and Israel sporadically since late 2023, stepped up their attacks, while the United States and Israel struck the factions and positions of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an official part of Iraq’s security apparatus, without Iraq’s consent.

The US strikes engaged a new phase of the international armed conflict with Iraq that had begun in November 2023, while Israel’s triggered a new one. The non-international armed conflicts between the IRI and the two States, and the conflict between Iraq and Israel, ended in April 2026. The conflict with the United States ended in July, after joint US and Saudi strikes on PMF sites that also briefly brought Saudi Arabia into an international armed conflict with Iraq. Iran’s missile and drone strikes in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which continued throughout the year, amount to an ongoing international armed conflict between Iraq and Iran. Iraq, supported by an international coalition until its withdrawal at the end of September, remains in a non-international armed conflict with Islamic State. Türkiye’s military presence in the north continues to amount to an occupation, although active hostilities ended in April 2025.

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THE ARMED CONFLICT(S)

Classification(s) and Parties to the Conflict(s)

  • International armed conflict between Iraq and Iran
  • International armed conflict between Iraq and Israel (ended April 2026)
  • International armed conflict between Iraq and the United States (ended July 2026)
  • International armed conflict between Iraq and Saudi Arabia (ended July 2026)
  • International armed conflict between Iraq and Türkiye (ongoing by occupation; hostilities ended April 2025)
  • Non-international armed conflict between Iraq, supported until end-September 2026 by States contributing to the Combined Joint Task Force of “Operation Inherent Resolve” (CJTF-OIR), and Islamic State
  • Non-international armed conflict between the United States and the Islamic Resistance of Iraq (IRI) (ended April 2026)
  • Non-international armed conflict between Israel and the IRI (ended April 2026)
  • Türkiye v PKK (ended in April 2025; please see the War WATCH report on Türkiye)
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CIVILIAN HARM

Civilian harm in 2026 was concentrated in March and April and in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Iran repeatedly struck members of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties and the camps housing their families, before and long after the April ceasefire, in violation of the principle of distinction. Drones launched at US positions frequently fell on homes in Erbil and Baghdad, while US, Israeli, and Saudi strikes on Iraqi forces also killed civilians and repeatedly hit ambulances and medical units. Many attacks could not be attributed to a specific party. The hostilities disrupted energy supplies and education across the KRI for months. Islamic State continued sporadic attacks on civilians, and an Iran-aligned group abducted a US journalist in what bore the hallmarks of hostage-taking. The transfer of more than 5,700 men and boys from Syria raised serious concerns over detention conditions, torture, and unfair trials, while more than 1,200 Yazidi women abducted by Islamic State remain missing.

Classification

Historical background

The territory that makes up contemporary Iraq was, at one time, part of the Ottoman Empire. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1920, the Kurdish people, who had lived in the region for centuries, had the opportunity to establish their own independent State for the first time in their history. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne signed by Türkiye and some Allied Powers, however, denied the coming into existence of an independent Kurdish State and instead divided Kurdish territory up, with it now spanning Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Türkiye. Iraq, as it exists today, gained independence from Britain in 1932, but was only allowed to join the League of Nations subject to the condition that the rights of Kurds in Iraq were protected. Iraq has engaged in various international armed conflicts over the years including with Iran, Kuwait, and the United States. Much of the instability in Iraq today stems from its various conflicts with the US.

An Autonomous Kurdistan

The Kurds were a nomadic people that were living in the region before the Arab conquest of Mesopotamia in the seventh century. Kurds have long struggled for an independent State and have been subject to persecution in Iraq, Türkiye, Syria, and Iran. In 1974, then-leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein introduced the Law for Autonomy in the Area of Kurdistan and gave Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani two weeks to agree to it. Barzani refused on the basis that the law gave more control to Baghdad and covered significantly less territory than envisaged by earlier promises. Kurdistan, as it autonomously exists today in Iraq, gained de facto autonomy after the 1991 Gulf War. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – an alliance of Kurdish political parties – held an election May 1992 to inject a formal governmental structure into the autonomous region. It was eventually in 2005, with the adoption of the new Iraqi Constitution, that the full autonomy of Kurdistan was formally recognized.

