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Armed conflicts in Mali

©S.N,ICRC. 27 July 2024. Taoudeni region, Mali. Local livestock farmers receive humanitarian assistance after their livelihoods were threatened by ongoing conflict and armed violence in the area.
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At a Glance

For more than a decade, Mali has experienced overlapping non international armed conflicts (NIACs), pitting Malian armed forces (FAMa) and allied militias against Tuareg separatist coalitions and Islamist groups such as Jama’at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP). The 2015 Algiers Accords failed to end violence, and former Plateforme and CMA coalitions reconfigured into Cadre Stratégique Permanent pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement (CSP-PSD), later Cadre stratégique pour la défense du people de l’Azawad (CSP-DPA) and then the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA), which now claims to represent Azawad and seeks independence. External involvement shifted from French and United Nations (UN) support to backing by the Wagner Group, rebranded then as Africa Corps. Russia is therefore now party to several NIACs in Mali. Since 2026, the situations has been marked by coordinated attacks launched by the FLA and JNIM in Kindal in April, a new economic conflict strategy employed by the JNIM, and Mali’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC).

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The Armed Conflicts

Classifications and Parties to the Conflicts

  1. Non-international armed conflict between Mali (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) and Jama’at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)
  2. Non-international armed conflict between Mali (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) and Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP)
  3. Non-international armed conflict between Mali (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) and the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) (formerly known as the Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad – CSP-DPA and before that, the Cadre stratégique permanent pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement – CSP-PSD) coalition
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Civilian Harm

Hostilities in Mali were marked by serious violations of IHL. ISSP attacked an internally displaced persons (IDPs) camp and a civilian convoy, while JNIM employed improvised explosive devices against civilian transportation, ordered village evacuations and attacked homes, villages, livestock and livelihoods, prompting forced displacement. FAMa drone strikes repeatedly hit civilian objects, including busy markets. Attacks on Base Aérienne 101 damaged a humanitarian aircraft, raising concerns regarding distinction, proportionality and precautions. FAMa and Wagner forces were accused of widespread killings, mass arrests, arbitrary detention, and enforced disappearances, often with ethnic targeting, while JNIM and ISSP carried out summary executions and abductions, as well as hostage-taking and enforced disappearances for the former. Severe sexual violence and recruitment and use of children, perpetrated by both State and non-State actors, were also reported.

Historical Background

Origins

For more than a decade, Mali has faced a complex and evolving landscape of non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) involving both separatist and Islamist armed groups. This includes hostilities against Tuareg separatist factions in northern Mali and against Islamist groups, notably Jama’a Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP). Other episodes of armed violence have involved ethnic militias and self-defence groups, but the confrontations have not met the organization or intensity thresholds to qualify as NIACs under IHL.

Coalitions and peace accord

Between 2014 and 2015, armed groups coalesced into two coalitions, the Plateforme des Mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d’Alger (Plateforme), comprising mostly pro-government groups, and the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), a separatist coalition. Confrontations between the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), Plateforme, and the CMA culminated in the Algiers Accords signed on 20 June 2015. Despite the agreement, armed clashes continued.

Evolution of Tuareg separatist groups

In 2021, the former CMA and Plateforme coalitions merged to form the Cadre Stratégique Permanent pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement (CSP-PSD) to support the implementation of the peace accordRenewed hostilities in 2023, the recapture of Kidal by FAMa, and the formal collapse of the Algiers Accords in January 2024 marked a major deterioration. The CSP-PSD then became the Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad (CSP-DPA), before being dissolved into the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) in November 2024, which claimed to represent Azawad and pursue independence in northern Mali.

Foreign involvement

FAMa were initially supported by the French Armed Forces and United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). France ended its mission on 9 November 2022, and MINUSMA completed its withdrawal on 31 December 2023. Since 2021, FAMa have been supported by the Wagner Group and later Africa Corps. Russian-backed operations intensified in 2024. In parallel, Ukraine allegedly assisted Tuareg separatists with intelligence, training and drones, prompting Mali to sever diplomatic ties with Ukraine, while Ukraine denied providing arms, intelligence or drone support.