The situation between Türkiye and the Kurds in Iraq

Iraq has seen long-standing tensions between Türkiye and the Kurds. Following a 1980 coup in Türkiye, tensions between the Turkish government and the Kurdish population in Türkiye escalated, culminating in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’s first armed attacks in 1984. This initiated a non-international armed conflict between Türkiye and the PKK on Turkish territory that, albeit with some interruptions, endured until April 2025.

A Turkish presence in northern Iraq

Although Türkiye has had some kind of presence in northern Iraq since Saddam Hussein gave it permission to advance five kilometres into Iraqi territory in 1984, Ankara has reportedly been establishing outposts in northern Iraq since 2018. In January 2023, Reuters reported that there were about eighty-seven Turkish bases in northern Iraq, although numbers floated have ranged from ‘more than a hundred’ to thirty-seven. The BBC reported that Ankara now controls more than 2,000 square kilometres of land in northern Iraq and that it had built over 600 kilometres of roads to connect its bases and outposts. As a justification for its presence, Türkiye stated that the bases were in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter and that its ‘fight against terrorism’, referring to the PKK, ‘is carried out in coordination and close cooperation’ with Iraq. Ankara has, however, not approached Baghdad for consent to construct the bases and Iraqi authorities have ‘complained about Ankara’s incursions’.

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Islamic State) in Iraq

By 2014, Iraq was engaged in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) with Islamic State. Following the fall of Mosul in June 2014, the Iraqi government requested international assistance, leading to the formation of an international Combined Joint Task Force as part of “Operation Inherent Resolve” (CJTF-OIR) and to the provision of support by Kurdish Peshmerga. The campaign against the Islamic State intensified until late 2017, when the Islamic State lost key strongholds and Iraq declared the border secured and the group defeated. States involved in CJTF-OIR ended combat missions but continued to support Iraq, including through transport, refuelling, surveillance, advising and training. Shia militias organized in Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU) also fought Islamic State; though affiliated with the Iraqi State since 2016, many of their factions operated largely outside government control.

Key developments (2023-2026)

  1. Oil Relations Between Baghdad and Erbil: Almost one third of all the oil in Iraq is located in the Kurdistan region. In the absence of legislation setting out how Iraq and Kurdistan are to share profits from oil and gas exports, Kurdistan started exporting oil on its own. For years, Baghdad and Erbil have failed to come to an agreement on revenue-sharing from oil. In the latter half of 2025, relations improved and the KRG, the Iraqi oil ministry, and oil companies operating in Kurdistan, agreed to resume exports from Kurdistan through Türkiye after a two-and-a-half-year hiatus.
  1. Provincial, Regional, and Parliamentary Elections: A series of elections have been held in Iraq and Kurdistan in recent years. In the December 2023, provincial elections, the Shia Coalition Framework, a ‘loose coalition’ of Shia Muslim groups won the most seats. Kurdistan’s parliamentary elections were held in October 2024 with the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan taking the top two spots respectively. On 11 November 2025, Iraq held parliamentary elections. No party won an outright majority – the Reconstruction and Development party won the most seats, the State of Law party was second, and the League of the Righteous party was third. A new Prime Minister, businessman Ali al-Zaidi, was only sworn in in Mya 2026.
  1. Improved Relations with Türkiye: Turkish President Recep Erdoğan visited Iraq for the first time in thirteen years in April 2024. More meetings between the two States have taken place since then, indicating improved relations between the States after decades of disputes over security.
  1. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq Comes to an End: The UN Security Council established UNAMI in 2003 to help Iraq deal with its years of internal conflict, occupation, and Islamic State. In July 2024, the Security Council voted to end the mission with it officially coming to an end in December 2025.
  1. ‘Transition Plan’ for the CJTF-OIR and Participating States: In September 2024, the US and Iraq decided on a ‘two-phase transition plan for CJTF-OIR operations in Iraq’ to end. The first phase of plan was to start at the end of September 2024 and concerned the complete withdrawal of CJTF-OIR forces from certain parts of Iraq. This was to be completed by the end of September 2025. This phase was extended for one year. The second phase concerns an agreement that the CJTF-OIR will still be able to operate out of Erbil against IS in Syria.
  1. Islamic State Detainees Moved into Iraq from Syria: In January and February 2026, the US transferred more than 5,000 IS detainees from prisons and camps in Syria to various facilities in Iraq.
  1. PKK Banned and Subsequently Disarms and Dissolves: In March 2024, the Iraqi government designated the PKK as a ‘banned’ organization. In February 2025, imprisoned PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, called on the PKK to lay down arms, dissolve, and end its conflict with Türkiye. In May 2025, the group announced that it would disband and that ‘all activities’ carried out under the group’s name have come to an end. The repatriation of PKK members and civilians to Türkiye as well as the full and final disarmament of the PKK is expected to be completed by the end of November 2026.
  1. Disarmament of Some Iranian-backed Militias in Iraq: In April 2025, several Iranian-backed militias were prepared to disarm in order to avoid a conflict with the United States. In June 2026, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi gave all Iranian-backed militias and other militias operating outside of Iraqi State control until 30 September 2026 to surrender their weapons. Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Imam Ali Brigades, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Saraya al-Salam has also agreed to disarm by the deadline.
  1. Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) Strikes on Jordan: In January 2024, the IRI launched an attack on a US base in Jordan, killing three US service members and injuring forty others. In early March 2026, the Saraya Awliya al-Dam, a member of the IRI, launched an attack on US positions on Jordanian territory with more attacks carried out throughout March 2026.
  1. Strikes on United Arab Emirates Nuclear Plant: On 17 May 2026, the UAE intercepted drones targeting its nuclear plant. The attack was unclaimed, but UAE officials blamed it on Iranian-backed militias operating in Iraq.
  2. A Growing Houthi Presence in Iraq: Although Yemen’s Houthis (also called Ansar Allah) have had a presence in Iraq since at least 2011, in September 2024 it was reported that the groups opened a political office in Baghdad. The Houthis also reportedly have ‘technical adviser teams’ in Iraq. The Houthis have operated alongside Iraqi militias within Iraq before and in July 2026, Saudi Arabian intelligence suggested that the Houthis were involved in an attack on Saudi Arabia that was launched from Iraqi territory allegedly by Iranian-backed militias.

International Armed Conflicts

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Iraq vs Iran

International Armed Conflict between Iraq and Iran

On 15 January 2024, a short-lived IAC between Iraq and Iran was triggered when the IRGC launched missiles into Erbil, Kurdistan. Iraq condemned the act as one of ‘aggression’ and a violation of its sovereignty. No further incidents were reported between the two States in 2024 and 2025. A second IAC broke out on 4 March 2026 when the IRGC launched a series of drone attacks on military bases in Erbil. Strikes continued and were not limited to Kurdistan – a strike in early April hit a US facility in Baghdad. Attacks on Iraq continued in May, June, July, August, and September 2026. The IAC is, as of early September 2026, ongoing.

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Iraq vs Israel

International armed conflict between Iraq and Israel Ended April 2026

A short-lived IAC between Israel and Iraq was triggered on 26 October 2024 when Israel launched Operation ‘Days of Repentance’ on Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Israel also used Iraqi airspace, without Iraqi consent, to target sites in Iran. No further attacks from Israel on Iraq were reported in either 2024 or 2025. Another short-lived IAC between Israel and Iraq started on 28 February 2026 when Israel (and the US) launched attacks on the IRI in Iraqi territory without Iraqi consent. Israeli attacks on Iraqi territory continued in March and April 2026. At the date of reporting (3 September 2026), no further Israeli strikes on Iraqi territory have been reported, meaning the Israel v Iraq IAC has been declassified.

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Iraq vs the United States

International armed conflict between Iraq and the United States (US) Ended July 2026

An IAC between the United States and Iraq was triggered on 21 November 2023 when the US conducted airstrikes on IRI militias on Iraqi territory without Iraqi consent. While Iraq expressly invited US support under the CJTF-OIR framework to counter the Islamic State, that consent is limited to operations against that armed group. Strikes directed at actors unconnected to the Islamic State – including individuals formally within Iraqi armed forces – likely fall outside the scope of that invitation. This assessment is reinforced by the consistent condemnation of the US airstrikes by the Iraqi government. Such strikes continued until January 2024 after which there were no further strikes until March 2026 when the US again started launching attacks on IRI groups in Iraq without Iraqi consent. The last reported US strike was in July 2026. As such, as of September 2026, this IAC has ended.