Key Developments (2025–2026)

  1. Russia now a party to several NIACs in Mali: Russia, through Africa Corps, has become a party to Mali’s NIACs against JNIM, the ISSP and the FLA. In June 2025, Africa Corps replaced Wagner and operates under the direct supervision of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Africa Corps’ direct participation in hostilities, including airstrikes, ground operations, convoy support, joint bases and operations alongside the FAMa, makes Russia a co-belligerent bound by IHL.
  2. Coordinated attacks launched by the FLA and JNIM in Kidal in April 2026: The April 2026 coordinated attacks marked a significant escalation, including the capture of Kidal and attacks on strategic sites. Although the FLA and the JNIM publicly coordinated against a common enemy, their relationship did not absorb the two pre-existing NIACs into a single conflict. They lacked a unified command structure, maintained separate leadership, pursued different objectives, and differed on rules of engagement, despite operational coordination and further joint attacks.
  3. JNIM’s new ‘economic conflict strategy’: Targeting oil convoys and gold mines: From late 2025, JNIM increasingly targeted fuel convoys and gold mining operations to exert economic pressure on Mali. The FAMa and Africa Corps responded through convoy escorts and military operations, but attacks continued. JNIM also placed a partial siege around Bamako for many months, exacerbating hardship in the civilian population.
  4. Mali’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court: Mali formally declared it was withdrawing from the Rome Statute on 24 June 2026. The withdrawal will take effect on 24 June 2027, but will not effect any investigations or prosecutions before the Court prior to that date.

Non-International Armed Conflicts

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Mali vs JNIM

Non-International Armed Conflict between Mali (supported by Russia through Africa Corps) and Jama’a Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM)

The Additional Protocol II (AP II)-type NIAC between Mali, supported by Russia through Africa Corps, and JNIM continued as of June 2026. The conflict forms part of Mali’s broader governance challenges, rooted in weak State control, local grievances and jihadist insurgency. Russia became a party through Africa Corps, which intervened on Mali’s invitation and directly supported FAMa. The intensity threshold was met through sustained and escalating hostilities from 2023 to 2026, including coordinated attacks, ambushes, airstrikes, attacks on military bases, fuel convoys and economic assets, civilian casualties, displacement, territorial contests and repeated operations involving FAMa, Africa Corps and JNIM. JNIM’s operations were planned and frequent, and were seemingly coordinated with other non-State armed groups. The organization requirement was satisfied by JNIM’s tiered command structure, central and regional leadership, internal discipline through the ‘Shura Council’, financing, logistics, and ability to conduct sustained military operations. Its territorial control also allowed implementation of AP II.

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Mali vs ISSP

Non-international armed conflict between Mali (supported by Russia through Africa Corps) and Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP)

The NIAC between Mali, supported by Russia through Africa Corps, and ISSP, also known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, persisted into 2026. The conflict forms part of Mali’s broader crisis since 2012, with ISSP emerging in 2015 and exploiting ethnic grievances, local rivalries and weak State control. Russia became a party through Africa Corps, which intervened at Mali’s invitation. The intensity threshold was met through protracted armed violence, ambushes of military convoys, assaults on bases, and repeated clashes with FAMa and Africa Corps. Although direct clashes were relatively infrequent, violence continued through June 2026. The organization requirement was satisfied by the group’s consolidated command structure, logistical networks, and territorial control. The conflict may qualify as an AP II-type NIAC.

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Mali vs FLA

Non-international armed conflict between Mali (supported by Russia through Africa Corps) and the FLA (formerly known as the CSP-DPA and before that, the CSP-PSD) coalition

The NIAC between Mali, supported by Russia through Africa Corps, and the FLA continued after the group’s evolution from the CSP-PSD to the CSP-DPA and then to the FLA in November 2024. The conflict arose from renewed hostilities between northern armed groups and the Malian State, with the FLA pursuing political status and independence for Azawad. The intensity threshold was met through repeated and escalating clashes from September 2023 to April 2026, including attacks on military bases, use of drones and mortars, and the inflicting of casualties among Malian and Africa Corps forces. The April 2026 coordinated operations with JNIM further intensified the conflict. The organization requirement was satisfied by the FLA’s inherited command structure, identifiable leadership, and ability to conduct sophisticated military operations.