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Iraq vs Saudi Arabia

International Armed Conflict between Iraq and Saudi Arabia Ended July 2026

Saudi Arabia triggered an IAC with Iraq when it launched joint airstrikes with the US on Iranian-backed militias in Iraq on 28 July 2026 without Iraqi consent. As of September 2026, no further strikes have been reported, meaning that the IAC has ended.

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Iraq vs Türkiye

International armed conflict between Iraq and Türkiye

In the absence of valid consent by Iraq, Türkiye’s continuing cross-border operations in Iraqi territory against the PKK continue to amount to as an international armed conflict (IAC). In May 2025, however, the PKK permanently laid down their arms with final disarmament to be completed by November 2026. No further attacks from Türkiye on the PKK in Iraqi territory were reported after April 2025. This means that Türkiye’s conflict with the PKK in Iraq has come to a permanent end, but the presence of Turkish forces without Iraqi consent means that a continued IAC through military occupation persists.

Non-International Armed Conflicts

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Iraq, supported by the CJTF-OIR vs IS

Non-international armed conflict between Iraq, supported by the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-OIR), and the Islamic State (IS)

IS (which emerged from the Islamic State of Iraq, expanded into Syria and became a distinct entity after breaking with al-Qaeda) has remained active despite its 2019 territorial defeat. It operates from remote Syrian areas, using decentralised cells for flexibility while retaining direction from a central leadership issuing guidance on military, economic and resource management. Islamic State continues to conduct coordinated and sustained attacks, recruit and train fighters, resupply from captured materiel, and maintain financing while projecting authority in the areas under its influence, evidencing sufficient organization under IHL. Although Iraqi armed forces, with CJTF-OIR support, conduct operations against the Islamic State’s infrastructure, degrading its capacity for large-scale attacks, the group retains an ability to coordinated violence. Even though some States forming part of the CJTF-OIR no longer carry out airstrikes in Iraq, their ongoing operational support satisfies the support-based approach and renders them parties to the pre-existing NIAC. The frequency and intensity of hostilities meet the intensity threshold, and the NIAC between Iraq, supported by the CJTF-OIR, and the Islamic State continues.

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United States vs IRI

Non-international armed conflict between the United States (US) and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) (Iraq) Ended April 2026

Following an escalation in clashes in October 2023, Iran-linked Shia militias in Iraq fighting under the banner of IRI conducted rocket and drone attacks on US forces and facilities in Iraq and Syria, met by repeated US airstrikes on IRI sites. The resulting casualties and damage indicate that violence met the intensity threshold required for a NIAC. The IRI is a network of PMF-affiliated Shia factions that, though formally integrated within Iraq’s security architecture, operate independently with their own hierarchies, units, logistics, media outlets and training. Despite their autonomy, IRI factions demonstrate a certain level of coordination and shared communication networks, suggesting that they be regarded as a decentralized organized armed group party to a NIAC. While Iran’s backing for the IRI is significant, evidence that the former also participates in the planning and supervision of military operations of the latter is insufficient, thereby excluding that the armed conflict be seen as an international one. Taken together, these elements suggest that the intensity and organization thresholds required for a NIAC to exist were met. The violence between the IRI and the US declined after July 2024 and the conflict was declassified. No exchanges of fire were reported in the latter half of 2024, the entirety of 2025, and the first two months of 2026. Violence, however, flared again after the outbreak of the US/Israel/Iran IAC on 28 February 2026. A new NIAC came into existence in March to April 2026. Almost immediately following the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the IRI started targeting US positions in Iraq and Jordan, and the attacks continued throughout March 2026. However, confrontations again declined from April 2026 and the NIAC is assessed to have ended by April 2026.

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Israel vs IRI

Non-international armed conflict between Israel and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) Ended April 2026

The IRI started attacking Israel in November 2023. The IRI is a network of PMF-affiliated Shia factions that, though formally integrated within Iraq’s security architecture, operate independently with their own hierarchies, units, logistics, media outlets and training. Despite their autonomy, IRI factions demonstrate a certain level of coordination and shared communication networks, suggesting that they be regarded as a decentralized organized armed group party to a NIAC. While Iran’s backing for the IRI is significant, evidence that the former also participates in the planning and supervision of military operations of the latter is insufficient, thereby excluding that the armed conflict be seen as an international one. Taken together, these elements suggest that the intensity and organization thresholds required for a NIAC to exist were met. Attacks between the two parties dropped after November 2024 and did not flare in 2025. The conflict thus ended in November 2024. Violence again flared on 28 February 2026, when Israel launched attacks on the IRI in Iraqi territory. However, no attacks have been reported since April 2026, the date from which the NIAC has been declassified.