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

  • Mali
  • Russia

Non-State Parties

  • Jama’at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)
  • Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)
  • Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) (formerly known as Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad – CSP-DPA)

 

Other Main Actors:

Other Non-State Actors Involved:

  • Dan Na Ambassagou self-defence groups

Foreign Involvement

  • Ukraine (potentially)
  • Alliance of Sahel States members Burkina Faso and Niger (potentially)

ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

Hostilities in Mali involved serious IHL violations affecting civilians. Islamic State in the Sahel (ISSP) reportedly attacked an internally displaced person (IDP) camp near Ménaka in retaliation. A civilian convoy escorted by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and the Wagner Group was also ambushed. Drone strikes by FAMa were linked to attacks on civilian objects including busy markets. Improvised explosive device (IED) incidents attributed to Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM) killed and wounded civilians. JNIM also ordered village evacuations and killed local leaders, prompting forced displacement.

Attacks against Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

IDPs are civilians and, as such, remain protected against direct attack under IHL. An ISSP attack on an IDP camp on the outskirts of Ménaka was reported in July 2024. The camp reportedly hosted around 200 ethnic Dawsahak, and the assault was described as targeted retaliation against this community, which the ISSP accused of collaborating with JNIM, resulting in the killing of several men. Such violence directed at an IDP site breaches the customary and treaty prohibition on attacks against civilians and may constitutes war crimes.

Attacks against Civilian Convoy

A civilian convoy in Mali was ambushed on 7 February 2025, raising serious concerns under the customary and treaty IHL rules protecting civilians and requiring that attacks comply with distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions in attack. The convoy comprised 19 vehicles transporting more than 100 civilians and was escorted by the FAMa and the Wagner Group, yet such escort does not, as such, render it a military objective. The attack was not claimed, but occurred in an area where the ISSP is active, and was presented as potentially retaliatory following earlier operations on the same road. Opening fire on the convoy as a whole may indicate an indiscriminate attack. Casualty figures differed, with the FAMa reporting 25 civilians killed and 13 injured, while other reporting claimed 78 civilian casualties.

ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE

In Mali, JNIM was reported to have repeatedly attacked civilian objects, notably villages and homes. In Bamako, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on the Faladié national gendarmerie training school. JNIM has also reportedly looted livestock and undermined agricultural livelihoods, in breach of the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of civilian population and the prohibitions of pillage and wanton destruction. An attack on Base Aérienne 101 damaged aircraft, including a humanitarian plane, raising concerns under distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack.

Attacks on Homes and Villages

In Mali, reports indicate that JNIM has repeatedly attacked civilian objects, notably villages and homes, contrary to the customary IHL rule that attacks may only be directed against military objectives. Between June and November 2024, JNIM was described as carrying out widespread destruction of housing in central Mali, burning large numbers of homes in communities perceived as supporting the Dan Na Ambassagou militia. In Tilé, hundreds of houses were reportedly destroyed, with witnesses describing fighters arriving on motorbikes, setting dwellings ablaze and firing at civilians. Similar tactics were reported in Souleye in the Ségou region, where the protracted violence has left the village without basic services, including a functioning school and effective access to healthcare.

VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY

In Mali, serious violations were reported against persons in the hands of the enemy, including widespread civilian killings attributed to FAMa supported by the Wagner Group, often with ethnic targeting, executions, concealment of bodies, mass graves, and destruction of property, as well as mass arrests followed by torture and alleged executions outside military facilities. JNIM and the ISSP were also accused of summary executions, including targeted killings of local leaders. Abductions and detention practices raised concerns of arbitrary detention, hostage-taking to coerce third parties, and enforced disappearances. Severe sexual violence affected mainly women and girls, and children faced grave violations, including recruitment and use in hostilities, largely attributed to non-State armed groups.

Murder of Civilians

In Mali, FAMa, supported by the Wagner Group, were accused of widespread and at times deliberate killings of civilians during counterterrorism operations and reprisals, often reportedly targeting individuals on ethnic grounds, particularly Fulani suspected of links with Islamist groups. Dozens of civilian deaths were attributed to FAMa and Russian operatives between May and December 2024, with allegations continuing in 2025 and including executions, concealment of bodies, mass graves and destruction of civilian property during raids. Reports further describe mass arrests followed by torture and alleged executions outside military facilities. Non-State armed groups were also accused of summary executions, with JNIM and the ISSP reportedly killing numerous civilians across several regions, including targeted killings of local leaders.