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Türkiye vs PKK

Non-International Armed Conflict between Türkiye and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) Ended April 2025

Please see the War WATCH entry on Türkiye.

Key parties to the conflict

State Parties

  • Iraq
  • United States
  • Türkiye
  • Israel
  • Saudi Arabia
  • Iran
  • States contributing to the Combined Joint Task Force of “Operation Inherent Resolve” (CJTF-OIR), including the United Kingdom, Spain, Canada, Australia (at least until December 2024), Syria, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy.

Non-state parties

  • Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
  • Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) (from October 2023 to February 2024)
  • Islamic State (IS)

 

Civilian Harm

Reporting period: 2026

ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

Civilians were killed and injured in several overlapping armed conflicts during 2026, especially in March and April in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Iran repeatedly struck members of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties, who are civilians, in violation of the principle of distinction. Strikes by the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia on Iraqi forces also caused civilian casualties, and Islamic State continued sporadic attacks on civilians. Many other incidents could not be attributed to a specific party.

Attacks on Iranian Kurdish opposition parties

Throughout 2026, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps carried out missile and drone strikes on the bases of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The deadliest, in July, killed nine people at a Komala Party base near Sulaymaniyah, and the strikes continued long after the April ceasefire. Members of these political parties are civilians who would lose protection only for such time as they directly participate in hostilities. Iran openly acknowledged many of the strikes, showing that the people at the bases were the object of the attacks, which violated the principle of distinction.

Other attacks affecting civilians

Strikes by Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States on Iraqi forces also caused casualties among civilians and police, including a follow-up strike in Mosul that wounded police officers evacuating their colleagues. The police are ordinarily civilians under IHL. Islamic State continued sporadic attacks on civilian areas, including mortar fire on a village in Kirkuk governorate that killed one woman. Mortar fire directed at a village is prohibited either as a direct attack on civilians or as an indiscriminate attack unless it targets a lawful military objective.

ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE

Homes, camps, schools, medical units and energy facilities were damaged during the period, mainly in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and around military sites across the country. Iran repeatedly attacked camps housing the families of Iranian Kurdish opposition party members, and drones launched at US positions frequently fell on residential neighbourhoods. Repeated follow-up strikes on ambulances and medical units raised serious concerns.

Attacks on camps housing families

Iran repeatedly struck camps in the Kurdistan Region housing members of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties and their families, before and long after the April ceasefire between Iran and the United States. One strike in April, which Iran publicly claimed, killed a seventeen-year-old boy. These camps are civilian objects, and the repeated and deliberate character of the strikes leaves little doubt that they were the object of the attacks, which violated the principle of distinction.

Harm to residential areas

Drones launched at sites hosting US forces in Erbil and Baghdad were often intercepted over residential neighbourhoods and fell on homes, injuring civilians, including children. Some of these attacks were claimed by Iran-aligned factions, while responsibility for others has not been established. Launching drones at military objectives in densely populated areas raises serious concerns about compliance with the obligation to take all feasible precautions and may be indiscriminate attacks. Strikes on Iraqi military sites near towns also killed civilians in their homes.

VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY

Serious protection concerns persisted for those in the power of the parties. The transfer of thousands of men and boys from Syria to Iraq left many in overcrowded detention, amid credible allegations of torture and fears of unfair trials and executions. An Iran-aligned group abducted a foreign journalist in an act bearing the hallmarks of hostage-taking. Women and children faced heightened risks, and many families still do not know the fate of relatives missing since the conflict with Islamic State.

In early 2026, US forces transferred more than 5,700 men and boys suspected of links with Islamic State from detention centres in north-east Syria to a prison near Baghdad. Many arrived seriously ill, fifteen died during or after the transfer, and the prison was filled well beyond its capacity. Detainees reported torture used to extract confessions. These conditions raise serious concerns under the absolute prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment, and the obligation to provide detainees with adequate food, water and medical care.